Suchergebnisse

Introduction: the quiet revolution -- Big dreams, small schools: how entrepreneurial rebels built a movement in New York City -- Testing power: when is disruption just ... disruptive? -- State of reform: the not-so-quiet revolution in Massachusetts -- No lone stars: how trust and collaboration in one Texas school district have created lasting reform -- The hurricane and the charters: new schools unearth old ways in New Orleans -- Conclusion: a civic action: how schools -- and society -- benefit from real democracy -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- Selected bibliography -- Index -- About the author.

Nederland is in de ban van cultuur. Meer dan ooit worden culturele verschillen tussen bevolkingsgroepen benadrukt. Maar een diepgravende antropologische analyse van wat er in Nederland gaande is, ontbreekt tot dusver. Dit boek vult dat gat.Ritueel burgerschap is deels een etnografie van gemeentelijke inburgeringsrituelen. Hoe ziet dat geritualiseerde Nederland er eigenlijk uit? Bestaat er een Nederland voorbij kaas, aardappels en Johan Cruijff? En geloven de organiserende ambtenaren zelf in de folklore die ze oproepen? Maar dit boek stelt ook diepgravender vragen over seculiere waarden die in

Liberal regimes in the West are not homogeneous in their application of secular principles. What kind of “secular” state a particular government promotes depends in large part on the strength and influence of the majority religion in that region. This article acknowledges the heuristic value of a recent threefold taxonomy of secularism: passive, assertive, and benevolent forms of secularism. I take issue with and challenge certain institutional privileges granted to the majority religion in one benevolently secular regime, the Republic of Ireland. I consider how benevolent secularism, while remaining benevolent toward religion, can align its application of secularism in the arena of publicly-funded education (primary and secondary education). A politically liberal regime, defined by the idea of public reason, invokes the principle of publicity, namely, that discourse and public policy be intelligible (and acceptable to a large degree) not only to an individual’s religious or moral community but also to the broader collection of members who constitute a liberal state. Drawing on John Rawls’ conception of public reason, and using Ireland as a case study, I show how this particular state-religion interrelation can be recalibrated in order to increase the prospects of reconciliation with a secular space of public reason.

This article is intended to think together of secularism as a social principle (legal and political), as a historical principle (enshrined in history, but above all by making history or contributing to 'beating time'), as a mental principle (which can be used by the individual in the face of clerical institutions) and finally as a principle of freedom (understood as negatious). Trying to assume a dialectic psycho-political structure, the article tries to address the problem of the apparent ambivalence of secularism, oscillating between tolerance and anti-religion. It therefore considers secularism as a principle of breaking religious relationships of domination; the democratic nature of secularism; its functioning as an internal obligation of freedom, i.e. as a requirement of power over oneself; finally, the conditions for the metaphysical possibility of secularism: what must be the human subject for secularism to be possible? ; Cet article vise à penser ensemble la laïcité comme principe social (juridique et politique), comme principe historique (inscrit dans l'histoire certes mais surtout faisant histoire ou contribuant à « faire époque »), comme principe psychique (ferment de souveraineté utilisable par l'individu face aux institutions cléricales), enfin comme principe de liberté (comprise comme négativité). Essayant l'hypothèse d'une structure psycho-politique dialectique, l'article tente de régler le problème de l'apparente ambivalence de la laïcité, oscillant entre tolérance et anti-religion. Il examine donc la laïcité en tant que principe de rupture des rapports religieux de domination ; la nature démocratique de la laïcité ; son fonctionnement comme obligation intérieure de liberté, c'est-à-dire comme exigence d'un pouvoir sur soi-même ; enfin, les conditions de possibilité métaphysiques de la laïcité : que doit être le sujet humain pour que la laïcité soit possible ?

In this paper I analyze Cécile Laborde's conception of justificatory secularism. Laborde points out that in her formulation and defense of the conception of justificatory secularism, she follows Rawls' conception of political liberalism to a certain extent. For that reason, I first provide a sketch of Rawls' conception of political liberalism. Then I focus on justificatory secularism, trying to show to what extent it displays similarities with the conception of political liberalism, but also how it differs. I am interested in whether justificatory secularism represents a better alternative to the conception of political liberalism or whether these two conceptions should be considered complementary. ; U ovom radu analiziraćemo stanovište sekularizma opravdanja koje je nedavno formulisala Sesil Labord. Labord jasno ističe da prilikom formulisanja i odbrane koncepcije sekularizma opravdanja u određenoj meri sledi Rolsovo shvatanje političkog liberalizma. Zbog toga ćemo u ovom radu najpre ponuditi skicu Rolsove koncepcije političkog liberalizma. Potom ćemo analizirati stanovište sekularizma opravdanja i nastojaćemo pritom da ukažemo u kojoj meri ono ima sličnosti sa koncepcijom političkog liberalizma, ali i u kojoj meri se od nje razlikuje. Tako da će nas prvenstveno interesovati da li koncepcija sekularizma opravdanja predstavlja bolju alternativu u odnosu na koncepciju političkog liberalizma ili na te dve koncepcije treba gledati kao na komplementarne

A secular state is supposed to remain indifferent to individual beliefs and to ensure that every individual enjoys the religious freedom in personal life. But practically, the nature and character of secularism changes in different contexts. India being a predominantly Hindu and fundamentally religious society has its own flavor of secularism. The Constitution of India on one hand assures personal freedoms and declares the state as secular but on the other hand carries contradictory indications of anti-religious objectives and prominence of Hinduism. This confusion creates the room for using the cloak of secularism to promote Hindutva. As populism and exclusive nationalism seem to dominate the political front domestically in India and several other countries around the world, it seems improbable, if not impossible, for secularism to take over religion as the primary paradigm of life in India. And with the history of communal violence in India, this scenario is threatening not only for minorities as well as the vulnerable and moderate elements among Hindus but also has far-reaching effects for the region and the world at large. With this context in view, this paper has surveyed the treatment of Muslims in India who are the largest minority in the country and the third largest population of Muslims in a country.
The article was initially prepared for a presentation in a seminar held at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) on July 12, 2017 on the same topic. The author thankfully acknowledges the assistance provided by Nadeem Farhat and Asifa Tanvir in writing the paper.