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Women, as individuals and as an issue, are often neglected in the agendas of Islamic revivalist movements. Their main priority is the reinstatement of previous Islamic glory and power, a return to the golden age of Islam, primarily to the years of and shortly fallowing the prophet. Revivalist ideologies differ depending on the nation and culture of origin. Those currently prevalent in Indonesia tend to be on the transnationalist path. That is that they dream of an Islamic Nation-State, one run under the banner of Khilafah, the so perceived ideal Islamic government. They seem to have forgotten the Prophet's fight for gender equality. The issue being drowned out by other, less gender concerning issues hotly advocated. Thus many of their followers are decidedly blind towards on holistic Islamic Spirituality, especially those on women and gender, two issues in need of more intense notice.

'In der Russischen Föderation bildet der Islam die zweitgrößte Glaubensgemeinschaft nach der russisch-orthodoxen Kirche. Prognosen über die Bevölkerungsentwicklung im 21. Jahrhundert gehen davon aus, daß die muslimische Komponente bei gleichzeitiger Abnahme der russischen noch an Gewicht gewinnen wird. In Rußland selber weist man darauf hin, daß heute dort mehr 'Muslime' leben als im Ursprungsland des Islam, in Saudi-Arabien, und in manchen anderen arabischen Staaten. Allerdings ist die Zahl der 'rußländischen Muslime' ebenso wie der Terminus 'Muslim' selber unbestimmt. Angaben schwanken zwischen 8,5 und 21 Mio. Der Terminus 'Muslim' ist eher ethnisch als religiös determiniert und umfaßt viele Angehörige islamischer Nationalitäten (Tataren, Baschkiren, Kaukasier), die sich persönlich nur bedingt als 'Gläubige' identifizieren würden. Dennoch vollzieht sich in Rußland seit 1990 eine sichtbare Wiedergeburt islamischer Gemeinden und Institutionen.' (Autorenreferat)

Hukum Islam sering dipandang sebagai hukum yang keras dan agresif. Pandangan demikian tidak hanya dianut oleh kalangan nonmuslim, namun juga oleh sebagian kalangan muslim sendiri. Mispersepsi mengenai sifat dasar hukum Islam tersebut sering mengaburkan mekanisme perdamaian yang ditawarkan oleh hukum Islam. Formulasi studi perdamaian dalam dunia Islam kurang berkembang, sehingga referensi terhadap mekanisme-mekanisme resolusi konflik dalam hukum Islam belum memenangkan wacana publik umat Islam, apalagi publik yang lebih luas. Tulisan ini adalah upaya untuk menggali model-model resolusi konflik alternatif dalam hukum Islam, baik dalam menghadapi konflik antara sesama muslim maupun dengan nonmuslim. Tulisan ini menunjukkan bahwa Islam memiliki model-model resolusi konflik alternatif, khususnya sulh dan tahkim. Keduanya mewakili resolusi konflik alternatif yang banyak diacu dalam al-Quran maupun hadis. Kedua resolusi konflik alternatif tersebut mengandung elemen-elemen persamaan dengan beberapa model resolusi konflik alternatif modern, namun ada aspek-aspek khas yang membuat model resolusi konflik alternatif dalam Islam memiliki keunikan, yaitu memiliki basis agama dan lebih menekankan penyelesaian konflik bersama. ABSTRACT: Islamic law is often seen as harsh and aggressive law. Such a view is not only shared by non-Muslims, but also by some Muslims themselves. Misperceptions about the nature of Islamic law are often obscuring peace mechanism offered by Islamic law. Formulation of peace studies in Islamic world is less developed, so that reference to mechanisms of conflict resolution in Islamic law has yet to win Muslim public discourse, let alone the wider public. This paper is an attempt to explore models of alternative dispute resolution in Islamic law, both in dealing with the conflict between the Muslim and non-Muslim neighbors. This paper shows that Islam has models of alternative dispute resolution, in particular sulh and tahkim. Both represent an alternative conflict resolution that is widely mentioned in the Qur'an and hadis. Both alternative conflict resolutions contain elements in common with some modern models of alternative dispute resolution, but there are aspects that make the alternative model of conflict resolution in Islam is unique, in which it has a religious basis, and it also more emphasizes to resolve a collective conflict.

"In today's world all eyes are on Iran, which has grappled with an experiment that has had a massive global impact. For some, the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 was the triumph of a modern, political Islam, heralding Muslim justice and economic prosperity. Others, including many of the original revolutionaries, saw religious fanatics attempting to roll back time by creating a despotic theocracy. Either way, the Iranian Revolution changed the Muslim world. It not only inspired the Muslim masses but also reinvigorated intellectual debates on the nature and possibilities of an Islamic state. The new 'Islamic Republic of Iran' combined not just religion and the state, but theocracy and democracy. Yet the revolution's heirs were soon engaged in a protracted struggle over its legacy. Dissident thinkers, from within an Islamic framework, sought a rights-based political order that could accept dissent, tolerance, pluralism, women's rights and civil liberties. Their ideas led directly to the presidency of Mohammad Khatami and, despite their political failure, they did leave a permanent legacy by demystifying Iranian religious politics, and condemning the use of the Shariah to justify autocratic rule. This book tells the story of the reformist movement through the world of Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari. An active supporter of the revolution who became one of the most outspoken critics of theocracy, Eshkevari developed ideas of 'Islamic democratic government', which have attracted considerable attention in Iran and elsewhere. In presenting a selection of Eshkevari's writings, this book reveals the intellectual and political trajectory of a Muslim thinker and his attempts to reconcile Islam with reform and democracy. As such it makes a highly original contribution to our understanding of the difficult social and political issues confronting the Islamic world today."--Bloomsbury publishing

Over the past twenty years, an influential body of conservative scholarship has focused on the alleged conflict between Islam and the West. Following widespread criticism of this scholarship, a number of commentators have revived its core assumptions to claim that the real conflict is between liberal democracy within Muslim societies and the political ideology of Islamism. In this article we trace the evolution of this scholarship, and suggest that recent empirical developments in the Muslim world suggest the potential for post‐Islamist parties to successfully adapt to the demands of democratic competition within Muslim societies. In this context, the emerging conflict is not between Islam and the West, or Islamism and the West, but between two very different discursive practices within the Muslim world that invoke Islam for radically different purposes.A traveler enters the world into which he travels, but a tourist brings his own world with him and never sees the one he's in.

Introduction: Islam and politics -- From Shamanism to Caliphate -- Reform and religious homogenization -- The creation of the Kemalist state -- The reemergence of Islam -- From periphery to mainstream -- Violent Islamist organizations

THE RECENT TREND TOWARD ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM CHALLENGES POLITICAL SCIENCE: FIRST, IN DEMANDING AN EXPLANATION AS TO THE CAUSES AND CHARACTER OF ITS DISSEMINATION AND, SECONDLY, IN REQUIRING A RESPONSE TO SEEMINGLY UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS THAT CHALLENGE CONVENTIONAL EXPECTATIONS ON MODERNITY, PROGRESS, INCREASING SECULARIZATION, AND POLITICAL CONVERGENCE. IT MAY BE THAT THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE PAST DECADES ON HOW SOCIETIES ARE CHANGING WILL PROVE TO BE WRONG -- THAT THE WORLD IS NEITHER AS GLOBALIZED OR AS DISENCHANTED AS WAS EXPECTED; BUT IT MAY ALSO BE THAT, BENEATH THE APPEARANCE OF RUPTURE AND A RETURN TO THE PAST, OTHER, MORE CONTEMPORARY AND RECOGNIZABLE, PROCESSES ARE AT WORK. IF THE RISE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM CAN SEEN AS A CHALLENGE TO THE CONCEPTION OF MODERNITY, IT CAN ALSO BE ARGUED THAT THE CONSTRAINTS OF CONTEMPORARY INDUSTRIAL AND POLITICAL LIFE HAVE SHAPED AND WILL ULTIMATELY DETERMINE THIS PHENOMENON.

"The question as to whether religion can block economic development and institutional change, or is a purely endogenous factor, assumes particular importance today because of the rise of Islamist movements and the disappointing economic performances in the lands of Islam. This paper starts from a critical examination of the thesis of Bernard Lewis according to which the lack of separation between religion and politics creates particular difficulties on the way to modern economic growth in these lands. It will be argued that (1) Lewis' thesis conceals the critical fact that, even when political and religious functions appear to be merged, religion is the handmaiden rather than the master of politics; (2) the influence of religion increases when the state falls into crisis, owing to its impotence or excessive absolutism; (3) because the Islamic frame of reference provides political rulers with a cheap default option when they are contested, they rarely undertake the much-needed reforms of the country's institutions; (4) this way of escape is all the more attractive to contested rulers as Islamist movements, born of the internal situation as well as of the international environment, accuse them of un-Islamic behaviour; (5) as argued by Timur Kuran, by creating an "institutional trap", the legacy of the Islamic classical system also makes institutional reforms more difficult to achieve." [author's abstract]

Why does Islam seem to dominate Egyptian politics, especially when the country's endemic poverty and deep economic inequality would seem to render it promising terrain for a politics of radical redistribution rather than one of religious conservativism? This book argues that the answer lies not in the political unsophistication of voters, the subordination of economic interests to spiritual ones, or the ineptitude of secular and leftist politicians, but in organizational and social factors that shape the opportunities of parties in authoritarian and democratizing systems to reach potential voters. Tracing the performance of Islamists and their rivals in Egyptian elections over the course of almost forty years, this book not only explains why Islamists win elections, but illuminates the possibilities for the emergence in Egypt of the kind of political pluralism that is at the heart of what we expect from democracy

Arguing Islam after the Rebirth of Arab Politics analyzes the politics of religion in the Arab world after the emergence of new public spheres over the past few decades. The book examines those spheres as they really are, not measuring them against any ideal of democratic deliberation, and show how they are lively and increasingly participatory but also polarizing, divisive, and far from egalitarian. And while they have grown in force, they are not efficacious, leading to a widening gap between regimes and the societies they govern. Focusing on arguments aired in new and old media, neighborhood discussions, and parliaments, Arguing Islam After the Revival of Arab Politics probes in special depth debates over constitution, family law, and education. It shows how these various places where arguments take place are increasingly linked, forming not a uniformed citizenry but instead a badly divided one in which a leader's words to followers are overheard and then lampooned by opponents and various groups become aware of how deeply they differ. Arguments are detached from the authority of the person making them. Without a strong political process to forge agreement and reward coalition building, the reborn Arab politics is exciting and vital but also noisy and rough