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Infrastructure is an important driving force for economic growth. It reduces trade and transaction costs and stimulates the productivity of the economy. Africa has been lagging behind in the global manufacturing market. Among others, infrastructure is an important constraint in many African countries. Using firm-level data for East Africa, the paper reexamines the relationship between firm performance and infrastructure. It is shown that labor costs are by far the most important to stimulate firm production. Among the infrastructure sectors, electricity costs have the highest output elasticity, followed by transport costs. In addition, the paper shows that the quality of infrastructure is important to increase firm production. In particular, quality transport infrastructure seems to be essential. The paper also finds that agglomeration economies can reduce firm costs. The agglomeration elasticity is estimated at 0.03–0.04.

This economy profile for Doing Business 2016 presents the 11 Doing Business indicators for Congo, Democratic Republic of. To allow for useful comparison, the profile also provides data for other selected economies (comparator economies) for each indicator. Doing Business 2016 is the 13th edition in a series of annual reports measuring the regulations that enhance business activity and those that constrain it. Economies are ranked on their ease of doing business; for 2015 Congo, Democratic Republic of ranks 184. A high ease of doing business ranking means the regulatory environment is more conducive to the starting and operation of a local firm. Doing Business presents quantitative indicators on business regulations and the protection of property rights that can be compared across 189 economies from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe and over time. Doing Business sheds light on how easy or difficult it is for a local entrepreneur to open and run a small to medium-size business when complying with relevant regulations. It measures and tracks changes in regulations affecting 11 areas in the life cycle of a business: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency and labor market regulation. The data in this report are current as of June 1, 2015 (except for the paying taxes indicators, which cover the period from January to December 2014).

This economy profile for Doing Business 2016 presents the 11 Doing Business indicators for Indonesia. To allow for useful comparison, the profile also provides data for other selected economies (comparator economies) for each indicator. Doing Business 2016 is the 13th edition in a series of annual reports measuring the regulations that enhance business activity and those that constrain it. Economies are ranked on their ease of doing business; for 2015 Indonesia ranks 109. A high ease of doing business ranking means the regulatory environment is more conducive to the starting and operation of a local firm. Doing Business presents quantitative indicators on business regulations and the protection of property rights that can be compared across 189 economies from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe and over time. Doing Business sheds light on how easy or difficult it is for a local entrepreneur to open and run a small to medium-size business when complying with relevant regulations. It measures and tracks changes in regulations affecting 11 areas in the life cycle of a business: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency and labor market regulation. The data in this report are current as of June 1, 2015 (except for the paying taxes indicators, which cover the period from January to December 2014).

This economy profile for Doing Business 2016 presents the 11 Doing Business indicators for Yemen, Republic of. To allow for useful comparison, the profile also provides data for other selected economies (comparator economies) for each indicator. Doing Business 2016 is the 13th edition in a series of annual reports measuring the regulations that enhance business activity and those that constrain it. Economies are ranked on their ease of doing business; for 2015 Yemen, Republic of ranks 170. A high ease of doing business ranking means the regulatory environment is more conducive to the starting and operation of a local firm. Doing Business presents quantitative indicators on business regulations and the protection of property rights that can be compared across 189 economies from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe and over time. Doing Business sheds light on how easy or difficult it is for a local entrepreneur to open and run a small to medium-size business when complying with relevant regulations. It measures and tracks changes in regulations affecting 11 areas in the life cycle of a business: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency and labor market regulation. The data in this report are current as of June 1, 2015 (except for the paying taxes indicators, which cover the period from January to December 2014).

Education management information systems (EMISs), usually located within the ministry of education, are tools that can help governments improve education system administration by providing information that can be used in strategic planning, resource allocation, and monitoring and evaluation. Frequently, however, they are underutilized and become merely a reporting mechanism. Using the data at the point of collection usually individual schools in a decentralized environment and feeding them into service improvement action plans can circumvent problems with the national EMIS, and allow the data to become instrumental in improving local education service delivery outcomes.

Debería concebirse una política pública de vivienda en la que el objeto no sea el inmueble en sí, sino la consolidación de un hábitat sostenible; mientras la VIS gratuita tiene un efecto asistencialista que no fortalece la democracia, el impacto de un programa participativo e integral de vivienda en el que aporte la familia, dignifica a las personas y eleva la condición humana.

The corporate scorecard is designed to provide a snapshot of the Bank's overall performance, including its business modernization, in the context of development results. It facilitates strategic dialogue between management and the Board on progress made and areas that need attention. With the results measurement system, which was adopted for the 13th replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA13) in 2002, the Bank became the first multilateral development institution to use a framework with quantitative indicators to monitor results and performance. The corporate scorecard expands this approach to the entire World Bank covering both the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and IDA. The corporate scorecard uses an integrated results and performance framework, which is organized in a four-tier structure that groups indicators along the results chain. Tier one is development context. Tier two is development results supported by the Bank. Whether the Bank is managing its operations and services effectively is shown in tier three. Tier four focuses on whether the Bank is managing skills, capacity, resources, and processes efficiently; and is business modernization on track?

This paper tracks the process through which FIAS, the investment climate advisory service of the World Bank Group advised the government of Latvia from 1998 to 2004 on ways to improve the business environment, achieve higher rates of economic growth, and thereby alleviate poverty. This case study shows that it is reasonable to describe how assistance by FIAS led to an improved business environment. The role that FIAS advice played may be discerned at the level of benefits accruing to the target population (i.e., the amount of resources freed up by lower costs associated with administrative procedures). Whether these benefits accruing to the business community translated into higher rates of investment and productivity, and thus to higher economic growth and reduced poverty, is a function of the entire political, social, and economic structure in Latvia. It is evident that there are many links in the chain of causation, and that the direct attribution FIAS can claim diminishes at every step downstream from its activities. Credit for success must be shared with the Government of Latvia and its immediate stakeholders (i.e., the businesses and their associations), the European Union accession process, the input of many other complementary projects, market forces, and fortuitous timing.

This study reviews recent experience applying ICTs in the fight against rural poverty and identifies ways in which donor interventions can make effective use of ICTs to improve the living conditions of rural communities in Latin America and the Caribbean and help reduce poverty.

Absentee Landlords and Agriculture -- Access to Land and the Right to Food -- Aesthetic Value, Art, and Food -- Africa, Food, and Agriculture -- African Food Security Urban Network (AFSUN) -- Agrarianism and the Ethics of Eating -- Agricultural and Food Products in Preferential Trade Agreements -- Agricultural Cooperatives -- Agricultural Ethics -- Agricultural Science and Ethics -- Agricultural Sciences and Ethical Controversies of Biofuels -- Agriculture and Ethical Change -- Agriculture and Finance -- Agriculture of the Middle -- Alcohol Abstinence and Sobriety -- Alcohol as Food and the Good Life -- Alimentary Delinquency -- American Cuisine, Existence Of -- American Food Rhetoric -- Ancestral Cuisine and Cooking Rituals -- Animal Agriculture and Welfare Footprints -- Animal Welfare in the Context of Animal Production -- Animal Welfare: A Critical Examination of the Concept -- Aroid Production and Postharvest Practices -- Artisanal Food Production and Craft -- Asian Cuisine: Ethical Considerations -- Authenticity in Food -- Beef Production: Ethical Issues -- Biodiversity -- Biodiversity and Global Development -- Biodynamic Agriculture -- Bioethics at Purdue University -- Biofuels: Ethical Aspects -- Biopharming -- Biosecurity and Food Systems -- Biotechnology and Food Policy, Governance -- Body Image, Gender, and Food -- Brazilian Agriculture -- Brillat-Savarin and Food -- Buddhism, Cooking, and Eating -- Buddhist Perspectives on Food and Agricultural Ethics -- Canada, US-EU Beef Hormone Dispute -- Cannibalism -- Carbon Farming -- Carnism -- Centre for Animal Welfare and Ethics -- Child Nutrition Guidelines and Gender -- Chinese Agriculture -- Chocolate: Ethical Dimensions -- Christian Ethics and Vegetarianism -- Christian Mysticism and Food -- Christian Perspectives on Food and Agricultural Ethics -- Christian Stewardship in Agriculture -- Christianity and Food -- Civic Agriculture -- Climate Change, Ethics, and Food Production -- Community-Supported Agriculture -- Company Identity in the Food Industry -- Conservation Agriculture: Farmer Adoption and Policy Issues -- Conventionalization Hypothesis -- Cooking Tools and Techniques: Ethical Issues -- Cooking, Food Consumption, and Globalization: Ethical Considerations -- Corporate Farms -- Corporate Social Responsibility and Food -- Cosmopolitanism, Localism and Food -- Cross-Contamination of Crops in Horticulture -- Cuban Agriculture -- Culinary Cosmopolitanism -- Culinary Tourism -- Derrida and Eating -- East European Agriculture -- Eating Disorders -- Eating Disorders and Disturbed Eating -- Eating Etiquette -- Eating and Nutrition -- Eating Invasive Species -- Eating, Feeding and the Human Life Cycle -- Eating, Feeding, and Disability -- Ecofeminist Food Ethics -- Economy of Agriculture and Food -- Ecosystems, Food, Agriculture, and Ethics -- Ecotopia -- Egg Production: Ethical Issues -- Emergency Food System: Soup Kitchens and Food Pantries -- Environmental and Animal Pragmatism -- Environmental Ethics -- Environmental Justice and Food -- Epicureanism and Food -- Equipment Sharing in Agriculture -- Escoffier -- Ethical Activism with Consideration of the Routine of Food Culture -- Ethical Assessment of Dieting, Weight Loss, and Weight Cycling -- Ethical Matrix and Agriculture -- Ethics and Food Taste -- Ethics of Agricultural Development and Food Rights in International Organizations -- Ethics of Dietitians -- Ethics of Nutrigenomics -- Ethics in Food and Agricultural Sciences -- Ethnicity, Ethnic Identity, and Food -- EU Regulatory Conflicts over GM Food -- European Cuisine: Ethical Considerations -- Expertise in Agriculture: Scientific and Ethical Issues -- Extraterritorial Obligations of States and the Right to Food -- Fair Trade in Food and Agricultural Products -- Farm Management -- Farmer Types and Motivation -- Farmers' Markets -- Farmer-Scientist Knowledge Exchange -- Farms: Small Versus Large -- Fasting -- Feeding Children -- Food "Porn" in Media -- Food Addiction -- Food Additives and International Trade -- Food Advertising to Children: Policy, Health, and Gender -- Food Allergies: Ethical Issues -- Food and Agricultural Trade and National Sovereignty -- Food and Agriculture in Bangladesh -- Food and Choice -- Food and Class -- Food and Health Policy -- Food and Life Chances -- Food and Place -- Food and Poverty in High Income Countries -- Food Rituals -- Food and the Avant-Garde -- Food Animal Production, Ethics, and Quality Assurance -- Food Assistance and International Trade -- Food Boycotts -- Food Culture and Chefs -- Food Deserts -- Food Ethics and Policies -- Food in Ancient Indian Philosophy -- Food Labeling -- Food Legislation and Regulation: EU, UN, WTO and Private Regulation -- Food Miles -- Food Not Bombs -- Food Preparation, Cooking, and Ritual in Judaism -- Food Riots, Historical Perspectives -- Food Risk Communication -- Food Risks -- Food Safety -- Food Security -- Food Security and International Trade -- Food Security and Rural Education -- Food Security in Systemic Context -- Food Standards -- Food Waste -- Food Waste and Consumer Ethics -- Food Worlds, Film, and Gender -- Food, Agriculture, and Trade Organizations -- Food, Class Identity, and Gender -- Food's Purposes -- Food-Body Relationship -- Foucault and Food -- Free Trade and Protectionism in Food and Agriculture -- Functional Foods -- Functional Foods as Commodities -- Functional Foods, Marketing of -- Gender and Dieting -- Gender Inequality and Food Security -- Gender Norms and Food Behavior -- Gender, Obesity, and Stigmatization -- Geographic Indications -- Geographical Indications, Food, and Culture -- Gluttony -- GM Food, Nutrition, Safety, and Health -- GMO Food Labeling -- Grocery Store Design -- Gustatory Pleasure and Food -- Hazon -- Herbicide-Resistant Crops -- Hinduism and Food -- Home Gardening -- Homesteading -- Horticultural Therapy -- Hospitality and Food -- Human Ecology and Food -- Human Rights and Food -- Humane Slaughter Association -- Hunting -- Hybridity in Agriculture -- In Vitro Meat -- Industrial Food Animal Production Ethics -- Industrialized Slaughter and Animal Welfare -- Infant Feeding -- Informed Food Choice -- Institute Technology-Theology-Natural Sciences (TTN), Munich -- Institutional Food Service -- Intellectual Property and Food -- Intellectual Property Rights and Trade in the Food and Agricultural Sectors -- International Food Quality Standards -- Islam and Food -- Islam and Food and Agricultural Ethics -- Jainism and Food -- Jefferson's Moral Agrarianism -- Judaism and Food -- Kristeva and Food -- Land Acquisitions for Food and Fuel -- Law and Regulatory Mechanisms for Food and Agriculture Research -- Literature, Food, and Gender -- Local and Regional Food Systems -- Local Food Procurement -- Marketing, Food Policy, Diet, and Health -- Meat: Ethical Considerations -- Medicalization of Eating and Feeding -- Metaphysics of Natural Food -- Molecular Gastronomy -- Montaigne and Food -- Multifunctional Agriculture -- Multifunctionality of Agriculture and International Trade -- Multilateral Trade Organizations, Food, and Agriculture -- NAFTA and the Food and Agricultural Industries -- Nanotechnology in Agriculture -- National Courts and the Right to Food -- Natural Food -- Nietzsche and Food -- Obesity and Consumer Choice -- Obesity and Responsibility -- Occupational Risks in Agriculture -- Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics -- Permaculture -- Pest Control -- Peter Singer and Food -- Plant-Based Diets and Scientific Value Judgments -- Plato and Food -- Political Agronomy -- Political Consumerism: Consumer Choice, Information, and Labeling -- Population Growth -- Pork Production: Ethical Issues -- Poverty and Basic Needs -- Pregnancy and Food -- Private Food Governance -- Provision of Agricultural Ecosystem Services -- Public Institutional Foodservice -- Punishment and Food -- Race, Racial Identity, and Eating -- Recipes -- Resource Conflict, Food, and Agriculture -- Responsible Innovation in the Food Sector -- Restaurant Reviewing -- Restaurant Workers -- Right to Food in International Law -- Rousseau and Food -- Saving Seeds -- School Lunch and Gender -- Seed Banking, Seed Saving, and Cultivating Local Varieties -- Slash-and-Burn Agriculture -- Slow Food -- Sub-Saharan African Agriculture -- Substantial Equivalence -- Sustainability and Animal Agriculture -- Sustainability of Food Production and Consumption -- Sustainable Consumption and Gender -- Synthetic Biology and Biofuels -- Synthetic Meat -- Systemic Ethics to Support Well being -- Taste, Distaste, and Food -- Technologies used for Animal Breeding, Ethical Issues -- Telos and Farm Animal Welfare -- The 2003–2006 WTO GMO Dispute: Implications for the SPS Agreement -- Trade and Development in the Food and Agricultural Sectors -- Trade Policies and Animal Welfare -- Trade Policies and Organic Food -- Transgenic Crops -- Urban Agriculture -- Vegetarianism -- Vertical Farms in Horticulture -- Vertical Integration and Concentration in US Agriculture -- Virtue Theory, Food, and Agriculture -- War and Food -- Waste and Food -- Water, Food, and Agriculture -- WTO Dispute Settlement and Food and Agricultural Trade -- You Are What You Eat -- Youth Food Activism

Front Matter -- Overview of the Crisis. Leverage and Liberal Democracy / George Bragues -- A Property Economics Explanation of the Global Financial Crisis / Gunnar Heinsohn, Frank Decker -- Of Subprimes and Sundry Symptoms: The Political Economy of the Financial Crisis / Ashok Bardhan -- The Political Economy of the Financial Crisis of 2008 / Roger D Congleton -- The Global Financial Crisis of 2008: What Went Wrong? / Hershey H Friedman, Linda Weiser Friedman -- The Roots of the Crisis and How to Bring It to a Close / James K Galbraith -- Enron Rerun: The Credit Crisis in Three Easy Pieces / Jonathan C Lipson -- The Global Crisis and Its Origins / Peter L Swan -- Four Paradoxes of the 2008₆2009 Economic and Financial Crisis / John E Marthinsen -- Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis / Steven L Schwarcz -- Causes and Consequences of the Financial Crisis. The Origins of the Financial Crisis / Martin N Baily, Robert E Litan, Matthew S Johnson -- Ten Myths About Subprime Mortgages / Yuliya Demyanyk -- The Financial Crisis: How Did We Get Here and Where Do We Go Next? New Evidence on How the Crisis Spread Among Financial Institutions / James R Barth, Tong Li, Lu Wenling, Glenn H Yago -- A Decade of Living Dangerously: The Causes and Consequences of the Mortgage, Financial, and Economic Crises / Jon A Garfinkel, Jarjisu Sa-Aadu -- Making Sense of the Subprime Crisis / Kristopher S Gerardi, Andreas Lehnert, Shane M Sherlund, Paul Willen -- Miraculous Financial Engineering Or Legacy Assets? / Ivo Pezzuto -- The Making and Ending of the Financial Crisis of 2007₆2009 / Austin Murphy -- The Subprime Mortgage Problem: Causes and Likely Cure / Ronald D Utt -- Sequence of Asset Bubbles and the Global Financial Crisis / Abol Jalilvand, A G (Tassos) Malliaris -- Borrowers. The Past, Present, and Future of Subprime Mortgages / Shane M Sherlund -- Fha Loans and Policy Responses to Credit Availability / Marsha Courchane, Rajeev Darolia, Peter Zorn -- The Single-Family Mortgage Industry in the Internet Era: Technology Developments and Market Structure / Forrest Pafenberg -- Speed Kills? Mortgage Credit Boom and the Crisis / Giovanni Dell'ariccia, Deniz Igan, Luc Laeven -- Subprime Mortgages: What We have Learned from a New Class of Homeowners / Todd J Zywicki, Satya Thallam -- Rating Agencies: Facilitators of Predatory Lending in the Subprime Market / David J Reiss -- the Process of Securitization. A Primer on the Role of Securitization in the Credit Market Crisis of 2007 / John D Martin -- Incentives in the Originate-to-Distribute Model of Mortgage Production / Robert W Kolb -- Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans / Benjamin J Keys, Tanmoy Mukherjee, Amit Seru, Vikrant Vig -- Tumbling Tower of Babel: Subprime Securitization and the Credit Crisis / Bruce I Jacobs -- The Incentives of Mortgage Servicers and Designing Loan Modifications to Address the Mortgage Crisis / Larry Cordell, Karen Dynan, Andreas Lehnert, Nellie Liang, Eileen Mauskopf -- The Contribution of Structured Finance to the Financial Crisis: An Introductory Overview / Adrian ARJM Van Rixtel, Sarai Criado -- Problematic Practices of Credit Rating Agencies: The Neglected Risks of Mortgage-Backed Securities / Phil Hosp -- Did Asset Complexity Trigger Ratings Bias? / Vasiliki Skreta, Laura Veldkamp -- The Pitfalls of Originate-to-Distribute in Bank Lending / Antje Berndt, Anurag Gupta -- Risk Management and Mismanagement. Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis / J V Rizzi -- Risk Management Failures During the Financial Crisis / Michel Crouhy -- The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models / Erik F Gerding -- The Future of Risk Modeling / Elizabeth Sheedy -- What Happened to Risk Management During the 2008₆2009 Financial Crisis? / Michael Mcaleer, Teodosio P̌rez-Amaral, Juan-Angel Jim̌nez-Martin -- Risk Management Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis for Derivative Exchanges / JAYANTH VARMA -- the Problem of Regulation. Regulation and Financial Stability in the Age of Turbulence / David S Bieri -- The Financial Crisis of 2007₆2009: Missing Financial Regulation Or Absentee Regulators? / George G Kaufman, A G Malliaris -- The Demise of the United Kingdom's Northern Rock and Large U.S. Financial Institutions: Public Policy Lessons / Robert A Eisenbeis, GEORGE G KAUFMAN -- Why Securities Regulation Failed to Prevent the Cdo Meltdown / Richard E Mendales -- Curbing Optimism in Managerial Estimates Through Transparent Accounting: The Case of Securitizations / Stephen Bryan, Steven Lilien, Bharat Sarath -- Basel II Put on Trial: What Role in the Financial Crisis? / Francesco Cannata, Mario Quagliariello -- Credit Rating Organizations, Their Role in the Current Calamity, and Future Prospects for Reform / Thomas J Fitzpatrick, Chris Sagers -- Global Regulation for Global Markets? / Michael W Taylor, Douglas W Arner -- Financial Regulation, Behavioral Finance, and the Global Financial Crisis: In Search of a New Regulatory Model / Emilios Avgouleas -- Institutional Failures. Why Financial Conglomerates Are at the Center of the Financial Crisis / Arthur E Wilmarth -- Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: A Case Study from the S & P 500 / Brian R Cheffins -- Secondary-Management Conflicts / Steven L Schwarcz -- The Financial Crisis and the Systemic Failure of Academic Economics / David Colander, Michael Goldberg, Armin Haas, Alan Kirman, Katarina Juselius, Brigitte Sloth, Thomas Lux -- Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Privatizing Profit and Socializing Loss / David Reiss -- Disclosure's Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis / Steven L Schwarcz -- the Federal Reserve, Monetary Policy, and the Financial Crisis. Federal Reserve Policy and the Housing Bubble / Lawrence H White -- The Greenspan and Bernanke Federal Reserve Roles in the Financial Crisis / John Ryan -- The Risk Management Approach to Monetary Policy: Lessons from the Financial Crisis of 2007₆2009 / Marc D Hayford, A G Malliaris -- Reawakening the Inflationary Monster: U.S. Monetary Policy and the Federal Reserve / Kevin Dowd, Martin Hutchinson -- The Transformation of the Federal Reserve System Balance Sheet and Its Implications / Peter Stella -- Implications of the Crisis for Our Economic Systems. Systemic Risk and Markets / Steven L Schwarcz -- The Transmission of Liquidity Shocks During the Crisis: Ongoing Research into the Transmission of Liquidity Shock Suggests the Emergence of a Range of New Channels During the Credit Crisis / Nathaniel Frank, Brenda Gonz̀lez-Hermosillo, Heiko Hesse -- Credit Contagion from Counterparty Risk / Philippe Jorion, Gaiyan Zhang -- International Dimensions of the Financial Crisis. Only in America? When Housing Boom Turns to Bust / Luci Ellis -- The Equity Risk Premium Amid a Global Financial Crisis / John R Graham, Campbell R Harvey -- Australia's Experience in the Global Financial Crisis / Christine Brown, Kevin Davis -- Collapse of a Financial System: An Icelandic Saga / Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson -- Iceland's Banking Sector and the Political Economy of Crisis / James A H S Hine, Ian Ashman -- The Subprime Crisis: Implications for Emerging Markets / William B Gwinner, Anthony B Sanders -- Financial Solutions and Our Economic Future. The Long-Term Cost of the Financial Crisis / Murillo Campello, John R Graham, Campbell R Harvey -- Coping with the Financial Crisis: Illiquidity and the Role of Government Intervention / Bastian Breitenfellner, Niklas Wagner -- Fiscal Policy for the Crisis / Antonio Spilimbergo, Steven Symansky, Olivier Blanchard, Carlo Cottarelli -- The Future of Securitization / Steven L Schwarcz -- Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy / Adam J Levitin -- The Shadow Bankruptcy System / Jonathan C Lipson -- Reregulating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac / Dwight M Jaffee -- Would Greater Regulation of Hedge Funds Reduce Systemic Risk? / Michael R King, Philipp Maier -- Regulating Credit Default Swaps / Houman B Shadab -- Index.

With NATO's 75th anniversary summit drawing near, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz told the Munich Security Conference in February that Germany would this year meet NATO's 2% of GDP target for defense spending and would sustain this level "through the 2020s and 2030s."But Bastian Giegerich, the head of the London-based International Institute for Security Studies, has said that reversing the effects across Europe of more than 20 years of underfunding of defense capabilities will take at least a decade of substantially increased defense spending. He's not alone in thinking this way, and for good reason. Germany's 2024 budget allocates 51.8 billion euros for defense, by itself short of the 2% of GDP NATO benchmark. Germany seems on course, however, to meet the target by drawing down the 100 billion euro emergency fund announced by Scholz in his famous Zeitenwende (epochal change) speech to the Bundestag in February 2022. Disbursements from this fund are projected to keep Germany's defense spending at or above the 2% of GDP mark through 2028, after which Germany plans to fund defense through the regular budget process. Achieving this will require an increase of approximately 30 billion euros over the 2024 defense outlay. An increase of this magnitude to defense spending from the regular budget process will require overcoming very serious obstacles. Germany has well established limits on the fiscal deficit, which will create politically destabilizing distributional conflict when other spending priorities are forced to adjust to make room for a bigger defense budget.. This constraint will be even more binding if the economy, expected to grow at only 0.2% this year, remains weak. Fiscal probity is baked into German political culture and shored up by formal legal constraints. The "debt brake" written into the constitution in 2009 holds the federal budget deficit to 0.35% in any budget year. The opposition Christian Democratic (CDU/CSU) party, which, according to current polling trends, seems likely to return to power in the 2025 elections, is wary of any attempt to circumvent or reform the debt brake, which legally can be suspended only by invoking "emergency" conditions, as was done to fund pandemic spending, and to unlock 100 billion euros for defense spending in 2022. Last November, Germany's Constitutional Court ruled against the government's plan to repurpose 60 billion euros of unspent COVID funding to pay for green energy transition programs. The ruling coalition had to scramble to fill the hole in its budget, exposing the vulnerability of Germany's fiscal policy to distributional constraints. Farmers took protests onto the streets of Berlin to demand restoration of their diesel fuel subsidy. This kind of social tension is likely to follow any attempt to shift massive resources to the defense sector by cutting other programs. The green energy transition remains a priority for the coalition's two main parties — the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens — even though both are fully convinced of the need to boost defense spending. The fiscally conservative Free Democrats (FDP) and their leader, Finance Minister Christian Lindner, adamantly oppose reforming the debt brake or raising taxes. The only obvious way to square this circle would be to consider the continuing war in Ukraine an emergency and thereby unlock another 100 billion euros. This is obviously not an ideal way to finance a program of rearmament that might take decades, and such a maneuver might not survive scrutiny by the Constitutional Court in any case. It is becoming evident that, even with the provision of emergency funding, the defense industrial base can expand only gradually, and weapons procurement processes are limited by the time needed to manufacture new weapons and equipment, whether from Germany, elsewhere in Europe or the United States. For example, the 18 Leopard 2 battle tanks ordered to replace those supplied to Ukraine will arrive two years from now at the earliest. Meanwhile, Ukrainian president Zelensky recently assailed Germany for not delivering the Taurus missiles; he claimed Berlin decided the missiles were necessary for defending Germany instead.Social Constraints: Leadership and Public AttitudesThe German military was underfunded for years before February 2022, because the political leadership absorbed the liberal triumphalism of the 1989 democratic revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe and believed history pointed to global convergence on the liberal democratic model.Efforts to expand military recruitment began after the 2014 Russian takeover of Crimea, but has failed to attract new recruits in sufficient numbers. The number of troops remains stuck at 180,000. Some are now calling for reinstituting mandatory military service.The most effective and vocal advocate for Germany's rearmament is Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, an SDP politician widely touted as a possible successor to Scholz. Pistorius has said that the Bundeswehr must be made "kriegstüchtig" (war ready) and warned that Russia might attack a NATO member within the coming 8-10 years.These statements, very much against the grain of Germany's antecedent anti-militarist political culture, have not dented Pistorius' popularity. German elites and, to a lesser extent, the broader society seem to be moving toward greater acceptance of the need for national rearmament.The European Vision: Too Many Cooks?The European Commission has advanced its own plans to coordinate the financing of rearmament across Europe, favoring and fostering synergies among European defense-industrial firms. In principle, this initiative should pose no problem for Germany since Scholz, a committed European, has repeatedly stated that the EU is the framework for Germany foreign and security policy.Nevertheless, the Commission risks competing with member nations for available resources for equipment and weapons acquisition. Most member countries, including Germany and France, conceive of defense cooperation in a multilateral pan-European context, but would insist that member nations remain in the driver's seat.Emmanuel Macron's exhaustive vision for Europe— the "Sorbonne II" speech of April 26 — dealt extensively with the European imperative to develop a more capable conventional deterrent, albeit within NATO.His framing of the issue was the stark warning that "Our Europe can die," but he did not endorse any pooling of national sovereignty on defense policy. On the contrary, he pledged personally to convene "all partners" to develop a "new defense paradigm" for the "credible defense of the European continent."This is an intergovernmental framework rather than one featuring a leading role for the European Commission.Why the Path Ahead is DifficultBastian Giegerich of IISS says that for Germany "the mental shift, the societal resilience" needed to underpin rearmament "has not happened." This is true, but it is not only a matter of changing hearts and minds. Germany's limitations are embodied in its institutional framework and very resistant to change, given the perceived challenges from the populist right, the climate policy imperative, its generous social safety net, the fragmented party system, the self-imposed but broadly popular fiscal constraints, and complex coordination problems with key partners (above all France) and the European Commission. This transformation, even if embraced without reservation by Scholz or his successors, is a vastly complex and fraught agenda.

With presidential elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) scheduled for December, concerns about pre-election human rights violations are already being raised in Washington. Given the alleged role the United States played in anointing the election victor in 2019, many expect the U.S. to be influential again, even if its original decision to recognize Félix Tshisekedi tipped the scales of that contested election. Many are hoping U.S. influence will result in an election period more respectful of human rights. In the five years since Tshisekedi was declared the winner, much-anticipated human rights reforms have not materialized. Still, the U.S. has an opportunity, and obligation, to center human rights in its relationship with the DRC, especially amid increasing human rights violations in the pre-election period. Failure to do so would expose the hard reality that the Biden administration continues to fail at following through on its human rights agenda. A New Partnership Since Tshisekedi assumed the presidency, the U.S.'s working relationship with the DRC has warmed. Almost immediately upon taking office, President Tshisekedi visited Washington and quickly joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. He further solidified his position as a strong ally by voting with the U.S. in the U.N. General Assembly. In return, the U.S. increased its bilateral aid to the DRC, resumed military cooperation, and explored new opportunities for U.S. investment, including in the mining sector. Both Secretary of State Antony Blinken and acting Deputy Secretary Victoria Nuland have proffered coveted visits to Tshisekedi, demonstrating a strong and privileged relationship. The upcoming elections present an urgent opportunity for the U.S. to demonstrate a commitment to human rights by pushing their protection in the pre-election period and setting policy priorities that will benefit people living in the DRC regardless of the election outcome. The Congolese people should have a government committed to protecting their rights, after years of violence, abuses, impunity, and plunder of resources at the expense of human rights protections. The US-Congo Bilateral RelationshipThe relationship between the U.S. and the DRC is a complicated one — made more so by the DRC's rich deposit of critical minerals the U.S. government wants to access and that the Chinese government currently dominates. While the U.S.'s engagement with the DRC has rarely centered on human rights, it has engaged on these issues across several administrations as human rights violations became harder to ignore. This renewed focus has led to concrete actions. In 2006 President Bush established an Executive Order to sanction those fueling the conflict, and accompanying human rights abuses. He also met with the leaders of both the DRC and Rwanda to press them to end violence in the east. The U.S. Congress also played a critical role in driving policies aimed at protecting human rights, most prominently by passing legislation such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 and section 1502 of the Dodd Frank Act in 2010. While imperfect, these policies have sought to protect the rights of the Congolese people to their own wealth and elevate human rights when under threat. Human Rights Context Leading into the Elections While Tshisekedi's election was touted as one of change by both Trump and Biden officials, the reality for many Congolese is that little has changed. Tshisekedi came into office committing to critical security services reforms, judicial reforms, civic space expansion, and anti-corruption efforts. However, few of these have been implemented. In addition, demonstrable examples exist of shrinking civic space. Take the "State of Siege" which has been in place in eastern DRC since May 2021. Under this measure there are restrictions on civilians gathering and the military has taken over all aspects of civilian governance. Amnesty International found that under the "State of Siege," the security situation has deteriorated further while authorities have used it to silence critics. The crackdown on freedom of expression goes beyond eastern DRC with Amnesty that two years into the Tshisekedi administration there was an increase in oppression against journalists. This has only escalated in the pre-election period. What US Policy Should Do About It While some may argue that human rights concerns are less important than the domestic need for access to clean energy minerals, this is a false dichotomy. Ignoring human rights violations for the sake of investment not only hurts the Congolese people who first and foremost should be benefitting from the wealth but does little to secure access long term. Tshisekedi may still make deals with other countries giving better offers. Furthermore, U.S. companies would benefit from the confidence in their investments created by a government committed to anti-corruption, human rights, and to ensuring that communities thrive alongside companies. It is in the long-term interest of the U.S. to promote a rights-first approach. Furthermore, the U.S.'s credibility will be lost if it does not leverage its partnership it has cultivated with the Tshisekedi administration to secure respect for human rights. Instead, civil society and the Congolese people will see another example where the U.S. meddles in the country's affairs but fails to center human rights in its diplomacy. In the spirit of a rights-forward relationship, there is much Washington can do to help ensure rights are respected in the pre-election period. U.S. officials should take advantage of their close relationship to have candid conversations about necessary human rights actions and reforms. First, there are already instances in the pre-election period where Congolese security forces have disproportionately reacted to opposition rallies and protests. Meanwhile journalists are increasingly harassed and arbitrarily arrested. Despite this, the U.S. has remained largely silent publicly, giving the impression to civil society and citizens that they are accepting of a violent and repressive pre-election environment. The United States has also not issued a single public statement condemning the "State of Siege" despite repeated pleas by Congolese and other human rights organizations. The Biden administration must publicly call for an end to this measure, which is in violation of the Congolese constitution and international human rights law, before any more criticism is silenced or people are denied their rights to freedom of speech or assembly. Finally, the Biden administration must center its relationship with the DRC moving forward around human rights, justice, and accountability. Indeed, much of the instability can be addressed if those involved stop focusing on a military response and instead focus on ending impunity and ensuring justice. The U.S. can do that by funding programs that address impunity and build the capacity of the Congolese justice system. When Blinken launched his foreign policy he argued that human rights would be central. Yet in the DRC the Biden administration has been silent as its partner has failed to implement promised reforms and instead further restricted the rights of the Congolese people. There is still time for the U.S. and DRC to work together and solidify respect for the rights for the Congolese people. Washington must not miss this opportunity.

Daniel Raisbeck


Less than a year ago, I wrote of the almost certain regret that awaited the prosperous, urban, multiple‐​degree‐​holding types who voted for Gustavo Petro, Colombia's Chavista president. They thought they had supported a Nordic‐​style social democrat—failing to notice that they had helped to elect a tropical socialist who, given his past as a guerrilla group member and Hugo Chávez supporter, was also a potential autocrat. Caveat emptor (or rather suffragator) indeed. But I never thought that voter's remorse would set in so quickly. Or so extremely.
According to poll data from June 1, 2023, only 26 percent of Colombian citizens approved of Petro's performance as president. And this was before the scandal that shook the country's political scene last Sunday evening, when Semana magazine released a series of WhatsApp audio files sent by Armando Benedetti, Petro's former ambassador in Caracas, to Laura Sarabia, the president's former chief of staff.
Among the least bombastic revelations is Benedetti's claim that Alfonso Prada, Petro's former interior minister, "stole the whole ministry with his wife." This implies massive levels of corruption around Petro, who came to power with an anti‐​corruption agenda (quite cynically given his disreputable political alliances). Prada proceeded to sue Benedetti for libel.
Petro's dwindling number of supporters may dismiss this as a politician's petty slander against a rival in the cabinet. Far more concerning for them—and for Petro—is Benedetti's matter‐​of‐​fact assertion to Sarabia that he himself obtained COP $15 billion (around USD $3.58 million at today's exchange rate) for Petro's 2022 presidential campaign, during which he served as the former candidate's right‐​hand‐​man and main political handler. Petro's campaign did not officially report any donation nearly as large. Its declared funds consisted mostly a series of bank loans, which were meant to be paid with the "reimbursement" sum that the Colombian state guarantees to candidates for each vote received in an election.
In many countries, an insider's admission of how millions of undeclared dollars flowed into the president's campaign coffers would bring down the government. Alas, Colombia is not one of them. This is not due to a lack of unashamedly corrupt presidents; as I wrote recently in The Wall Street Journal, the opposite has been the case. Rather, since the 1950's, the Colombian elite's idiosyncratic approach to presidential corruption has followed the maxim, attributed to journalist Hernando Santos (1922–1999), that the trouble with overthrowing a president is that he may fall upon those doing the toppling.
Already in Petro's case, the three‐​member House of Representatives commission created to investigate Benedetti's statements includes two members of the president's own party. The enquiry will be a charade, which is a pity since the source of the undeclared campaign money is as important as the sum itself. In an interview, Benedetti told Semana that the money "did not come from entrepreneurs," meaning the legal business community. Suspicion has fallen on the Marxist guerrilla groups and other drug trafficking organizations, but also on the Venezuelan regime of Nicolás Maduro. Anonymous, the hacker group, claims that Maduro financed "part of the campaign of the current president of Colombia," but has not published evidence hitherto.
What is certain is that, in regional terms, the Maduro regime has been the principal beneficiary of Petro's election. To begin with, Colombia recognized Maduro's presidency after a three‐​and‐​a‐​half‐​year hiatus, and Petro himself has met Maduro four times since his inauguration. His government, which opposes any future hydrocarbon exploration in Colombia despite dwindling reserves, has promoted the idea of importing Venezuelan natural gas.
While Petro wages a political war against Colombia's key petroleum industry—crude oil has been the country's main legal export for decades—he lobbied President Joe Biden to end American sanctions against the Maduro regime. This would imply renewed Venezuelan oil exports to the U.S. market (even if socialism devastated Venezuela's oil industry well beyond immediate or even medium term repair). Petro's "shoot yourself in the foot / prosper‐​thy‐​neighbor" policy is devoid of any rationality. Unless, of course, Colombia's increasingly authoritarian president is somehow subject to the Venezuelan tyrant.
Petro's eco‐​fanatical crusade against the hydrocarbon industry is but one example of how his government is bent on destroying the few areas of the Colombian economy that are functional. Other examples include his plans to put the state in charge of centralized funding for the healthcare and pension systems, both of which are efficient—although certainly not perfect—thanks to private sector involvement and some degree of consumer choice. Where things are already problematic, Petro's policies would make them worse. For instance, he wants to make a rigid, overregulated labor market even less flexible and more hostile to businesses.
Then there is the matter of rising insecurity, an old problem that, until recently, appeared mostly solved, only to resurface dangerously in the last year. Under Petro, illegal armed groups have expanded their power as they launch constant, deadly attacks against the armed forces and police. It all brings to mind the dark era of the late 1990's, when Colombia was on the verge of becoming a failed state as it came under siege from the FARC guerrillas, which are still up in arms despite the much‐​touted "peace" agreement of 2016.
Usually, a crisis in government breeds economic instability. Under Colombia's current government, however, the opposite has been the case. Since the Benedetti scandal broke, the peso rallied to reach its highest value against the dollar since mid‐​2022, when Petro was about to win the presidential election. In October, two months after he took office, the peso reached an all‐​time low against the dollar. Amid the current political turmoil, forward‐​looking markets are anticipating the failure of Petro's legislative initiatives in health care, pensions, and labor law. Which is to say, there is speculation that Colombia's institutional framework has already survived Petro's statist onslaught. The weaker his position, the thinking goes, the less likely it is that non‐​leftist parties will lend him their support, which he needs to obtain congressional majorities.
I fear, however, that markets may be getting ahead of themselves. The Colombian congress is minimally ideological and highly transactional. There is still a good chance that, issue by issue, Petro's government can negotiate just enough votes to have his "reforms" approved, in which case only the courts will stand in the way of his agenda.
Not that Petro is respectful of any check or balance. This week, he propounded the theory that, since he was elected, his government represents "the will of the people," meaning that any opposition to his political project—including from the news media—is part of an illegitimate, "soft coup." The onslaught, in other words, is far from over.
In my view, the worst part about Petro's election victory is that, at this time last year, Colombia was in need of radical reforms. Above all, a chronically sluggish economy required budget discipline, public spending cuts, drastic debt reduction, a strong currency (ideally through dollarization), far lower taxes, labor market deregulation, subsoil privatization, school choice, and an end to non‐​tariff barriers. By electing Petro, however, voters decided to do precisely the opposite on all fronts. As warned, most already regret it.

Good cities reward those who walk, looking outwards and upwards, and reflecting on the paths taken and on the sauntering asides that open an easy relationship with the city and its neighbourhoods. The Spanish paseo and the Italian passeggiata are, of course, as much about meeting friends and family as about using the connecting streets and passageways between one part of the city and another, and such act of walking is liberating, enjoyable and important in the making of place. Belfast does not, in many neighbourhoods, have that easy, social connectivity. The once easy cross-city network of minor streets is, in large part, gone. Interface walls, motorways, and other barriers and separation devices are not overtly visible in the commercial city core but continue to define key emblematic neighbourhoods. And the growth of small-scale political tourism manifested in several bus, black-taxi trails and short neighbourhood walks to visit the interface areas and their walls, have potential result, unfortunately, that such walls, as artefacts of conflict, could tend towards permanence. As one of many post-conflict cities, Belfast is still emerging from its historical and localised condition of manifested deep-seated sectarianism, where identities and allegiances are linked to a strongly held sense of ownership of territory. Hence, the reluctance to build in void spaces that could help resolve the housing crisis and be model for housing-led regeneration and model for development-partnering for change with the public, private and community sectors. The once daily reality in the small nurture-field city-of-camouflage and the desire for a more-connected city and neighbourhood does, however, have creative possibility, where conflict, friction, and collaborative opportunity – the collision and kiss of confluence – as creative act, can influence and impact one upon the other, that, as we know, sparks fly: alight. The spirit of self-help and community resilience, the confluence of history, cultural continuity, and an urgent need to act remains an opportunity for transformative change: for the making of new ground in an emerging city-form. ; Las buenas ciudades recompensan a quienes caminan, mirando hacia fuera y hacia arriba, y reflexionando sobre los caminos recorridos y sobre los paseos que abren una relación fácil con la ciudad y sus barrios. El paseo español y la passeggiata italiana tienen que ver tanto con el encuentro con los amigos y la familia como con el uso de las calles y pasillos que conectan una parte de la ciudad con otra, y ese acto de caminar es liberador, agradable e importante en la creación del lugar. En muchos barrios de Belfast no existe esa fácil conectividad social. La red de calles secundarias que antes cruzaba la ciudad ha desaparecido en gran parte. Los muros de interconexión, las autopistas y otras barreras y dispositivos de separación no son abiertamente visibles en el núcleo comercial de la ciudad, pero siguen definiendo barrios emblemáticos clave. Y el crecimiento del turismo político a pequeña escala, que se manifiesta en varias rutas de autobuses, taxis negros y pequeños paseos por los barrios para visitar las zonas de interfaz y sus muros, tiene como resultado potencial, por desgracia, que dichos muros, como artefactos del conflicto, podrían tender a la permanencia. Como una de las muchas ciudades en situación de posconflicto, Belfast aún está saliendo de su condición histórica y localizada de sectarismo profundamente arraigado y manifiesto, en el que las identidades y las lealtades están vinculadas a un fuerte sentido de propiedad del territorio. De ahí la reticencia a construir en espacios vacíos que podrían ayudar a resolver la crisis de la vivienda y ser un modelo de regeneración dirigido por la vivienda y un modelo de asociación para el desarrollo con los sectores público, privado y comunitario. Sin embargo, la realidad antaño cotidiana en la pequeña ciudad de camuflaje y el deseo de una ciudad y un barrio más conectados tiene una posibilidad creativa, en la que el conflicto, la fricción y la oportunidad de colaboración -la colisión y el beso de la confluencia- como acto creativo, pueden influir e impactar unos sobre otros, que, como sabemos, saltan chispas: encendidas. El espíritu de autoayuda y la resistencia de la comunidad, la confluencia de la historia, la continuidad cultural y la necesidad urgente de actuar siguen siendo una oportunidad para el cambio transformador: para la creación de un nuevo terreno en una forma de ciudad emergente. ; As boas cidades recompensam aqueles que nela caminham, olhando para fora e para cima, e refletindo sobre os caminhos percorridos e sobre os passeios que abrem uma relação fácil com a cidade e seus bairros. O paseo espanhol e o passeggiata italiana são, é claro, tanto para encontrar amigos e familiares quanto para o uso das ruas e passagens de interligação entre uma parte da cidade e outra, e esse ato de caminhar é libertador, agradável e importante na construção do lugar. Belfast não tem, em muitos bairros, essa conectividade social fácil. A rede de ruas secundárias que cruzava a cidade, em grande parte, já não existe. Muros de interface, rodovias e outras barreiras e dispositivos de separação, não plenamente visíveis no centro comercial da cidade, continuam a definir bairros emblemáticos chave. E o crescimento do turismo político em pequena escala, manifesto em vários ônibus, trilhas de táxis pretos e passeios curtos pelos bairros para visitar as áreas de interface e seus muros, apresentam como resultado potencial, infelizmente, a tendência da permanência desses muros como artefatos de conflito. Como uma das muitas cidades pós-conflito, Belfast ainda está emergindo de sua condição histórica e localizada de sectarismo profundamente enraizado, onde as identidades e lealdades estão ligadas a um forte senso de propriedade do território. Daí a relutância em construir espaços vazios que poderiam ajudar a resolver a crise habitacional e ser modelo para uma regeneração urbana que, liderada pela habitação, se constituísse em modelo de desenvolvimento de parcerias de a mudança das relações entre os setores público, privado e comunitário. A realidade outrora cotidiana da pequena cidade-campo-de-camuflagem e o desejo de uma cidade e bairros mais conectados tem, no entanto, possibilidades criativas onde o conflito, o atrito e a oportunidade de colaboração - a colisão e o beijo da confluência - como ato criativo, podem influenciar e impactar um sobre o outro. Como sabemos, as faíscas voam: acendem-se. O espírito de autoajuda e a resiliência da comunidade, a confluência da história, a continuidade cultural e uma necessidade urgente de agir continuam sendo uma oportunidade para uma mudança transformadora: para a construção de um novo território em uma forma emergente de cidade.