Suchergebnisse

Many coastal and offshore fish species are highly dependent on specific habitat types for population maintenance. In the Baltic Sea, shallow productive habitats in the coastal zone such as wetlands, vegetated flads/lagoons and sheltered bays as well as more exposed rocky and sandy areas are utilized by fish across many life history stages including spawning, juvenile development, feeding and migration. Although there is general consensus about the critical importance of these essential fish habitats (EFH) for fish production along the coast, direct quantitative evidence for their specific roles in population growth and maintenance is still scarce. Nevertheless, for some coastal species, indirect evidence exists, and in many cases, sufficient data are also available to carry out further quantitative analyses. As coastal EFH in the Baltic Sea are often found in areas that are highly utilized and valued by humans, they are subjected to many different pressures. While cumulative pressures, such as eutrophication, coastal construction and development, climate change, invasive species and fisheries, impact fish in coastal areas, the conservation coverage for EFH in these areas remains poor. This is mainly due to the fact that historically, fisheries management and nature conservation are not integrated neither in research nor in management in Baltic Sea countries. Setting joint objectives for fisheries management and nature conservation would hence be pivotal for improved protection of EFH in the Baltic Sea. To properly inform management, improvements in the development of monitoring strategies and mapping methodology for EFH are also needed. Stronger international cooperation between Baltic Sea states will facilitate improved management outcomes across ecologically arbitrary boundaries. This is especially important for successful implementation of international agreements and legislative directives such as the Baltic Sea Action Plan, the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, the Habitats Directive, and the Maritime Spatial Planning Directive, but also for improving the communication of information related to coastal EFH among researchers, stakeholders, managers and decision makers. In this paper, efforts are made to characterize coastal EFH in the Baltic Sea, their importance and the threats/pressures they face, as well as their current conservation status, while highlighting knowledge gaps and outlining perspectives for future work in an ecosystem-based management framework. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. ; Peer reviewed

List of Tables 6 List of Figures 7 List of Maps 8 Abbreviations 9 Prelude 11 Introduction 15 Part One: The Input Process 1. Political Aggregations and Political Articulations 23 2. The Socio-Economic Variables 62 3. The Changing World Order 93 4. The Regional Variable: Unstable Region 126 5. The Arab-Israeli Conflict 162 Part Two: The Output: Case Studies 6. Arab States' Policies towards the Middle East Peace Process 201 7. Desertification and Water Crisis in the Arab World 233 8. Food Insecurity in the Arab World 261 9. Determinants of Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy-Making 294 Epilogue 335 Notes 341 Bibliography 379 Index 387 List of Tables: 1.1 Electoral Turnout in Eighteen Arab States (2003-2008) 32 2.1 Female Empowerment in the Arab World (2009) 80 2.2 Female Participation in Parliaments 80 2.3 Corruption in the Arab Countries (2008) 83 2.4 Inter-Arab Trade (2003-2007) 87 2.5 Trends of Arab Foreign Trade 88 2.6 Proven Arab Oil Reserves 90 2.7 Proven Arab Gas Reserves 91 3.1 Cash Reserves in Contemporary World Order (2009) 117 3.2 Defence Expenditures of World Leading Powers 120 4.1 Middle East Military Expenditures (2007) 131 7.1 Arab Population Census (1980-2030) 236 7.2 Fresh Water Availability in Selected Arab Countries (1990) 237 7.3 Water Consumption by Sector 240 7.4 Water Distributions 243 7.5 Peace Pipes Distribution 254 7.6 The Egyptian and Sudanese Damage as a Result of Israeli-Ethiopian Cooperation 256 8.1 Agricultural Sector Economic Indicators 264 8.2 Comparison of Crop Production 266 8.3 Arab Food Gap for Main Crops (2000-2006) 269 8.4 The Food Gap (1975-2000) 274 8.5 The Arab Food Gap for Major Food Commodities (2000-2006) 275 8.6 The Percentage of Change in the Food Gap Cost (2000-2006) 276 8.7 Arab Agricultural Exports and Imports (2000-2006) 277 8.8 Net Arab Agricultural Imports (2000-2006) 278 8.9 Arab Agricultural Exports and Imports 281 9.1 Saudi Arabia Population (1965-2009) 307 List of Maps: See seperate section 1 Saudi-Yemeni Border Agreement 2 Saudi Arabia-UAE Borders after the Agreement of 1974 3 UAE-Saudi Borders prior to 1974 Jeddah Agreement 4 Arab Territory of Ahwaz Occupied by Iran 5 Boundaries and Maritime Jurisdiction of Iran, Iraq and Kuwait 6 UAE Disputed Islands with Iran 7 UN Resolution 181 for the Partition of Palestine 8 The Aquifer of the West Bank 9 Conflicting Water Projects in the Jordan Basin 10 Sources of Euphrates and Tigris Rivers 11 Sources of the Nile River

In der vorliegenden Diplomarbeit werden die Einflüsse der (nord-)westeuropäischen, seefahrenden Nationen auf die Seeräuberei durch private Seebeutenehmer in der Karibik der frühen Neuzeit untersucht, um deren Entwicklung im Laufe des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts aufzuzeigen. In keiner anderen Epoche der Pirateriegeschichte verschwimmen die Grenzen zwischen 'legitimer' Freibeuterei und 'illegaler' Piraterie so stark wie bei den untersuchten Generationen privater Seebeutenehmer, weshalb das Hauptaugenmerk auf der Prüfung der theoretisch-juristischen Rhetorik an der historischen Wirklichkeit liegt. Um den unterschiedlichen Dimensionen der europäischen Einflüsse auf die frühneuzeitliche Seeräuberei im karibischen Raum gerecht zu werden, wurde ein interdisziplinärer und globalgeschichtlicher Ansatz verfolgt und Fachliteratur aus der Rechts-, Wirtschafts-, Politik-, Sozial- und Literaturgeschichte in die Analyse einbezogen. Die Ergebnisse bestätigen dabei die These, dass die Einflüsse der europäischen Mächte und ihrer Politik in Europa mit der wachsenden Distanz zwischen den Schauplätzen der seeräuberischen Aktivitäten privater Seebeutenehmer und 'ihren' Souveränen bis zum Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts stetig abnahmen. Auch die dauerhafte Ansiedlung nicht-spanischer Akteure auf den Westindischen Inseln bildet wie erwartet eine Zäsur, welche die Loslösung der im karibischen Raum als Freibeuter oder Piraten tätigen Seefahrer von der europäischen Politik beschleunigte und diese zunehmend außer Kontrolle der Souveräne und Autoritäten in Europa geraten liess. Wie sich aber herausgestellt hat, sind die Auswirkungen der Handlungen privater Seebeutefahrer, die sich häufig nicht an die von ihren Auftraggebern vorgegebenen Bestimmungen hielten und die europäischen MonarchInnen dadurch zu politischen Reaktionen zwangen, ebenfalls nicht zu unterschätzen. ; This thesis examines the influences of (North-)Western European seafaring nations on sea-robbery by private sea-bounty takers in the early modern Caribbean in order to show its development over the course of the 16th and 17th centuries. In no other period of piracy history do the boundaries between 'legitimate' privateering and 'illegal' piracy blur as much as in the generations of private sea-robbers analyzed in this study, which is why the main focus is on testing theoretical-legal rhetoric against historical reality. In order to offer an adequate account of the different dimensions of European influences on early modern sea-robbery in the Caribbean region, an interdisciplinary and global-historical approach was taken, and specialized literature from legal, economic, political, social, and literary history was included in the analysis. The results support the thesis that the influence of the European powers and their politics and policies in Europe steadily decreased until the end of the 17th century with the growing distance between the sites of piratical activities of private sea-bounty takers and 'their' sovereigns. Also, as expected, the permanent settlement of non-Spanish protagonists in the West Indies forms a turning point that accelerates the detachment of maritime pirates operating as privateers or pirates in the Caribbean from European politics, leaving them increasingly out of control of sovereigns and authorities in Europe. As it turned out, the impact of the actions of private sea-bounty takers, who often did not obey the terms and regulations set by their patrons and thus forced European monarchs to react politically, should not be underestimated either. ; Arbeit an der Bibliothek noch nicht eingelangt - Daten nicht geprüft ; Abweichender Titel laut Übersetzung des Verfassers/der Verfasserin ; Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, Diplomarbeit, 2021 ; (VLID)6423855

Resolution in climate models is thought to be an important factor for advancing seasonal prediction capability. To test this hypothesis, seasonal ensemble reforecasts are conducted over 1993–2009 with the European community model EC-Earth in three configurations: standard resolution (~1° and ~60 km in the ocean and atmosphere models, respectively), intermediate resolution (~0.25° and ~60 km), and high resolution (~0.25° and ~39 km), the two latter configurations being used without any specific tuning. The model systematic biases of 2-m temperature, sea surface temperature (SST), and wind speed are generally reduced. Notably, the tropical Pacific cold tongue bias is significantly reduced, the Somali upwelling is better represented, and excessive precipitation over the Indian Ocean and over the Maritime Continent is decreased. In terms of skill, tropical SSTs and precipitation are better reforecasted in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans at higher resolutions. In particular, the Indian monsoon is better predicted. Improvements are more difficult to detect at middle and high latitudes. Still, a slight improvement is found in the prediction of the winter North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) along with a more realistic representation of atmospheric blocking. The sea ice extent bias is unchanged, but the skill of the reforecasts increases in some cases, such as in summer for the pan-Arctic sea ice. All these results emphasize the idea that the resolution increase is an essential feature for forecast system development. At the same time, resolution alone cannot tackle all the forecast system deficiencies and will have to be implemented alongside new physical improvements to significantly push the boundaries of seasonal prediction. ; The research leading to these results has received funding from the EU Seventh Framework Programme FP7 (2007–2013) under Grant Agreements 308378 (SPECS), 603521 (PREFACE), and 607085 (EUCLEIA), the Horizon 2020 EU program under Grant Agreements 641727 (PRIMAVERA) and 641811 (IMPREX), and the ESA Climate Change Initiative (CCI) Living Planet Fellowship VERITAS-CCI. We acknowledge PRACE for awarding access to Marenostrum3 based in Spain at the Barcelona Supercomputing Center through the HiResClim project. We acknowledge the work of the developers of the s2dverification R-based package (http://cran.r-project. org/web/packages/s2dverification/index.html) and autosubmit workflow manager (https://pypi.python.org/ pypi/autosubmit/3.5.0). Paolo Davini acknowledges the funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme COGNAC under the European Union Marie Sklodowska-Curie Grant Agreement 654942. ; Peer Reviewed ; Postprint (published version)

Resolution in climate models is thought to be an important factor for advancing seasonal prediction capability. To test this hypothesis, seasonal ensemble reforecasts are conducted over 1993–2009 with the European community model EC-Earth in three configurations: standard resolution (~1° and ~60 km in the ocean and atmosphere models, respectively), intermediate resolution (~0.25° and ~60 km), and high resolution (~0.25° and ~39 km), the two latter configurations being used without any specific tuning. The model systematic biases of 2-m temperature, sea surface temperature (SST), and wind speed are generally reduced. Notably, the tropical Pacific cold tongue bias is significantly reduced, the Somali upwelling is better represented, and excessive precipitation over the Indian Ocean and over the Maritime Continent is decreased. In terms of skill, tropical SSTs and precipitation are better reforecasted in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans at higher resolutions. In particular, the Indian monsoon is better predicted. Improvements are more difficult to detect at middle and high latitudes. Still, a slight improvement is found in the prediction of the winter North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) along with a more realistic representation of atmospheric blocking. The sea ice extent bias is unchanged, but the skill of the reforecasts increases in some cases, such as in summer for the pan-Arctic sea ice. All these results emphasize the idea that the resolution increase is an essential feature for forecast system development. At the same time, resolution alone cannot tackle all the forecast system deficiencies and will have to be implemented alongside new physical improvements to significantly push the boundaries of seasonal prediction. ; The research leading to these results has received funding from the EU Seventh Framework Programme FP7 (2007–2013) under Grant Agreements 308378 (SPECS), 603521 (PREFACE), and 607085 (EUCLEIA), the Horizon 2020 EU program under Grant Agreements 641727 (PRIMAVERA) and 641811 (IMPREX), and the ESA Climate Change Initiative (CCI) Living Planet Fellowship VERITAS-CCI. We acknowledge PRACE for awarding access to Marenostrum3 based in Spain at the Barcelona Supercomputing Center through the HiResClim project. We acknowledge the work of the developers of the s2dverification R-based package (http://cran.r-project. org/web/packages/s2dverification/index.html) and autosubmit workflow manager (https://pypi.python.org/ pypi/autosubmit/3.5.0). Paolo Davini acknowledges the funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme COGNAC under the European Union Marie Sklodowska-Curie Grant Agreement 654942. ; Peer Reviewed ; Postprint (published version)

The Phoenicians were a Semitic people that inhabited the coast of the southern Levant. They were known throughout the Ancient Near East as shrewd merchants, gifted artisans, and exceptional mariners who ventured the Mediterranean Sea and beyond the straights of Gibraltar long before the invention of the compass. And yet despite all their acknowledged traits, modern scholars still define this important ancient culture as a lost civilization, mainly due to the acute lack of prominent original Phoenician written sources. Although thousands of Phoenician and Punic inscriptions were found over the years, the vast majority consists of laconic formulas providing little information. Therefore, most of our conceptions on the Phoenicians are still derived from anachronistic exterior sources such as the Hebrew bible and various classical authors. Since the 19th century, archaeology has played a key role in the rediscovery of the Phoenician culture in the east and west. However, since most of the major Phoenician urban centers lie below their modern successors, excavations in Lebanon are often difficult. Furthermore, the fragile political situation in the region during the last half a century has greatly hindered archaeological exploration of the Phoenician homeland. For these reasons and more, the Phoenicians received little scholarly attention in comparison to other ancient Levantine people such as the Israelites, Philistines, or Aramaeans. Modern scholars often treat each Phoenician city-state as an individual entity, emphasizing their autonomous nature and their independent civic identity. Some even questioned whether we may refer to the Phoenicians as a people, as they seem to lack basic elements of an ethnic group. They were a people without a common name, as they often chose to identify themselves as members of their city-state rather than subscribing to a broader ethnic or national identity. They had no acknowledged state with fixed borders, and they lacked political unity. Furthermore, some scholars maintain that there was no substantial difference between the language, religion, or craftsmanship of the city-states that constituted Phoenicia, and that of the rest of the southern Levant during most of the Bronze and Iron Ages. This study aims to answer the question can a broad Phoenician ethnic identity be reconstructed from the material culture of the Phoenicians during the Iron Age despite their tendency for a strong regional civic identity? By implementing an interdisciplinary longue durée approach that takes into consideration historical, political, and socio-economic factors, as well as the acute effect of the land-and-seascape on this ancient society, and analyzing various aspects of their material culture as it was expressed through architecture, religion and cult, burial practices, and the maritime culture, certain unique cultural elements were recognized which may serve as 'ethnic markers'. These unique markers, which were mainly exhibited in the Phoenicians' religion and cult, and maritime culture, were identified throughout Phoenicia and its dependencies suggesting a pan-Phoenician cultural koiné. In light of these findings, core issues of the Phoenician culture in the east, such as their ethnogenesis and the constant tension between their civic and ethnic identities, were addressed and possible theories were offered. Although material culture should not be automatically equated with ethnicity, it is undeniable that in the course of the self-definition of any human group, certain aspects of material culture, alongside other cultural traits such as language, religion, or dress, are chosen or used to mark ethnicity and often reflect symbolism and ethnic behavior. Material culture constitutes an indirect reflection of society, as ideas, ideology, and systems of belief are often manifested in its people's handiwork. The utilization of certain aspects of material culture was often implemented in order to distinguish a certain group from other groups, creating social boundaries that differentiate 'us' from 'them', and thus facilitating the formation of a distinct identity. This study, which often times extends far beyond its chronological scope, demonstrates that despite the individual/autonomous tendencies of the Phoenicians for a strong regional/civic identity, rather than to a broader ethnic identity, certain unique cultural elements manifested in the material culture demonstrate a pan-Phoenician cultural koiné, which was recognized not only by others as distinctive 'Phoenician' or 'Canaanite', but also by the Phoenicians themselves. These cultural elements, expressed in the material culture, and their self-ascription and ascription by others, constitute a complex shared ethnic identity that we refer to today as 'Phoenician'. ; XXIII, 497 Seiten

How can private international law contribute to the development of the legal architecture needed to integrate our emerging multi-cultural society? Key FeaturesOpens a cross-regional dialogue, shifting the Eurocentric discussion on diversity and integration to a more inclusive engagement with the Global South in private international law issuesPromotes a cosmopolitan vision of private international law, as a discipline with the potential to transcend its boundaries to further promote the reality of cross-border integrationProvides timely insights on the significance of the Brexit vote for rethinking the challenges that legal diversity poses for an integration projectBringing together world-renowned academics and experienced private international lawyers from a wide range of jurisdictions in Europe and South America, this book explores how the methodologies and techniques of private international law can be used to engage with legal diversity. The contributors explore ways forward and set out a vision of private international law connected to the communication, coordination, cooperation and engagement between legal orders. It provides in-depth analysis of the role of private international law in dealing with legal diversity across a diverse range of topics.Topics covered includeInternational cooperation in civil and commercial mattersLabour migration and other migration issues more generallyCross-border family issuesConsumer protectionPrivate international law of successionInternational contractsArbitration and private international lawList of ContributorsMercedes Albornoz, Professor of Private International Law, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) (México) Beatriz Añoveros Terradas, Associate Professor of Private international law, ESADE Law School Universitat Ramon Llull, Barcelona (Spain)Nadia de Araujo, Professor of Private International Law , Pontificia Universidade Católica de Rio de Janeiro (Brazil)Guillermo Argerich, Professor of Private International Law, University of Buenos Aires (Argentina)Laura Capalbo, Associate Professor of Private International Law, Universidad de la República (Uruguay) Laura Carballo, Professor, Nippon Foundation Chair, World Maritime University, Malmo (Sweden)Janeen M. Carruthers, Professor of Private Law, University of Glasgow (Scotland)Giuditta Cordero Moss, Professor of Private International Law, University of Oslo (Norway)Rosario Espinosa Calabuig, Professor of Private International Law, Universitat de Valencia (Spain)Diego P. Fernández Arroyo, Professor of Law, SciencesPo, Paris (France)Cecilia Fresnedo de Aguirre, Professor of Private International Law, Universidad de la República (Uruguay)Ignacio Goicoechea, Representative for Latin America and the Caribbean of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (Argentina)Kasey McCall-Smith, Lecturer in Public International Law, University of Edinburgh (Scotland)David McClean, Emeritus Professor of Private International Law, University of Sheffield (England)Ralf Michaels, Arthur Larson Professor of Law, Duke University (United States)Maria Blanca Noodt Taquela, Professor of Private International Law, Universidad de Buenos Aires (Argentina)Didier Opertti Badán, Emeritus Professor of Private International Law. Universidad de la República (Uruguay)Sebastián Paredes, Assistant Professor of Private International Law, Universidad de Buenos Aires (Argentina)

Second home tourism : an introduction / Dieter Müller & C. Michael Hall -- Governing and planning for second homes / C. Michael Hall & Dieter Müller -- The role of second homes in a Mediterranean coastal mass tourism destination : an evolutionary perspective / Maria Trinitat Rovira Soto & Salvador Anton Clavé -- Second homes and the commons : terms for second home leaseholds and collective action in Kvarken Archipelago, Finland / Kristina Svels & Ulrika Åkerlund -- Rights to the rural : comparison of political and property/land rights of second homes owners in Canada, Finland and Poland / Greg Halseth, Kati Pitkänen, Czeslaw Adamiak & Mia Vepsäläinen -- National Mexican tourism policy and North American second homeowners in Mexico : local tourism development and Mexican identity / Helene Balslev Clausen & Mario Alberto Velázquez García -- Recreational second home governance in China : policy implementation and structural framework / Yuefang Wu & Honggang Xu -- The rise and fall of the houses of Attefall? : effects of reduced building regulation in coastal municipalities with large numbers of second homes / Ingrid Persson -- Displacement and second homes : full circle or time to move on? / Gijsbert Hoogendoorn & Roger Marjavaara -- From common ground to elite and commercial landscape / Dieter Müller & C. Michael Hall -- Uncertain benefits : how second-home tourism impacts community economy / Adam Czarnecki -- Undervaluing a sector : the enigma of micro-enterprise self-contained accommodation in Australia / Clare Keogh, Anton Kriz & L. Barnes -- Australian holiday homes : places of escape and sites of investment / Chris Paris -- From socialist Yugoslavia to the European Union : second home development in Croatia and Slovenia / Vuk Tvrtko Opacic & Miha Koderman -- Stretching the boundaries : building the Russian dacha dream / Olga Hannonen -- Second home tourism in Sicily : development, current trend and future outlook / Serena Volo -- Changing social structure of second home owners in Poland / Czeslaw Adamiak -- Community, culture and identities / Dieter Müller & C. Michael Hall -- Second homes, their users and relations to the rural space and the resident communities in Czechia / Dana Fialová, Jirí Vágner & Tereza Kusová -- Do second home owners only play a secondary role in coastal territories? : a case study in Charente-Maritime (France) / Caroline Blondy, Christine Plumejeaud, Luc Vacher, Didier Vye & Caroline Bontet -- Host community perceptions of international permanent tourists : the case of Didim, Turkey / Imren Uysal Waller & Richard Sharpley -- The moral dilemma of second-home owners' position in the host community / Maja Farstad -- The family and the second home : on building sandcastles, sharing places and the passing of time / Annika Strandin Pers, Maja Lagerqvist, & Urban Nordin -- From makeshift to makeover : materialising the beach shack as architectural heritage / Felicity Picken -- Caravanning and mobile second homes / C. Michael Hall & Dieter Müller -- Caravan cultures : second homes on wheels / Hege Høyer Leivestad -- Caravan people and space attachment / Martyn Steer-Fowler & Paul Brunt -- Wherever I park my RV, that's my home : freedom camping and local community tensions in eastern Australia / Rod Caldicott, John M. Jenkins & Pascal Scherrer -- Follow the sun : retirees motorhomes' movements, meanings and practices during the winter season in the Algarve / Joana Afonso Dias & Alexandre Domingues -- The future of second homes / C. Michael Hall & Dieter Müller

Marine spatial planning (MSP), a public process of analysing and allocating the spatial and temporal distribution of human activities in marine areas to achieve ecological, economic, and social objectives, is today generally accepted as the preferred tool to promote sustainable development of our increasingly degrading marine environment. However, as implementation of MSP grows worldwide, so does the realisation of the importance of effectively assessing performance of that implementation, to ensure that MSP delivers its maximum potential. While some evaluation initiatives are already in place, dedicated research on the evaluation component of MSP is a pressing need. Portugal is one of Europe's and the world's largest maritime nations, and, in line with EU policy and guidelines, has just completed its legal framework for MSP. As the spatial plan for the c. 4 M km2 of Portugal's national maritime space (NMS) is being developed, it is critical that it is coupled from the onset with the discussion on how its performance (the success of those actions) will be evaluated. This study aimed to assist the emerging Portuguese MSP system, in the development of an evaluation mechanism to assess its performance, based on a set of national, strategic level indicators scoped out through a participatory approach. The methodology used was based on a combination of secondary research (literature review) and primary research (data production). The latter included two components both involving MSP stakeholders: i) an analysis of the Portuguese legal framework for MSP; ii) the development of an indicator system to evaluate MSP performance designed as a five-step iterative process and based on legally stated objectives of MSP. A framework for evaluating performance of Portuguese MSP is proposed. Indicators selected are related to the EU's eleven principles for MSP and the legally stated objectives of Portuguese MSP. They cover key aspects of MSP: the ecosystem-approach to management, data and knowledge base, transparency, stakeholder participation, improved coordination, legal certainty, and articulation at the boundaries of MSP (landsea integration, and cross-border cooperation). This research constituted a first approach to a mechanism to evaluate MSP performance for the entire Portuguese NMS from the outset of the planning process. It was unique in Portugal in fully engaging a diversity of MSP practitioners and stakeholders in this stage of planning evaluation, a burgeoning approach at the international level. As such, while the proposed mechanism was focused on the Portuguese case, it has the potential to be useful, relevant and adaptable to other coastal nations in Europe and beyond. ; O Ordenamento do Espaço Marítimo (OEM), um processo público de analisar e alocar a distribuição especial e temporal das actividades humanas em áreas marinhas para alcançar objectivos ecológicos, económicos e sociais, é hoje globalmente aceite como a ferramenta preferencial para promover o desenvolvimento sustentável do nosso ambiente marinho, em crescente estado de degradação. Porém, à medida que a implementação do OEM aumenta a nível mundial, também cresce a consciência da importância de uma avaliação concreta dessa implementação, de forma a assegurar que o desempenho do OEM maximiza o seu potencial. Embora algumas iniciativas de avaliação estejam já em curso, há uma necessidade premente de desenvolver investigação dedicada sobre a componente de avaliação em OEM. Portugal é uma das maiores nações marítimas da União Europeia (UE) e do mundo e, em linha com as políticas e directrizes da UE, acabou de completar o seu quadro legal para o OEM. Enquanto o plano de situação para os c. de 4 M km2 do espaço marítimo nacional (EMN) está a ser desenvolvido, é crítico que, desde o início, ele seja acompanhado por uma discussão de como o seu desempenho (o sucesso das acções efectuadas no seu âmbito) será avaliado. Este estudo pretendeu contribuir para o OEM português, através da proposta de um mecanismo de avaliação para avaliar o seu desempenho, baseado num conjunto de indicadores nacionais de nível estratégico. A metodologia usada foi baseada numa combinação de fontes secundárias (revisão bibliográfica) e primárias (produção de dados), esta última envolvendo agentes de OEM: i) uma análise do quadro legal português de OEM; ii) o desenvolvimento de um sistema de indicadores para avaliar o desempenho do OEM nacional, concebido como um processo iterativo, com cinco passos, e baseado nos objectivos de OEM legalmente estabelecidos. Os indicadores seleccionados estão relacionados com os onze princípios da UE para o OEM e com os objectivos de OEM português legalmente estabelecidos, e cobrem aspectos chave do OEM: abordagem ecossistémica, base de informação, transparência, participação dos agentes, melhorias na coordenação, segurança legal e articulação nas fronteiras do OEM (integração mar-terra e cooperação transfronteiriça). Este estudo constituiu uma primeira abordagem a um mecanismo de avaliação do desempenho do OEM em todo o EMN, desde o arranque do processo de planeamento. Tratou-se de uma abordagem única em Portugal no que diz respeito ao envolvimento de um conjunto alargado de agentes nesta fase do planeamento da avaliação em OEM, uma metodologia que inicia a sua implementação ao nível internacional. Assim, embora o mecanismo proposto tenha sido focado no caso português, tem o potential de ser útil, relevante e adaptável a outras nações costeiras europeias e no resto do mundo.

Introduction: Sustainability for heritage and heritage for sustainability / Kalliopi Fouseki, Guillaume Dreyfuss, Kelvin Kah Eng Ang and May Cassar -- Values and sustaining heritage / Randall Mason -- Heritage and change management / Torgrim Sneve Guttormsen and Joar Skrede -- Combining theory and practice : incorporating value in risk assessment at heritage sites / Katherine Curran, Junnan Bao, Heather Oakley, Argyro Gili, Kalliopi Fouseki -- Heritage values and heritage management frameworks in Nigeria / Joy Edeoja, Kalliopi Fouseki and Alejandra Albuerne -- Evaluating the management plan of Bali cultural landscape from the local community's perspective / Diana Rahman and Kalliopi Fouseki -- Managing participatory heritage for enhancing social well-being / Eirini Gallou and Kalliopi Fouseki -- Social sustainability and witnessing difficult heritage / Ross J. Wilson -- Citizen science in sustainable heritage conservation / Rosie Brigham and Josep Grau-Bové -- Community-centred sustainable heritage management : reality and challenges in practice / Sujeong Lee -- Heritage conservation as a social process : Assessing social impacts of participatory cultural heritage conservation / Elia Quijano Quiñones and Kalliopi Fouseki -- Sustainable heritage through a sustainable community / Chihei Suzuki -- Developing international cultural relations through the negotiation of cultural property disputes : a sustainability perspective / Maria Shehade -- Is world heritage politically sustainable? / Kristen Barrett-Casey, Lorika Hisari, and Kalliopi Fouseki -- Political ruptures and the cultural heritage of Iraq / René Teijgeler and Mehiyar Kathem -- Najaf, Iraq : developing a sustainable approach to threatened heritage / Caroline A Sandes and Ali N. Attiyah -- Sustaining cultural heritage in post-conflict Syria : the case of Aleppo / Hiba Alkhalaf -- Heritage and peace-building : challenges, possibilities and sustainable practices / Feras Hammami, David C. Harvey, Daniel Laven and Diana Walters -- Sustainable heritage and climate change / Alessandra Bonazza -- Environmental design strategies for heritage / Rosa Schiano-Phan and Talia Quesada Campaña -- Energy efficiency in historic buildings / Gustaf Leijonhufvud, Petra Eriksson and Tor Broström -- Balancing heritage values, thermal comfort and energy efficiency in world heritage sites : the case of Mexico City / Krisangella Sofía Murillo Camacho, Kalliopi Fouseki and Hector Altamirano -- Food heritage as a catalyst for environmental sustainability : reflections on the cultural value imbued by citizens to food and its role in supporting scientific debate about food security / Georgios Alexopoulos, Suzanne Kapelari and Theano Moussouri -- The search for virtue : sustainability and systemic protection of agricultural heritage / Isabelle Anatole-Gabriel -- A boundaries approach to urban heritage : the case of Egyptian antiquity / Amr El-Husseiny and Kalliopi Fouseki -- Sustaining heritage places crossroads between urban imaginaries, heritage use and sustainability / Tu-Chung Liu and Kalliopi Fouseki -- Fort St. Angelo is not a billboard : IMAGE-driven media and the resilience of the project / Erica Giusta and Guillaume Dreyfuss -- Integrating urban conservation into urban planning / Arthur Parkinson and Mark Scott -- Foregrounding ethics in conservation in Singapore : issues, questions, and framework / Kang Shua Yeo and Jeffrey Kok Hui Chan -- Urban values-centred regeneration in the perspective of the circular economy model : an overview of the key issues / Luigi Fusco Girard and Francesca Nocca -- Using system dynamics in heritage research / Kalliopi Fouseki, Katherine Curran and Josep-Grove Grau -- Port city resilience : piloting a socio-spatial method for understanding, comparing and representing linked maritime heritage / Carola Hein, Lucija Ažman Momirski and Yvonne van Mil -- Heritage data science / Scott Allan Orr -- Capturing heritage significance : a critical analysis of economics-based methods / Mina Dragouni -- A rambling field role for the heritage practitioner : a means to come to more socially sustainable heritage (re-) development projects / Gisèle Gantois -- Teaching futures literacy for the heritage sector / Cornelius Holtorf.

This paper examines the effectiveness of the Senate committee system and the effect the double majority has had on this system, concentrating on Senate select and standing committees. In order to determine effectiveness eight committee inquiries were chosen before and after the double majority, as case studies of the committee process. Effectiveness was examined using the as well as the debates and speeches surrounding the establishment and conclusion of these inquiries. Chapter One briefly deals with the rules governing committees, in terms of their official definition, establishment and power. Standing committees are permanent committees appointed at the beginning of each parliament according to the Senate's standing orders (standing orders are procedural rules for how the Senate operates). These committees are responsible for particular areas of government. While standing committees were once divided into two streams they were collapsed into a single stream as of 11 September 2006. Unlike standing committees, which conduct many inquiries; select committees are established to address a single issue and cease to exist upon tabling their final report. Committees are the agents of parliament which generally gives them the power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents, within certain limits. Witnesses also have specified rights. Committees have the responsibility to report offenses to the Privileges Committee. The heaviest penalties that this body can impose are a six month jail term and a heavy fine. When committee reports are presented they are usually debated within a specified time limit. Chapter Two deals with four inquiries established before the Howard Government gained control of the Senate majority on 1 July 2005. These were the Select Committee into a Certain Maritime Incident, the Inquiry into the Privacy Act 1988, the Inquiry into Education of Students with Disabilities and the Select Committee into a New Research Reactor at Lucas Heights. The main problems before the double majority were lack of access to relevant people and information, as well as the Government ignoring committee recommendations. Chapter Three deals with four inquiries after the double majority took effect. These were the Inquiry into the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Bil1 2005 [Provisions] and Associated Bills, the Inquiry into Petrol Sniffing, the Inquiry into Stolen Wages and the Inquiry into Workplace Exposure to Toxic Dust. The final chapter, Chapter Four, compares Chapters Two and Three and considers the committee system from the point of view of the Senators who are responsible for making it work. After the double majority, the problems faced by the committee system were more or less the same except that the Government's control of the Senate gave it the ability to define the boundaries that committees must operate within. It can also prevent matters going to committees. As well as this the Government has the ability to constrict the time frames that committees must operate within. The problems that existed before the double majority have also been exacerbated. These have always been partly caused by the reluctance of Senators to enforce the Senate's powers. While it is possible that an opposition with a majority in the Senate could also abuse its position, the removal of parties voting as a bloc would prevent both the Government and the opposition from being in a position to do this. The problems of the Senate are largely cultural and for significant reform to take place a change of mindset is required. Nevertheless the Senate committee system remains a useful and effective accountability tool.

Esta zona de América –el Mar Caribe– parece que viviera en constante ebullición Londoño, 1973. En 2014 "Nicaragua inició una demanda contra Colombia para determinar la delimitación de las fronteras entre la plataforma continental de Nicaragua más allá de las 200 millas náuticas y la plataforma continental de Colombia" (La Fm, 2014). Este país ya había presentado una primera demanda en 2001 la cual le resultó favorable, sin embargo, busca mantiene una actitud ambiciosa y se plantea adquirir más plataforma continental y zona económica exclusiva. Estos hechos son preocupantes a los ojos de la población colombiana, la cual rechazó contundentemente la decisión de la Corte Internacional de Justicia. La controversia se desenvuelve en una zona de indescriptible dinamismo político, económico y cultural, de unas características geográficas excepcionales y que presenta grandes ventajas a aquellos Estados que logren controlarla; el espacio en referencia es el Mar Caribe. A su vez, la disputa se enmarca en una reconfiguración global de la distribución de poder, con la confluencia de los intereses de potencias extra continentales. Estas han aportado según el análisis, para aprovechar las desgracias de Colombia. De esta forma, la búsqueda de explicación a diversos interrogantes se legitima, entre estas inquietudes se hallan: ¿Colombia tenía títulos jurídicos que validaran su soberanía sobre el archipiélago de San Andrés, las aguas circundantes, el suelo y el subsuelo marino? ¿Colombia había definido sus límites marítimos con Nicaragua? ¿La búsqueda por parte de Nicaragua de hacerse con una mayor extensión marítima en su costa atlántica es reciente? ¿Quién fue el culpable del resultado del fallo de la Corte Internacional de Justicia de 2012? ¿Qué se espera que pase con las relaciones bilaterales entre Colombia y Nicaragua? ¿Cuál es la importancia geográfica, geoestratégica y geopolítica del Caribe? ¿Cuáles son los intereses de China y Rusia en el Caribe? ¿Tiene consecuencias regionales o internacionales esta controversia? Y finalmente ¿Cuál es el impacto para la seguridad nacional de un Estado el someterse a las instituciones jurídicas internacionales o abstenerse de participar en ellas y no acatar sus sentencias? Con el fin de responder a estos interrogantes y con el propósito de desarrollar un análisis multidisciplinario del tema que convoca este escrito es necesario, en primer lugar, tener claro el desarrollo histórico de la titularidad de los territorios neogranadinos y colombianos, así como su importancia geoestratégica para las potencias coloniales; en un segundo momento, observar la dinámica jurídica y argumentativa que tuvo lugar con cargo a otros casos que son de actualidad y que si bien es cierto pareciera no guardan relación directa con el escenario para Colombia, sí, tienen algunos elementos comunes como lo son la definición de límites entre los estados, el sistema internacional la Corte Internacional de Justicia y los intereses de los estados potencia para preservar y garantizar no solo su desarrollo económico sino su seguridad nacional. Un elemento común evidente en los casos que analizaremos es la participación de la CIJ como organismo del sistema internacional ya sea por los conflictos internacionales de este orden y su intervención directa para dirimirlos por sentencia o por su opinión al mismo respecto, escenario al cual acudió Nicaragua contra Colombia; en tercer lugar, analizar las oportunidades y ventajas que ofrecen el Caribe y el archipiélago de San Andrés y Providencia a quien domine geoestratégicamente sobre ellos, especialmente, para la consecución de intereses nacionales particulares como pareciera puede ser el caso. ; This area of America-the Caribbean Sea seems to live in constant turmoil Londoño, 1973. In 2014, "Nicaragua filed a lawsuit against Colombia to determine the delineation of boundaries between Nicaragua's continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles and the continental shelf of Colombia "(the MF 2014). East country had already filed a first lawsuit in 2001 that it was favorable, without But looking maintains an ambitious attitude and gain more platform arises continental and exclusive economic zone. These facts are disturbing to the eyes Colombian population, which overwhelmingly rejected the decision of the Court International Justice. The controversy unfolds in an area of indescribable political dynamism, economic and cultural, of exceptional geographical characteristics and presents great advantages to States that achieve control; reference space is The Caribbean Sea. In turn, the dispute is part of a global reconfiguration distribution of power, with the confluence of interests extra powers continental. These have provided according to the analysis, to take advantage of the misfortunes of Colombia. Thus, the search for an explanation to various questions are legitimate, among these concerns are: Colombia had legal title to validate his sovereignty over the archipelago of San Andres, the surrounding waters, soil and I subsoil? Is Colombia had defined its maritime boundary with Nicaragua? The Search by Nicaragua to gain greater maritime area in its Atlantic coast is new? Who was to blame for the result of the judgment of the Court International Justice in 2012? What it is expected to happen with relations bilateral between Colombia and Nicaragua? What is the geographical importance, geostrategic and geopolitical Caribbean? What are the interests of China and Russia Caribbean? Do you have regional or international implications this controversy? Y finally What is the impact on the national security of a State to submit to international legal or refrain from participating in these institutions and not abide their sentences? In order to answer these questions with the purpose of developing a multidisciplinary analysis of the issue before this writing is necessary, first Instead, be clear about the historical development of the ownership of the territories neogranadinos and Colombia, as well as its geostrategic importance to the colonial powers; in a second stage, observe the legal and argumentative dynamics held from other cases that are topical and that if it is true it seems not directly related to the stage for Colombia, yes, they have some elements common such as the definition of limits between the states, the international system the International Court of Justice and the interests of states to preserve power and ensure not only economic development, but its national security. An element Common evident in cases involving discuss is the ICJ as organization of the international system either by international conflicts of this order and direct intervention to resolving it by judgment or his opinion at the same connection scenario which came against Colombia Nicaragua; thirdly, analyzing the opportunities and advantages of the Caribbean and the archipelago of San Andres and Providence geostrategically who dominate them, especially for the achieve particular national interests as seems may be the case.

Hamas's attack into Israel and massacre of Israelis, followed by Israel's war of obliteration on Gaza backed by the United States, is a political earthquake in the Middle East. Its tremors are shaking up the politics of the Horn of Africa, bringing down an already tottering peace and security architecture. It's too early to discern the shape of the rubble, but we can already see the direction in which some of the pillars will fall.The most obvious impact is that the Israel-Palestine war has legitimized and invigorated protest across the wider region. Hamas showed that Israel was not invincible, and Palestine would no longer be invisible. Many in the Arab street — and Muslims more widely — are ready to overlook Hamas's atrocious record as a public authority and its embrace of terror, because it dared stand up to Israel, America, and Europe.Hamas's boldness has given a shot in the arm to Islamists, such as Somalia's al-Shabaab. As the African Union peacekeeping operation in Somalia draws down, al-Shabaab remains a threat— and will likely be emboldened to intensify its operations both in Somalia and neighboring Kenya.Kenyan President William Ruto gave strong backing to Israel while also calling for a ceasefire. For the U.S. and Europe, Kenya is now the anchor state for security in the Horn — but it desperately needs financial aid if it is to shoulder that burden.The war is consuming Egyptian attention and terrifies President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who is treading a fine line between sponsoring pro-Palestinian protests and suppressing them.Red Sea SecurityThe Red Sea is strategic for Israel. One quarter of Israel's maritime trade is handled in its port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba, an inlet of the Red Sea. Eilat is Israel's back door, vital in case the Mediterranean coast is under threat. Israel has long seen the littoral countries of the Red Sea — Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia — as pieces in the jigsaw of its extended security frontier.Historically, Egypt has shared the same concern. Last year, revenues from the Suez Canal were $9.4 billion— its third largest foreign currency earner after remittances from Egyptians working in the Gulf States and tourism. Neither Israel nor Egypt can afford a disruption to maritime security from Suez and Eilat to the Gulf of Aden.The Red Sea is also the buckle on China's Belt and Road Initiative, with China's first overseas military base — strictly speaking a "facility" — in the port of Djibouti near the Bab al-Mandab, the narrow straits between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. More than 10 percent of world maritime trade is carried on 25,000 ships through these straits every year.Having long neglected its Red Sea coastline, Saudi Arabia has reawakened to its significance in the last decade. In the 1980s, amid fears that Iran might block tanker traffic through the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia built an east-west pipeline from the Aqaig oil fields to the Red Sea port of Yanbu al Bahr. Its strategic significance is back in focus.In parallel, the United Arab Emirates is well on track to securing a monopoly over the ports of the Gulf of Aden, which forms the eastern approaches to the Red Sea. It has de facto annexed the Yemeni island of Socotra for a naval base. The UAE is looking for a foothold in the Red Sea proper, and a string of satellite states on the African shore.All these factors intensify the scramble for securing naval bases in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Djibouti is already host to the U.S.'s Camp Lemonnier along with French, Italian, Japanese, and Chinese facilities. Turkey and Russia are actively seeking bases too, focusing on Port Sudan and Eritrea's long coastline.Empowered Gulf StatesWell before the recent crisis, the Horn of Africa was becoming dominated by Middle Eastern powers. This process is now intensified. Decades of competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran for alignment of Sudan and Eritrea has swung different ways. Sudan's General Abdel Fattah al-B­­urhan, formerly political partner of Benjamin Netanyahu and signatory to the Abraham Accord, cut an ill-timed deal with Iran in early October, to obtain weapons, which has embarrassed his outreach to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. More recently, Turkey and Qatar's regional ambitions have clashed with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, especially over the Muslim Brothers — supported by the former, opposed by the latter. The latest emerging rivalry is between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.Saudi Arabia has positioned itself as the regional anchor. While running for president, Joe Biden called Saudi Arabia a "pariah." But it is now indispensable to the U.S.Among the Arab states. the UAE has been the most restrained in condemning Israel for its actions in Gaza. It has also said that it doesn't mix trade and politics— meaning that it will continue to implement the economic cooperation agreements it signed with Israel following on from the Abraham Accords. The UAE is also positioned at the center of the U.S.-sponsored India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), unveiled at the September G20 summit in India as a response to China's Belt and Road Initiative.The UAE also has a free hand in the Horn of Africa, and in the last five years it has moved more rapidly and decisively than Saudi Arabia.Sudan's Fate between Riyadh and Abu DhabiAfter the eruption of war in Sudan in April, the joint Saudi-American mediation was in large part a gift from Washington to try to mend fences with the Kingdom. Talks in Jeddah resumed in late October, with the modest agenda of a ceasefire and humanitarian access, and a pro forma "civilian track" delegated to the African Union, which has shown neither commitment nor competence.Meanwhile, the Emiratis are backing General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as "Hemedti," who is currently driving the Sudan Armed Forces out of their remaining redoubts in Khartoum. This followed more than six months of fighting in which Hemedti's Rapid Support Forces gained a reputation for military prowess and utter disregard for the dignity and rights of civilians. Despite widespread revulsion against the RSF, especially among middle class Sudanese, UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan, known as MBZ, stuck with his man.In charge of the ruins of Sudan's capital city, Hemedti will soon be in a position to declare a government, perhaps inviting civilians for the sake of a veneer of legitimacy. What's holding him back is the ceasefire talks in Jeddah. His rival, Gen. al-Burhan is meanwhile floating a plan to form a government based in Port Sudan — raising the prospect of two rival governments, as in Libya. The real negotiations there are between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. If the two capitals agree on a formula, the U.S. and the African Union will applaud, and the Sudanese will be presented with a fait accompli.Ethiopia Goes RogueIn Ethiopia, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's rule is underwritten by Emirati treasure. MBZ has reportedly paid for Abiy's vast new palace, a vanity project whose $ 10 billion price tag is paid for entirely off-budget. Abiy told lawmakers that this bill was none of their business as it was funded by private donations, directly to him. Other megaprojects in and around the capital Addis Ababa, such as glitzy museums and theme parks, have similarly opaque finances.Ethiopia's wars have depended on largesse from the UAE. Ethiopian federal forces prevailed against Tigray, forcing the latter into an abject surrender a year ago, on account of an arsenal — especially drones — supplied by the UAE. Abiy is currently rattling his saber against his erstwhile ally, Eritrea, demanding that landlocked Ethiopia be given a port, or it will take one by force. The likely target is Assab in Eritrea, though other neighbors such as Djibouti and Somalia have been rattled too.Eritrea unexpectedly finds itself as a status quo power and is relishing this role, tersely expressing its refusal to join in the confusing discourse from Addis Ababa. It suddenly has allies in Djibouti, Somaliland, Somalia and even Kenya — all of them threatened by Abiy's bellicosity.If Abiy does invade Eritrea, he will violate the basic international norm — the inviolability of state boundaries — and risk plunging his already failing economy deeper into disaster. This will pose a sharp dilemma for the UAE. It is ready to override multilateral principles, but whether it would bail out its errant client in Addis Ababa, and jeopardize its winning position in Sudan, is a different matter. It would also present Saudi Arabia with the dilemma of whether to back Eritrea's notorious dictator, President Isaias Afewerki.America and the Pax AfricanaPeace and security in the Horn of Africa isn't a priority for the Biden administration. Despite a rhetorical commitment to a rule-based international order, Washington has neither protected Africa's painstakingly-constructed peace and security architecture nor brought the Ethiopian and Sudanese crises to the U.N. Security Council.While the American security umbrella was in place over the Arabian Peninsula, the countries of the Horn of Africa had the chance to develop their own peace and security system, based on a layered multilateral structure involving the regional organization, the InterGovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union, and United Nations, with peacekeepers and peace missions funded by the Europeans. This emergent Pax Africana was already imperiled as the U.S. drew down and the Middle Eastern middle powers became more assertive. President Donald Trump authorized his favored intermediaries — Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE — to pursue their interests across the Horn of Africa. The Biden administration has not pulled that back.It's possible that the administration cares about peace, security and human rights in Africa. But for as long as the U.S.'s Horn of Africa policy is handled by the Africa Bureau at the State Department — whose diplomats scarcely get the time of day from their counterparts in the Gulf Kingdoms — Washington's views will remain all-but-irrelevant. The Horn of Africa doesn't make the cut when staffers prepare talking points for President Biden, Secretary of State Antony Blinken or national security adviser Jake Sullivan to speak to their Arab counterparts. It's a prioritization that leaves the region in a deepening crisis, at the mercy of ruthless transactional politics.America's well-established practice of treating Israel as an exception to international law is rubbing off on Israel's allies and apologists across the Middle East, who are actively dismantling the already-tottering pillars of Africa's norm-based peace and security system. Those African countries most in need of principled multilateralism are paying the price.

Horse mussel (Modiolus modiolus) and maerl beds are 'priority' habitats that can be threatened by human activity and as such require conservation under the UK Biodiversity Action Plan (UK BAP). During 2010 the Shetland Shellfish Management Organisation (SSMO), the body responsible for the management of all shellfish stocks within six nautical miles of Shetland, proposed to voluntarily close 24 areas to scallop dredging vessels in order to help conserve these priority habitats. Initially, the boundary of each closed area was defined from data extracted primarily from the Shetland Marine Spatial Plan but also through consultation with local maritime users. Some data were of limited quality, extent, or based on non-validated reports several decades old. In several cases fishermen actively involved in the development of the closed areas questioned whether the priority feature was present in the area at all, based on their local knowledge. Despite such reservations, the science-industry partnership involved agreed to adopt an iterative, precautionary approach whereby areas would be closed pending detailed survey and assessment, and the legalisation of the voluntary closed areas came into force in 2011. The primary aim of this report was to define the effectiveness of the current closed areas based on up-to-date, high resolution survey data so that the SSMO can validate and refine its spatial management plan. Closed areas to scallop dredging are widely distributed around Shetland, amounting to just under 26 km2 of sea surface area. The areas vary in size from 0.003 km2 to 14.6 km2, the largest accounting for 56.6% of the total area closed around Shetland. This variation is primarily due to the type of externally sourced data (i.e. point data or predicted species bed) used to originally define the extent of the feature. Historically, predicted species beds had been derived from a number of sources and various agencies from a combination of point data and localised bathymetry information. The current study surveyed existing closed areas using a hull mounted multibeam system and groundtruthed with an underwater camera system. Information was imported to GIS in order to create a georeferenced map of the presence of the species of interest, and in particular where they occur in sufficient abundance to consitute a 'priority feature' or habitat. Although it is generally accepted that the presence of the species does not inidcate a priority feature at low density and/or small patch size, some debate remains as to what criteria should be met to define the presence of a significant feature; a suggested criteria appropriate to the survey methodology was defined for this study. For the 20 sites surveyed in detail the predicted species beds, based on or derived from historical data, were not found to be representative of the current distribution of priority features. As a result the corresponding closed areas originally established by the SSMO were either not fully encompassing the UK BAP habitats located at the sites or were not protecting any UK BAP habitats (none present). Of the 20 sites surveyed, 12 were found to have either M. modiolus, maerl, or both; nine of these contained a priority feature but only two had a closed area which completely encapsulated the full extent of the feature. Alteration or removal of the boundaries of the existing closed areas is therefore appropriate and recommendations for this process are included. Further refinement of boundary areas may be warranted after consultation and additional focussed surveys. Although the surveys illustrate the need for validation of closed areas with high quality acoustic and visual survey data, the exercise provides a practical and successful industry-science approach to the establishment and incremental development of local spatial management plans. In the absence of detailed maps for entire sea areas, which rarely if ever exist, the use of historical data and local knowledge provides a basis for the focussing of survey resources. The use of acoustic surveying technology, such as multibeam, proved highly cost effective in mapping priority habitats. Multibeam surveys cover large areas of seabed relatively quickly, producing good quality maps to a high degree of accuracy, and as with this example, this is ideally suited to management plans based on 'physical' features (biogenic reefs) rather than biotopes. However, broad scale mapping of this type may inform the likely presence of biotopes, which can be confirmed by more cost and labour intensive methods if required. Although the science-industry partners acknowledge that the methodology of using historical data and local knowledge may not result in absolute protection of priority features during the first iteration, as is the case here, it was deemed preferable to establish a locally agreed framework, dialogue, and options for further refinement toward this goal than to leave the conservation of priority features unaddressed or awaiting investment in large-scale, holistic marine surveys. Direct stakeholder involvement in the process installed belief that clear and unambiguous science would rectify issues at a later date, and therefore fishermen agreed to voluntary closures of these areas before they were made statutory. As the Scottish Government currently empowers the SSMO to make changes to the spatial management plan for shellfisheries in the waters around Shetland by means of a Regulating Order, further surveys and consultation will increment toward more fine-scale improvements to the appropriateness of the plan well into the future.

[ES] Al Berto es un poeta trágico y moderno que encierra en su obra: O Medo (1974-1997) el "itinerario lírico de su vida", bajo un tono autobiográfico y testimonial. Una escritura que pone en marcha tras su regreso a Portugal, coincidiendo con un régimen democrático después de una estancia de autoexilio en Bruselas de ocho años. Las nuevas condiciones de su país le permitirá expresar sus ideas libremente a través de sus obras, tan diferentes como alternativas en el panorama de las letras lusas de aquel final de los años 70, con un radical narcisismo que se halla presente en todos sus libros, hasta el extremo de fracturar en dos partes su nombre: Al Berto, en los albores de su carrera literaria. Una escisión que lleva al poeta a convivir entre dos identidades, la del "sujeto real" (Alberto) y la ficticia de un "yo lírico imaginario" (Al Berto), cada vez más sólidas en el discurso poético, diluyéndose sus límites y siendo difícil separarlos. Su escritura rebosa de emoción por el atractivo lenguaje de una cálida belleza surrealista, y sus impactantes y conmovedoras metáforas. Del mundo underground de sus primeros libros, enmarcados en una etapa de rebeldía, excesos y transgresión, influenciado por la beat generation, y por los poetas malditos franceses, W.S Burroughs o Jean Genet (cuyos núcleos temáticos predominantes son homoerotismo, drogas, noches sórdidas, rock, escenas cinematográficas…), pasando luego a una etapa marítima en la que recupera su juventud a orillas del Atlántico, por medio de la memoria. Una etapa en la que su escritura es más serena, menos vertiginosa, no ausente de temores y de diversos "miedos" que el poeta vive en su experiencia errante, en su inquietud y en su desasosiego, por no querer anclarse ni permanecer arraigado a ningún lugar, fiel a sus encuentros pasionales fugaces, nombrando lo efímero del momento en su poesía para darle de este modo una categoría de eternidad a cada instante. La melancolía se apodera de sus versos largos, de rima irregular, ajenos a puntuaciones y a reglas sintácticas, cada vez más solemnes a medida que pasa el tiempo y el poeta es consciente de un mundo de ausencias (de amores y deseos), de pérdidas (de espacios) que le provocan un irremediable sufrimiento. Este "miedo" se precipita cuando mira de frente la condena de una enfermedad que le conducirá hasta la desaparición, hasta "el fuego que calcina sus versos", como tratándose de una escena cotidiana más, en donde Al Berto representa el drama de su vida y de su muerte y lo poetiza de manera singular ; [EN] Al Berto is a modern tragic poet who, in his emblematic work O Medo (1974-1997), circumscribes "the lyric itinerary of his life" using a unique testimonial and autobiographical tone. Upon his returning to Portugal, after an eight years self imposed exile in Brussels, he sets in motion his poetic career just as the new democratic regime was ushered in – this presented an opportunity to freely express his ideas in a literary work clearly alternative and different in the landscape of the late 70's. His radical narcissism is present right from the beginning in all his books. Even to the point of fracturing his own name as if consisting in two separate units: Al Berto. This is an underlying drive that pushes the author to coexist in between two distinctive identities. That of the "real subject" (Alberto) and another fictional of an "imaginary lyric one" (Al Berto). Both, increasingly differentiated in his poetic discourse – blending their boundaries, at times, to the point of making them indistinguishable – and, all this, using a profound, emotional surrealistic language knitted together with disturbing and deeply moving metaphors. From the underground world of his first writings, a rebellious phase of excess and transgression is present showing influences from the Beat generation, proscribed French poets together with W.S. Burroughs, Jean Genet (homoerotism, drugs, sordid nights, rock, film scenes., thematic core of his work) continuing with a maritime stage in which he recovers his early adult life by the Atlantic. At this point, his writings evolve into a more serene, less accelerated pace. Nonetheless, a different kind of "miedos"/ fears and apprehensions still persisted. Fears that the poet experiences in his drifting experience, in his restlessness and distress; in his desire of avoiding to stay put in any given place, but still faithful to his swift encounters. The way he describes these ever changing moments in his poetry gives them, undoubtedly, a transcendent dimension of eternity. Melancholy impregnates his long verses of irregular rime, foreign to punctuation and syntactic rules, gradually more solemn with the passing of the time - in which the poet is aware of a world of absences (love and desire) as well as losses (spaces) that triggers pain and suffering. This "miedo"/fear precipitates itself when he confronts the threat of a disease which will take him to oblivion - until this "fire that consummates his verses" as if it were one more ordinary fact of life; one in which Al Berto represents he drama of his life and death. Drama that he expresses in a singular and utterly poetic manner