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Given the difficulty to describe the musical forms of the Arabian Peninsula, which are very little known, three main geographical areas are presented here : the Arabian Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. In the Gulf, there are two main styles : pearl-divers' songs, al-ghaws, and traditional urban music, sawt, accompanying the zafan dance. In Saudi Arabia and the Nejd, four main categories of music can be distinguished : the dewînih, a solo voice accompanied with rabâb, the sâmirî, a collective chanting with frame drums, târ, performed during the night ; the 'arda , a ceremonial dance for political and tribal events and the riddiyya, a poetical contest. The main poetry is the nabatî genre, in colloquial Arabic. In Hejaz, the urban music is influenced by the cultural trends brought by the Pilgrimage, and show influences from Yemen, Syria, Egypt and Irak, although it has its specific features. In Yemen, three main regions can roughly be distinguished : the Zaydi Highlands, dominated by cultivators tribes which have war and agricultural songs, but with an old urban civilization in Sanaa ; the Shafii coastal plains, with a music typically influenced by the sea (fishermen, sailing from the Gulf and Egypt) ; the Hadramawt (inner and outer) which developped very specifical form, mainly based on the dân poetry, with cultural influences from south and south east Asia. In most of the rural forms, the percussions instruments are predominant, when in the urban forms, several forms of lute are dominant. This article does not cover Oman nor the Sanaa Song. The diversity and unity of music in the Arabian Peninsula express themselves in a series of sociological, linguistic and performing features common to all these countries, but with many related variants.

There is hardly any country in the world with which we have better, warmer and more cordial relations than the Arab World. India's cultural relations with Arabia date back to prehistoric times. In India the Harappans, Dravidians and Aryans wove the webs of many cultures. In the Arab lands, Babylon, Assyria, Syria, Palestine, Arabia, Egypt, Sumer and Elam were the centres of ancient civilizations. The people of the Indus Valley had intimate relations with the people of Sumer and trade relations with Egypt and Crete. The presentation on a seal of a mastless ship with a sharply upturned prow and stern, similar to the archaic representation on early Mingan seals, cylinders of Sumer and pre-dynastic pottery of Egypt testify to it. The similarity of these sculptures in fact led scholars to designate at least for some time the Indus Valley Civilization as Indo-Sumerian. The influence of the Indus Valley on Sumer is best illustrated in the fashion of hair dressing which was adopted by the Sumerian women from the Indus Valley. Recognising the importance of the Harappans, Prof. Frankfort says: "It has been established beyond a possibility of doubt, that India played a part in that early complex culture which shaped the civilized world before the advent of the Greeks." Recent excavations have further confirmed this view; the black and red ware bowls and red ware stands recently discovered in the excavations of graves near Tumas are very much similar to those found in the megalithic burials of South India. The resemblances include the corbelled arch at Tell Asmar and Mohenjodaro and the use in Sumer and the Indus of circular wells of segmental bricks. Common also is the use of stone circles in Nubia and South India.

Following the success of our first therapeutic discovery conference in 2017 and the selection of King Abdullah International Medical Research Centre (KAIMRC) as the first Phase 1 clinical site in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, we organized our second conference in partnership with leading institutions in academic drug discovery, which included the Structural Genomic Constorium (Oxford, UK), Fraunhofer (Germany) and Institute Material Medica (China) ; the participation of members of the American Drug Discovery Consterium ; European Biotech companies ; and local pharma companies, SIPMACO and SudairPharma. In addition, we had European and Northern American venture capital experts attending and presenting at the conference. The purpose of the conference was to bridge the gap between biotech, pharma and academia regarding drug discovery and development. Its aim primarily was to: (a) bring together world experts on academic drug discovery to discuss and propose new approaches to discover and develop new therapies ; (b) establish a permanent platform for scientific exchange between academia and the biotech and pharmaceutical industries ; (c) entice national and international investors to consider funding drugs discovered in academia ; (d) educate the population about the causes of diseases, approaches to prevent them from happening and their cure ; (e) attract talent to consider the drug discovery track for their studies and career. During the conference, we discussed the unique academic drug discovery disrupting business models, which can make their discoveries easily accessible in an open source mode. This unique model accelerates the dissemination of knowledge to all world scientists to guide them in their research. This model is aimed at bringing effective and affordable medicine to all mankind in a very short time. Moreover, the program discussed rare disease targets, orphan drug discovery, immunotherapy discovery and process, the role of bioinformatics in drug discovery, anti-infective drug discovery in the era of bad bugs, natural products as a source of novel drugs and innovative drug formulation and delivery. Additionally, as the conference was organized during the surge of the epidemic, we dedicated the first day (25 February) to coronavirus science, detection and therapy. The day was co-organized with the King Saud bin Abdulaziz University for Health Sciences, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia(KSA) Ministry of Education to announce the grant winner for infectious diseases. Simultaneously, intensive courses were delivered to junior scientists on the principle of drug discovery, immunology and clinical trials, as well as rare diseases. The second therapeutics discovery forum provided a platform for interactive knowledge sharing and the convergence of researchers, governments, pharmaceuticals, biopharmaceuticals, hospitals and non-profit organizations on the topic of academic drug discovery. The event presented showcases on global drug discovery initiatives and demonstrated how collaborations are leading to successful new therapies. In line with the KSA 2030 vision on becoming world leaders with an innovative economy and healthy population, therapeutic discovery is becoming an area of interest to science leaders in the kingdom, and our conference gave us the opportunity to identity key areas of interest as well as potential future collaborations.

This book discusses the strategic shift in ownership of Aramco, the Saudi Arabian Oil Company, and its potential impact on Aramco's role in a post- privatized world. Scheduled to become an IPO in 2018, Aramco is on the verge of becoming the largest IPO on the market. As the world's largest oil and gas company, Aramco's impending privatization has important implications for the world's petroleum market. This book, therefore, undertakes an analysis of Aramco, examining its history, its current role in Saudi Arabia's economy, and its future role as an IPO. The chapters highlight the likely outcomes for Aramco in proceeding with its planned IPO and privatization, as well as the various policy options and models available to it by drawing on the privatization of other national oil companies in Norway, Russia, Brazil, and China. The book also explores the complexities that will be involved in transforming Saudi Aramco to a privatized company--albeit with significant government oversight and control--and addresses key questions on the issues likely to be faced, such as IPO pricing, the listing, domain, and market capacity, and potential stakeholders. As such, this book will be of interest to academic researchers studying energy economics, energy policy, and the political economy of the Middle East, as well as private sector decision makers in energy related fields, international organizations, international oil companies, energy commodity traders, and public sector energy policy makers with interest in Saudi Arabia and Aramco's IPO.

Hamas's attack into Israel and massacre of Israelis, followed by Israel's war of obliteration on Gaza backed by the United States, is a political earthquake in the Middle East. Its tremors are shaking up the politics of the Horn of Africa, bringing down an already tottering peace and security architecture. It's too early to discern the shape of the rubble, but we can already see the direction in which some of the pillars will fall.The most obvious impact is that the Israel-Palestine war has legitimized and invigorated protest across the wider region. Hamas showed that Israel was not invincible, and Palestine would no longer be invisible. Many in the Arab street — and Muslims more widely — are ready to overlook Hamas's atrocious record as a public authority and its embrace of terror, because it dared stand up to Israel, America, and Europe.Hamas's boldness has given a shot in the arm to Islamists, such as Somalia's al-Shabaab. As the African Union peacekeeping operation in Somalia draws down, al-Shabaab remains a threat— and will likely be emboldened to intensify its operations both in Somalia and neighboring Kenya.Kenyan President William Ruto gave strong backing to Israel while also calling for a ceasefire. For the U.S. and Europe, Kenya is now the anchor state for security in the Horn — but it desperately needs financial aid if it is to shoulder that burden.The war is consuming Egyptian attention and terrifies President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who is treading a fine line between sponsoring pro-Palestinian protests and suppressing them.Red Sea SecurityThe Red Sea is strategic for Israel. One quarter of Israel's maritime trade is handled in its port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba, an inlet of the Red Sea. Eilat is Israel's back door, vital in case the Mediterranean coast is under threat. Israel has long seen the littoral countries of the Red Sea — Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia — as pieces in the jigsaw of its extended security frontier.Historically, Egypt has shared the same concern. Last year, revenues from the Suez Canal were $9.4 billion— its third largest foreign currency earner after remittances from Egyptians working in the Gulf States and tourism. Neither Israel nor Egypt can afford a disruption to maritime security from Suez and Eilat to the Gulf of Aden.The Red Sea is also the buckle on China's Belt and Road Initiative, with China's first overseas military base — strictly speaking a "facility" — in the port of Djibouti near the Bab al-Mandab, the narrow straits between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. More than 10 percent of world maritime trade is carried on 25,000 ships through these straits every year.Having long neglected its Red Sea coastline, Saudi Arabia has reawakened to its significance in the last decade. In the 1980s, amid fears that Iran might block tanker traffic through the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia built an east-west pipeline from the Aqaig oil fields to the Red Sea port of Yanbu al Bahr. Its strategic significance is back in focus.In parallel, the United Arab Emirates is well on track to securing a monopoly over the ports of the Gulf of Aden, which forms the eastern approaches to the Red Sea. It has de facto annexed the Yemeni island of Socotra for a naval base. The UAE is looking for a foothold in the Red Sea proper, and a string of satellite states on the African shore.All these factors intensify the scramble for securing naval bases in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Djibouti is already host to the U.S.'s Camp Lemonnier along with French, Italian, Japanese, and Chinese facilities. Turkey and Russia are actively seeking bases too, focusing on Port Sudan and Eritrea's long coastline.Empowered Gulf StatesWell before the recent crisis, the Horn of Africa was becoming dominated by Middle Eastern powers. This process is now intensified. Decades of competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran for alignment of Sudan and Eritrea has swung different ways. Sudan's General Abdel Fattah al-B­­urhan, formerly political partner of Benjamin Netanyahu and signatory to the Abraham Accord, cut an ill-timed deal with Iran in early October, to obtain weapons, which has embarrassed his outreach to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. More recently, Turkey and Qatar's regional ambitions have clashed with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, especially over the Muslim Brothers — supported by the former, opposed by the latter. The latest emerging rivalry is between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.Saudi Arabia has positioned itself as the regional anchor. While running for president, Joe Biden called Saudi Arabia a "pariah." But it is now indispensable to the U.S.Among the Arab states. the UAE has been the most restrained in condemning Israel for its actions in Gaza. It has also said that it doesn't mix trade and politics— meaning that it will continue to implement the economic cooperation agreements it signed with Israel following on from the Abraham Accords. The UAE is also positioned at the center of the U.S.-sponsored India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), unveiled at the September G20 summit in India as a response to China's Belt and Road Initiative.The UAE also has a free hand in the Horn of Africa, and in the last five years it has moved more rapidly and decisively than Saudi Arabia.Sudan's Fate between Riyadh and Abu DhabiAfter the eruption of war in Sudan in April, the joint Saudi-American mediation was in large part a gift from Washington to try to mend fences with the Kingdom. Talks in Jeddah resumed in late October, with the modest agenda of a ceasefire and humanitarian access, and a pro forma "civilian track" delegated to the African Union, which has shown neither commitment nor competence.Meanwhile, the Emiratis are backing General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as "Hemedti," who is currently driving the Sudan Armed Forces out of their remaining redoubts in Khartoum. This followed more than six months of fighting in which Hemedti's Rapid Support Forces gained a reputation for military prowess and utter disregard for the dignity and rights of civilians. Despite widespread revulsion against the RSF, especially among middle class Sudanese, UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan, known as MBZ, stuck with his man.In charge of the ruins of Sudan's capital city, Hemedti will soon be in a position to declare a government, perhaps inviting civilians for the sake of a veneer of legitimacy. What's holding him back is the ceasefire talks in Jeddah. His rival, Gen. al-Burhan is meanwhile floating a plan to form a government based in Port Sudan — raising the prospect of two rival governments, as in Libya. The real negotiations there are between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. If the two capitals agree on a formula, the U.S. and the African Union will applaud, and the Sudanese will be presented with a fait accompli.Ethiopia Goes RogueIn Ethiopia, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's rule is underwritten by Emirati treasure. MBZ has reportedly paid for Abiy's vast new palace, a vanity project whose $ 10 billion price tag is paid for entirely off-budget. Abiy told lawmakers that this bill was none of their business as it was funded by private donations, directly to him. Other megaprojects in and around the capital Addis Ababa, such as glitzy museums and theme parks, have similarly opaque finances.Ethiopia's wars have depended on largesse from the UAE. Ethiopian federal forces prevailed against Tigray, forcing the latter into an abject surrender a year ago, on account of an arsenal — especially drones — supplied by the UAE. Abiy is currently rattling his saber against his erstwhile ally, Eritrea, demanding that landlocked Ethiopia be given a port, or it will take one by force. The likely target is Assab in Eritrea, though other neighbors such as Djibouti and Somalia have been rattled too.Eritrea unexpectedly finds itself as a status quo power and is relishing this role, tersely expressing its refusal to join in the confusing discourse from Addis Ababa. It suddenly has allies in Djibouti, Somaliland, Somalia and even Kenya — all of them threatened by Abiy's bellicosity.If Abiy does invade Eritrea, he will violate the basic international norm — the inviolability of state boundaries — and risk plunging his already failing economy deeper into disaster. This will pose a sharp dilemma for the UAE. It is ready to override multilateral principles, but whether it would bail out its errant client in Addis Ababa, and jeopardize its winning position in Sudan, is a different matter. It would also present Saudi Arabia with the dilemma of whether to back Eritrea's notorious dictator, President Isaias Afewerki.America and the Pax AfricanaPeace and security in the Horn of Africa isn't a priority for the Biden administration. Despite a rhetorical commitment to a rule-based international order, Washington has neither protected Africa's painstakingly-constructed peace and security architecture nor brought the Ethiopian and Sudanese crises to the U.N. Security Council.While the American security umbrella was in place over the Arabian Peninsula, the countries of the Horn of Africa had the chance to develop their own peace and security system, based on a layered multilateral structure involving the regional organization, the InterGovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union, and United Nations, with peacekeepers and peace missions funded by the Europeans. This emergent Pax Africana was already imperiled as the U.S. drew down and the Middle Eastern middle powers became more assertive. President Donald Trump authorized his favored intermediaries — Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE — to pursue their interests across the Horn of Africa. The Biden administration has not pulled that back.It's possible that the administration cares about peace, security and human rights in Africa. But for as long as the U.S.'s Horn of Africa policy is handled by the Africa Bureau at the State Department — whose diplomats scarcely get the time of day from their counterparts in the Gulf Kingdoms — Washington's views will remain all-but-irrelevant. The Horn of Africa doesn't make the cut when staffers prepare talking points for President Biden, Secretary of State Antony Blinken or national security adviser Jake Sullivan to speak to their Arab counterparts. It's a prioritization that leaves the region in a deepening crisis, at the mercy of ruthless transactional politics.America's well-established practice of treating Israel as an exception to international law is rubbing off on Israel's allies and apologists across the Middle East, who are actively dismantling the already-tottering pillars of Africa's norm-based peace and security system. Those African countries most in need of principled multilateralism are paying the price.

"Riyadh has set its sights on becoming a world city befitting the twenty-first century. To that end it has embarked on a massive construction drive evidenced in the proliferation of proposals for high-end districts, giga-developments and elaborate infrastructures. An urban vision seemingly dedicated to attracting global capital. Yet such a narrative can be misleading. A 'humanization programme', initiated during the tenure of its former mayor Abdulaziz bin Ayyaf, has complemented the city's rapid rise by providing spaces catering for the everyday needs of its inhabitants. Yasser Elsheshtawy, in this richly illustrated book, targets these people-centred settings. It is a compelling counter-narrative interweaving critical theoretical insights, personal observations, and serendipitous encounters. He deftly demonstrates how Riyadh thrives through the actions of its people. As the world moves towards an urban model that is resilient and humane, the humanizing efforts of an Arab city are worthy of our attention. Riyadh's premise is perhaps best captured in the cover image depicting the desert riverbed of Wadi Sulai, filled with rainwater, making its way towards the Saudi capital. Along its banks there will be dedicated public pathways and urban parks. It is a vision of an urbanity where both the spectacular and the everyday co-exist. A city that is not just dedicated to the few, but one that serves the many"--

International audience ; The recent discovery of three new Sabaic inscriptions sheds new light on three grey areas of this century: 1) the beginning of the reign of the Sabaean king Wahabʾīl Yaḥūz; 2) the date of the reign of the Sabaean king Rabbshamsum Nimrān; and 3) the moment when the Ḥimyarite king Dhamarʿalī Yuhabirr took control of the Sabaean territory.