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U.S. competitors pursuing meaningful revision or rejection of the current U.S.-led status quo are employing a host of hybrid methods to advance and secure interests contrary to those of the United States. These challengers employ unique combinations of influence, intimidation, coercion, and aggression to incrementally crowd out effective resistance, establish local or regional advantage, and manipulate risk perceptions in their favor. So far, the United States has not come up with a coherent countervailing approach. It is in this "gray zone"—the awkward and uncomfortable space between traditional conceptions of war and peace—where the United States and its defense enterprise face systemic challenges to U.S. position and authority. Gray zone competition and conflict present fundamental challenges to U.S. and partner security and, consequently, should be important pacers for U.S. defense strategy. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1924/thumbnail.jpg

This article uses a 'scoping' methodology to identify the different ways in which asylum policy and practice fall short of policymakers' stated aims, are counter-evidential and are inhumane in their effects. It highlights how asylum seekers, commonly constructed as undeserving economic migrants, are impacted by these powerful 'othering' narratives, before drawing on a breadth of research evidence to challenge dominant claims and expose the particular weaknesses of the asylum system. In doing so, it asks why, if asylum policy is not informed by the evidence, does not achieve its stated objectives and yet causes suffering for those seeking asylum, such an approach persists. The article then develops the concept of 'bad faith' as an exercise of power, in order to theorise the actions of powerful agents in the shaping of asylum policy and practice with reference to hidden collective interests. It contends that the asylum policymaking community, in failing to acknowledge the suffering resulting from the diminishment of asylum seekers into a 'typified other', are engaging in an oppressive power operation, concealed by the political narratives underpinning policy reforms from the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act to the 2016 Immigration Act.

This article discusses the difficult period of the XVII - XIX century in China's development. As a result of Manchu taking over China, the Qing empire was formed, and historiographers differ in evaluating the results of its rule. On the one hand, the Qing dynasty inherited the sinocentric view of the world from its predecessors - China was declared as the center of the universe, and all other states as sidelined vassals, who should not be subject to equal treatment. Manchu attempted to apply this doctrine in practice, which resulted in a significant expansion of the state, the annexation of Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang, and border wars with Russia, Vietnam and Burma. The self-isolation policy led to economic stagnation while the population was growing strongly. These problems could not have been resolved within the bounds of the traditional society.

That the later Roman empire was a period of stagnation, not to say X of decline and total collapse, in the economic as in other spheres has long been recognized. But it has been the contribution of such modern scholars as Frank, Rostovtzeff, and Heichelheim to show that the symptoms and causes of this stagnation are not to be sought solely in the anarchy of the third century A.D. They may be detected earlier, behind the facade of peace and prosperity in the second century, and have roots which reach back into the very beginnings of the Roman domination over the Mediterranean world. In order to avoid too great extension in time, as well as in space, the present discussion will be limited to the symptoms and causes of economic stagnation that may be detected throughout the Mediterranean world during the early Roman empire, the two hundred and fifty odd years that elapsed from the Battle of Actium in 31 B.C., which left Augustus master of the Mediterranean world, to the assassination of Severus Alexander in 235 A.D., which ushered in a half century of anarchy and eventually the totalitarian state of Diocletian and Constantine.

Assesses foreign relations under President George W. Bush regionally and globally; argues that since the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Bush has aggravated problems with unilateralism, inconsistent policies, and rhetorical excess that creates anti-Americanism, and should rely less on US military power and more on strategic vision. Critical of Bush's policies everywhere except Russia and comparison with President George H. W. Bush.

The story of the relation between political philosophy and economics records many curious twists and turns, anachronistic survivals, and striking anticipations. But nothing is more astonishing than the contrast between the current preoccupations of economists and their tacit methodological beliefs. During the last war and today economic enquiry has inevitably been harnessed to problems of government. But even during the two decades of armistice the bulk of the work of economists has been intimately related to policy. Not only has activity in the empirical and applied fields increased greatly, but purely theoretical analysis, too, has had a strong practical bias. Probably the three outstanding topics in theoretical discussion during the last few years have related to the problems of crises, monopoly, and planning. All three, even when debated in the most abstract terms, have an obvious "tendency to use," in the sense that they envisage the application of measures of control by government or other social agencies.Thus, judged by their choice of topics, economists seem to have given up any implicit unquestioning belief in the virtues of laissez-faire, and, to some extent, even in the capitalist system. Yet there seems still to be lurking in their minds an inherited regard, if not for the Smithian "hidden land," at least for the so-called economic case for laissez-faire as expounded by such members of the first generation of modern economics as William Stanley Jevons, Philip Wicksteed, and J. B. Clark. There are left, it is true, only a few citadels which would put up a full-bodied defence of this case. But a great many of the less intransigent economists still appear to subscribe to it when they are asked explicitly to discuss it.