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Although ideology is a central factor in models of voting choice, little is known about the factors that explain the variation across elections in the strength of ideological voting. This paper suggests that the role of citizens' left-right orientations increases with party system polarization. It improves on previous studies on this question by avoiding potential sources of bias linked with voters' perceptions of the level of polarization, with rationalization effects, and with the specification of the spatial model of the vote. Based on data from the 1999 European Election Study and from an expert survey on party positions, the results confirm that polarization reinforces ideological voting. However, this effect is mediated by party identification and by political sophistication. [Copyright 2008 Elsevier Ltd.]

The advent of multi-racial elections inaugurated democracy in South Africa in 1994. The results of subsequent elections in 1999 & 2004 differed little from those of 1994, except that the Democratic Party gained ground & the National Party lost support. In all three of these elections, there was an important correlation between race & vote. However, although participation in elections has remained high, rates of underlying party identification have significantly decreased over the first decade of democracy. This article uses survey data to analyse changing patterns of underlying support for political parties in South Africa, focusing closely on the African National Congress & the (New) National Party. Evidence is found of an emerging class cleavage that significantly affects party support. Tables, Figures, References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2006.]

In recent years, the Republican Party (GOP) has sharply narrowed the Democratic edge in overall party identification. Using New York Times/CBS News surveys (1980-1986) & earlier preelection surveys (1952-1976), several explanations for that partisan change are probed: generational replacement, conversion, & mobilization. The findings rule out conversion, give some support to mobilization, but emphasize the historically unique surge toward the GOP among the young since 1980. This break with the parental partisan legacy signals the prospect of a party realignment through generational replacement. 4 Tables, 1 Figure, 35 References. HA

Recent comparative electoral research shows that both ideological and competence voting are influenced by the degree of party system polarization. However, while the former association is uncontroversial, investigations on the latter have led to contradicting results. This study takes one step back, arguing that polarization rather affects how voters perceive party ideological positioning and competence. Building on literature linking elite polarization to mass partisanship, the study argues that party identification is a strong moderator of party evaluations in polarized elections. Hypotheses are tested with multilevel logit models on a pooled data set of European Election Studies from 1994 to 2009. Results show that partisans are more likely to view their preferred party as the most competent and ideologically close when the environment is polarized, while there is no such effect for non-partisans. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

Social-psychological models of voting behaviour systematically downsize the relevance of party leader evaluations by conceiving them as mere consequences of causally prior partisan attachments. However, the validity of this interpretation depends heavily on the effectively exogenous status of party identification. Empirical research shows that the assumed exogeneity of partisanship is, at best, doubtful. In such a context, single-equation models of voting are likely to provide seriously biased estimates. By employing the proper econometric procedures (instrumental variable estimation) and the most appropriate data sources to address causality issues (panel data) this study provides strong support in favour of the personalisation hypothesis.

Our focus is a puzzle: that ideological identification as "liberal" is in serious decline in the United States, but at the same time support for liberal policies and for the political party of liberalism is not. We aim to understand this divorce in "liberal" in name and "liberal" in policy by investigating how particular symbols rise and fall as associations with the ideological labels "liberal" and "conservative." We produce three kinds of evidence to shed light on this macro-level puzzle. First, we explore the words associated with "liberal" and "conservative" over time. Then we take up a group conception by examining the changing correlations between affect toward "liberals" and affect toward other groups. Finally, we consider the changing policy correlates of identification.

Die Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) ist drei Jahre nach ihrer Gründung in acht deutschen Landtagen vertreten. Die mit europakritischem und national-konservativem Profil gegründete Partei hat sich sowohl programmatisch als auch personell stark verändert und ähnelt zunehmend anderen rechtspopulistischen Parteien in Europa. Die vorliegende Untersuchung auf Basis der Daten des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels (SOEP) der Jahre 2014 bis 2016 deutet darauf hin, dass die Bindung der AnhängerInnen an die AfD verhältnismäßig schnell erfolgt ist. Drei Jahre nach Gründung geben mehr Menschen an, sich mit der AfD verbunden zu fühlen, als jemals mit den Republikanern, der DVU oder der NPD. Der Anteil der Parteibindungen ist im Falle der AfD damit ungefähr so hoch wie das langfristige Mittel der FDP und etwas unter dem Niveau der Grünen in den 1980er Jahren. Die AfD-AnhängerInnenschaft ist im Umfang gewachsen und hat sich in ihrer Zusammensetzung deutlich verändert: Die Partei findet ihre AnhängerInnen mehr und mehr unter NichtwählerInnen und im Lager rechtsextremer Parteien sowie unter BürgerInnen, die angaben, unzufrieden mit der Demokratie zu sein und solchen, die erklärten, sich vor Zuwanderung zu fürchten. ; Three years after its founding, the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) is now represented in eight German Landtagen. The party, which was founded with a eurosceptical and national conservative profile, has changed notably both in terms of its agenda and its representatives, and is increasingly starting to resemble other right-wing populist parties in Europe. According to the present study, which is based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for the years 2014 through 2016, the AfD is drawing in supporters relatively quickly. Today, the AfD boasts more followers than the Republicans, the German People's Union, or the National Democratic Party, respectively, ever have-that is, roughly as many as the Free Democratic Party's longterm average or somewhat fewer than the Greens had in the '80s. The party's base has also grown in scope and changed significantly in composition: more and more rightwingers and non-voters, as well as citizens who are antiimmigration or dissatisfied with the current democracy, are identifying with the AfD.

The "issue profiles" that emerge when the 2 major pol'al parties of the US are defined according to differing criteria are discussed. Data derive mainly from the U of Connecticut's Soc Sci Data Center. It is found that over a wide array of issues, from 1948 to the present, the Democratic Party, as defined by behavioral criteria (voting support), has been more "liberal" than its self-identified counterpart, while behavioral Republicans are persistently more "conservative" than self-identified GOP partisans. Any study of the "parties in the electorate" should take into account definitional biases. Most analysis has been confined to parties defined by the self-identification of the electorate. When behavioral constructions are used instead of partisan self-perception, there are consistently greater inter-party variations. The choice of which definition is to be used in determining the composition of the citizenry parties must be related to the analysis being performed & the election or elections examined. 4 Tables. Modified HA.

This article examines citizens' attitudes towards the two major parties in the United States since 1952 and in West Germany since 1969 employing open-ended data from each country's National Election Study time series. Despite similar declining trends in party identification in the two countries, it is found that the patterns of change in party images are markedly different. In the United States it is shown that voters have become increasingly neutral towards the two parties as the focus has turned more and more towards the candidates. In contrast, in West Germany voters have come to have a more balanced view of the parties, seeing both positive and negative features of both. Thus in both cases there has been a decline in polarized strong partisanship ('my party right or wrong'), but for different reasons. In the United States this decline can be seen as a sign of the decay of an ageing and outdated party system; in West Germany it can be seen as the development of realistic and balanced views of a party system which is just reaching full maturity. The implications for analysing party system development in Eastern Europe are discussed.

Since election results routinely show that elderly people are especially prone to cast their votes for the German Conservatives and do hardly sympathize with the Greens, the question arises: Does the ageing of the electorate go along with an increasing asymmetry of electoral chances? The article examines whether the electoral success of the Conservatives in the elderly population stems from a long-standing party affiliation or from emerging conservative attitudes in the lifecourse. Using Data from the German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) the results provide support for cohort effects: In the prospering era after World War II, many people established an affiliation towards the Conservatives and retained it. The Babyboomers instead show (1) a much lesser extent of support for the Conservatives (2) a much higher sympathy towards the Greens and (3) a higher rate of disenchantment with political parties at the same time. In sum, the ageing of the electorate may result in better electoral chances for the Greens rather than the conservatives.

In a recent monograph, Professor Heinz Eulau begins his analysis by quoting two "evidently antagonistic formulations" of the theoretical underpinnings of voting behavior in the United States:1. "A person thinks, politically, as he is socially."2. Crucial among the elements in the electoral decision are "traditional or habitual partisan attachments."These rival conceptions of primacy among politically relevant variables are often summarized by the terms "class" and "party." As Eulau points out, "from Aristotle to Harold J. Laski, the relationship between class and party has been one of the 'grand problems,' so-called, of speculation about political systems. It has also remained one of the most neglected areas of systematic theory and of empirical analysis." Data drawn from Survey Research Center surveys have recently been used to explore the relative importance and specify the interdependence of class and party in American voting. Generally, they show party to be more immediately relevant to the voting decision than class, though class position clearly shapes and sets limits to possible party identification and party-related perspectives.Difficult problems are involved in attempting to sort out and define the two postulated independent variables. The extent to which, in some sense, class determines party orientation is perhaps the most difficult. For example, even when it is found that a certain portion of the working class prefers the Republican party, it may still be that a generation or two earlier the families of this group were Republican on class grounds, and have perpetuated the identification through the socialization process. Campbell et al., conclude that party identification has a "conserving influence," inhibiting or, at least, slowing down the political manifestation of changes in class position. Their dat a strongly suggest that in any immediate situation class will be much less highly correlated with the vote than party preference. Campbell et al., do not attempt to control for class in relating party identification to the vote, although they do explore the separate effect of class. Eulau deals with this problem at length, but his focus is rather different. He does not attempt to specify the relative weight of each independent variable in predicting the vote, but concentrates on exploring the interrelationships of the two variables.

British politics are more fun today, at least for the political scientist, than at any time since the Second World War. The British two-party system, that seemingly immutable product of the "first past the post" electoral system, Britain's social structure and the enduring party identifications of Britain's voters, shows every sign of breaking up–not slowly and gradually, but with something approaching Mount St. Helen's force. A political party that did not exist a year ago, the Social Democrats, is now, in alliance with the liberals, sweeping all before it electorally. This short article tries to give some account of what is going on–and why.The present upheaval is taking place both down below, among voters, and up above, among members of Parliament and other prominent politicians. Let us begin with the voters.