Suchergebnisse

604Territory — Sovereignty — Occupation — Non-self-governing territories — East Timor — Portuguese colony — Indonesia occupying East Timor — Political turmoil and violence — Independence — Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste — United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor ("UNTAET") — UNTAET Regulations — Constitution of Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste — Applicable law — Whether Indonesian law ever validly in force in East TimorInternational criminal law — Crimes against humanity — Genocide — Definition — Whether defendant committing genocide in East Timor during political turmoil and violence — UNTAET Regulation 2000/15, Section 5.1 — Whether Special Panel erring in finding defendant lacking necessary mens rea for genocide under Section 5.1 of Regulation — Requirements under Section 5.1 — Whether requirement that defendant aware of widespread or systematic nature of attacks against civilian population throughout whole territory of East Timor — Applicability of Section 5.1 — Applicable law — The law of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste

On January 19, 2012, the European Commission (Commission) decided to launch a visa liberalisation dialogue with Kosovo, and on June 14, 2012, it handed over to Kosovo's government a 'Roadmap Towards a Visa-free Regime'. This document included 95 requirements that Kosovo had to fulfil. By 2016, the Commission had adopted four reports on progress made by Kosovo in the visa dialogue. In a report issued on May 4, 2016, the EC proposed to the Council of the EU (Council) and the European Parliament (EP) to lift visa requirements on the citizens of Kosovo. The Commission stressed that by the day of the adoption of the proposal by the EP and the Council, Kosovo must have ratified the border/boundary agreement with Montenegro and strengthened its track record in the fight against organised crime and corruption. On July 18, 2018, the Commission confirmed in a report on the progress made by Kosovo in the visa dialogue, that the country had fulfilled the last two requirements included in the roadmap. The aim of this article is to analyse the visa-liberalisation dialogue between the European Union (EU) and Kosovo and whether liberalisation through a visa-free regime with Kosovo had an influence on reducing organised crime and corruption in Kosovo. The article is based on an analysis of primary and secondary sources, as well as statistical data.

The paper analyzes the social construction of youth violence in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and El Salvador on the one hand, and the related security policies of the three states, on the other. In each country, there is an idiosyncratic way of constructing youth violence and juvenile delinquency. Also, each country has its own manner of reaction to those problems. In El Salvador youths are socially constructed as a threat to security, and the state implements predominantly repressive policies to protect citizens against that threat. In Nicaragua and Costa Rica, where the social discourse on youth violence is less prominent, the state's policies are neither very accentuated nor very coherent, whether in terms of repressive or nonrepressive measures. There are strong relations and mutual influences between the public's fear (or disregard) of youth violence and the state's policies to reduce it. ; In diesem Beitrag wird einerseits die soziale Konstruktion von Jugendgewalt in Nicaragua, Costa Rica und El Salvador analysiert und andererseits die auf diese Problematik gerichtete Sicherheitspolitik der drei Staaten. Die Konstruktion von Jugendgewalt und Jugendkriminalität weist von Land zu Land unterschiedliche Charakteristika auf, und die drei Staaten reagieren jeweils anders auf diese Phänomene. In El Salvador werden Jugendliche als Sicherheitsbedrohung konstruiert, vor der die Gesellschaft mit vorwiegend repressiven Sicherheitspolitiken geschützt werden muss. In Nicaragua und Costa Rica, wo der gesellschaftliche Diskurs über Jugendgewalt weit weniger im Mittelpunkt der öffentlichen Debatte steht, sind die diesbezüglichen staatlichen Politiken weder sehr ausgeprägt noch sehr kohärent, gleich ob es sich um repressive oder nichtrepressive Maßnahmen handelt. Gesellschaftliche Angst vor (oder Nichtbeachtung von) Jugendgewalt und staatliche Sicherheitspolitik, um dieser Gewaltform zu begegnen, stehen miteinander in engem Verhältnis und üben gegenseitigen Einfluss aufeinander aus.

Bill introduced by the Texas House of Representatives relating to the nonsubstantive revision of certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, including conforming amendments.

The justice system in our country, as in many other countries, is trying to change and reform, moving from a punitive approach to a system that values restorative justice embraces the principles of rehabilitation and reintegration into society and the implementation of alternative measures against imprisonment, seeing the limitation of juvenile delinquency only as a last resort. Progress in this direction was also marked by the adoption of the Juvenile Justice Code. This Code considers detention of juveniles only as a last resort and sanctions alternative measures for children in conflict with the law. The Code brings the juvenile justice system in compliance with the Constitution, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and international standards, and other international norms aimed at protecting the juvenile and the effective protection of the highest interests of the juvenile. One of the international standards of juvenile justice is the use of imprisonment as a last resort and reintegration as a goal of the justice system. Justice should be gentle with children and be on their side. Freedom of liberty as a last resort and for a short period of time is clearly expressed and dealt with in international acts, which I have previously dealt with in some other scientific works. What is important and what I would like to present in this article in terms of applying the "punishment of imprisonment" measure is to know about the implementation of legal provisions in favor of juvenile justice and the relevant gaps. This is done by focusing primarily on national legislation.Keywords: imprisonment sentence, minor offense, crime, criminal offense, juvenile justice, rehabilitation, etc.

Despite the conclusion of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg that aggression is the 'supreme international crime', armed conflict remains a frequent and ubiquitous feature of international life, leaving millions of victims in its wake. This collection of original chapters by leading and emerging scholars from all around the world evaluates historic and current examples of the use of force and the context of crimes of aggression. As we approach the 75th anniversary of the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, Seeking Accountability for the Unlawful Use of Force examines the many systems and accountability frameworks which have developed since the Second World War. By suggesting new avenues for enhancing accountability structures already in place as well as proposing new frameworks needed, this volume will begin a movement to establish the mechanisms needed to charge those responsible for the unlawful use of force.

Abstract
Set against a backdrop of a need to develop new theories of youth 'risk' behaviour, a groundwork for how such theoretical work might be undertaken is described. Meta-theoretical principles from critical realism are used to help clarify issues such as causality in an open world, adolescents as stratified social agents, and science as a value-laden practice. A methodology for developing fallibilistic, context-sensitive knowledge is also outlined. These principles are applied to two influential risk behaviour theories—the social development model and problem behaviour theory—to illustrate how existing theory can be clarified and developed. In particular, current theories may negate adolescent agency in relation to different socio-ecological contexts. Moreover, there is a need for greater reflexivity about the moral frameworks that implicitly guide theory and thus practice. Examples of quantitative empirical studies are also discussed to demonstrate how they contribute towards building realistic theories for prevention practice.

Most discourses on victims in international criminal justice take the subject of victims for granted, as an identity and category existing exogenously to the judicial process. This book takes a different approach. Through a close reading of the institutional practices of one particular court, it demonstrates how court practices produce the subjectivity of the victim, a subjectivity that is profoundly of law and endogenous to the enterprise of international criminal justice. Furthermore, by situating these figurations within the larger aspirations of the court, the book shows how victims have come to constitute and represent the link between international criminal law and the enterprise of transitional justice. The book takes as its primary example the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), or the Khmer Rouge Tribunal as it is also called. Focusing on the representation of victims in crimes against humanity, victim participation and photographic images, the book engages with a range of debates and scholarship in law, feminist theory and cultural legal theory. Furthermore, by paying attention to a broader range of institutional practices, Figuring Victims makes an innovative scholarly contribution to the debates on the roles and purposes of international criminal justice.

The wave of reform in Indonesia that was rolling in the context of overthrowing the New Order was full of abuse of power, corruption, collusion, nepotism (KKN) and human rights violations. Application of the concept of a direct law enforcement system against the category of international crimes, which in the past emphasized the national justice jurisdiction (indirect enforcement system). Cases of human rights violations are very interesting, because the crimes that occur have a special condition which by experts call it a special form of political crime. The research method in this study is a normative juridical research method, which means that this research is sourced from library data. The legal issue in this research is How is the individual and command responsibilities in Serious Human Rights Violations in Indonesia. The results of this research show that Indonesia is currently under the spotlight internationally in connection with the indictment of gross human rights violations, especially in the issues of East Timor, Tanjung Priok and so on. The universal principle that it is impossible to treat gross human rights violations as "ordinary crimes" and the existence of a universal qualification regarding "crimes against humanity" requires the utilization of a special human rights court, which also contains several special criminal procedures. In accordance with the provisions of the International Criminal Code Statute (Art.l), cases which have been investigated and terminated by the country concerned will not be accepted for trial by the ICC (inadmissible). We have to show everyone that called "International Criminal Tribunal" really is complementary to the national courts

The article covers the criminal activity of the Bolshevik Party in Katerynoslav (modern Dnipro region) during the establishment of the Soviet-communist form of statehood in the early 1920s. The activity regards peasantry, workers, intellectual elite, political opponents, clergy. It is noted that Katerynoslav province belonged to the largest administrative-territorial units of the newly formed Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR). It covered the overwhelming majority of the south-eastern part of Ukraine. Such territorial scale of the region led to the fact that it turned into a peculiar field of sociopolitical, economic, and military course of the Bolsheviks with all the dramatic consequences thereupon.At the end of 1920, the frontline civil war gradually evolved into a struggle for the Bolshevist regime against the peasant masses. Bolsheviks called this war a struggle against "political banditism". Attention is drawn to the most important factors that predetermined the spread and growth of the peasant rebel movement, one of which was the Bolshevist economic policy pursued in villages.The emphasis is put on the scale of the peasant movement in Ukraine and the help of the UPR government to the atamans (riot leaders) who shared the idea of Ukraine's independence.Considerable attention is paid to the repressive measures taken by the Bolshevik authorities to eliminate the rebel movement: the creation of special extraordinary bodies – military meetings; the transfer of Katerynoslav region to the front line; the introduction of the hostage institution, defendants, and mutual responsibility. The Bolsheviks used punitive measures against workers who demanded an increase in meagre food provision and the improvement of difficult working conditions.It is also noted that the consequences of the 1921–1922 famine for Katerynoslav can be compared to the results of the First World War and civil wars. The Bolshevik authorities did not help the hungry; instead, they stimulated the famine in the southern Ukrainian regions with the active anti-communist movement. According to the research, during that famine Katerynoslav province lost about 1 million inhabitants. ; У статті висвітлюється злочинна діяльність партії більшовиків на Катеринославщині (сучасна Дніпропетровщина) під час утвердження радянсько-комуністичної форми державності на початку 20-х років ХХ ст. щодо селянства, робітників, інтелігенції, політичних опонентів, духовенства. Зазначається, що Катеринославська губернія належала до найбільших адміністративно-територіальних одиниць щойно утвореної Української Соціалістичної Радянської Республіки (УСРР). Вона охоплювала переважну більшість південно-східної частини України. Такі масштаби регіону призвели до того, що він перетворився на своєрідний полігон суспільно-політичного, економічного та військового курсу більшовиків з усіма драматичними наслідками, що з нього випливали.Наприкінці 1920 р. фронтова громадянська війна поступово перетворилася на боротьбу більшовицького режиму проти селянських мас. Ця війна більшовиками називалася боротьбою з «політичним бандитизмом». Розкриваються найголовніші фактори, що зумовили поширення й зростання селянського повстанського руху, одним із яких була економічна політика, яку проводили на селі більшовики. Акцентується увага на масовості селянського руху в Україні та допомозі уряду УНР отаманам, які поділяли ідею незалежності України. Розглядаються репресивні заходи, які застосовувала більшовицька влада для ліквідації повстанського руху: створення спеціальних надзвичайних органів – воєнних нарад, переведення Катеринославщини на фронтове становище, введення інституту заручництва, відповідачів та кругової поруки. Каральні заходи більшовики застосовували і проти робітників, які вимагали підвищення мізерного продовольчого забезпечення та поліпшення важких умов праці.Наголошується, що наслідки голоду 1921–1922 рр. для Катеринославщини можна порівняти з результатами Першої світової та національно-визвольної воєн. Більшовицька влада не допомогла голодуючим, а, навпаки, стимулювала голод у тих південноукраїнських регіонах, де був поширений антикомуністичний рух селян. За підрахунками дослідників, під час цього голоду Катеринославська губернія втратила близько 1 млн. жителів.

Bail reform is under attack by public officials historically identified with the cause of social justice. Release on personal recognizance is increasingly assailed as significantly contributing to the problem of pretrial flight and crime. Are these observations valid or have such reforms represented a step toward equal justice‐without seriously threatening public safety? To test the argument against bail reform, the authors analyzed the outcome of randomly selected felony cases in Houston, Texas. All defendants were monitored by a computerized information system for athirty month period.The results of the major hypotheses were mixed. Pretrial status was found to have no significant effect on conviction outcome. However, as expected, a significantly higher proportion of convicted detained defendants were sentenced to prison than their bonded counterparts. While failure to appear rate was found relatively high for both defendants released on recognizance and money bail, the actual fugitive rate (2%) and pretrial crime rate (7%) for total bonded defendants were low. Finally the results indicated that bail reform, as experienced in this major southwestern jurisdication, has not significantly affected pretrial flight or crime.

It is, in certain cases, impossible for persons to tell in advance which states will have effective legislative jurisdiction over their acts. In these cases, it is impossible to tell in advance whose law the person must obey. This quandry arises where some national law purports to regulate outsiders and their acts in a manner arguably inconsistent with the international law of legislative jurisdiction. If the regulating state's courts do not allow challenges to jurisdiction based on international law, and the state of the outsider's nationality fails to protect her diplomatically, the outsider has no protection against excessive claims of jurisdiction. Some common law states, like the United States, have no thorough jurisdictional provisions in their criminal codes. In the United States, the presumption against extraterritorial effect, revitalized in the non-criminal case of Morrison v. Australia National Bank (U.S.S.Ct. 2010), can assist in minimizing the problem of "surprise" jurisdiction over persons who had no reason to know that they would be subject to United States criminal laws which do not specify the territory, persons, and situations outside the U.S. to which they apply. The presumption against extraterritorial effect might sensibly be given an "elemental" reading. The presumption against extraterritoriality would be triggered if neither subjective territoriality (an act committed in the U.S. constitutes an element of an offense) or objective territoriality (a result which is an element of the crime occurs on U.S. territory) is present. It is hard to believe that any state would give up the general right to control either wrongful acts or illegal effects on its own territory, despite statements made by certain countries in the Morrison litigation and its aftermath. In developing this argument, this paper suggests that, on average, in recent decades, Congress has been more attuned to the obligations of the United States as an entity under the international law of jurisdiction than have been the Courts.

On 1 March 2022, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock accused the Russian President Vladimir Putin's government of waging a war of aggression against Ukraine. Speaking at the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN), she drew explicit links to the Nazi war of aggression in order to legitimise sanctions against Russia as she stressed the UN's mission to work for peace enshrined in the UN charter. Twelve months earlier, in February 2021, the Higher Regional Court in Koblenz sentenced a forty-four-year-old Syrian citizen to four and a half years' imprisonment. Based on the 'shared values of humanity', the verdict made headlines as the court explicitly cited the universal jurisdiction principle enshrined in the Völkerstrafgesetzbuch (VStGB) that had been enacted in 2002 to bring German law into accordance with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.1 Since 2002, German courts have adopted these international law principles and legal norms in a series of legal actions against foreigners to prosecute crimes against humanity.

Three and a half years ago, the ASI published a position paper and draft law proposing a "UK Free Speech Act" which would, if enacted, forever remove the regulation of nonviolent political discussion from the remit of law enforcement in the United Kingdom.The censorship provisions of the Hate Crime and Public Order (Scotland) Act 2021 (the "Hate Crime Act"), entering into force this week, are deeply offensive to freedom of expression, and the only way to stop them is to implicitly repeal these new rules with UK-wide protection for freedom of speech.The Hate Crime Act contains three provisions in particular – "aggravation of offences by prejudice," "racially aggravated harassment" and "stirring up hatred" – which are, at least as-described, descriptions of the sort of speech that most members of polite society would rightly oppose as a personal, moral matter. However, if we look at the substance of the language employed by the new laws and its derivation from similar, viewpoint-neutral English rules – in the case of the stirring-up offence and the "racially aggravated harassment" offences,  the "alarm or distress" language from the English Public Order Act 1986, and in the case of the stirring-up offence only, the historic "threatening, abusive, or insulting" language from that same law – we know that these rules have proven capable of extremely overbroad application in England, and these new rules will prove just as terrible, if not more so, if allowed to stand in Scotland.The position, outlined in a 2020 paper for the ASI, and the applicable English legal rules, remains entirely unchanged. It suffices for present purposes to note that existing English laws, which are nowhere near as intrusive as the new Scottish ones, have already been used in England to, variously: ·      threaten a schoolboy with prosecution for nonviolently holding up a sign calling the Church of Scientology a dangerous cult;·      arrest republican protestors in the vicinity of King Charles' coronation for nonviolent picketing;·      convict a protestor for nonviolently saying David Cameron had "blood on his hands" for cutting disability benefit at an event where the then-PM was speaking;·      convict protestors against the war in Iraq for nonviolently expressing their points of view in front of soldiers of the British Army returning home from that war;·      arrest students for nonviolently saying "woof" to a dog;·      arrest a woman for nonviolently praying silently; and·      arrest a preacher for nonviolently reading from the Bible, in public, verbatim.The existing rules should have been repealed years ago, but few UK lawyers, being unaccustomed to an American perspective on free speech jurisprudence and thus unable to see that the frog was starting to boil, seemed to notice very much as the English judiciary lost its way after issuing its landmark, pro-free speech decision of Redmond-Bate [1999] EWHC Admin 733. In a few short years, the English courts went from protecting controversial speech to routinely acquiescing to the criminalization of what, pre-1999 at least, would have been entirely lawful, if somewhat controversial, expression (see: Norwood v DPP [2003] EWHC 1564, and Abdul v. DPP  [2011] EWHC 247). The provisions of Article 10 of the European Convention concerning freedom of expression, enshrined in domestic law by the UK Human Rights Act, are little better than window-dressing. They have been of no assistance whatsoever in protecting English speakers of controversial ideas since that law's enactment; indeed, the Human Rights Act may have harmed the cause of free speech in the country by formalising the broad derogations from that right permitted under Article 10(2) which have been abused, time and again, to stifle discourse. Put another way, our experience with the English rules, in particular the Public Order Act 1986 but also the Malicious Communications Act 1988, and Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003, is that their application, especially in the last 25 years, has been subjective, unpredictable, inconsistent, politically-motivated, sometimes capricious, and thoroughly chilling to speech.The Scottish law turbocharges all of these problems by abandoning viewpoint-neutrality and expressly targeting "culture war" issues around questions of identity within the four corners of the statute. This is particularly the case when we look at the "aggravation of offences by prejudice" law, which states that age, disability, national or ethnic origin, sexual orientation, and transgender identity are all to be considered when sentencing people in Scotland for criminal offences. The problem with this, of course, is that merely talking about these issues and causing offence is already capable of constituting a public order offence, both in England and substantially equivalent legislation in Scotland, and these provisions were used in both England and Scotland to suppress speech even before the Hate Crime Act entered into force.Only last month transgender activists sought to have J.K. Rowling arrested there after English prosecutors declined to prosecute her for prior "gender critical" remarks. The Hate Crime Act now requires Scottish judges to take into account Rowling's motivations when judging her speech, which we think would be fairly described as emanating from the identitarian, and therefore definitionally "prejudicial," ideology known as second-wave feminism, and would require, in a public order or malicious communications-based prosecution for those feminist remarks, for a Scottish judge to consider a sentencing enhancement.It makes no sense to criminalise these conversations. Indeed it makes sense to expressly legalise them, given that national politics seems, increasingly, to cluster around identity issues and, in a democratic society, require their open discussion in order for these disputes around the proper ordering of society to be satisfactorily resolved. On the gender theory question, in particular, the debate seems to be between, on one side, critical theory-informed intersectional activists who seek to view all power relationships through the lens of what they call immutable characteristics, and on the other, we see a coalition of classical liberals and religiously-minded traditionalists from the usual suspects like the Catholic Church but also newly aggrieved groups such as traditionalist Muslim parents of schoolchildren. As the fact that the Prime Minister himself felt the need to chime in on these matters this week plainly evidences, identity issues, whether we like it or not, now sit squarely at the centre of contemporary UK political discourse. We take no view on the merits of either "side" here, because taking a viewpoint does not matter and, in any case, is inadvisable, to the extent anyone here at the Institute plans on ever setting foot in Scotland again. This is because it is now quite unsafe, legally speaking, to take a vigorously-defended public position on these questions in Scotland from any perspective, as long as there is a hearer who is offended enough to file a police report against the hearer's perceived political enemies, or calculating enough to pretend to be so offended. To see how the Hate Crime Act potentially cuts in all directions, we need look no further than criminal complaints which have already been made under the new law. See, for example, the fact that Scottish First Minister Humza Yousaf, the law's primary advocate and promoter, was immediately reported by the Indian Council of Scotland to the police for thoughtcrime contained in a speech he himself delivered in Scottish Parliament in 2023 as soon as the Hate Crime Act entered into force. Under the new regime, even the First Minister will need to take care not to express those same thoughts in the same manner again.There are not many reasonable people who wish to live in a country where the first response to any political disagreement is to call for a speaker's arrest. Nonviolent speech should never warrant a violent response. Yet, as was proven on day 1 of this new law, we already see that the Scottish law will be used, and is being used, to call down state-sanctioned violence, namely arrests and imprisonment, to suppress broad swathes of viewpoints from all political quarters. To the few back-benchers who are engaged by this pertinent issue: This is the hill to die on. Rishi Sunak, the Prime Minister, has said he opposes the Scottish law. Push the Prime Minister to back up that opposition with decisive action. Permanently abolish political censorship enforced at gunpoint. Enact the UK Free Speech Act.