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On March 17 Niger's National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) suspended its military agreement with the United States after a visit by senior U.S. officials to the capital, Niamey. A CNSP spokesman said the decision was made after the U.S. delegation warned the military regime against partnering with Russia and Iran. Niger, which hosts around 1,000 U.S. troops and a drone base, has been an important partner in Washington's counterterrorism operations in the region. But relations have deteriorated considerably since July 2023, when Niger's presidential guard removed democratically elected Mohamed Bozoum and installed General Abdourahamane Tchiani.Russian influence looms large in Western discourse on the Sahel, and now informs U.S. policy and decision-making in places like Niger. This is a mistake. Outsized focus on Russia misunderstands the scale and scope of Moscow's presence. More importantly, it ignores longstanding patterns of governance and denies the role of Africans in emerging pro-sovereignty movements and political blocs. Neither the U.S. nor Russia are in a position to force Africans to choose sides, efforts to do so will only result in rebuke.African governments seek to balance outside powers while retaining the ability to work with each. Historically, local elites leverage these often unequal relations with powerful states to enhance their own domestic position. In francophone Africa, the cozy relationship between French officials, companies, and African autocrats came to be known as Françafrique. Niger had become somewhat of an exception among its peers, however, when it pursued close military ties with the United States.Recent years have seen a wave of anti-French sentiment hit the Sahel. Military regimes seeking political legitimacy have helped foment anti-French sentiment, but they do not control it. The backing of Paris is politically poisonous; kicking the French military out of Niger was necessary to the CNSP's survival.Neither the U.S. nor Russia have a policy to address the humanitarian, economic, and security implications of France's departure from the Sahel, which explains, in part, the focus on ideological narratives.Without a clear strategy, Russia responds opportunistically to events on the ground. And while Moscow has enjoyed more success than America in exporting security to Africa recently, it lacks comparable experience and capabilities in the humanitarian field. "We understand everything through Africa Corps," a Russian security expert in the region says. "We can strengthen it, expand it, redirect it. There are now some aspects of soft power, your matryoshkas and balalaikas. But now we need to do serious things, and that requires a lot of time, money, and people."Even though Washington historically ceded policy priorities in francophone Africa to France, anti-French sentiment did not carry over to anti-American sentiment in Niger. Close military relations, and leadership in the humanitarian field still carried weight.It appears that the U.S. delegation's visit to Niamey in March — led by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee and AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley — did significant damage. Sahel expert Alex Thurston noted the reportedly uniliteral announcement of the U.S. delegation's visit, and the relatively low rank of visiting officials, may have played a part.The subject of the talks — Niger's turn towards Russia and Iran — appears to have been equally insulting. Ironically, the U.S. delegation's attempt to counter Russian influence in Niger has further pushed the CNSP to seek ties with Russia.U.S. focus on Russia misses the reality that Africans, not Russians or Americans, are driving major political shifts in the Sahel. The formation of the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES), for example, was a project initiated by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger first and foremost to counteract the military threat from a regional bloc, ECOWAS. That Russia welcomed the development does not mean Moscow inspired it.Indeed, the overthrow of Bozoum was as unexpected in Moscow as it was in Washington. "The coup was a surprise with no obvious advantage," a Russian diplomat in the region admitted. Western media were still quick to divine a Russian hand. Implicit was the belief that Russian influence thrives in instability and can "spill" across borders.Such tropes, however, fail to account for a basic building block of politics: personal relationships. Russia's arrival in Mali was not a product of information warfare — it was the result of collaboration between Russian advisers in Mali and Malian military officers who trained in Russia, the history of which goes back to the Soviet era. Malians, not Russians, cleared the way politically, working to secure the buy-in of trade unions and other powerbrokers in Bamako.There is no equivalent history in neighboring Niger. The U.S. has the monopoly on relations with Niger's officer corps. Moscow doesn't have an embassy in Niamey. Lacking strong, proven connections, Russian diplomats and security officials feel they don't have a good read on the junta. Moreover, Russian officials have little gauge over the mood within the broader Nigerien military. "Pressure to break with the U.S.," a high-ranking Nigerien military officer adds, "comes from within, not Russia."Sensing wariness on both sides, the CNSP has tried to attract, rather unsuccessfully thus far, the Kremlin's attention. When a CNSP delegation visited Moscow in January, they couldn't land a meeting with Vladimir Putin or even Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov. Still, Niamey was among the first countries to congratulate Putin on his election victory.The saga of Niger reflects a strange, transitory phase between Washington's "War on Terror" and "Great Power Competition," the strategic rivalry between the U.S., China, and Russia, in which geopolitical foes find themselves on the same side against al-Qaida and ISIS-affiliated armed groups.The Kremlin views and frames its intervention in the Sahel in counterterrorism terms — a fact likely to continue following the recent terror attacks in Moscow. This resonates far better with Sahelian leaders than geopolitical rivalry. "If the United States does not participate in the fight against terrorists, then why are they here?" the Nigerien officer asked. "To track and contain the Russians? This is not their business. We respect America, we need their help. But this does not mean that we are ready listen to reproaches and accusations from incompetent people."Some time has passed now since the U.S. delegation's visit and the denunciation of Niger's military agreement with the U.S., and it appears that the initial tension from the Nigerien authorities' categorical statement has subsided. There is still a chance that the denunciation was a strong-arm tactic to coerce Washington into dialogue.At the same time, the AES continues to gather steam, with Chad now expressing interest in joining. Niger is an integral part of this new alliance and is closer to the U.S. and further from Russia compared to Mali and Burkina Faso.If the U.S. loses a foot in the alliance, which is very possible, it will be the result of efforts to force Africans to choose sides. In the long run, if the U.S. and Russia wish to continue fighting Islamist militancy in the Sahel, they will need to find a way to, if not cooperate, at least deconflict and accommodate for each other's presence. If not, they'll both find themselves on the outside looking in.
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In the Art of War, Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu said, "if you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle." This nugget of wisdom is as perceptive today as it was over 2,000 years ago. And it does not bode well for America.We clearly don't know our adversaries. We've been caught flat-footed, repeatedly, in recent years, from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the almost instantaneous collapse of the Afghanistan government that we'd spent two decades supporting, to the recent Hamas attacks destabilizing the Middle East.The biggest question mark of all is if and when China might transition from nibbling on the margins of Asia to taking a big bite in the form of Taiwan. Perhaps even more worrisome, and far less excusable, is the fact that we don't know ourselves. In a world growing less stable by the day, the disconnect between our policymakers in Washington and the American public is frightening. While prominent national security experts of both parties seem to be coalescing around maximalist approaches toward the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, and lobbying for a more confrontational stance toward China, the American public appears largely tuned out, instead focused on challenges closer to home, like paying bills, raising children, and navigating polarizing domestic politics. The disconnect between rhetoric and reality is breathtaking. On one hand Washington issues commitments to helping reclaim all Ukrainian territory, the "total destruction" of Hamas, and a robust defense of Taiwan. On the other hand the American public is either disengaged from (or divided on) these issues, our weapons stockpiles are shrinking, military recruitment numbers plunging, the deficit is ballooning, and the economy is uncertain.Meanwhile, the country continues to fracture along red and blue lines. Could we still unite in a time of war? It depends. If Russian paratroopers descended on Colorado like the 1984 cult classic Red Dawn, yes, I'm confident we'd come together and repel the existential threat of a foreign invasion. But am I convinced, in this toxic political climate, that farm boys from Kansas, warehouse workers from the Rust Belt, and college students from the Pac-12 would race to recruiting offices to help Taiwan repel a Chinese invasion? Or to deploy to the Middle East to dive into what looks like an intractable conflict with complicated roots dating back at least 75-years? Not really.It is also worth asking if America has the stomach for casualty numbers that would almost certainly dwarf the 7,057 U.S. servicemembers killed in action post-9/11 in a Great Power war. Russia continues to fight in Ukraine despite estimates of over 100,000 killed in just the past few years. We can't assume China wouldn't have a similar tolerance for heavy losses too.Despite these concerns, national security officials and foreign policy luminaries persist in advancing strategic postures that may require U.S. troops to deploy in greater numbers to three theaters (even if these deployments are under the guise of "deterrence") . (While the principle of deterrence is sound in theory, the danger lies in assuming that appearing to be a superior force on paper will obviate the need to ever actually fight, overlooking the fact that credibility requires a willingness and capacity to do just that. Which brings us back to Sun Tzu. Can we answer the willingness and capacity question about ourselves with any degree of confidence? Have we ever taken it seriously?)Right now it seems like our strategy — to the extent we have one — is being developed in a vacuum, with little concern for minor details like who will fight, and with what degree of national commitment. This reflects, in part, a persistent tendency, to which we keep returning since the days of Robert McNamara's "Whiz Kids" of the Vietnam era, to view conflict as a technocratic exercise where victory and defeat are largely dependent on the amount, and quality, of sophisticated high-dollar weaponry. But as our experiences in Vietnam and Afghanistan should have taught us, collective will and resolve also matter. A lot. We must not overestimate (or fail to even consider) ours. Wars are still fought by people. And, to date, there has been no effort to secure the buy-in of the American public.We need to really ask: How many young Americans would volunteer to strap on a ruck, grab an M4, and go fight one of these distant wars if an adversary calls what they may see as a bluff? We must first accept that these would not be conflicts that could be handled by cobbling together the same people from a volunteer force and deploying them countless times over decades like we did during the "Global War on Terror." In fact, it is almost impossible to envision a scenario where our deterrent is credible, or where we could prevail in a world war, absent a draft.While a draft invokes images of Vietnam it may be time to revisit its upsides in the context of today's disconnect between citizen and military and citizen and government.At the most basic level, a draft would solve the personnel shortages we are struggling with. I'm aware that military leaders fear that a draft would hurt the professionalism of today's force. However, the lowering of recruiting requirements, as well offering big signing bonuses to impressionable high school students, is already diminishing standards. It would also serve as a powerful unifying force, bringing together young people of different races, belief systems, and geographic backgrounds in shared national service. This would help unify a generation that has experienced little but corrosive fragmentation for years. And since Americans would have skin in the game, a draft would also force politicians to abandon vapid, cliché-ridden rhetoric, and be forced to either convince Americans we need to be on wartime footing, or tone down their bellicose talk and develop creative and less militaristic strategies, starting with our approach to Ukraine, China, and now the Middle East.Finally, it would signal to the world that we are serious about a strong national defense. The perception would no longer be that we are a country in decline, anesthetized by popular culture and unwilling to sacrifice. Unfortunately, there seems to be no appetite for such a call to service on the part of the same leaders and pundits lobbying for a muscular, militarized foreign policy. It is remarkable to witness swaggering commitments to the potential use of force against Great Power adversaries on Capitol Hill but absolutely no willingness to discuss the national sacrifice that it would require. And so, if we conclude a draft won't happen, we'd be better off addressing the massive disconnect between Washington rhetoric and the extent of Americans' willingness to fight now, as opposed to after our leaders talk us into another, and possibly far more calamitous, war.
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Gaza in the distance I have spent most of my career engaged in the five d's of dodgeball when it comes to the Mideast and especially the Israel-Palestine conflict. Despite starting my career with the international relations of ethnic conflict, I managed a total of one piece of research on the Mideast, and that was more by accident than by design. I got asked to join an edited volume project by a terrific Mideast scholar, Shibley Telhami, after one of my very best job talks (which did not produce a job). Bomb shelter next to a kindergarten if I remember correctlyWhen I turned to doing civil-military relations, I was asked if I was including Israel in my multi-democracy study, and I said nope. I have a better explanation for that--that as a very militarized society, its' civil-military relations are far less comparable. Bus stop, shelter in a town that was probably overrun last weekendBut on the ethnic conflict side? Maybe I refrained because the one time I raised it as an illustration in a job talk, it did not go well. That lesson was certainly reinforced by the experience of teaching US Foreign Policy the semester the US invaded Iraq. That class quickly divided into pro and anti factions based on how the students identified with one side or the other of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Perhaps it is because of a conflict between my background/identity and my scholarly work. I often joked that the three things I learned in Hebrew school were: enough Hebrew (barely) to get through my Bar Mitzvah, much about the Holocaust and the history of oppression of the Jews, and that Israel was empty before the Jews got there and everything Israel does is right. The last is the most relevant although the second obviously hits hard when more Jews died in one day due to violence this weekend than any other time since the Holocaust apparently. I definitely was miseducated about the history of Israel. I was also conflicted about my upbringing since I hated Hebrew school (I never fit in or came close), never believed in the religion, and came to realize my identity as Jew is defined by the reality that Nazis would have included me in their roundups no matter what I believe. That is, identity is not defined by oneself but by the interaction of oneself with others, and as long as folks saw me as Jewish, it was less relevant what I believed.Open air prison ....So, that ambivalence then hits the stuff I have picked up from the work on ethnic conflict. I can see via those lenses that ancient hatred is not really what is going here, but political dynamics in Israel and in the Palestinian community. There is outbidding and pandering to extremists in both, which then feed the outbidding and pandering in the other. Netanyahu feeds Hamas, and Hamas feeds Netanyahu. When I visited in 2019, my first visit, as part of a group tour of IR scholars, I got to see how much has been locked in, that bad decisions beget bad decisions. That Israeli generals told me that the only response to violence is to hit harder than they hit you, as if this were Chicago with the Untouchables fighting Capone. I could see their point of view, but again, it was a path to more violence. I left Israel, like many of those on the trip, sad and frustrated--that the future of Israel and of the Palestinians was bleak--that there was no way out and no one in or near power was interested in finding one. And this happens.So, I see people saying that an unprovoked Israel deserves all of our support. And I have to recoil a bit, as Israel has done a shit ton of provoking via its empowering of rabid settlers who have encroached on the Mosque and engaged in lots of violence against Palestinians in the West Bank. But I also recoil when I hear folks talk about Hamas being part of anti-colonial struggle, as, yes, the Palestinians do have legitimate grievances, but Hamas is an awful, theocratic, maybe nihilist entity that did truly barbaric things. Yet, I also know that Israel is going to kill a lot of Palestinian kids in Gaza since, yes, the population of Gaza is about 50% under 18. War crimes do not justify war crimes. And more violence is not going cause this conflict to go away. Pretty sure those towers are now destroyedBoth sides need far better governance, actors who don't benefit from the other side being radicalized. But the institutions and dynamics of each are perverse and reinforcing. I hope that Netanyahu pays a high price for letting this happen on his watch, but I seriously doubt that Israeli politics is going to move to the center as a result. The flavors of the more successful parties in Israel are all variants of far right. The left/center was broken by the second Intifada, and I doubt that these events will resurrect them. I know less and understand less the Palestinian side, but I am pretty sure that air strikes are not going to lead to moderates taking power. So, I have rambled without reaching a clear idea of who should do what. Which is probably fitting. And also explains why I have been reluctant to discuss this stuff--not just a bad job talk in 1993, but because the reality is so difficult, twisted, and painful.Update:I got into a conversation with my sister during the weekly family zoom, and she pressed me on when have ethnic conflicts ended peacefully rather than through conquest. I gave the easy answer: South Africa. But that conversation reminded me of the basic rules of ethnic conflict:Most ethnic groups, no matter their history, are at peace: violence is rare.When there is violence, it ends. No place is constantly at war forever.The past constrains choices but does not determine the present. It is up to today's politicians to decide what to do, and the incentives the structures/systems provide influence but do not determine. Agency remains.Which means it didn't have to be this way, it didn't have to happen this weekend, while there are dynamics locking the parties in, those dynamics can be resisted, and, yes, outsiders could play some role in either exacerbating or ameliorating the nasty dynamics.
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Ten years after Chinese President Xi Jinping announced China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Kazakhstan and Indonesia, a new connectivity initiative was unveiled with great fanfare by the United States, India, and the Arab Gulf and European countries during the G20 meeting in New Delhi earlier this month.Since the announcement was made without the presence of the Russian and Chinese presidents, it has stirred conflicting interpretations. Some see it as a potential alternative to BRI, while others, pointing to the failure of similar projects backed by Western powers in the past, view it as a paper tiger.Details are still missing, but the project's ambition is enormous. It follows a transregional approach as noted by the White House statement: "Through the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), we aim to usher in a new era of connectivity with a railway, linked through ports connecting Europe, the Middle East, and Asia."The idea of this corridor dates back to 2021 and has also been discussed as part of the I2U2 group that includes India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the United States. Like the BRI, its design vision follows the corridor's logic. This is no surprise. "Corridorization" is the most significant spatial manifestation of infrastructural capitalism and geo-economics since the beginning of this century.Corridorization, which is part of the thriving "minilateralism" space, could be viewed as contradictory because middle powers are trying to navigate between two hardening geopolitical blocs. But the ongoing process of reshaping the global supply chain connectivities created by decades of globalization could make it a viable proposition.The BRI and the IMEC seem to share many similar goals. But there are also critical geographical differences. Most importantly, the new initiative features India, which has never been part of the BRI, as a central cross-regional player amid rearranged geo-imaginations.Each of the parties to the new initiative comes with its own perspective and interest.For the United States, the I2U2 and IMEC serve as platforms for infrastructure investment, bringing together Middle Eastern and South Asian partners and providing an alternative to Chinese projects. Washington sees this approach as an opportunity to encourage its regional partners to take a more active and independent role in shaping the region's future, allowing the United States to reduce its own resource investment while maintaining its presence and influence.For the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the goal is to strengthen their increasingly diversified and multi-networked economic diplomacy covering a wider geography. Both countries are active members of the BRI, and their cooperation with China is growing. Apart from burgeoning trade, they are dialogue partners of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and will soon become full members of the expanded BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Both countries are trying to expand their strategic autonomy and vying to become influential regional and international players. Getting involved in multiple new minilateral groupings is a key ingredient of their approach to strengthening their middle power status.As Saudi Arabia opens to the world with a tilt towards China, the UAE has found its new unique selling point in connectivity and multi-alignment. While diverging approaches toward geostrategic and regional issues, particularly China's rising power and global influence, remain a concern, Gulf Arab countries' participation in U.S.-led initiatives reflects their new penchant for equidistance amid U.S.-China competition.Indeed, the United States might see the IMEC as a vehicle to counter China's growing influence in the region. In the Middle East, however, competition and convergence are mixed and less black and white than the increasing U.S.-China bipolarity would suggest. If the United States expects this to be a "counter BRI" move for the region, it will likely be disappointed. Competition in the Indian Ocean could escalate, but potential synergies and convergencies should allow for some degree of mutual accommodation.India, which the United States treats as an "indispensable partner," has been showcasing a good template of multi-alignment for others to follow. It is a member of the Quad and I2U2, both comprising the United States, and it's also a member of BRICS and SCO, with China in both, despite New Delhi's feud with Beijing over border issues. The IMEC adds another thread to its longstanding multi-alignment policy, as it highlights the other connectivity corridor that India is promoting — the International North South Transport Corridor — with Iran and Russia. Together, these projects add value to India's development story and its boast that it is the fastest growing economy in the world.The new economic corridor also envisions the potential addition of Israel. This should be seen as a step in the renewed U.S. efforts to expand the Abraham Accords by facilitating the normalization of Israeli-Saudi relations. This form of regional engagement also allows Israel to manage tensions with the United States, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia in the wake of the politics of a far-right coalition led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.For Israel and the United States, expanding the Abraham Accords, especially to include Saudi Arabia, remains a top priority despite Riyadh's insistence on linking the normalization of relations to progress on the two-state solution. There are tentative indications that Netanyahu might agree to some concessions on the Palestinian front, even at the cost of his right-wing coalition falling apart, in order to capitalize and sustain Israel's broader regional integration.For China, which will soon host the first in-person BRI summit in Beijing after major COVID-19 shutdowns, IMEC throws up a challenge and an opportunity. It could dismissively treat the IMEC like the United States has done with the BRI. The other option, as indicated soon after the G20 meeting, is to demonstrate its openness to support multidirectional connectivity, even if it is not part of this corridor, as long as such projects are "open, inclusive, and form synergy," and do not become "geopolitical tools."The last piece in this new connectivity saga would be Europe, especially the Eastern Mediterranean countries. The IMEC is a welcome development because the "Global Gateway," the European Union's own connectivity project, has not gained adequate momentum because European diplomats in Brussels are hesitant about multi-alignment strategies and transregional corridors.While the IMEC is an economic-diplomatic-security interplay, its prospects will depend on its ability to promote connectivity and translate its economic potential into commercial success. Critics have already pointed out that the initiative may be unviable in terms of profit. However, it could also be argued that there are virtues other than economic efficiency. In a world of de-risking and politically induced supply chain shifts, the new corridor could be viewed as a tool for promoting strategic resilience, friendshoring, and tech cooperation, especially for middle powers.
Aquest article analitza la relació entre els artistes i les estrcuturas de poder portuguesos i les masses populars després de la Revolució de el 25 d'abril de 1974 i fins a 1977. L'anàlisi d'aquest període a Portugal considerarà les dinàmiques que envolten les pràctiques artístiques socialment compromeses integrades en l'espai públic, dins del seu marc històric i social. L'article sosté que el context artístic portuguès en estudi va sorgir de la motivació dels polítics i artistes per apropar l'art i les masses populars a l'procés revolucionari en curs. En aquesta aproximació, identifico la col·laboració com l'actitud més utilitzada pels artistes en relació amb el sistema polític i la població. Aquest enfocament va disminuir des de 1976, moment en què es va incrementar el conflicte amb les estructures de poder polític. Pel que fa a la relació amb la població, a partir d'aquest moment també hi va haver una disminució en l'ús d'eines col·laboratives i una intensificació d'eines transgressores i provocatives en les pràctiques artístiques. Aquests canvis seran articulats en l'article a partir de les condicions polítiques i socials objectives de país, i la seva influència en els matisos actitudinals identificats en les pràctiques artístiques socialment compromeses en anàlisi. ; This article analyzes the relationship between Portuguese artists and bodies of power and the popular masses after the Revolution of 25 April 1974 and until 1977. The analysis of this period in Portugal will consider the dynamics surrounding socially engaged artistic practices integrated in the public space, within its historic and social framework. The article argues that the Portuguese artistic context under consideration arose from the politicians and artists motivation to bring art and the popular masses closer to the ongoing revolutionary process. In this approach, I identify collaboration as the most frequent attitude used by artists in relation to the political system and population. This approach decreased since 1976, at which time there was an increase in conflict with the political power structures. Regarding the relationship with the population, from that moment on there was also a decrease in the use of collaborative tools and an intensification of transgressive and provocative tools in artisticpractices. These changes will be articulated in the article based on the country's objective political and social conditions, and their influence on attitudinal nuances identified in the socially engaged artistic practices under analysis. ; Este artículo analiza la relación entre los artistas y las estructuras de poder portugueses y las masas populares después de la Revolución del 25 de abril de 1974 y hasta 1977. El análisis de este período en Portugal considerará las dinámicas que rodean las prácticas artísticas socialmente comprometidas integradas en el espacio público, dentro de su marco histórico y social. El artículo sostiene que el contexto artístico portugués en estudio surgió de la motivación de los políticos y artistas para acercar el arte y las masas populares al proceso revolucionario en curso. En esta aproximación, identifico la colaboración como la actitud más utilizada por los artistas en relación con el sistema político y la población. Este enfoque disminuyó desde 1976, momento en el que se incrementó el conflicto con las estructuras de poder político. En cuanto a la relación con la población, a partir de ese momento también hubo una disminución en el uso de herramientas colaborativas y una intensificación de herramientas transgresoras yprovocativas en las prácticas artísticas. Estos cambios serán articulados en el artículo a partir de las condiciones políticas y sociales objetivas del país, y su influencia en los matices actitudinales identificados en las prácticas artísticas socialmente comprometidas en análisis. ; Cet article analyse les relations entre les artistes et les structures de pouvoir portugaises et les masses populaires après la Révolution du 25 avril 1974 et jusqu'en 1977. L'analyse de cette période au Portugal considérera les dynamiques qui entourent les pratiques artistiques socialement engagées intégrées dans l'espace public, dans leur cadre historique et social. L'article soutient que le contexte artistique portugais à l'étude est né de la motivation des politiciens et des artistes à rapprocher l'art et les masses populaires du processus révolutionnaire en cours. Dans cette approche, j'identifie la collaboration comme l'attitude la plus utilisée par les artistes par rapport au système politique et à la population. Cette approche a diminué depuis 1976, lorsque le conflit avec les structures du pouvoir politique s'est accru. Concernant le rapport à la population, à partir de ce moment, il y a également eu une diminution de l'utilisation des outils collaboratifs et une intensification des outils transgressifs et provocateurs dans les pratiques artistiques. Ces changements seront articulés dans l'article en fonction des conditions politiques et sociales objectives du pays, et de leur influence sur les nuances comportementales identifiées dans les pratiques artistiques socialement engagées en analyse. ; Questo articolo analizza il rapporto tra artisti e strutture di potere portoghesi e le masse popolari dopo la Rivoluzione del 25 aprile 1974 e fino al 1977. L'analisi di questo periodo in Portogallo prenderà in considerazione le dinamiche che circondano le pratiche artistiche socialmente impegnate integrate nello spazio pubblico, all'interno del loro quadro storico e sociale. L'articolo sostiene che il contesto artistico portoghese oggetto di studio è nato dalla motivazione di politici e artisti di avvicinare l'arte e le masse popolari al processo rivoluzionario in corso. In questo approccio, identifico la collaborazione come l'atteggiamento più utilizzato dagli artisti nei confronti del sistema politico e della popolazione. Questo approccio è diminuito dal 1976, quando è aumentato il conflitto con le strutture del potere politico. Per quanto riguarda il rapporto con la popolazione, da quel momento si registra anche una diminuzione dell'uso di strumenti collaborativi e un'intensificazione di strumenti trasgressivi e provocatori nelle pratiche artistiche. Questi cambiamenti saranno articolati nell'articolo in base alle condizioni politiche e sociali oggettive del paese e alla loro influenza sulle sfumature attitudinali individuate nelle pratiche artistiche socialmente impegnate in analisi. ; Este artigo aprofunda as relações estabelecidas entre os artistas, os organismos de poder e as camadas populares portuguesas após a Revolução do 25 de Abril de 1974 e até 1977. A análise deste período português considera a dinâmica criada pelas práticas artísticas socialmente comprometidas integradas no espaço público, a partir do seu enquadramento histórico e social. O artigo influi que o contexto artístico português em análise surgiu da motivação de determinados circuitos políticos e artísticos em aproximar a arte e as camadas populares do processo revolucionário em curso. Seguindo esta óptica, a colaboração é identificada como a atitude mais frequente utilizada pelos artistas em relação ao sistema político e à população. Essa postura colaborativa diminuiu a partir de 1976, altura em que o conflito com as estruturas de poder político começou a aumentar. No que se refere ao relacionamento com a população, foi também a partir desse momento que houve uma diminuição do uso de ferramentas colaborativas e uma intensificação de ferramentas transgressivas e provocativas nas práticas artísticas. A alteração destas dinâmicas será articulada, no artigo, a partir das condições políticas e sociais objectivas vividas no país e sua influência nas nuances atitudinais identificadas nas práticas artísticas socialmente comprometidas em análise.
The current literature presents inconsistencies with regard to the 'Bright' and 'Dark Sides' of emotional labour and related emotion management strategies: it indicates that the negative effect of emotional labour cannot be explained on the basis of emotion management strategies alone and additional factors should be considered. The aim of this research was to investigate the 'Dark Side' of emotional labour in greater depth by: a) analysing constructs (emotion management strategies, cultural orientation and personality influences) which might be responsible for the discrepancies in emotional labour which result in positive and negative effects; b) verifying Machiavellian responses and investigating the social desirability effect in self-report measures; and c) examining sources of Machiavellian amoral values and behaviour. Emotional labour was examined from the perspective of intra-organisational relationships. The focus was upon Machiavellianism as the main construct of this research, it being in the forefront of each of the three studies conducted. Study one investigated the relationship between the elements of an ego-centric triad (Individualistic Cultural Orientation, Surface Acting and Machiavellianism) and the impact of that triad upon employees' states at work (well-being, career success, job satisfaction and turnover intentions). This study asked the following research questions: 'RQ1 - Is there a positive relationship between the elements (Individualistic Culture, Surface Acting and Machiavellianism) of an ego-centric triad?' and 'RQ2 - How does the triad impact upon employees' well-being, career success, job satisfaction and turnover intentions?' It was hypothesised that: (H1) there would be a positive relationship between the elements of the ego-centric triad; (H2) the ego-centric triad elements will have negative impact on employee well-being, (H3) Machiavellian personality traits will be more prevalent in males than females; (H4) Machiavellianism leads to greater career success; (H5) Machiavellians experience lower job satisfaction; and (H6) Machiavellians will demonstrate higher turnover intentions than their counterparts. The sample consisted of 319 UK-based working professionals who were recruited via the social media site LinkedIn. Participants completed an online questionnaire comprised of amended validated tools measuring levels of Surface Acting, Idiocentrism, Machiavellianism, participants' well-being, career success, job satisfaction and turnover intentions. The analysis focused on Independent Sample T-Test and Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) - model fit testing. SEM revealed a positive correlation between the elements of the ego-centric triad. Nevertheless, the elements did not have a unified effect upon employees' states at work, as only Machiavellianism demonstrated a negative impact upon employees' well-being. Individualistic cultural orientation (Idiocentrism) was linked to decreased job satisfaction and increased turnover intentions, while Surface Acting had the opposite effect of decreasing turnover intentions. The main variable of interest - Machiavellianism - demonstrated a negative impact upon employees' well-being, career success and job satisfaction factors, all of which served as the mediating variables for increased turnover intentions. Furthermore, the independent sample T-Test showed that gender does not serve as an antecedent to Machiavellianism. The research contributes to existing theoretical knowledge by introducing the ego-centric triad and demonstrating that the 'Dark Side' of emotional labour cannot be attributed to emotion management strategies alone but includes additional factors such as cultural orientation (Idiocentrism) and personality traits (Machiavellianism). The research also has practical implications, demonstrating that recruitment and selection strategies should pay attention to these undesirable characteristics; as they have negative implications for individuals and organisations alike. Furthermore, organisations need to invest more efforts in management of employee well-being as emotional labour contributes to impaired well-being in high Machiavellians, who may not necessarily exhibit obvious signs. Study two aimed to establish the validity of Machiavellian responses and to ascertain the level of confidence that can be placed on the findings deriving from Study one. It asked the following question: 'RQ3 - Does the social attractiveness effect take place in anonymous self-reports when ego-centric qualities are of concern?' and hypothesised (H7) that Machiavellianism is positively related to self-rating bias, and therefore high Machiavellians will under-report their true level of amoral values and behavioural practices to a much greater extent than will low Machiavellians. Participant sample consisted of 16 UK-based working professionals who were asked to complete an online MACH IV test and to provide an e-mail sample of their workplace correspondence. One-way Anova was used to compare the scores from the MACH IV test against the scores deriving from Lingustic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) analysis assessing Machiavellian attributes (use of personal pronoun 'I', negative emotions, analytic and clout dimension, power and rewards drives) evident within the workplace correspondence (e-mails). Therefore, the focus was upon reported versus observed levels of Machiavellianism. The results showed that individuals exhibited minor self-report bias at all levels of Machiavellianism (low, medium and high). Self-reported low Machiavellians demonstrated the lowest level of Machiavellianism (despite minor under-reporting), while self-reported medium Machiavellians demonstrated the highest level of Machiavellianism. Surprisingly, self-reported high Machiavellians demonstrated a medium level of Machiavellianism. Therefore, low and high Machiavellians under-reported, while medium Machiavellians over-reported their levels of amoral values and practice. The research findings support the notion of self-report bias and demonstrate that manipulative behaviour becomes acceptable in a workplace environment; as a result, high Machiavellians freely admit to their amoral values and behaviours. The research has also shown that self-reporting bias are evident across all levels of Machiavellianism. Therefore, whenever possible, objective measures should be included when investigating undesirable traits, values and behaviours. Study three investigated the sources of Machiavellian tendencies, their amoral values and behaviours by asking the following research question: 'RQ4 - Where do Machiavellian tendencies stem from? Are upbringing practices or organisational cultures responsible for employees' personal values and subsequent behaviour within an intra-organisational setting?' Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 15 participants (UK-based working professionals). The Mach IV test was employed to segment participants into high and low Machiavellians, while Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis was utilised to investigate the sources of amoral values between the two groups. The results showed that the amoral values of both groups derived from upbringing practices and have a tendency to mirror parental values. Additionally, such values are relatively stable over time and unaffected by the institutional values deriving from organisational culture. Therefore, organisational culture and institutional values do not possess the power to override morality related values. However, workplaces that allow the presence of organisational politics provide positive stimuli for Machiavellianism, enabling high Machiavellians to flourish while alienating low Machiavellians. Despite the control measure (continuous employment in an organisation for three years or more), the cross-sectional design served as a limitation and further research is required to validate these findings.
La tesi è il frutto di una ricerca che ha inteso essere un tentativo di approfondimento della cosiddetta stagione della "stagnazione" del processo di integrazione comunitaria, e in particolare del ruolo svolto al suo interno dall'Italia, attraverso alcune delle personalità politiche designate a far parte della Commissione unica, nata nel luglio 1967 dalla fusione delle strutture di Ceca, Cee ed Euratom. Se in effetti nell'ultimo decennio non sono mancati validi contributi storiografici alla ricostruzione dell'operato dei politici italiani presso le giovani istituzioni comunitarie, un primo, oggettivo limite riscontrato in questi lavori si è presentato da subito nel loro termine temporale, sostanzialmente fermo al tornante del 1963-64, rendendo così auspicabile un suo superamento. Oltre a quello cronologico, l'altro piano che si è voluto affrontare è stato quello interpretativo, nel voler parzialmente rimettere in discussione l'impostazione corrente, tendente a relegare l'Italia in una posizione di secondo piano nella storia dell'integrazione tra la fine degli anni Sessanta e l'inizio degli anni Ottanta, ben lontana dai fasti della stagione degasperiana e dei trattati di Roma. Un ridimensionamento di cui si sarebbe resa protagonista in buona parte, suo malgrado, la classe dirigente politica a livello nazionale, e in primo luogo la stessa Democrazia Cristiana erede della tradizione dei Padri fondatori dell'Europa unita. Attraverso lo studio di una vasta documentazione inedita conservata presso gli Archivi storici dell'Unione europea, quelli della Commissione UE a Bruxelles, e l'Archivio storico dell'Istituto Luigi Sturzo di Roma, si è ricostruito l'impegno europeistico di Edoardo Martino, Franco Maria Malfatti, Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza e Lorenzo Natali. Un percorso certamente disomogeneo in quanto a tipologia e durata degli incarichi ricoperti, e ancor più sotto il profilo della quantità e reperibilità delle fonti, ma che nondimeno traccia una traiettoria alquanto differente rispetto alla tradizionale lettura di una marginalità italiana nelle Comunità europee. Un primo dato da rilevare è la centralità dei compiti che vengono affidati a queste personalità, che pure escono dall'attività politica nazionale in uno dei momenti certo di maggiore difficoltà interna e appannamento d'immagine conosciuti dall'Italia repubblicana a livello internazionale, e comunitario in primo luogo. L'attività di queste figure copre in effetti dossier essenziali nella politica europea. Dalle relazioni internazionali con Martino (1967-70), agli allargamenti mediterranei con Lorenzo Natali (1977-84), passando per la PAC e in seguito le politiche ambientali (Scarascia Mugnozza, 1972-77) e la stessa presidenza della Commissione, tenuta da Franco Malfatti per un breve ma significativo periodo tra il 1970 e l'inizio del 1972, gli "italiani a Bruxelles" contribuiscono in modo decisivo allo sviluppo, pure contraddittorio e non privo di ombre, della costruzione europea, gettando insieme all'intera classe dirigente comunitaria di quella fase le basi della successiva stagione del "rilancio", che contrassegnerà poi i lunghi anni della presidenza Delors. Altrettanto importante si è poi rivelata essere una certa affinità di vedute, emersa sottotraccia dalla documentazione archivistica, su quale dovesse essere il futuro delle Comunità e la loro collocazione nel delicato equilibrio bipolare. Proprio nel periodo che vede il consolidarsi definitivo di un impianto intergovernativo, specialmente dai primi Summit e dalla nascita del Consiglio europeo in avanti, non sono infatti pochi i commenti critici e le valutazioni negative, talvolta insofferenti, che i commissari italiani forniscono su questi sviluppi, in occasioni pubbliche come nella fitta corrispondenza privata, lamentando come il rischio maggiore la progressiva marginalizzazione dell'autonomia e del potere reale delle istituzioni comunitarie, già all'epoca limitate, e la conseguente definitiva scomparsa dall'orizzonte di quella soluzione federale - che tutti e quattro auspicano - che proprio quest'ultime avrebbero dovuto preparare come obiettivo finale. E come unica, vera realizzazione dei progetti originari dei fondatori. ; This thesis is the result of a research that has sought to be an attempt to deepen the so-called season of "stagnation" of the process of European Integration, and particularly the role played within it from Italy, through some of the political figures designated to be part of the single EC Commission. If indeed there have been valuable contributions to the reconstruction of the historical work of Italian politicians at European institutions in the last decade, a first, objective limit found in these works occurred immediately in their temporal term, essentially fixed on 1963-64, thus making it desirable for its overcoming. Besides that, the other issue that I wanted to deal with was that of the historiographical interpretation, in order to partially undermine the current setting, tending to relegate Italy on the back burner in the history of the Integration between the late 1960s and early 1980s, far from the centrality of the political season of Alcide De Gasperi and of the Treaties of Rome. The political establishment at the national level, primarily Christian Democracy, was pointed as the first responsible of this downsizing, having betrayed to some extent the tradition itself of the Founding Father of EU. Through the study of extensive documentation, which was previously unreleased and preserved in the Historical Archives of the European Union, those of the EU Commission in Brussels, and the Historical Archive of the Istituto Luigi Sturzo in Rome, it has been analysed the European commitment of Edoardo Martino, Franco Maria Malfatti, Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza and Lorenzo Natali. This path was certainly uneven in terms of type and duration of the offices, and even more in terms of quantity and availability of sources. Nevertheless it can draw a somewhat different trajectory than the traditional reading related to the Italian marginality in the European Communities during those years. A first issue to note is the centrality of the tasks that are entrusted to these personalities, who come out of the national political activity in one of the most difficult moments and international weakness known by the Italian Republic. The activity of these figures cover indeed essential dossier in European politics. From the International Relations (Martino 1967-70), to the Mediterranean Enlargements with Lorenzo Natali (1977-84), passing through the CAP and further Environmental policies (Scarascia Mugnozza 1972-77), and the same Commission Presidency, held by Franco Malfatti for a brief but significant period between 1970 and early 1972, the "Italians in Brussels" make a decisive contribution to the even contradictory development of European Integration. Together with the entire Community leadership of that period, they throw together the next season's bases of the so called "relaunch", which will mark then the long years of Delors Presidency. A certain unity of views was later revealed to be equally important. It emerged by the archival documentation of these Commissioners, and it dealed with the future development of Communities, and also with their same placement in delicate Cold War balance of power. Right around the time that sees the consolidation of an Intergovernmental system, especially from the first Summits and the rise of the European Council onward, there are many critical comments and ratings, sometimes even impatient, that the Italian Commissioners provide on these developments, in public occasions as in private correspondence, lamenting as the greatest risk the gradual marginalization of the already limited autonomy and the real power of the Community institutions. In their views, this would have permitted the subsequent definitive disappearance from the horizon of that Federal unification that the EC institutions themselves should have prepared as ultimate goal, and as the only real heritage of the original projects of the Founders.
The relationship between Australia and Indonesia has fluctuated sharply over the decades, since Indonesia first declared independence in 1945. After Suharto took power in 1966, aid began to flow to the country, after the new Indonesian leader transformed Indonesia's outlook to be proWest and anti-Communist. Events such as the annexation of East Timor in 1975 soured relations for a time, however the two nations had essentially converging interests up until the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Indonesia was heavily hit by the crisis, and the secession of East Timar in 1999, with heavy Australian involvement meant relations were at a new low. However, the tsunami disaster of 2004 marked a turning point, with a strong Australian aid response helping significantly in putting relations back on track. Despite this, people-to-people links in Australia are still weak, and there are high levels of mistrust and misunderstanding between the public in both nations. Culturally, the two nations could not be more different, although geographically they are close. Indonesian language programs are also falling away in Australia, as well as public diplomacy funding. From an economic standpoint, business links are weak also. However, the one positive in this regard are the strong elite and government-to-government relations that the two countries share. The relationship with Indonesia can be seen as one of Australia's most important relationships. Primarily, the gee-strategic location of Indonesia is perhaps the most important factor in this regard. The relationship is also translating into strong Indonesian support for Australia within vitally important regional forums, and Indonesia's current growth highlights its new found assertiveness on the diplomatic stage. Australia's policy priorities in regards to Indonesia include upholding Indonesia's territorial integrity, and upholding Australia's wider interests in matters of security and regional international politics. The rise of China and the advent of the 'Asia-Pacific century,' mean that it is a vital national interest for Australia to assist Indonesia in its economic recovery and development, in order for Australia to have strong partners in the region to face the challenges ahead. Foreign aid is one way of achieving this goal. Australia, as one of the 24 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) country members, will provide an estimated $4.8 billion in total Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) in 2011- 2012, reaching an estimated 0.35 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI). By 2015-2016, the Australian government has committed to increase Australia's ODA/GNI to 0.5 per cent. The Australian aid program has a strong focus on the Asia-Pacific region, but has recently expanded to encompass Central and South America. In terms of ODA expenditure by country, Indonesia is the top bilateral aid recipient, with Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Solomon Islands, Afghanistan and Vietnam making up the remainder of the top 5. 2015 is also the date that has been set for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), targets set by all United Nations (UN) members, and International Organisations (IOs) that outline eight goals that aim to reduce poverty throughout the world. AusAID sees the MDGs as a vital part of the aid program and its objectives. As well as this, AusAID have taken measures to improve the effectiveness of aid, establishing an Office of Development Effectiveness (OD E), and in the last few months, the Gillard government have established an independent review of the aid program, completed in late April 2011, which will assess future directions for the aid program, considering that the increase to 0.5 per cent of ODA/GNI by 2015-2016 will effectively double the aid budget to around $8-9 billion. Australia has a long history in providing aid to Indonesia, and the Australia Indonesia Partnership (AIP) is the current bilateral development partnership body responsible for the oversight of the distribution of aid to Indonesia. The AIP Country Strategy consists of 4 pillars, dealing with different area of aid distribution, which have been formulated in line with the Indonesian government Medium Term Development Plan (RPJMN). The Australian aid program clearly outlines that its aid activities within Indonesia are undertaken with the national interest in mind, and the geographical spread of the overall program also reflects this. Indonesia, although recording impressive growth, in 2006 still had more than half of its population of approximately 246 million people living on under $2 a day. The UN Human Development Index (HDI) highlights this, ranking Indonesia 108th out of 169 countries. Despite the aforementioned impressive growth, Indonesia's HDI figures show a far slower rate of improvement in terms of poverty alleviation. The AIP strategy heralds a shift from 'traditional, stand-alone programs' of aid delivery to more governance and decentralisation activities, however this strong focus seems to taking the focus away from direct poverty alleviation activities. One reason for this occurrence can be seen in the aid policy debate that exists in Australia between the neo-liberal and social justice agenda. The government's national interests in security, economics and regional diplomacy are the drivers of aid policy, but neo-liberalism provides the framework for this. The strong promotion of activities such as 'good governance' within countries such as Indonesia can be seen to have an adverse effect on the alleviation of poverty, as those that promote the social justice agenda point out. However, the neo-liberal agenda is firmly fixed within Australian aid policy-making, and within both major political parties. This is due to pressures from businesses with interests in expanding into overseas markets, as well as the institutionalised executive level environment in which foreign aid policy is formulated. Although the social justice agenda has a strong public voice, it has little to no real influence on the final formulation of policy. This report finds that when it comes to Australian aid assistance within Indonesia and the balance between the national interest and the delivery of real outcomes for Indonesians, the balance is significantly weighted in the favour of the national interest. Although there have been recent improvements in direct alleviation activities in the health, education and environment sectors, it is clear that national interests are the driving force behind aid implementation within Indonesia. Considering Australia's gee-strategic location, and the challenges that it faces, it is vital and not surprising that a middle power such as Australia looks to use foreign aid to serve its own interests as well as others. However it must be recognised that too heavy a focus on governance activities can result in the poor being left behind as development continues apace. The report recommends that the projected doubling of the aid program by 2015-2016 offers an excellent opportunity to reconfigure this balance somewhat, by continuing the current activities in the same vein, yet using any new significant increases in funding exclusively to target and implement new poverty alleviation activities within the poorest provinces and districts of Indonesia.
1. Objetivos: Esta tesis pretende realizar un estudio profundo de algunas crónicas de Flandes y así determinar si existía un discurso político, cómo era percibido por sus autores, y si éstos pretendían influenciar con él a sus lectores. Para lograr esto, se analizará la figura de los cronistas de Flandes con el objetivo de poder conocer su origen social, ideal de servicio, idea de cómo se debe gestional el poder y las redes de protección, etc… Tal estudio permitirá un acercamiento al modo en que los cronistas presentaron un territorio que era ajeno a la mayoría de sus lectores. Esto, a su vez, informará sobre cuestiones como cuál era su estructura, si había o no discursos políticos compitiendo, etc… De igual modo, con este estudio se pretende conocer el destino individual de los actores militares, sumado como estaba a la explicación causal y moral de los hechos. Porque la crónica sirve para presentar el desorden del mundo, por eso mismo, permite conocer cómo debía ser ese mundo ordenado: sobre qué moral había de sustentarse, lo cual constituye el propósito de esta tesis. 2. Metodología: Esta investigación se realizará a través de una lectura promenorizada de las obras de cronistas e historiadores que participaron en los hechos militares que narran, una vez han transcurrido más de veinte años, o que tenían presencian en la corte durante tal periodo. Esta lectura se hace según el punto de vista de la historia cultural, al igual que según la historia social y política de los autores y personajes que tratan. Tal análisis político se llevará a cabo utilizando documentación original, memoriales de parte, correspondencia, pero sobre todo una lectura política y moral de sus crónicas. 3. Resultados o conclusiones: Se ha podido comprobar que los cronistas de Flandes no sólo tenían elementos de pensamiento político en su discurso histórico, sino que intentaron influenciar de un modo específico al público que dirigían sus obras. Tal tarea fue realizada por unos autores que se pudieron conocer a fondo, tanto en su diverso origen social, como con respecto a su formación, ideología de servicio al rey y meritocracia. También se pudo conocer la fuerza en ellos de ideas tales como la fama, el prestigio y el honor, el modo en que presentaron la política imperial al público español, apropiación, uso y puesta en práctica de conceptos políticos a través de las cuales definieron el pasado y a ellos mimos, manifestación, a lo largo de todo este proceso, de sus propias convicciones, compromisos, contexto e intuiciones, etc… Tales autores también permitieron comprender lo que ellos consideraban había de ser la función del historiador y cronista, relacionada con la cual estaba el concepto de la verdad de sus relatos. Esto permitió analizar las fuentes que utilizaron, basadas en muchos casos en redes clientelares que actuaron a modo de focos de información y al mismo tiempo hicieron del ejercicio de la escritura un acto colectivo, lo cual redundaba en la veracidad de las crónicas. Tal análisis del contenido político de sus obras permitió comprobar la riqueza de conceptos e ideas que tenían a su disposición, y que supieron utilizar a través de sus escritos para influir en sus lectores a través de la presentación del Imperio Español. 1. Objectives: This dissertation is intended to be an in-depth study of some of the chronicles of Flanders to determine if there was a political discourse, how its authors perceived it, and if they wanted to influence their readers. To achieve this, this work will analyze the chroniclers of Flanders with the objective of knowing their social background, ideal of service, idea about how should the exercise of power and protection networks be administered, etc… Such investigation will provide an understanding about the way in which the chroniclers presented a territory unknown to most of their readers. This, in turn, will inform about matters such as what was its structure, if there were competing political discourses, etc… Likewise, the purpose of this investigation is based upon the knowledge of the individual destiny of the military actors, associated as it was to the causal and moral explanation of the events. Because the chronicle has the power to present the chaos of the world, it allows to know how that ordered world should be: on what morality it should be grounded, which is the object of study in this thesis. 2. Methodology: This investigation will be carried out through a meticulous reading of the writings of chroniclers and historians who took part in the military events they recount, more than twenty years after they took place, or that were established in the court during that period. The reading of this material is done according to the point of view given by cultural history, and the social and political history of the authors and characters they write about. Such political analysis will be carried out using original documentation, memoriales de parte, correspondence, but above all a political and moral reading of their chronicles. 3. Results or conclusions: It has been demonstrated that the chroniclers of Flanders not only included elements of political thought in their historical discourse, but also tried to influence the public to whom their writings were directed in a specific way. Such a task was carried out by authors who became very well known to us with respect to their diverse social background, as well as in relation to their education, ideology of service to the king and meritocracy. It was also possible to learn the strength in them of ideas such as fame, prestige and honor, the way in which they presented the imperial politics to the Spanish public, their appropriation, use and implementation of political concepts through which they defined the past and themselves, manifestation, throughout this entire process, of their own convictions, compromises, context and intuitions, etc… Such authors also allowed us to understand what they considered was the mission of the historian and chronicler, related to which was the concept of truth in their recounts. This allowed us to analyze the sources that they used, based on many occasions in patronage networks that played the part of information cells and at the same time made the act of writing a shared exercise, which redounded in the truthfulness of the chronicles. Such an analysis of the political content of their works allowed us to verify the richness of concepts and ideas that they had at their disposal, and knew how to use in their works in order to influence their readers through the presentation of the Spanish Empire.
"Intolerance of Catholics and Catholicism is one of the best-known features of seventeenth-century England" ; but at the same time it is also "in some ways […] one of the least explored. In particular ; little is known of the essential feature of this intolerance – the nature ; extent and causes of the Protestant fear of Catholics." It was this quote which struck me the most while I was conducting research for my thesis. Robin Clifton made this statement in his study on "The popular fear of Catholics during the English Revolution" in the early 70's and addressed a well-known phenomenon of early modern studies. We all know about the religious and political struggles of the Elizabethan and Jacobean eras. We know about the event which initiated the whole English Reformation ; that is the divorce of Henry VIII from Catherine of Aragon and his second marriage to Anne Boleyn. And we know that "a vocabulary of anti-Catholicism or anti-Popery was developed and deployed for a wide variety of national and international circumstances" ; but the reason why this ; in essence ; marital issue launched the prosecution of hundreds of English Catholics and converted a Catholic nation into a Protestant nation with fierce anti-Catholic sentiments has remained an under-investigated and intriguing phenomenon. The aim of my thesis was to find a satisfying answer to these questions. The basis for this answer consists of political and historical facts ; legal texts and a selection of dramatic texts of the early modern period. I chose dramatic texts for the simple reason that theatre was the only open medium and form of entertainment which was accessible for all social classes. Moreover ; going to the theatre did not "demand literacy in an age when most of the population was illiterate" ; and when books were reserved for the literate few ; that is to say that even the uneducated 'groundlings' – as they were called – formed a welcome part of the audience. By choosing such a broad spectrum I hoped to have built an ideal foundation of historical and literary inquiry ; which would offer sufficient information and leave as little questions as possible. The structure of my thesis therefore aims at providing all necessary facts and information at first and in a second step bringing all the information down to a common denominator and find an – in this case – philosophical explanation. Therefore ; the first part of my thesis offers a broad and extensive overview of the historical background of the early modern period by bringing together "a number of religiously coded events" like the excommunication of Elizabeth I ; the execution of Mary Stuart ; the victory over the Spanish Armada and the Gunpowder Plot. These events are put into context with the governmental measurements – in the form of decrees and statutes – that were passed as a direct response and attempted to restrict and finally banish Catholic life from England. I limited the time span to nearly one hundred years ; starting in 1534 and ending in 1625. The second part offers a discussion of ten selected dramatic texts and subsequent literary analysis. To fulfill the requirements needed for such a literary analysis the dramas selected were chosen for different reasons. Firstly ; it was essential that one or more Catholic characters be amongst the characters. Secondly ; these Catholic characters had to be complex and in some way provoking the audience and/ or the other characters. Furthermore ; they needed to be influential and in some position of power ; so that the possible abuse of their office would be of major consequence. Considering the time these plays needed to cover ; I kept close to the historical time span ; so that the first play was produced in 1588 and the last in 1641. Thus ; the final selection included plays from the Elizabethan ; Jacobean and Caroline era ; which fulfilled the aforementioned criteria. All plays contain one or more Catholic characters ; who are in relatively powerful positions and either abuse their power or manipulate those around them to achieve higher political and personal aims. In the case of the Elizabethan plays ; it is the Bishop of Winchester ; later Cardinal Beaufort of Shakespeare's Henry VI ; Parts 1+2 ; Cardinal Pandulph of Shakespeare's The Life and Death of King John and the Catholic league around Catherine de Medici and the Duke of Guise in Marlowe's The Massacre at Paris. Doctor Faustus ; was chosen because of the open derision of Catholicism displayed on stage ; and opens the chapter on Elizabethan drama. In the first Jacobean play ; Thomas Dekker's allegory The Whore of Babylon ; the plot centers on a Catholic league led by the Empress of Babylon – an allegorical figure ; representing the pope and the Vatican. John Webster's plays The White Devil and The Duchess of Malfi both show a cardinal who considerably – and negatively – influences the strand of the plot ; either by abusing his position or by manipulating other characters. The last Jacobean play ; Thomas Middleton's A Game at Chess ; is another allegory ; staging a game of chess in which the Black House is representative of a Catholic league ; and the White House stands for the English Protestants. The last play discussed in this thesis is James Shirley's The Cardinal. After having provided this basis ; which I found necessary to offer before the theoretical analysis ; the third part of my thesis then merges history ; law and drama and highlights the common features these three levels have in common. For example ; techniques for isolating Catholics off the stage and Catholic characters on the stage ; Protestant fears of being seduced by cunning missionary priests and the theatrical representation of these fears on stage ; or ; for example ; the completely exaggerated image the English Protestants had of the pope ; which also found its way to the stage. Finally I searched for an explanation for all these elements which would illustrate that the processes on the stage were just a mirror of the processes off the stage. And which furthermore would support my thesis that early modern drama was just as influential in promoting the prosecution and banishment of Catholics in England as the legal and political measurements ; or that politics and literature worked in a mutual and reciprocal cooperation ; respectively. I attribute this explanation to the philosophical writings of the Lithuanian phenomenologist Emanuel Levinas. Levinas has worked out the idea of 'the other' based on his experiences during the Holocaust – he was held prisoner in a special camp at Hanover ; while his Jewish relatives were being murdered in Lithuania by German National Socialists. Due to situational similarities ; that is ; life as a member of an alienated ; demonized and persecuted minority ; I thought his approach was the most suitable to apply to English Catholics 400 years before.
In response to a lawsuit by the ACLU under the Freedom of Information Act, the Obama administration released several memos by the Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice Department between the years 2002-2005 that gave the green light for "harsh interrogation techniques" of detainees in the fight against terrorism, the euphemism du jour for the use of torture.Although from the beginning the Justice Department under present Attorney General Eric Holder assured that CIA officials would not be prosecuted for following orders, the lawyers in the OLC are under investigation and could be prosecuted for their recommendations to the Bush White House. When asked if members of the Bush administration may also be prosecuted for making the final decisions to use those procedures, Obama said a week ago that this was a time for "Reflection, not Retribution," thus implying that he would protect the disclosure from politicization. He might as well have called for immediate peace in the Middle East. The huge public outcry from both sides of the political spectrum was instantaneous, with Cheney accusing the President for jeopardizing national security, and human rights and other groups calling for an on-the-spot decision to prosecute former White House authorities for war crimes. In a visit to CIA headquarters at Langley on Monday, Obama tried to personally reassure CIA officers that they won't be prosecuted for carrying out orders and explained, in very rational terms as is his custom, his decision to release those memos and put an end to those practices:"Now, in that context I know that the last few days have been difficult. As I made clear in releasing the OLC memos -- as a consequence of a court case that was pending and to which it was very difficult for us to mount an effective legal defense -- I acted primarily because of the exceptional circumstances that surrounded these memos; particularly the fact that so much of the information was public, had been publicly acknowledged, the covert nature of the information had been compromised.I have fought to protect the integrity of classified information in the past, and I will do so in the future. And there is nothing more important than protecting the identities of CIA officers. So I need everybody to be clear: We will protect your identities and your security as you vigorously pursue your missions. I will be as vigorous in protecting you as you are vigorous in protecting the American people.Now, I have put an end to the interrogation techniques described in those OLC memos, and I want to be very clear and very blunt. I've done so for a simple reason: because I believe that our nation is stronger and more secure when we deploy the full measure of both our power and the power of our values –- including the rule of law. I know I can count on you to do exactly that."As more information trickles in, it is becoming clear there were deep internal divisions and intense infighting within the Obama White House over whether to disclose the information or not. But now that it is out, pressure is mounting for Obama to allow the appropriate institutions to deal with the issue and for the rule of law to be applied. At present, there are two courses of action being considered: for Congress to establish an independent bipartisan commission or for the Attorney-General to appoint a special prosecutor.An independent commission would be similar to the 9-11 one: it would conduct public hearings and issue a report. This is the less confrontational, more conciliatory approach, similar to the "Truth and Reconciliation Commissions" in other countries, and one that would not lead to criminal prosecutions. It is being advocated by moderates who do not want to shut out the past, but would like to move on with the new agenda. It is more in line with President Obama's dictum of "reflection, not retribution." But this is a very fluid situation and he now seems to be leaning toward the second option.The other possibility is for the Attorney General to designate a Special Prosecutor, a neutral, well-respected person to investigate suspected crimes by high ranking officials. This is the option preferred by those who insist that Truth and Reconciliation commissions are acceptable for those countries that are still in the stage of nation-building. But in the United States, there are strong institutions that can enforce the laws, and there is nothing to "reconcile". A Special Prosecutor would let the investigation go where the evidence leads it. He or she would uphold the rule of law and prosecute those responsible, according to evidence of crimes committed. In contradiction with President Obama's judgment, Jonathan Turley, Professor of Constitutional Law at George Washington Law School observes that "that would not be retribution, it would be justice."The problem for the President is that he cannot have it both ways, first authorizing a full disclosure of CIA harsh interrogation methods and then refusing to let justice take its course. Or worse yet, allowing half measures such as the prosecution of attorneys who gave the legal advise to proceed with the practices (perhaps on pre-ordained decisions from the White House), and not holding responsible the higher authorities who gave the final order. The use of torture in pursuit of national security by the US government is a grey legal and emotional area that this country has still not been able to figure out. The goal posts have constantly been moved depending on perceived fears, and the post 9-11 state of mind was conducive to excesses in proportion to the horrific event itself, as well as to its effect on the American psyche. The Bush White House, with its natural penchant for aggressive action, was moving into unchartered waters in a war against non-state actors, so it used this grey legal area to its full advantage. Having been asked by the White House whether these methods were lawful, lawyers in the OLC explicitly recognized in one of these memos that the techniques they were endorsing were the ones the United States condemned other countries for using. This obvious moral double standard notwithstanding, they explicitly stated that "the standards we impose on others do not bind us in any way…however…given the paucity of relevant precedent…we cannot predict with confidence whether a court would agree with his conclusion." This conclusion was informed by a blatantly narrow interpretation of both international and national laws, but was wholly embraced by the White House, in spite of a dissenting view by Condoleezza Rice and others at the State Department. At almost a hundred days into his presidency, Barack Obama is finding out that that no decisions can be taken "outside politics" and that the center of the political spectrum is an uncomfortable and lonely place to be. No president is an island and his hand will be forced in one direction or the other. By trying to square the circle between values and national security so early into his first term, the President is putting the tombstone on bipartisanship for good. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
The Peace of Fexhe has always been seen by the Liegeois as a constitutional treaty of paramount importance as it provided the principality of Liège with a representative assembly. Yet, this text, enacted in 1316, remained in use until the end of the State of Liège. The present article focuses therefore on its history in order to determine the role it actually played in the political life of Liège at the end of the Middle Ages and during the Modern Times. What emerges is that, signed in a context of tension, the Peace of Fexhe really was a compromise signed between two parties exhausted by famine, not the victory of one over the other. Even though the treaty seems to record several claims of the opponents to the prince-bishop Adolphe de La Marck, it really is the latter who, in spite of what numerous historians believed, continued to direct the political game of Liège. Indeed, his arbitrators managed to counter the claims of their opponents through the insertion of clauses preventing any real upheaval within the principality. For Adolphe, this treaty is therefore a break in his quest for a total sovereignty. Following him, the prince-bishops of Liège strove in defence of their power, contravening if need be the text of 1316. The Liégeois appeared to us to have been perfectly aware of the limits of the Peace of Fexhe but they endeavoured to gloss over these in order to make the text an absolute reference in the domain of political claims and a revered rallying symbol. Then, it will be through the constant reminder of this treaty that various political claims arose, making it de facto the source of the "Liegian constitution". Afterwards, the Liegeois had recourse to the Peace of Fexhe in order to legitimate their political options. However, it was absolutely not a general rule since several politicians close to the people, such as Thierry de Perwez or Raes de Heers did not make use of the text. On the contrary, it was within more "cultivated" circles, such as the municipal magistrates and the burgomasters, that the text was the less rarely used, whether it be at the time of the promulgation of the decisions of the Council of Trente or at the eve of the Liegian Revolution. Moreover, it is by its almost uninterrupted presence in the Liegian politics that the Peace of Fexhe asks the question of the administration of law in the principality. In spite of a common objective, punishing the abuse of power of the episcopal officers, it was in opposition over the question of the procedure with the Peaces of the XXII . Yet the Court of the XXII considered itself to be in charge of the defence of the Peace of Fexhe. Similarly, the capitulations of the prince-bishops swore to the respect of the text and court without fear of a contradiction that no one seemed to have wanted to highlight. This shows how deep it was rooted in the Liegian legal culture, even though the real action of the Peace of Fexhe through the centuries left few traces. In conclusion, the Peace of Fexhe owes its prestige to its recuperation by different political forces that used it as a battle flag, adapting it, contradicting it sometimes, to their claims. Thus, event though its exact stipulations were forgotten as soon as the end of the 16th century and it was then progressively completed, it survived in the imagination and built up its prestige on the additional meaning its utilisations provided it with, for, in Liège, who defends Fexhe defends the good right. ; La Paix de Fexhe a toujours revêtu aux yeux des Liégeois l'apparence d'un traité constitutionnel de première importance qui dotait la principauté de Liège d'une assemblée représentative. Or, ce texte, édicté en 1316, est resté en vigueur jusqu'à la fin de l'État liégeois. Le présent article se concentre donc sur son histoire afin de déterminer le rôle qu'il joua effectivement dans la vie politique liégeoise de la fin du Moyen Âge et des Temps modernes. Il en ressort que, signée dans un contexte de tensions, la Paix de Fexhe est bien un compromis signés entre deux partis épuisés par la famine et non la victoire de l'un sur l'autre. Même si elle semble enregistrer plusieurs exigences des opposants au prince-évêque Adolphe de La Marck, c'est bien ce dernier qui, malgré ce qu'ont pu croire nombre d'historiens, continue à diriger réellement le jeu politique liégeois. En effet, ses arbitres sont parvenus à contrer les revendications de leurs adversaires par l'insertion de clauses empêchant un réel bouleversement au sein de la principauté. Pour Adolphe, ce traité est donc une pause dans sa quête d'une souveraineté totale. À sa suite, les princes-évêques de Liège œuvreront tous à la défense de leur pouvoir, contrevenant au besoin au texte de 1316. Les Liégeois nous semblent être parfaitement conscients des limites de la Paix de Fexhe mais ils vont s'efforcer de les taire afin de faire de ce texte une référence absolue dans le domaine des revendications politiques et un signe révéré de ralliement. Ce sera ensuite d'un rappel constant de ce traité que procèderont les diverses revendications politiques, en faisant de facto la source de la « constitution liégeoise ». Par la suite, les Liégeois recourront ponctuellement à la Paix de Fexhe pour légitimer leurs options politiques. Cependant, il ne s'agit absolument pas là d'une règle générale puisque des hommes politiques proches du peuple tels Thierry de Perwez ou Raes de Heers ne font pas appel à ce texte. Au contraire, c'est dans les cercles plus « cultivés », tels les échevins ou les bourgmestres, que ce texte est le moins rarement utilisé, que ce soit lors de la promulgation des décisions du Concile de Trente ou à la veille de la Révolution liégeoise. D'autre part, c'est par sa présence presque ininterrompue dans la politique liégeoise que la Paix de Fexhe pose la question de l'exercice de la loi dans la principauté. Malgré un objectif commun, châtier les abus de pouvoir des officiers épiscopaux, elle est en opposition sur la question de la procédure avec les Paix des XXII. Or le Tribunal des XXII se considère comme chargé de la défense de la Paix de Fexhe. De même les capitulations des princes-évêques jurent le respect de ces texte et tribunal sans craindre une contradiction que personne ne semble avoir voulu mettre en évidence. Cela témoigne donc d'un enracinement profond dans la culture juridique liégeoise, alors même que l'action réelle de la Paix de Fexhe au fil des siècles n'a laissé que peu de traces. En conclusion, la Paix de Fexhe doit son prestige à sa récupération par différentes forces politiques qui s'en servent tel un étendard, l'adaptant, et la contredisant parfois, à leurs revendications. Ainsi, alors même que ses stipulations exactes sont oubliées dès la fin du XIVe siècle et qu'elle est progressivement complétée, elle survit dans l'imaginaire et bâtit son prestige sur le surcroît de sens que lui donne son utilisation, car, à Liège, qui défend Fexhe défend le bon droit. ; Peer reviewed
Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation? Wilsonian ideals influenced the AEF's actions in the First World War because most American leaders and soldiers shared Wilson's concepts of Progressivism and believed that the United States should play a role in saving Europe. Even if some did not agree with Wilson's politics, most doughboys shared his ideas of American Exceptionalism, and these views affected United States involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. In merging the two topic areas of Wilson's ideologies and AEF involvement in the war, this essay will attempt to answer how the American doughboy found motivation in the same principles that guided President Wilson. ; Master of Arts in Military History ; Week 11 Final Paper Wilsonianism in the First World War: Progressivism, American Exceptionalism, and the AEF Doughboy Brian P. Bailes A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Military History Norwich University MH 562B Dr. John Broom August 16, 2020 Bailes 2 While the duration of American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) involvement in First World War combat operations remained short compared to the armies of the European powers, the experience had a lasting impact on the United States' status as a global power. President Woodrow Wilson's mediation in the European affair throughout American neutrality, his integration of the AEF into Allied operations, and his contribution to the post-war peace process cast him as a central figure of the conflict as well as a harbinger of United States interventionist foreign policy. Through the more than a century since the end of the war, historians have analyzed and debated various facets of United States belligerency. Historians have explored President Wilson's ideologies and the decision making that ultimately led to him making his April 1917 appeal to Congress for American belligerency. Additionally, historians have expanded on AEF actions in Europe and argued how General Pershing's adamancy on maintaining an independent American command created tension with the Allied leaders. Historians have not connected these two topics to analyze how a reader can conceptually link Wilson's ideas and doughboy exploits in Europe. Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation? Throughout the historiography of United States involvement in the First World War, specific themes reoccur as significant areas of consensus. The historiography presents two primary arguments in which historians agree. Historians agree that Wilson's peace objectives drastically differed from those of the Allies, and historians agree that these differences motivated Wilson's decisions regarding how the United States would enter the war. Historians also agree that friction existed between General Pershing and the Allied Commanders once the AEF arrived in Europe and began combat operations. These two commonalities in the historiography remain Bailes 3 relatively constant throughout the past 50 years of historical research, and even when portraying more positive sentiments expressed between AEF and Allied soldiers, historians still note some tension between Pershing and the Allied commanders. Historians agree that Wilson's peace objectives differed significantly from those of the Allies. David Woodford argues that the gap between British imperial interests and Wilson's peace objectives affected the alliance between the United States and England throughout the war.1 William Widenor argues that Wilson failed in achieving his goals during the Versailles Peace Settlement because he attempted to make too many concessions for enduring peace, and he claims that Wilson grew at odds with the Allied leaders at the peace conference.2 George Egerton argues that British policymakers were closely monitoring the dispute within the United States Senate during the Treaty of Versailles conference, and he suggests that British leadership remained skeptical of Wilson's League of Nations.3 Historians capture Wilson's opposing peace aims throughout the European conflict, and they seemingly agree on how these aims influenced Wilson's policies and actions. Some historians cite the most significant gap in peace aims as existing between the United States and France. David Stevenson argues that French leaders were continually at odds with Wilson throughout the war as the French war aims focused much more on their national security, which they saw as requiring the destruction of Imperial Germany.4 Stevenson points out that while Wilson's peace aims differed from England as well as France, many French objectives 1 David R. Woodward, Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917-1918 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 7-25, 35-43, 77-80, 125-9, 208-20. 2 William C. Widenor, "The United States and the Versailles Peace Settlement," Modern American Diplomacy, eds. John M. Carroll and George C. Herring (Lanham: SR Books, 1996), 46-59. 3 George W. Egerton, "Britain and the 'Great Betrayal': Anglo-American Relations and the Struggle for United States Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919-1920," The Historical Journal 21, no. 4 (December 1978): 885-911, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638973. 4 David Stevenson, "French War Aims and the American Challenge, 1914-1918," The Historical Journal 22, no. 4 (December 1979): 877-894, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638691. Bailes 4 were more aggressive against Germany as they involved reclaiming land lost to Germany in previous wars, specifically the 1870 Franco-Prussian War.5 Stevenson highlights the fact that Wilson could not get French officials to see the "two Germanys" concept that prevailed in American thinking at the time. While the American public generally saw two Germanys – the autocratic ruling party dominated by the Prussian elite and the German people living under that oppressive regime – Stevenson argues that France only saw Imperial Germany as a total enemy.6 Robert Bruce explains that during the post-war occupation period, the American doughboys perceived Frenchmen as distrustful and hateful toward German soldiers, and this sullied the alliance between France and the United States.7 In line with Wilson's ideology, historians cite Wilson's desire for Europe to achieve a "peace without victory" as he attempted to serve as a mediator during the United States period of neutrality. These historians ultimately conclude that Wilson believed any of the European powers achieving their aims through victory would lead to a continuation of balance of power politics in Europe. They argue that Wilson thought merely putting an end to the fighting would be the only way to achieve lasting peace. Ross Gregory argues that Wilson acted as a persistent mediator throughout the war as he strove for a "peace without victory."8 Arthur Link explains that Wilson believed a "peace without victory" and a "draw in Europe" proved the best solution for establishing a new system to replace the broken power structure in Europe.9 Ross Kennedy portrays Wilson as advocating the United States as a neutral mediator striving for a "peace 5 Stevenson, 884, 892-4. 6 Stevenson, 885. 7 Robert B. Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms: America & France in the Great War (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2003), 286-95. 8 Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1971), 115-6. 9 Arthur Link, "Entry into World War I," Progress, War, and Reaction: 1900-1933, eds. Davis R.B. Ross, Alden T. Vaughan, and John B. Duff (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1970), 141. Bailes 5 without victory" before the U.S. entered the war, then as an advocate of "just peace" after they entered the war.10 Kennedy argues that Wilson blamed the international system that led to power politics and wanted to have a separate voice in the peace process to shape a new diplomatic and global political order.11 Historians point to Wilson's ideology as a reason for his differing peace objectives, and historians point to Wilson's Christian faith as a significant motivation for his progressive philosophy. Lloyd Ambrosius highlights Wilson's four tenets of national self-determination, open-door economic globalization, collective security, and progressive history as the framework in which he envisioned a global order shaped by American democratic ideals that would bring the world to peace.12 Ambrosius examines Wilson's embrace of "American Exceptionalism" and looks at how his Anglo-American bias clouded his vision and prevented him from seeing the various cultural factors throughout the world.13 Ronald Pestritto examines Wilson's progressive form of history while arguing that Wilson saw democracy emerging within society as a phenomenon only natural to specific groups of people, and he only saw a few civilizations as "progressed."14 Pestritto notes Wilson's Christian inspiration, referencing early manuscripts written by Wilson titled "Christ's Army" and "Christian Progress."15 William Appleman Williams argues that Wilson maintained a Calvinist idealism that intensified the existing doctrine 10 Ross A. Kennedy, "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security," Diplomatic History 25, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 15, 29, https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00247. 11 Kennedy, "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security," 2-3. 12 Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 2-47. 13 Ambrosius, Wilsonianism, 125-34; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 33-49; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, "World War I and the Paradox of Wilsonianism," The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 17 (2018): 5-22, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537781417000548. 14 Ronald J. Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 6-61. 15 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 23, 40. Bailes 6 based on God's supposed ordination of American influence and expansion in the world.16 Richard Gamble explains that Wilson's vision and rhetoric nested with many of the Christian messages of progressive religious leaders in the United States during the First World War who saw the war as a Christian crusade to spread American ideals.17 Historians seem in unanimous agreement that Wilson's separate peace aims formed the primary impetus for him seeking an independent American presence in the war effort. David Esposito argues that Wilson wanted to have an American presence in the war because he realized that to establish a dominant American voice in the post-war peace talks, the United States needed to make a significant contribution to Allied victory.18 Edward Coffman details the United States' experiences in the First World War by explaining Wilson's desire to gain an independent voice in the peace process.19 David Trask maintains that Wilson wanted to "remain somewhat detached from the Allies" in defeating Imperial Germany to provide Wilson leverage so that he could directly influence the post-war peace process.20 Arthur Link explains that Wilson did see the benefit of not joining the Entente but keeping the United States independent of "any political commitments" with the Allies as providing a chance to ensure an American presence at the peace conference.21 Thomas Knock argues that Wilson faulted the "balance of power" politics of Europe and saw the United States as the actor to save Europe and create a new system of 16 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1959; New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), 67-112. Page references are to the 2009 edition. 17 Richard M. Gamble, The War for Righteousness: Progressive Christianity, the Great War, and the Rise of the Messianic Nation (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2003), 22-3, 86-208, 254-5. 18 David M. Esposito, "Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the AEF," Presidential Studies Quarterly 19 no. 1 (Winter 1989): 127-38, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40574570. 19 Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1968), 5-8. 20 David F. Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918 (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1993), 2-6. 21 Link, "Entry into World War I," 141. Bailes 7 diplomacy.22 Overall, historians agree that President Wilson desired very different peace outcomes for a post-war Europe, and this influenced him as he made decisions regarding United States actions throughout the war. In addition to the agreement that Wilson's peace aims differed from the Allies, historians also agree that once the United States did enter the war and the AEF arrived in Europe, friction quickly developed between General Pershing and the Allied commanders. David Trask argues many instances of "increasing friction" existed between Pershing and the French and British command. Trask includes a case where the Allies "attempted to bypass Pershing" by working directly with Wilson even though Wilson had appointed Pershing as Commander in Chief of the AEF.23 Trask argues that Pershing believed that the preceding few years of trench warfare had "deprived the French and even the British of offensive spirit," and he maintains that with Pershing's "open warfare" tactics, his methods of training drastically differed from the Allies.24 Michael Adas cites disagreement between Pershing and the Allied commanders immediately after Pershing arrived in France due to Pershing's unwillingness to listen to the experienced French and British leaders as they tried to suggest ways to employ the AEF.25 Adas argues that Pershing's desire to pursue "open warfare" did not take into account the realities of trench warfare and resulted in costly casualties.26 Russell Weigley cites frequent tensions between Pershing and the Allied commanders, including an example in September of 1918 in which AEF 22 Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest For a New World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 30-69. 23 Trask, AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 38-9. 24 Trask, AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 19. 25 Michael Adas, "Ambivalent Ally: American Military Intervention and the Endgame and Legacy of World War I," Diplomatic History 38 no. 4 (September 2014): 705-7, http://doi.org/10.1093/dh.dhu032. 26 Adas, "Ambivalent Ally," 710. Bailes 8 "traffic congestion" caused a significant disturbance in a visit from Georges Clemenceau.27 Weigley explains that Pershing's belief in "open warfare" would not work due to the enormous American divisions built for the trenches, arguing that Pershing would need "smaller, maneuverable divisions" if he wanted his open warfare to work.28 All historians agree that the issue of AEF amalgamation with the French and British forces served as the primary reason for the friction between the military leaders. David Woodford cites the notion that AEF amalgamation would "undermin[e] the significance of the American military role." Hence, Pershing remained adamant in his stance not to let the Allies use American soldiers to fight under French or British flags.29 Woodward notes that Pershing felt his AEF superior to the Allies as he "believed that the Americans had almost nothing to learn from French and British officers."30 Woodford explains that war aims and peace objectives formed the basis of a fractured Anglo-American relationship that finally crumbled during the peace conference.31 Mitchell Yockelson argues that despite tension between Pershing and the Allied leaders regarding the question of amalgamation, the 27th and 30th Divisions contributed significantly to the Allied effort under British command. Yockelson highlights a fascinating illustration of Pershing's stubbornness in noting that Pershing did not follow the exploits of these divisions even though they proved instrumental in the offensive against the Hindenburg Line.32 As an enduring theme throughout the amalgamation debate, historians point to Pershing's desire for the United States to deliver the decisive blow against Germany with an independent 27 Russell F. Weigley, "Strategy and Total War in the United States: Pershing and the American Military Tradition," Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, eds. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 333. 28 Weigley, "Pershing and the American Military Tradition," 341-2. 29 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 57-8. 30 Woodward, 88. 31 Woodward, 7-80, 112-220. 32 Mitchell A. Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers: Americans Under British Command, 1918 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 92-228. Bailes 9 American army. Allan Millett argues that Wilson gave Pershing the explicit directive to keep the AEF separate from the Allies and allowed Pershing the freedom to make decisions on how to integrate the AEF.33 Millett cites Pershing's initial plan to use an AEF offensive on Metz as the critical blow that would decide the war and establish an American contribution to defeating Imperial Germany. Pershing would not have his AEF ready to carry out this offensive until 1919, and his stubbornness in dealing with the requests for amalgamation in the interim "frustrated the Allies."34 Bullitt Lowry narrates Pershing's attempt to shape the post-war peace terms by arguing that Pershing wanted to force Germany into an "unconditional surrender." While Lowry concludes that Pershing's effort to influence the political realm failed, he believed that the only way to "guarantee victory" would be to crush Germany in battle.35 David Woodward argues that Pershing believed that the AEF would decide the war by becoming "the dominant role in the war against Germany."36 Woodward cites Pershing's ideas regarding "the aggressive American rifleman, whose tradition of marksmanship and frontier warfare" could rid the Western Front of trench warfare and execute a great offensive against Germany.37 Historians cite the notion throughout the ranks of the AEF that the United States should remain independent from the Allies, and historians point to the fact that many doughboys saw themselves as superior soldiers to the Allies. Robert H. Zieger argues that "virtually the entire military establishment" agreed with Pershing's desire to have an independent American 33 Allan R. Millett, "Over Where? The AEF and the American Strategy for Victory, 1917-1918," Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present, eds. Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts (Westport: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1986), 237. 34 Millett, "Over Where?," 239. 35 Bullitt Lowry, "Pershing and the Armistice," The Journal of American History 55 no. 2, (September 1968): 281-291, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1899558. 36 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 81. 37 Woodward, 89, 207. Bailes 10 command.38 Still, Zieger does note that this separate American command relied heavily on the Allies for logistics support, and the AEF "misunderstood the military dynamics of the Western Front."39 Richard Faulkner argues that Pershing's doctrine rested on his belief that the "superior American rifle marksmanship, aggressiveness, and skilled maneuvering" could win the fight for the Allies.40 Faulkner argues that American soldiers saw themselves as intervening in the war effort to help the failing French and British, taunting their British partners by claiming AEF stands for "After England Failed." He devotes a chapter named as such to explain the AEF belief in the superiority of the American fighting man.41 Harold Winton argues that Pershing believed that the United States soldier was superior to his European counterpart.42 Jennifer Keene argues that issues such as the treatment of African-American soldiers and disagreements about which nation contributed the most to the Allied victory created rifts between the two allies.43 In her full text, Keene narrates AEF interactions with their French Allies, and she claims that doughboys saw themselves as superior fighters who could help turn the tide of war.44 Michael Neiberg explains that United States citizens and soldiers came away from the conflict with the belief in the "inherent superiority" of the American system over that of Europe.45 38 Robert H. Zieger, America's Great War: World War I and the American Experience (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 92-102. 39 Zieger, America's Great War, 96. 40 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders: The American Soldier in World War I (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017), 285. 41 Faulkner, 281-304. 42 Harold Winton, "Toward an American Philosophy of Command," The Journal of Military History 64, no. 4 (October 2000): 1059, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2677266. 43 Jennifer D. Keene, "Uneasy Alliances: French Military Intelligence and the American Army During the First World War," Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (January 2008): 18-36, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432461. 44 Jennifer D. Keene, Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 105-11. 45 Michael S. Neiberg, The Path to War: How The First World War Created Modern America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 23. Bailes 11 Even when historians convey a more positive relationship between the AEF and their Allied counterparts, they still address the tension between Pershing and Allied leadership. Robert Bruce portrays a much more positive partnership between the doughboy and his French ally. Bruce documents Marshal Joseph Joffre's visit to the United States after Congress declared war against Germany to muster American support for the French. By comparing France's visit to Britain's, Bruce argues that Joffre established the framework for an intimate Franco-American partnership.46 Bruce maintains that the French respected the American soldier and viewed the entry of the AEF into the war as the saving grace of the Allies. Bruce narrates a bond between doughboys and French troops that increased as they trained and fought together.47 Despite this positive portrayal by Bruce of the French and AEF bond, Bruce still highlights the tension in Pershing's interactions with French commanders as well as noting the general perception amongst French commanders that Pershing thought "he knew everything there was to know about modern warfare."48 Bruce adds that different peace aims and post-war sentiments towards Germany created disagreements amongst American and French soldiers that fractured the relationship built during the war.49 Of note, Bruce suggests that the doughboys harbored what they saw as a "perceived lack of aggressiveness in the French."50 After synthesizing the historiography, the question remains regarding how these two arguments can be linked. Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale 46 Robert B. Bruce, "America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917," Journal of Military History 66 no. 2 (April 2002): 407-441, http://doi.org/10.2307/3093066; Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 32-59. 47 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 86-121. 48 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 128, 143. 49 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 286-95. 50 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 122. Bailes 12 coalition operation? Wilsonian ideals influenced the AEF's actions in the First World War because most American leaders and soldiers shared Wilson's concepts of Progressivism and believed that the United States should play a role in saving Europe. Even if some did not agree with Wilson's politics, most doughboys shared his ideas of American Exceptionalism, and these views affected United States involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. In merging the two topic areas of Wilson's ideologies and AEF involvement in the war, this essay will attempt to answer how the American doughboy found motivation in the same principles that guided President Wilson. Perhaps a reader will identify that the AEF demonstrated trends in Europe that highlight an "American way of war" that still resonates in United States coalition operations today. When President Wilson brought the United States into the First World War in April of 1917, he sold it as an effort to make the world safe for democracy. In Wilson's war address to Congress, Wilson called Imperial Germany's resumption of their unrestricted submarine campaign "warfare against mankind."51 Wilson maintained that Imperial Germany had given the United States no other choice but to declare war when they resumed their submarine attacks on merchant ships in the early spring of 1917. Still, Wilson furthered his justification for war by appealing to the broader ideal of fighting to defeat the Imperial German autocracy. Wilson described the "selfish and autocratic power" against which a free people needed to wage war.52 Later in his address, Wilson stated that he found hope in what he saw as the restoration of power to the people demonstrated in the Russian Revolution. Wilson saw a pre-Lenin revolution as 51 Woodrow Wilson, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress Calling for a Declaration of War" in "President Wilson," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, ed. Mario R. DiNunzio (New York: NYU Press, 2006): 399, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.15. 52 Wilson, "Declaration of War," 400. Bailes 13 bringing democracy to the people of Russia, and it opened the door for the realization that the Allies fought because "the world must be made safe for democracy."53 Arthur Link comments on Wilson's initial optimism on hearing of the Russian Revolution overthrowing Czar rule.54 While the Russian Revolution took a different turn in the following years, the initial news of the Russian people revolting against the Czar gave Wilson confidence that democracy could spread in Europe since now the Allies truly represented a democratic system. Wilson had spent the first years of the war trying to mediate peace in Europe through United States neutrality, and he tried to negotiate an end to the fighting without a victory for any of the imperial belligerents. Wilson did not see a lasting peace coming to Europe if any of the imperial powers achieved their peace objectives, so he attempted to mediate a truce. Kendrick Clements narrates how Wilson's desire to keep the United States neutral grew at odds with his economic support for the Allies. War for the United States rose to be more likely as Imperial Germany became increasingly aggravated with the United States for supplying aid to France and Britain while professing neutrality.55 Fraser Harbutt argues that at the initial outbreak of war in Europe, leaders as well as citizens of the United States concerned themselves with the economic impacts of the war primarily, and the United States benefited economically by supporting the Allies, specifically in the steel trade.56 Imperial Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, as well as the capture of Germany's Zimmerman Telegram in January 1917, soliciting an alliance with Mexico, prompted Wilson to support waging war on Imperial Germany. Now American entry into the conflict presented Wilson with some new options for shaping the post- 53 Wilson, "Declaration of War," 401-2. 54 Link, "Entry into World War I," 122-3. 55 Kendrick A. Clements, "Woodrow Wilson and World War I," Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 1 (March 2004: 62-82, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552564. 56 Fraser J. Harbutt, "War, Peace, and Commerce: The American Reaction to the Outbreak of World War I in Europe 1914," An Improbable War? The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture Before 1914, eds. Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 320-1. Bailes 14 war world. Thomas Knock describes how even though the United States entry into the war meant the essential failure of Wilson's "Peace Without Victory," the international community had seemingly bought into Wilson's concept of "collective security."57 In the previous few years of American neutrality, Wilson had advocated for creating a collection of democratic nation-states to band together to prevent war, and by 1917 the international community seemed interested. Wilson would use American belligerency to shape his new world order for peace. Russia's withdrawal from the war in March of 1918 made the need for a United States presence all the more significant for the Allies. The American soldier would be a crusader of sorts, attempting to cure Europe of the diplomacy of old that had brought her to destruction. The European July crisis of 1914 that erupted in a full-scale war the following month proved to be the culmination of decades of the European balance of power diplomacy that led to rival alliances and an armament race between the feuding dynasties.58 European power politics had dominated the continent for centuries, which inevitably escalated into a world war, and the United States soldier would have the opportunity to save the nations from which most of their ancestors had descended. Michael Neiberg argues that by 1917, the American people felt an obligation to enter the war to save Europe. While the people of the United States supported neutrality initially, Neiberg explains that public opinion swayed over time toward a desire to save Europe from the terror of Imperial Germany.59 The United States Secretary of War from 1916-1921, Newton Baker, published a text almost two decades after the armistice in which he maintained that the United States went to war to stop Imperial Germany and make the world safe for democracy. Baker took issue with the 57 Knock, To End All Wars, 115. 58 James Joll and Gordon Martel, The Origins of the First World War, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 9-291. 59 Neiberg, The Path to War, 7-8, 31-3, 235. Bailes 15 historians of the 20s and 30s who claimed that economic interest influenced the United States entry into the war, and he argued they ignored the necessity of U.S. involvement to stop Germany. Baker explained that the American public remained overwhelmingly critical of the German autocracy and desired to intervene to save the European people.60 Private Alexander Clay of the AEF's 33rd Division demonstrated this sense of duty as he wrote regarding his 1918 deployment to France. As Clay's ship passed the Statue of Liberty while leaving the New York harbor, he thought to himself of the French leader Lafayette's role in securing United States victory during the American Revolution. He wrote that the AEF went to France to "repay the debt of our gratitude to your country for your country's alliance with our country in obtaining liberty from an oppressor England."61 For the United States to effectively reshape the world, there needed to be an independent American command that would ensure the United States contributed to the victory over Imperial Germany, which would give Wilson his seat at the post-war peace talks. In a January 22, 1917 address to the Senate in which he articulated his vision for peace in Europe, Wilson claimed that the warring European nations could not shape a lasting peace. While Wilson still did not advocate for United States intervention at this point, he did state that to achieve peace "[i]t will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it."62 In this speech, Wilson advocated for a "peace without victory" because he did not envision a peaceful 60 Newton D. Baker, Why We Went to War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1936), 4-10, 20, 160-3. 61 Private Alexander Clay in American Voices of World War I: Primary Source Documents, 1917-1920, ed. Martic Marix Evans (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2001; New York: Routledge, 2013), 19, Kindle. 62 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe" in "President Wilson," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, 393. Bailes 16 outcome if any of the imperial powers achieved victorious peace terms.63 Wilson reiterated his stance that the United States should play a decisive role in shaping post-war Europe and ensuring that "American principles" guided the rest of the world.64 When the United States declared war against Imperial Germany a few months after this speech, it essentially put Wilson's vision into motion. Diplomatic historian William Widenor argues that Wilson realized that the United States needed to participate in the war "rather than as an onlooker" to achieve his visions for peace.65 Widenor notes Wilson's desire for the United States to enter the war as an "associate" to the Entente as opposed to an "ally," and Widenor maintains that Wilson desired to change the world and "democratize and also, unfortunately, to Americanize it."66 The late international historian Elisabeth Glaser captures the Wilson administration's balancing between maintaining an economic relationship with the Entente powers while attempting to remain "an independent arbiter in the conflict."67 Wilson appointed General Pershing to lead the American effort, and Wilson gave him the simple instruction to keep the American Expeditionary Forces as a command separate from the Allies. In 1928, the Army War College published The Genesis of the American First Army, which documented the details surrounding how the War Department created an independent army of the United States. The text includes a caption from Secretary of War Baker's memorandum to Pershing. Baker informed Pershing of Wilson's order to "cooperate with the forces of the other countries employed against the enemy; but in so doing the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component of 63 Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 394. 64 Wilson, 396-7. 65 William C. Widenor, "The United States and the Versailles Peace Settlement," 42. 66 Widenor, 42-3. 67 Elisabeth Glaser, "Better Late than Never: The American Economic War Effort, 1917-1918," Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, eds. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 390. Bailes 17 the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved."68 The President did give Pershing the authority to decide how the AEF would integrate into Allied operations. Upon Pershing's June 13, 1917 arrival in Paris, he began making decisions regarding AEF employment as it pertained to logistics, training, and an initial American area of operations on the Western Front. With a plan of achieving a force of 1,328,448 men in France by the end of 1918, Pershing needed to ensure his troops were able to build combat power and prepare for war while simultaneously ensuring that he maintained a distinct American command.69 The following 17 months of conflict with American boots on the ground in Europe saw significant political and diplomatic friction between Pershing and the Allied commanders. Pershing attempted to keep his AEF intact while satisfying Allied requests for American soldiers to replace French and British casualties, especially when Germany launched their Spring 1918 offensives. Pershing described in his memoirs that the French and British requested American soldiers to fill their gaps on the front lines when they had each sent diplomatic missions to America shortly after the United States entered the war. Pershing maintained his adamancy against the United States "becoming a recruiting agency for either the French or British," and he recounted that the War Department retained his position as well.70 While Allied leaders ostensibly supported having an independent American army participate in the war effort, the need to replace casualties in the trenches proved to be their immediate concern. Russia withdrawing from the conflict allowed Germany to reinforce their strength on the Western Front and mount a series of offensives. Germany knew they had a limited window of time for victory 68 Army War College (U.S.) Historical Section, The Genesis of the American First Army (Army War College, 1928), Reprints from the collection of the University of Michigan Library (Coppell, TX, 2020), 2. 69 The Genesis of the American First Army, 2-9. 70 John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 1 (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1931), 30-3. Bailes 18 with the United States continuing to build combat power, so they surged in the early months of 1918. Pershing faced a strategic dilemma of trying to support the Allies and get his troops in the fight while simultaneously attempting to build an independent American army. Ultimately, Pershing gave the Allies some of his army divisions as much needed replacements, and he made an effort to ensure that these divisions remained as intact as possible. Pershing endeavored to organize these divisions under a U.S. corps level command, but this corps command proved mostly administrative rather than tactical.71 By the time Pershing activated his independent American First Army, it only spent a few months in combat. The temporarily amalgamated doughboys Pershing gave to the Allies to meet their requests had contributed more to the defeat of Imperial Germany than Pershing's independent army. Mostly because Pershing had interspersed his divisions throughout the French and British fronts to meet the Allied requests for replacements, the American First Army did not activate until August of 1918. The September 20-25 Meuse-Argonne offensive would be the first significant operation for Pershing's independent army.72 David Trask concludes his critique of Pershing by recognizing the contribution that the American soldier played in providing manpower to the Allies. Trask commends the bravery of the American doughboy, but he argues that the amalgamated U.S. divisions contributed more to victory than the American First Army.73 In a similar vein, Mitchell Yockelson contends that the 27th and 30th Divisions who remained under British command throughout the war benefited over the rest of the AEF from extensive training led by the experienced British troops, and they contributed significantly to the Allied 71 The Genesis of the American First Army, 9-46. 72 John J. Pershing, Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing: Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), 37-8; The Genesis of the American First Army, 45-58. 73 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 174-7. Bailes 19 victory.74 Pershing detailed his plans to capitalize on the initiative gained with his Meuse-Argonne offensive to deliver his decisive blow against Germany. The November 11 armistice came before he could achieve his grand vision.75 While the American doughboy played a critical role in providing an Allied victory over Imperial Germany, Pershing never realized his concept of an independent American command autonomously crushing the German army. The American soldier contributed most significantly to the Allied victory by taking part in offensives planned and conducted under the control of French and British Generals. Understanding American motivation during the war effort requires understanding the Progressive Movement taking place in the early-twentieth-century United States. Michael McGerr writes a detailed account of the cause and effect of the Progressive Movement. McGerr describes the wealth disparity brought about by Victorian society and the Gilded Age, and the class conflict emerging from this gave birth to a social and political movement that attempted to enact massive change in the American system.76 McGerr claims that the Progressive Movement attempted such major reform that no social or political action since has tried "anything as ambitious" due to the adverse reactions of such massive change.77 The Progressive Movement engulfed American society and brought about changes in family structures, race relations, and governmental powers. Herbert Croly illustrated the drive for monumental change rooted in the Progressive Movement with his text Progressive Democracy. In his narrative, Croly advocated for a complete overhaul of the American system to achieve freedom and alleviate wealth disparity. Croly saw governmental reform as the method for spreading democracy to all 74 Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers, 213-23. 75 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 2, 355-87. 76 McGerr, A Fierce Discontent, 3-146. 77 McGerr, 315-9. Bailes 20 citizens.78 In describing American public opinion during the time of United States entry into World War I, David Kennedy argues that for those Americans who championed progressive ideals, "the war's opportunities were not to be pursued in the kingdom of commerce but in the realm of the spirit."79 While the United States maintained a formidable economic link with the Allies throughout American neutrality, Wilson appealed to American ideals to garner public support for the war. United States entry into the war did not come as the natural development of the Progressive Movement. Still, the American public's reason for supporting the war certainly borrowed progressive sentiments. Wilson championed progressive initiatives that had ingrained themselves in the national mood of early-twentieth-century America. Wilson ran for President in 1912 on the principles he codified the following year in his text The New Freedom. Wilson argued that the Jefferson era of United States democracy had long ended. Wilson maintained that because of the new complexities found in American society, a "reconstruction in the United States" needed to occur to achieve real economic and social freedom.80 Ronald Pestritto articulates Wilson's vision for a governmental system as it relates to a society's history and progress. According to Wilson, the method of government that works for people depends on how far that population has progressed. In that manner, the government should always change to reflect the progression of its people best.81 Pestritto argues that a major theme found in Wilson's 1908 text Constitutional Government in the United States rests in the idea that: [T]here are four stages through which all governments pass: (1) government is the master and people are its subjects; (2) government remains the master, not through 78 Herbert Croly, Progressive Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1914; New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers; Second printing 2006), 25, 103-18. 79 David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 39. 80 Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom: A Call for the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People (New York and Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1913), www.philosophical.space/303/Wilson.pdf. 81 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 34-42. Bailes 21 force but by its fitness to lead; (3) a stage of agitation, when leaders of the people rise up to challenge the government for power; and (4) the final stage, where the people become fully self-conscious and have leaders of their own choosing.82 Wilson epitomized the Progressive Movement's ideals regarding the government adapting to the changes of the people to create a more representative system of government. He would appeal to these principles in advocating for United States intervention in Europe. An underlying sentiment existed within the Progressive Movement that sought to bring about massive change, and this energy extended into the war effort. Lloyd Ambrosius explains the rise of the United States as an imperial power during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. The outcome of the American Civil War created a more powerful central government, and economic growth during the following decades allowed more opportunity for global expansion.83 As the United States extended its global presence, the ideals that formed the nation began to influence foreign policy. David Kennedy writes about the shift in prominent progressives toward support of the war effort. Kennedy references John Dewey as a significant advocate for utilizing the war to satisfy progressive initiatives. According to Kennedy, progressives found appeal in Wilson's reasons for American belligerency in Europe as "a war for democracy, a war to end war, a war to protect liberalism, a war against militarism, a war to redeem barbarous Europe, a crusade."84 Michael McGerr states that the First World War "brought the extraordinary culmination of the Progressive Movement."85 Regardless of the typical progressive view of war, progressives could find merit in Wilson's justification for United States involvement. 82 Pestritto, 37. 83 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 26-32. 84 Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society, 50-3. 85 McGerr, A Fierce Discontent, 280. Bailes 22 Even though a vast segment of the United States population did not support going to war in Europe, the notion of saving Europe still permeated throughout American society. In a series of essays published in the July 1917 edition of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, multiple thinkers of the time expressed the necessity of the United States entering the war to save Europe. Miles Dawson argued the importance of the United States' mission in the war by documenting the five "fundamentals" that made the United States unique, and he explained the importance of spreading those principles globally. Dawson advocated for the spreading of American ideals throughout the rest of the world.86 George Kirchwey argued that the United States must go to war to defeat Imperial Germany and secure peace. Kirchwey suggested that the war was a fight against an autocratic empire and a crusade to make the world safe for democracy. Kirchwey maintained that the United States needed to lead the effort in creating a world order for peace.87 Samuel Dutton saw the purpose of the United States as transcending party lines. Dutton suggested that the aim of defeating autocratic Imperial Germany needed to be a united American mission.88 Emily Greene Balch wrote that the United States "enters the war on grounds of the highest idealism, as the champion of democracy and world order."89 Walter Lippman argued that once the United States entered the war, they were obligated to fight to make the world safe for democracy. Lippman placed the blame for the war squarely on Germany and their aggression in Belgium and unrestricted submarine warfare. Similar to Wilson in his war address, Lippman drew parallels to the Russian Revolution and the 86 Miles M. Dawson, "The Significance of Our Mission in This War," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 10-13, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013639. 87 George W. Kirchwey, "Pax Americana," Annals, 40-48, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013645. 88 Samuel Dutton, "The United States and the War," Annals, 13-19, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013640. 89 Emily Greene Balch, "The War in Its Relation to Democracy and World Order," Annals, 28-31, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013643 Bailes 23 importance of it signaling that the Allies truly represented democracy.90 Wilson's reasons for war had found a voice in the academic circles of the United States, and they nested well with the progressive message. Wilson's goals for peace illustrate how Progressive initiatives manifested into the global sphere. In his August 18, 1914 address advocating for the American population to remain neutral during the European conflict, Wilson maintained that the United States held a responsibility "to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend."91 Similarly, when addressing the Senate over two years later communicating his persistent intent of mediating peace in Europe through American neutrality, Wilson criticized the demands for peace submitted by the Entente that sought revenge over Imperial Germany rather than a lasting peace. Wilson instructed that "peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again."92 In line with his progressive ideology, Wilson believed in United States intervention in the European conflict that would fundamentally improve their diplomatic system entirely. The United States would intervene in Europe to not only end the conflict but restructure the political climate in a more peaceful, progressive manner. Kendrick Clements argues that Wilson's economic and diplomatic decisions throughout United States neutrality drew him into the war gradually as he continued to side with the Allies. Wilson attempted to maintain his ideals for peace as the United States continued to get closer to belligerency.93 When the United States entry into the war proved virtually inevitable, Wilson 90 Walter Lippman, "The World Conflict in Its Relation to American Democracy," Annals, 1-10, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013638. 91 Woodrow Wilson, "An Appeal for Neutrality in World War I," 390. 92 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 392. 93 Clements, "Woodrow Wilson and World War I," 63-81. Bailes 24 ensured that the reasons for fighting aligned with the progressive energy that moved within American society. A religious vigor inspired military action that can be seen as a product of the Progressive Movement as well. Richard Gamble narrates the origin of the opinion that the United States represented a light for the rest of the world, and he describes how this concept brought the nation into the war. Gamble argues that these Christian ideals drove the political climate as Wilson's vision echoed the religious sentiment, and they prompted men to fight.94 Gamble describes the "social gospel" movement that had energized progressive Christians in the United States as extending into the international realm. The same energy that had influenced Christians to enact domestic change had transcended into a desire to improve the world, and Wilson ensured these sentiments carried over into United States foreign policy.95 Ronald Pestritto argues Wilson's religious conviction and explains that Wilson linked his faith with his duty to help shape the rest of the world. Pestritto explains the belief that "America was a key battleground in the victory of good over evil."96 Richard Gamble's mention of literature such as Washington Gladden's 1886 "Applied Christianity" highlights the popular message of progressive faith that nests with Pestritto's argument.97 Wilson illustrated the linkage of religion and progressive reform when he spoke in Denver, Colorado, in a 1911 build-up to his run for the Presidency. Wilson commented that "liberty is a spiritual conception, and when men take up arms to set other men free, there is something sacred and holy in the warfare."98 Wilson went on to champion the necessity of finding truth in the Bible's message, and he concluded by warning against believing "that 94 Gamble, The War for Righteousness, 5-87. 95 Gamble, 69-87. 96 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 40-3. 97 Gamble, The War for Righteousness, 49-67. 98 Woodrow Wilson, "The Bible and Progress" in "On Religion," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.7, 54. Bailes 25 progress can be divorced from religion."99 To Wilson, Christianity taught the spiritual duty of working toward social progress, and most progressive men of faith believed in these same sentiments which carried over toward United States actions in France. At the core of this Progressive energy and Wilson's peace aims were the sentiments surrounding an idea of American Exceptionalism. Many of the same ideas found in the religious aspect of the need to work for social progression catered to a sense of American Exceptionalism. In the same May 7, 1911 address in Denver, Colorado, Wilson spoke of the greatness of the United States as a direct correlation to the religious zeal and Biblical principles with which the founders had established the nation. According to Wilson, "America has all along claimed the distinction of setting this example to the civilized world."100 Wilson believed that the United States should serve as the model of Christian values for the rest of the world as "America was born to exemplify that devotion to the elements of righteousness which are derived from the revelations of Holy Scripture."101 In his text In Search of the City on a Hill, Richard Gamble describes how the United States narrative utilized an interpretation of divine providence to create an image of a nation built on religious principles that should serve as an example for the rest of the world.102 Lloyd Ambrosius describes the prevalent belief in the early twentieth-century United States that considered the United States a "providential nation" as citizens attempted to justify global expansion.103 If the United States existed as a providential manifestation of God's will, then that could rationalize the spread of the American system into the international realm. 99 Wilson, "The Bible and Progress," 53-9. 100 Wilson, 56. 101 Wilson, 59. 102 Richard M. Gamble, In Search of the City on a Hill: The Making and Unmakng of an American Myth (London: Continuum International Publishng Group, 2012), 6-119. 103 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and Ameriam Internationalism, 33. Bailes 26 Men of faith found a divine message in the need for the United States to intercede in the global sphere to mold the world in her image. Wilson's brand of progressive history nested well with his idea of American Exceptionalism. Lloyd Ambrosius explains Wilson's fundamental belief that "primitive peoples moved toward greater maturity over the generations."104 Wilson applied this to the history of the United States. As Ronald Perstritto describes, Wilson believed that "the history of human progress is the history of the progress of freedom."105 As people progressed, they, in turn, developed a governmental system that allowed for more representation for its citizens. According to Ambrosius, Wilson believed that "the United States represented the culmination of progressive historical development."106 The American people had achieved real progression in Wilson's historical model, and democracy achieved through the American Revolution solidified his theory. Wilson certainly made this point evident in his writings regarding history. Wilson suggests that "the history of the United States demonstrates the spiritual aspects of political development."107 The United States embodied the ideal form of Wilson's progressive history. Wilson saw it as the responsibility of the United States to spread its exceptional personification of progressive history with the rest of the world. Wilson acknowledged his views on the uniqueness of the United States in his New Freedom. While arguing for progressive reform in the states, Wilson stated that "[t]he reason that America was set up was that she might be different from all the nations of the world."108 Indeed, Wilson believed in the providential nature of the United States, and he desired to shape the rest of the world. 104 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 236. 105 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 37. 106 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 236. 107 Woodrow Wilson, "The Historian," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, 216, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.10. 108 Wilson, The New Freedom, 16. Bailes 27 Early in the war during the period of United States neutrality, Wilson's reasons for remaining neutral stemmed from his belief in the exceptional nature of the American system and his desire for the United States to stay clear of European affairs. Even in American neutrality, Wilson still sought to mediate a peace in Europe because he perceived a chance to spread the democracy of the United States to Europe. Wilson believed that he needed to mediate in the European conflict because "mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves," and he questioned whether the Entente and Central powers fought "for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power."109 Wilson's peace aims were in sharp contrast to the Allied leaders, which illustrated his emphasis that the United States should mold a post-war Europe, and this tied directly to American Exceptionalism. While the British leadership concerned themselves with imperial interests, the French sought revenge on Germany from the 1870 Franco-Prussian War. Wilson made it clear in his war address that the United States had "no quarrel with the German people."110 Wilson's vision for a post-war world remained focused on a lasting peace rather than what he perceived as selfish imperial gains or senseless revenge. American Exceptionalism formed the foundation for the interventionist foreign policy of the Progressive Era, and it profoundly motivated Wilson as well as the bulk of American society. Diplomatic historian William Appleman Williams details the rise of the United States as a global power. Williams argues that most Americans in the early twentieth-century United States agreed not only with "Wilson's nationalistic outlook," but they also agreed that the nation should serve as an example for the rest of the world.111 As mentioned previously, Miles Dawson contributed 109 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 393. 110 Woodrow Wilson, "Declaration of War," 401. 111 Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 86. Bailes 28 to the July 1917 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science to voice the justification of United States intervention in France. In his text, Dawson defined the five uniquely American fundamentals as: 1. The inalienable right of every man to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness – not as a mere dead saying, but as a living reality. 2. The right of local self-government, within territories possessing or entitled to claim such right, embracing every power of government not expressly granted to the union. 3. The guaranty to each state of a forum for the redress of grievances of one state against another with full power to enforce the verdict of that forum. 4. The guaranty of a republican form of government to each constituent state. 5. The right and duty to maintain the union.112 To thinkers like Dawson, this unique set of traits not only provided United States citizens with a system of government that separated them from the rest of the world, but it inherently gave them a duty to spread the American ideology to the rest of the world. Fundamentally, the idea that the world should take the lead from the United States exemplified the broad theme of American Exceptionalism inspiring AEF actions in the war. With Progressivism and American Exceptionalism at the root of the war effort, the citizen-soldier of the AEF found inspiration in the same rhetoric. Nelson Lloyd described the "melting-pots" of the army cantonment areas in which soldiers who were born outside of the United States "have become true Americans. They have learned the language of America and the ideals of America and have turned willing soldiers in her cause."113 Michael Neiberg argues that a lasting legacy of United States involvement in the war became a unified American mission superseding any cultural allegiance, and "disagreements would no longer be based on ethnicity 112 Dawson, "The Significance of Our Mission in This War," 11. 113 Newson Lloyd, How We Went to War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922), 58, https://archive.org/details/howwewenttowar00lloyrich/page/n7/mode/2up. Bailes 29 or religion."114 United States entry into the war gave the American citizen-soldier a reason for fighting to preserve a democratic system in Europe, and Wilson's belief that the United States would play a central role became widespread amongst the ranks of the AEF. Lieutenant Willard Hill of the Transport Division and 94th Aero Pursuit Squadron claimed when hearing of the United States entry into the war "that this war is not over yet and that the U.S. troops will play a very decisive factor."115 The purpose of United States entry into the war inspired an idealism that would unify soldiers and champion a belief that the AEF would save Europe from the autocracy of Imperial Germany. Private Willard Newton of the 105th Engineers, 30th Division, exclaimed his joy during the September offensives by stating, "[a]t last we are at the beginning of a real battle between Prussianism and Democracy! And we are to fight on the side of Democracy that the world may forever be free from the Prussian peril!"116 The sentiments of these soldiers expressed a voice that echoed Wilson's desire to utilize an American army to bring peace to Europe, and Pershing dutifully followed his instructions. Pershing's stubbornness in not giving in to the Allies' request to amalgamate troops remained the most significant source of friction between him and the Allied military leaders. Still, Pershing's belief that the doughboy remained a superior warrior to the French and British soldier intensified Pershing's negative feelings toward his Allied counterparts. Pershing did not hide his views regarding coalitions when he wrote early in his memoirs that "[h]istory is replete with the failures of coalitions and seemed to be repeating itself in the World War."117 Russell Weigley argues that Pershing believed "that only by fighting under American command would 114 Michael S. Neiberg, "Blinking Eyes Began to Open: Legacies from America's Road to the Great War, 1914-1917," Diplomatic History 38, no. 4 (2014): 812, https://doi:10.1093/dh/dhu023. 115 Lieutenant Willard D. Hill (Cleburne, Texas) in American Voices of World War I, 47. 116 Private Willard Newton (Gibson, North Carolina) in American Voices of World War I, 140. 117 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 1, 34. Bailes 30 American soldiers retain the morale they needed to fight well."118 This assertion proved incorrect as those American doughboys who fought under French and British command performed extraordinarily.119 David Trask maintains that Pershing's "presumption that the American troops were superior to others in the war helps explain his stubborn insistence on an independent army even during the greatest crisis of the war."120 Although the German Spring Offensives of 1918 put the Allies in desperate need of replacements, Pershing held his ground in resisting amalgamation. He only agreed to temporary amalgamation after much deliberation. Pershing's plan required maintaining a separate and distinct American force if the United States was to play a critical role in defeating Imperial Germany. This plan did not always synchronize with General Foch's overall plan for the Allied strategy for defeating Imperial Germany. Mitchell Yockelson describes an instance in late September 1918 in which a newly established AEF officers' school near Pershing's headquarters pulled a bulk of American officers from the front lines, which "affected the AEF First Army divisions that were about to attack in the Meuse-Argonne operation."121 United States political leadership back home undoubtedly noticed the friction between Pershing and the Allied leaders. David Woodward mentioned that at one point, Wilson and Secretary Baker intervened to plead with Pershing to be more accommodating to the Allies. According to Woodward, "Pershing proved as immovable as ever when it came to wholesale amalgamation and introducing Americans to trench warfare before he deemed them ready for combat."122 118 Weigley, "Pershing and the U.S. Military Tradition," 335. 119 Weigley, 335. 120 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 61. 121 Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers, 127. 122 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 168-9. Bailes 31 Pershing's doctrine of "open warfare" proved predicated on a firm belief in the exceptional quality of the American fighting man. In his memoirs, Pershing documented his view that the results of the Battle of the Marne had placed the opposing forces in a trench defensive that had taken away their aggression and ability to fight an offensive battle. Pershing maintained that "victory could not be won by the costly process of attrition, but it must be won by driving the enemy out into the open and engaging him in a war of movement."123 Sergeant-major James Block of the 59th Infantry, 4th Division, wrote after an offensive near Belleau Wood that his troops "had proven to ourselves that we were the Hun's master, even in our present untrained condition. The Hun could not stand before us and battle man to man."124 David Trask argues that Pershing's reliance on the rifle and bayonet under his open warfare doctrine limited the AEF's ability to adapt to the combined arms fight as quickly as did the French and British.125 In his Final Report, Pershing praised the Allied training system that prepared his inexperienced troops for combat on the Western Front. Although he admitted that his soldiers needed to learn from the experiences of the combat tested French and British, he stated that "[t]he long period of trench warfare had so impressed itself upon the French and British that they had almost entirely dispensed with training for open warfare."126 Pershing relied heavily on his infantrymen, and he saw the rifle and the bayonet as the superior weapon. He did not factor advances in the machine gun, tanks, and artillery to integrate all lethal assets onto the battlefield. According to Richard Faulkner, Pershing planned on using his troops – who he believed were 123 Pershing, 151-4. 124 Sergeant-major James W. Block (Marquette, Michigan) in American Voices of World War I, 108. 125 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 19. 126 Pershing, Final Report, 13-5. Bailes 32 better suited for offensive warfare – to "force the Germans from their trenches into open terrain where the Allies' greater resources would then destroy the unprotected enemy army."127 Perhaps nothing exhibited Pershing's obtuse attitude toward his Allied counterparts more than his desire to beat the French in seizing Sedan from the Germans. Pershing outlined his wishes that his "troops should capture Sedan, which the French had lost in a decisive battle in 1870."128 Russell Weigley comments on Pershing's intent "to try to snatch from the French army the honor of recapturing the historic fortress city of Sedan, where the Emperor Napoleon III had surrendered to the Prussians on September 1-2, 1870."129 Sergeant-major Block described the fierce German resistance during the late September Allied offensives. Still, he claimed that "[o]nce the Americans penetrated that line, their advance northward would be comparatively easy. Sedan would fall next."130 The AEF performed well during the offensives in early November, and the crumbling Imperial German army made Sedan easily attainable for either Pershing's Second Army or the Franco-American armies.131 David Trask points out the diplomatic issue that would ensue if Pershing were to "deprive the French army of this honor."132 The new commander of the American First Army, General Liggett, ultimately did not carry out the attack, which undoubtably prevented a political and diplomatic disaster.133 Russell Weigley maintains that Liggett changed plans after "the offended French" updated him of Pershing's plans on November 7.134 The idea that Pershing wished to take away French retribution by giving 127 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders, 285. 128 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 2, 381. 129 Weigley, "Pershing and the U.S. Military Tradition," 342. 130 Sergeant-major Block in American Voices of World War I, 135. 131 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 282-3. 132 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 174. 133 Trask, 174, 134 Weigley, 343. Bailes 33 his troops a decisive victory and morale boost demonstrated his disconnect from the sentiments of his Allied counterparts. Pershing's belief in the superiority of the American soldier to his French and British counterpart extended to the lower ranks of the AEF. While perhaps sensationalizing his account, Scout Corporal Edward Radcliffe of the 109th Infantry, 28th Division wrote regarding actions around St Agnon "that the French of the 10th or 6th army had fallen back, their officers being shot by our men when they ordered them to retreat."135 In a post-World War I survey, Sergeant Donald Drake Kyler of the 16th Infantry, 1st Division answered a question about what he learned about America and Americans from the war. Sergeant Kyler stated that "Americans are inclined to brag about their systems and accomplishments which may or not be superior to those of other peoples or cultures."136 In many of the accounts of AEF actions in Europe, General Pershing and his doughboys showcased American Exceptionalism. Richard Faulkner devotes a chapter of his text to argue that most of the AEF doughboys perceived inferiority in the French way of life compared to the United States. The majority of white AEF soldiers came away from the war, believing that, in terms of technology as well as general health and welfare, American society remained superior to that of France and England.137 Faulkner makes note that "with the notable exception of the African Americans, the soldiers generally believed that their society was markedly superior to anything they encountered in Europe."138 Sergeant-major Block wrote a letter home to his parents during the post-war occupation period. He wrote of the perception that "Paris makes up for the backwardness of the rest of France."139 135 Corporal Edward Radcliffe in American Voices of World War I, 94. 136 Sergeant Donald Drake Kyler (Fort Thomas, Kentucky) in American Voices of World War I, 196. 137 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders, 188-93. 138 Faulkner, 189. 139 Sergeant-major Block in American Voices of World War I, 191. Bailes 34 While the bond formed between the French and British soldiers and the AEF doughboy proved strong, there still seemed to be a sentiment of American superiority amongst the AEF ranks. Tasker H. Bliss, who served as Army Chief of Staff from September 1917 to May 1918, documented the challenge of absent unified Allied command in a 1922 essay. Bliss wrote a detailed piece in which he criticized the lack of a unified Allied mission while praising General Foch and championing his eventual selection as "Allied Commander-in-Chief."140 Bliss condemned the Allied leaders for waiting so long before establishing any sort of unified command, and he argued that for the first years of the war, they fought for their national goals only. Bliss maintained that this hindered United States integration into the war effort as well.141 Charles Pettit wrote an account of his time on the Western Front. Initially serving in the British army, Pettit joined the AEF once they arrived and concluded his 42 months of combat with the Rainbow Division. Pettit commented that "[w]e know why the French and English didn't win the War. They was waiting for us."142 Robert Bruce expands on the relationship between the American and French soldiers during the post-war occupation period. The doughboys believed that the Allied victory had eliminated the threat of autocratic Imperial Germany. At the same time, the French soldiers still demonstrated distrust of the German for fear of a future war. According to Bruce, "Americans did not want to hear about the need to prepare for a future war with Germany. They believed that victory in the Great War and the conversion of Germany to a democracy was enough to end the menace; Americans were unwilling to do more."143 For the AEF doughboy, the United States' actions in the war had saved Europe from the threat of the 140 Tasker H. Bliss, "The Evolution of the Unified Command," Foreign Affairs 1, no. 2 (December 1922): 1-30, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20028211. 141 Bliss, 7-30. 142 Charles A. Pettit in Echoes From Over There: By the Men of the Army and Marine Corps who Fought in France, eds. Craig Hamilton and Louise Corbin (New York City: The Soldiers' Publishing Company, 1919), 107-9. 143 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 289. Bailes 35 Imperial German autocracy. United States' involvement in its first large-scale coalition operation had solidified the dominance of the American soldier and the system for which he fought. The American doughboy contributed significantly to the Allied victory over Imperial Germany. Without American boots on the ground in France, Imperial Germany may have defeated the Allies. Allan Millett argues that Pershing's independent army did not achieve all that Pershing had hoped. Still, Millett maintains that an accurate assessment of the war would be that the "Allies might have lost the war without the American Expeditionary Forces."144 With the Russian withdrawal from the war and Germany's surge in the Western Front in the Spring of 1918, the Allies desperately needed more boots on the ground. AEF actions in Cantigny, Belleau Wood, and the attack on the Hindenburg line proved the value of the doughboys to the Allied victory over Imperial Germany and the Central Powers. Acknowledging the contribution of the American soldier to the Allied victory should remain a critical focus of any study of United States involvement in the war. While the presence of American troops on the ground benefited the Allies and did give Wilson his seat at the post-war peace talks, Pershing did not realize his grand vision of an independent American army crushing Imperial Germany. Bullitt Lowry documents Pershing's desire to capitalize on increasing the United States combat power to continue pressing a weakening German army and deliver a crushing blow.145 The Germans signed the armistice before Pershing could make this happen. While Wilson gained his seat at the peace conference and Pershing did not get his chance to win a tactical victory, the French and British still received their original desires and delivered Germany "harsh armistice terms."146 144 Millett, "Over Where?," 251. 145 Lowry, "Pershing and the Armistice," 286-91. 146 Lowry, 291. Bailes 36 With the eventual collapse of the League of Nations, Wilson never achieved his vision of a new world order for peace. Still, the United States government had established its importance and commenced its entry into the realm of global powers. United States involvement in the First World War helped solidify a national identity as well as establish an American presence on the international stage. Theodore Roosevelt Jr. wrote a letter on May 15, 1919, in which he documented the benefit of the war and what he saw as "Americanizing and democratizing" the soldiers through military service.147 Roosevelt commented that through service in support of the war effort, "love of the men for their country has been deepened, that their sense of real democracy has been sharpened and steadied and that insofar as any possible bad effect goes, the men are more than ever ready and determined to see order and fair play for all."148 In a similar vein, Italian born AEF Sergeant Morini wrote that the war provided him a chance "to make good on my Americanism."149 To Morini, fighting in the war provided him with "the right to the name Yankee all right."150 While the United States' efforts in the war were in support of the Allies, the war became a chance for the nation to claim its identity. A country that had been torn apart by civil war half a century before utilized the war effort to continue to unify and recover its self-proclaimed providence. The war ostensibly became an effort to Americanize its own citizens. The historiography of United States involvement in the First World War presents various arguments. Some historians such as David Trask and Russell Weigley remain critical of General Pershing and his decision making. While some scholarly history shows a narrative less scathing of Pershing, most of the description found in popular history showcases valiant actions of 147 Theodore Roosevelt in Echoes From Over There, 95. 148 Roosevelt, 95. 149 Sergeant Morini in Echoes From Over There, 115. 150 Morini, 115. Bailes 37 Pershing and his efforts in maneuvering the American Expeditionary Forces to achieve victory for the Allies against Imperial Germany. The fact remains that while the doughboys contributed significantly to the Allied victory, they helped the most when they were not fighting Pershing's fight. In his Final Report, Pershing highlights the benefit that the Allies provided to the American forces. In terms of training as well as logistics, the Allies provided the doughboys with the resources they needed to defeat Imperial Germany and the Central Powers effectively.151 Pershing recognized what the Allies had supplied him and his men, but his stubbornness and arrogance still clouded his vision to a degree. While Pershing did build a trusting relationship with the Allied commanders, and his troops were efficient, he did not always operate per their same vision. At times, Pershing's desire to maintain an independent American army superseded his desire to enable the Allied strategy. Pershing strived to meet Wilson's intent of keeping a distinct American command. The question remains if, in carrying out his President's instructions, Pershing prolonged the war and delayed the defeat of the Central Powers. Secondary and primary source literature from the First World War showcases both Wilson's peace aims – which were shaped by his ideology – as well as General Pershing and AEF actions while attempting to remain an independent command in the war. When war broke out in August 1914 in Europe, Wilson tried to mediate a peace while maintaining United States neutrality. When continued trade with the Allies brought the United States into the war in April of 1917, he seized the chance to shape a new world order by establishing an independent American command to defeat Imperial Germany. Primarily because of the Progressive Movement in the United States and the concepts surrounding American Exceptionalism, the American soldier embraced Wilson's ideologies for fighting and fought valiantly to defeat the 151 Pershing, Final Report, 90. Bailes 38 Imperial German autocracy. The Progressive Movement had established itself in American society by the time the citizen-soldier went to war in France, and the principles of American Exceptionalism permeated in virtually every facet of American culture. The American doughboy carried both of these concepts with him to France. Despite Pershing not attaining his decisive blow against the German army, and Wilson not achieving his vision for a new world order, the United States still met a significant amount of Wilson's original intent for entering the war. Wilson's ideologies influenced how the AEF fought in France. As the First World War shaped the United States standing as a global power, it also demonstrated the critical nature of maintaining relationships with coalition partners. Hew Strachan begins the conclusion to his history of the war by stating that "[t]he First World War was a coalition war."152 The American doughboy established a positive relationship with his French and British counterparts. The ability of the American soldier to learn from the experiences of the combat tested Allies, to adapt to the rigors of trench warfare, and to perform well in battle fighting beside his international partners shows the success of the AEF's performance in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. Despite these successes, the AEF doughboy exhibited American Exceptionalism in the First World War. 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The purpose of this study is to outline preliminary steps towards a history of emotions in IR. The primary contribution – and argument – of this study emerges from the observation that IR scholars have tended to write emotions 'out of history' in order to make sense of the present. Building on the works of historian Barbara Rosenwein, this study argues that much of the discipline of International Relations has incorporated into its thinking a strong but flawed 'grand narrative' of emotion. In brief, the narrative is this: the history of the West is the history of increasing emotional restraint – a progressive historical development that moves from 'primitive' emotional cultures, which give people much more liberty to manifest emotions they experience, to 'civilized' modernity and the bureaucratic rational state, which require social control of emotions. I assess two different arguments for this conclusion. The first argument concedes that at least some IR theories do take seriously the historical representation of emotions but holds that much of IR theorizing rests on a temporal binary that uses a linear-progressive conception of emotional history, in which the experience and expression of emotion increasingly became subject to emotional control by social forces. Certainly not all IR theories insist on the universal validity of specific models of emotion concepts, as I will show below. But even those IR theories that do take history seriously, cannot avoid incorporating the grand narrative of emotional restraint outlined above into their thinking. The second argument holds that the grand narrative, which represents the history of international relations as a history of increasing emotional restraint, is predominantly a Western historical narrative. This argument introduces a spatial binary that rests on a spatial misrepresentation of emotional history in IR. This second binary constructs the history of international relations as a narrative of an increasingly rationalized Western world against an emotionalized non-Western world that remains stuck in its violent past. I suggest that this double binary – temporal and spatial – is deeply problematic because it is rooted in a questionable historical understanding of emotions in IR: it employs a linear understanding of emotions that underappreciates and misrepresents the emotional epistemologies of previous eras. The alternative that this study develops of a history of emotions in IR is to advance the argument that the history of international relations resembles a history of emotional communities. Emotional communities are "groups in which people adhere to the same norms of emotional expression and value – or devalue – the same or related emotions" (Rosenwein, 2006, p. 2). Precisely, the idea is to suggest non-linear ways to study emotions in IR as embedded in and expressed through various emotional communities in particular times and spaces. The most promising research strategy to develop such a cross-historical comparison of emotions is to historicize them. To historicize emotions means "subjecting discourses on emotion, subjectivity, and the self to scrutiny over time, looking at them in particular social locations and historical moments, and seeing whether and how they have changed" (Abu-Lughod and Lutz, 1990, p. 5). This approach avoids some of the problems stemming from the double binary outlined above. First, it allows for a mapping of multiple emotional communities without introducing a particular temporal and spatial hierarchy. Second, the study of emotional communities enables us to evaluate contemporary notions of what is "emotional" in IR and if or how emotions have changed in their historical meaning and relative importance. Moreover, by historicizing emotions in this way, we can learn a lot about the moral values, power relationships and identities of various political communities of the past and present. Finally, to historicize emotions in this way lets us assess how different emotional communities interacted over time, contributing to a fuller understanding of globally entangled emotional histories. I illustrate this based on three interrelated approaches: communitarian, communicative, and comparative-connective. The analytical value of historicizing emotions through emotional communities is that it provides detailed insights into how emotions (or more precisely their meaningful expressions) change over time, how emotions are not merely the effects of historical circumstances but are actively shaping events and enriching historiographical theories in IR. First, this study contributes to the historical turn by further bridging the so-called 'eternal divide' between History and Political Science/International Relations (Lawson, 2010). Precisely, it problematizes the Eurocentric and presentist character of much of IR in a novel way by engaging in a critical dialogue with a linear process of emotional control. As many scholars have argued, the scholar's choice of theorizing history becomes constitutive of the way IR is theorized and understood. My aim here is to sensitize IR scholars about how they include emotions in their work and to warn against how an unconscious and anachronistic treatment of emotions may distort our view of history in IR. A more nuanced inclusion of emotions may add to our understanding of the complex historical processes that underpin and have underpinned global politics. For example, there has been a renewed interest in the study of hierarchies in IR (Zarakol, 2017). As pointed out above, emotions are important, yet underappreciated, manifestations of such historically constructed international hierarchies. That said, it should be pointed out that the approach put forward here still represents only one way of 'doing' history in IR. It is not meant to diminish existing approaches or to simply replace an existing grand narrative with a new one. As Lawson and Hobson (2008) have rightly pointed out, "history comes in plural modes rather than in singular form" and this study welcomes such pluralism. Second, the study furthers the emotional turn by highlighting the historical dimension of researching emotions in world politics. Many IR scholars – with some important exceptions – study emotions in ahistorical ways through a universal psychologizing of international relations. Essentially, they suggest that today's emotions were the emotions of the past and will remain those of the future. But this viewpoint neglects the crucial fact that contemporary emotional categories and meanings are themselves the product of historical processes. While this has been increasingly recognized by some scholars (Hutchison, 2019; Linklater, 2014), it remains unclear what exactly is historical about emotions and how we should use history in their study. My point here is that before we can genuinely appreciate diversity or pluralism in and among emotional histories, we need to dispense with this grand narrative and its tendency to universalize emotion as regressive or atavistic tendencies. To this end, I suggest that the notion of emotional communities provides us with a novel historical perspective to open up space for a broader research agenda to analyze emotions in IR.
With headlines dominated by the scares of the Ebola virus and ISIS victories in Iraq, the mid-term elections came and went without much fanfare, until the stunning results were known.Republicans gained control of the Senate by winning at least eight seats (Louisiana will have a runoff in December) and expanded their majority in the House by near-historic levels. They also won governorships in several blue states (Massachusetts, Maryland and Illinois). The magnitude of their sweeping victory surprised many, most interestingly among them, the pollsters themselves. They failed to predict for example, the GOP victory in the Maryland race for governor, as well as the narrow re-election of Democrat Mark Warner in Virginia, who was projected to win by a 9.7 point-margin, but narrowly missed a recount against former Virginia Republican Party Chairman Ed Gillespie.Two circumstances may explain the huge margin of Democratic losses: turnout was low, as is usually the case in mid-term elections, and the GOP ran its campaigns on one issue only: the low approval of the President's performance, nationally at 40% but as low as 15% in some red states. There was also a quite substantive amount of open seats as several senior Senators retired.Democratic candidates based their campaigns on local issues, trying to distance themselves as much as possible from Obama, the extreme case being Senate candidate Alison Lundergan Grimes, running against Mitch McConnell in Kentucky, who refused to answer when asked by a reporter if she had voted for Obama in the presidential election. It is not unusual however, for the White House party to lose mid-term legislative elections especially in the sixth year of a president with low approval rates, and under a political map that favored the GOP due to the latest round of gerrymandered re-districting.The pollsters' miscalculation is directly related to the low turnout: minorities and students didn't show up to cast their votes. In Maryland, turnout was especially low in urban Baltimore and the Washington suburbs. Pollsters base their model on self-reported likelihood to vote, which is not a reliable measure in mid-term elections, mainly because it is merely a vague intention but not a priority for most voters.With the GOP firmly in control of the two Houses of Congress, what is the next step for Obama as he enters the last two years of his Presidency? Will he defend the mandate the voters entrusted him in two elections? Or will he passively accept his "lame-duck" status and allow the new majority party to have its way? Will the author of "The Audacity of Hope" believe in his own creed about reclaiming the American Dream and "get something meaningful done" in his last 24 months at the helm?Six-year legislative losses for the President's party are nothing new. Even with divided government, presidents like Eisenhower, F. D Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan outmaneuvered opponents, and managed to shape the political agenda and leave a long shadow in the history of American politics. The question now is not if, but how Obama will do the same, whether by the power of his office, exercising his veto or issuing executive orders or by the real "stuff of politics", political compromise, bargaining and consensus building.Republicans also must choose their course as they transition from minority to majority status in the Senate: will they show they can govern and start passing legislation with some bi-partisan support or will they listen to the base and continue the combative brinkmanship that led to a government shutdown last year?The former appears more likely: Mitch McConnell, now leader of the majority in the Senate, struck a non-confrontational tone when he outlined an agenda starting with issues that have bipartisan consensus, such as completion of free trade agreements and moderate tax reform. Texas Senator Ted Cruz, notorious ego-maniac, famous for leading the battle to defund and dismantle "Obamacare" may find he is alone if he unreasonably tries to rekindle that debate. He is expected to be a presidential candidate in 2016 and may insist on a more "conservative" agenda. However, McConnell, a cunning senate veteran from Kentucky, calling Ted Cruz "an army of one", has candidly acknowledged they don't have the votes to overturn a Presidential veto, so they won't be able to repeal the health law.Still, from the extreme side of the aisle, the GOP leader is being pressured to use the leverage of another government shutdown to obtain concessions on the health law and to stop the President from using his executive authority to reform immigration. Indeed, since June the White House has been preparing to extend legal status to more undocumented immigrants and to stop some cases of deportation. This is now expected to be one of the first executive orders Obama will sign in this period, in spite of threats by Speaker Boehner that he would thereby kill any chances for comprehensive immigration reform to pass in the House before 2016. On his part, Mitch McConnell has refused the GOP base's proposals as "self-destructive".Instead, Mc Connell proposes to work on issues for which he can count on some bipartisan support such as the Keystone XL oil Pipeline, which the president may not veto (unless he succumbs to the pressure of the left wing of his party), repealing the medical device tax (a small provision of the Affordable Care Act that some say is crucial to be able to fund the health care law), and finalize some free trade agreements. To appease the base, Mc Connell is likely to bring up a bill that would ban abortions after 20 weeks of pregnancy which he is expected to do next year. Although Republicans say they have learned the lesson that denying women's reproductive rights will lose them the female vote over and over again, this is a relatively modest and reasonable measure for which they may get the support of centrist Democrats.In sum, there are plenty of openings for both parties to cooperate and for Obama to still find ways to shape his legacy. He can stand firm on certain principles such as immigration reform and climate change, and use his veto pen when he feels it is absolutely necessary. But he can also encourage Democrats in Congress to cooperate on other issues such as trade and defense policies, and not to surrender to the demands of the most radical wing.History shows that presidents can and do survive sixth-year mid-term upsets. They can still leave a strong imprint on the evolution of the political process and on the country itself. They can even pave the way for their own party to win the next election.The 2016 contest is already under way and with their eyes on the Presidency both parties know they must prove to the American public that they can do one thing: govern. Maria L. Fornella es docente de Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia.
