Suchergebnisse

Nantes, the city of 100 Jardins, my city in a garden, European Green Capital, has an exceptional natural heritage. Public policy directs its actions towards research continuities plant to further grow and still the agents of the city teams towards more sustainable development. The coordination of the human is becoming more difficult with very constrained budgets today. Taking necessary perspective to ensure coherence is not possible without systematic and validated by management. This is the main objective of revegetation Nantes strategy. Through the cross and Commission Bloom Landscape, Green Spaces and Environment Service of the city of Nantes structure, directs, consults and acts to address the challenge of improving the green living environment for the Nantais. ; Nantes, la ville aux 100 Jardins, ma ville dans un jardin, capitale Verte européenne, possède un patrimoine naturel d'exception. La politique publique oriente ses actions vers la recherche de continuités végétales pour pousser, encore et toujours, les équipes d'agents de la ville vers plus de développement durable. La coordination de l'humain est de plus en plus difficile avec des budgets aujourd'hui très contraints. La prise de recul nécessaire pour assurer de la cohérence n'est pas possible sans méthode systématique et validée par la direction. Cela constitue l'objectif principal de la stratégie de végétalisation nantaise. Par le biais de la Commission transversale Fleurissement et Paysage, le Service Espaces Verts etEnvironnement de la ville de Nantes structure, oriente, se concerte et agit pour relever le défi d'améliorer le cadre de vie vert des Nantais.

The current problems derived of the accelerated growth urban and demographic that have experienced them main cities of Mexico, lead to the need of explore the close relationship that should exist between it planning metropolitan, the political public and it governance territorial. In the particular case of Mexico, the scarce collaboration level inter-governmental and intra-institutional to meet the challenges of the urbanization, is obligated to design horizontal and vertical coordination schemes that involve the participation of the social partners. By such reason, the present article contextualizes them origins and fundamentals conceptual of these dimensions, whose contributions allow perfect them instruments that it administration public in their different areas can apply to respond with efficiency and effectiveness to them complex demands of the population. ; Los actuales problemas derivados del acelerado crecimiento urbano y demográfico que han experimentado las principales ciudades de México, conducen a la necesidad de explorar la estrecha relación que debe existir entre la planeación metropolitana, las políticas públicas y la gobernanza territorial. En el caso particular de México, la escasa colaboración gubernamental a nivel inter e intrainstitucional para atender los retos de la metropolización, obligan a diseñar esquemas de coordinación horizontal y vertical que involucren la participación de los agentes sociales. Por tal motivo, el presente artículo contextualiza los orígenes y fundamentos conceptuales de estas dimensiones, cuyas aportaciones permiten perfeccionar los instrumentos que la Administración Pública en sus diferentes ámbitos puede aplicar para responder con eficiencia y eficacia a las complejas demandas de la población.

2013 saw the National Health Service (NHS) in England severely criticized for providing poor quality despite successive governments in the previous 15 years, establishing a range of new institutions to improve NHS quality. This study seeks to understand the contributions of political and organizational influences in enabling the NHS to deliver high-quality care through exploring the experiences of two of the major new organizations established to set standards and monitor NHS quality. We used a mixed method approach: first a cross-sectional, in-depth qualitative interview study and then the application of principal agent modeling (Waterman and Meier broader framework). Ten themes were identified as influencing the functioning of the NHS regulatory institutions: socio-political environment; governance and accountability; external relationships; clarity of purpose; organizational reputation; leadership and management; organizational stability; resources; organizational methods; and organizational performance. The organizations could be easily mapped onto the framework, and their transience between the different states could be monitored. We concluded that differing policy objectives for NHS quality monitoring resulted in central involvement and organizational change. This had a disruptive effect on the ability of the NHS to monitor quality. Constant professional leadership, both clinical and managerial, and basing decisions on best evidence, both technical and organizational, helped one institution to deliver on its remit, even within a changing political/policy environment. Application of the Waterman–Meier framework enabled an understanding and description of the dynamic relationship between central government and organizations in the NHS and may predict when tensions will arise in the future.

This contribution argues that the EU's 'cosmopolitan foreign policy constitution' (e.g. based on Articles 2,3 and 21 TEU and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) and the universal recognition of human rights require re-interpreting the 'rules of recognition' of EU and international law by 'balancing' state-centered rules and principles with the human and constitutional rights of EU citizens and the person-centered 'principles of justice' underlying EU constitutional law and multilevel human rights law. As EU law recognizes citizens as 'agents of justice', constituent powers and 'democratic principals' entitled to constitutional rights and 'strict observance of international law' (Article 3 TEU) also in the EU external relations, the transnational constitutional rights and multilevel judicial remedies protected by EU law must be construed as entitling citizens to transnational rule of law and corresponding duties of EU institutions to protect citizens and their rights also in international dispute settlement procedures (e.g. under UN, WTO, regional trade and investment agreements). The EU constitutional principles of conferral, subsidiarity, proportionality and access to justice for multilevel judicial protection of equal freedoms and 'strict observance of international law' are relevant context for interpreting EU obligations under UN, WTO and other treaty and dispute settlement systems for the benefit of EU citizens that must hold the limited 'constituted powers' of multilevel governance institutions more legally, democratically and judicially accountable in order to protect transnational public goods and rule of law inside the EU.

O presente estudo teve como objetivo avaliar a evolução da resistência a antimicrobianos em isolados clínicos de Klebsiella pneumoniae, no período de 2000 a 2011, no Hospital Universitário da Universidade Estadual de Londrina (HU-UEL). Foi realizada uma análise retrospectiva de 2.318 testes de sensibilidade aos antimicrobianos de K. pneumoniae, a partir de um banco de dados do setor de Microbiologia do Laboratório Clínico do HU. No período de 2000 a 2009, o principal mecanismo de resistência aos antimicrobianos ?-lactâmicos observado foi a produção de ?-lactamases do tipo ESBL (?-lactamase de espectro ampliado), que pode ser verificado pelo aumento da resistência de K. pneumoniae às cefalosporinas de 3ª geração e ao cefepime. No entanto, a partir de 2009 apareceram as primeiras cepas de K. pneumoniae produtoras de carbapenemase, comprometendo a eficácia dos carbapenêmicos. Os índices de resistência ao ertapenem variaram de 16%, em 2005, para 40%, em 2011. Outra classe de antimicrobianos comprometida foi a das fluoroquinolonas; para ciprofloxacina, os índices de resistência variaram de 13% a 62%, em 2001 e 2011, respectivamente. Os aminoglicosídeos tiveram oscilações de resistência durante o período estudado, chegando, em 2011, a valores de 56% e 30% para gentamicina e amicacina, respectivamente. Enquanto isso, sulfametoxazol/trimetoprim e piperacilina/tazobactam alcançaram cerca de 60%, nesse mesmo período. O aumento de resistência em K. pneumoniae neste hospital evidencia a necessidade de adequação do tratamento de infecções por este agente e de adoção de medidas apropriadas que visem ao controle de infecções, bem como ao uso adequado dessas drogas.

El modelo de los mercados completos para llegar al equilibrio se basa en un conjunto de supuestos que requieren el uso de una gran cantidad de información, sin considerar los altos costos inherentes al manejo de la misma; así como un alto grado de racionalidad de parte de los agentes económicos, lo que es difícil de lograr sin la información apropiada sobre riesgos y rendimientos de activos que conduzcan a tomar las decisiones más adecuadas.De otro lado, el modelo de los mercados incompletos busca explicar algunas de las imperfecciones que afectan a las transacciones en el mundo real, de tal manera que las fricciones que se encuentran permitan entender mejor el rol de los bancos, los que a su vez pueden producir ineficiencias en la asignación de recursos.En mercados en donde no hay acceso a la información de manera amplia, transparente y adecuada, debido a los altos costos económicos. se observa que se desarrollan mercados con alta probabilidad de ineficiencias, lo cual puede ser extendido al caso especifico del sector bancario de la economía peruana.Sin embargo, como los bancos constituyen la principal fuente de financiamiento de la actividad económica y cumplen el rol de canalizador de ahorro, asignador de recursos de capital y transformador de riesgos, es de suma importancia y muy relevante, especialmente en economías poco desarrolladas como la peruana, el estudio de su desarrollo, luego del proceso de liberalización y de transformaciones estructurales llevadas a cabo a comienzos de los noventa.

Regulatory administrations are increasingly fragmented. Regulation is produced by multi-actor multi-level constellations. Researchers have described how actors in such constellations coordinate with each other. This article explores how coordination affects the decision-making autonomy of agencies, using a case study of energy regulation in Belgium. It describes the extent of autonomy from the parent minister and explores how the regulator coordinates with other actors at multiple levels of government. The findings indicate that de facto discretion of regulators can be increased or reduced by other governmental actors besides the parent minister. This calls for the development of a 'relational perspective' on (regulatory) agency autonomy, which looks at relations with multiple actors, even when these actors have no direct principal–agent relationship with the agency.Points for practitionersIn recent decades, many Western governments have created independent regulatory agencies. The accumulation of these agencies across policy sectors and across levels of government has been associated with the creation of new coordination mechanisms. However, these trends may have certain unintended consequences. When authority is fragmented, the capacity for single actors to intervene may be reduced. Coordination may affect the de facto decision-making capacity of regulators. When agencies use inter-organizational relations to build up expertise, the autonomy vis-à-vis the parent minister may increase. However, when coordination mechanisms are based only on informal, voluntary agreements, these mechanisms may fail to compensate for all resource dependencies.

The incredibly low levels of learning and the generally dysfunctional public sector schooling systems in many (though not all) developing countries are the result of a capability trap (Pritchett et al. 2010). Two phenomena reinforce persistent failure of schooling systems to produce adequate learning outcomes. One is the mismatch between system design - the allocation of activities across organizations and mechanisms of accountability - and the insights of the 'new institutional economics' from principal agent models and contract theory. In particular, many education systems attempt to manage teaching and learning as a 'thin' or 'logistical' activity that can be managed with top-down control and an emphasis on compliance. The reality is that teaching is a 'thick' or 'implementation intensive' activity that performs better when teachers and operators of schools are given performance standards, have multiple in-depth accountability channels, and are given greater autonomy. The second phenomena that facilitates persistent failure is global isomorphism on enrollment and inputs (Meyer et al. 1977; Boli et al. 1985; Meyer et al. 1997). That is, the field (in the sense of Bourdieu 1993) of global education has produced a near exclusive emphasis on enrollments and duration in school, adequacy of physical inputs, and formal qualifications that allowed, perhaps encouraged, national systems to ignore completely performance on child-learning (of any type, measured in any way). I conclude with a comparison in India of the national governments recent efforts in basic education which have been almost exclusively isomorphic.

The longstanding framing of accountability in principal-agent terms has encouraged adversarial and oppositional interactions and ways of thinking amongst nonprofit and funding agency practitioners within government-nonprofit relationships. These interactions are deeply rooted in the accountability claims made by government funders and responded to by nonprofit practitioners. This dissertation outlines the implications of nonprofit-government contracting for participating nonprofit organizations and explores various strategies practitioners in those institutions utilize to respond to the challenges raised by their relationship to public funders. To understand the tensions surrounding government accountability claims, I provide an overview of the emergence of the contracting regime and an exploration of the understanding of accountability that has attended its evolution. Through an in-depth qualitative case study, constructed on the basis of interviews, observation, and document analysis and following a grounded theory approach to analysis, I explore various nonprofit manager responses to the norms and pressures of the contracting regime. I chronicle nonprofit practitioners\' responses to contracting regime pressures, including accepting those norms, even when arguably inimical to their organization\'s mission, ignoring them in favor of serving clients, or leaving the employ of organizations altogether. I also explore examples of practitioner efforts to navigate outside of the contracting regime\'s antagonistic framing and engage both with powerful stakeholders and others in their organizations to negotiate changes. Drawing on the theoretical lens of agonism, I examine the context and characteristics of those responses to provide insights into how nonprofit managers might move beyond antagonistic accountability frames. ; Ph. D.

Issues related to Unaccompanied Migrant Children (MENAs as per the Spanish acronym) have been broadly discussed among political and social actors in several Spanish Autonomous Communities. The main objective of this article is to analyse the phenomenon MENAs and to investigate the opinions and perceptions of the autochthonous Basque population. For this purpose we will use the data provided by Ikuspegui (Basque Observatory of Immigration) in 2009. In general, it can be concluded that negative opinions prevail about both MENAs themselves and the public policies adopted. Especially amongolder people, with low academic background, non-Euskara speakers, living in Biscay and coming from a middle or low economic status. ; A través de este artículo quiere profundizarse en un fenómeno como el de los Menores Extranjeros No Acompañados —MENAs—. Tras una breve introducción inicial acerca del fenómeno, el principal objetivo de este artículo será profundizar en la valoración que hace la población autóctona vasca sobre los MENAs, para poder así conocer mejor su opinión en torno a un colectivo que en varias CC.AA. ha suscitado algunos debates tanto entre agentes políticos como en la opinión pública. Para ello se utilizarán losdatos de la encuesta realizada por Ikuspegi – Observatorio Vasco de Inmigración en el año 2009. En líneas generales, puede observarse que prevalecen opiniones negativas con respecto al colectivo y a la respuesta institucional que ha de darse, sobre todo entre personasmayores, con bajos estudios, que no saben Euskara, que residen en Bizkaia y que tienen una situación económica media o baja.

International audience ; En Afrique Subsaharienne et particulièrement dans l'Ouest du Burkina Faso la forte pression démographique entraîne une baisse de la fertilité des sols. Les agriculteurs doivent innover en permanence pour continuer à produire. Cependant ce travail d'innovation doit être conçu par des collectifs que se soit par filière ou territorial. L'objectif de l'article est de présenter les conditions à satisfaire pour un bon fonctionnement des instances de concertations à l'échelle du village visant à concevoir des innovations. En nous basant sur les activités des sept comités de concertation villageoises (CCV) mis en place dans le cadre du projet Fertipartenaires pour la conception des innovations agropastorales; nous avons étudié l'effet de l'implication des acteurs sur leurs résultats techniques et organisationnels. Une Analyse en Composante Principale a été effectuée avec les indicateurs objectivement vérifiables des activités des CCV et les notes d'implication des acteurs. Cette ACP a été suivi d'une classification ascendante hiérarchisée pour déterminer les CCV à caractéristiques similaires. Trois classes de CCV ont été identifiées selon leur niveau de fonctionnement : les opportunistes, les suiveurs et les impliqués. Le fonctionnement est positivement influencé par l'implication du conseiller en gestion et du bureau exécutif. La forte implication de ces acteurs se traduit par un bon résultat organisationnel mais pas technique. La réussite des activités techniques dépendent de l'implication des agents de suivi et de la volonté individuelle des expérimentateurs à respecter les cahiers de charge des expérimentations. Pour avoir des instances fonctionnelles et dynamiques, une implication de tous les acteurs est nécessaire mais pas suffisante. Il faudra en outre un respect des engagements individuels et collectifs.

International audience ; En Afrique Subsaharienne et particulièrement dans l'Ouest du Burkina Faso la forte pression démographique entraîne une baisse de la fertilité des sols. Les agriculteurs doivent innover en permanence pour continuer à produire. Cependant ce travail d'innovation doit être conçu par des collectifs que se soit par filière ou territorial. L'objectif de l'article est de présenter les conditions à satisfaire pour un bon fonctionnement des instances de concertations à l'échelle du village visant à concevoir des innovations. En nous basant sur les activités des sept comités de concertation villageoises (CCV) mis en place dans le cadre du projet Fertipartenaires pour la conception des innovations agropastorales; nous avons étudié l'effet de l'implication des acteurs sur leurs résultats techniques et organisationnels. Une Analyse en Composante Principale a été effectuée avec les indicateurs objectivement vérifiables des activités des CCV et les notes d'implication des acteurs. Cette ACP a été suivi d'une classification ascendante hiérarchisée pour déterminer les CCV à caractéristiques similaires. Trois classes de CCV ont été identifiées selon leur niveau de fonctionnement : les opportunistes, les suiveurs et les impliqués. Le fonctionnement est positivement influencé par l'implication du conseiller en gestion et du bureau exécutif. La forte implication de ces acteurs se traduit par un bon résultat organisationnel mais pas technique. La réussite des activités techniques dépendent de l'implication des agents de suivi et de la volonté individuelle des expérimentateurs à respecter les cahiers de charge des expérimentations. Pour avoir des instances fonctionnelles et dynamiques, une implication de tous les acteurs est nécessaire mais pas suffisante. Il faudra en outre un respect des engagements individuels et collectifs.

Este trabajo centró su atención en el análisis de las columnas semanales de opinión política publicadas por los diarios Pregón y ElTribuno de la provincia de Jujuy, durante el desarrollo de la campaña electoral legislativa del año 2005. El objetivo principal fuedar cuenta de las representaciones que cada diario construyó acerca del "oficialismo" y la "oposición", y develar la/s ideología/spresente/s en el discurso. El propósito mayor fue entender cómo hablan y qué piensan los dos medios gráficos de referencia de laprovincia acerca de bloques políticos antagónicos y desde qué creencias y valores emiten opinión y proponen comportamientosciudadanos, particularmente en el contexto de elecciones legislativas. Para ello se utilizaron los aportes teóricos del AnálisisCrítico del Discurso (ACD), por considerar que su aplicación permite "avivar la conciencia de los que padecen los efectos depresión y dominio generados a partir de prácticas discursivas de políticos y otros agentes a través de los medios de comunicación"(Marañón, Cerviño, Rondoletto, 2001). El desarrollo de la investigación reveló que tanto Pregón como El Tribuno de Jujuymantuvieron una relación explícita con el oficialismo producto de una participación activa en la conformación de listas decandidatos como así también en el diseño de campañas de prensa. En este sentido, la convivencia de intereses se evidenció, connitidez, en el cuerpo del discurso de opinión, a partir de construcciones temáticas y empleos de recursos retóricos que transfirieronvalores positivos al grupo político de pertenencia y valores negativos a la oposición.

Infrastructure regulation under asymmetric information on cost and effort-averse agents is revisited in this paper from the perspective of pragmatic implementations of regulatory regimes by political princi- pals that have potentially non-aligned preferences. The political prin- cipal manipulates the independent regulator to leave rents to industry by two means; regulatory oversight by appeal courts and by imposing ex post participation constraints for yardstick regimes. First, along the lines of the law and regulation literature, we also assume that regulatory rulings can be appealed and repelled at high social costs if shown to be infeasible. By forcing the regulator to internalize these costs, the ex ante high-powered regimes are biased to provide higher information rents for a long period. Second, the yardstick regimes are powerful instruments to induce information revelation and productive efficiency under some conditions, one of them being a credible threat of bankruptcy. In our model, the weak political principal safeguards full participation from the full panel of firms by offering individual rationality constraints fulfilled ex post even under a yardstick regime, basically curtailing the regime to only offer upside gains. The frame- work presented in a stylized model shows that the fear for regulatory failure leads to welfare losses under all regimes, may distort choices of regulatory instruments and hampers information revelation. Some policy conclusions and analogies to the situation for the European economic regulation of electricity distribution system operators are given at the end of the paper.

Infrastructure regulation under asymmetric information on cost and effort-averse agents is revisited in this paper from the perspective of pragmatic implementations of regulatory regimes by political princi- pals that have potentially non-aligned preferences. The political prin- cipal manipulates the independent regulator to leave rents to industry by two means; regulatory oversight by appeal courts and by imposing ex post participation constraints for yardstick regimes. First, along the lines of the law and regulation literature, we also assume that regulatory rulings can be appealed and repelled at high social costs if shown to be infeasible. By forcing the regulator to internalize these costs, the ex ante high-powered regimes are biased to provide higher information rents for a long period. Second, the yardstick regimes are powerful instruments to induce information revelation and productive efficiency under some conditions, one of them being a credible threat of bankruptcy. In our model, the weak political principal safeguards full participation from the full panel of firms by offering individual rationality constraints fulfilled ex post even under a yardstick regime, basically curtailing the regime to only offer upside gains. The frame- work presented in a stylized model shows that the fear for regulatory failure leads to welfare losses under all regimes, may distort choices of regulatory instruments and hampers information revelation. Some policy conclusions and analogies to the situation for the European economic regulation of electricity distribution system operators are given at the end of the paper.