Suchergebnisse

Minētajā darbā autore pēta samērīguma principa saturu veidojošos aspektus, kā arī aplūko samērīguma principa pārkāpumu novēršanas mehānismus valstī. Autore analizē problēmu rašanās cēloņus samērīguma principa ievērošanā, kā arī Eiropas kontroles iespējas minētā principa ievērošanai Latvijā. Skaidrojot samērīguma principa būtību, autore analizē to, kādā veidā šis princips ir nostiprināts Latvijas Republikas normatīvajos aktos, kā arī aplūko samērīguma principa, iestādes rīcības brīvības un lietderības apsvērumu savstarpējo sakarību. Pētot samērīguma principa ievērošanas problēmas Latvijā, autore analizē problēmu – vai tiesību piemērotājam ir jāievēro samērīguma princips, izdodot obligāto administratīvo aktu? Atbildot uz šo jautājumu, autore aplūko virkni pazīstamu juristu viedokļu, kā arī norāda un pamato savus apsvērumus. ; In this paper the author researches the esence of proportionality principle and studies the mechanisms for removing infringements of proportionality principle in the state. The author analyses the reasons of rising the problems in observance of proportionality principle and the possibilities of european institutions to control proportionality principle`s observance in Latvia. Explaning the esence of proportionality principle, the author analyses, how this principle is represented in normative acts of the Republic of Latvia, and also examines the intercommunication between proportionality principle, discretion of the state government offices and considerations of expediency. Researching the problems of proportionality principle`s observance in Latvia, the author analyses – whether the law-applying authorities should observe the proportionality principle in issuing of compulsory administrative acts? Answering this question the author studies opinions of the famous lawyers and expresses its own considerations.

The author discusses some recent changes in the theoretical literature on globalization. He claims that the irreversibility of the globalization process is no longer taken for granted as in the enthusiastic literature on the subject during the 1990's. The globalization is no longer regarded as an untouchable structure, and for over a decade now, we are witnessing an overall questioning of the globalization process itself. Therefore, the author pays special attention to the theoretical works of Justin Rosenberg who claims that the age of globalization is over. For Rosenberg, the globalization was only an ideological construction supported by the so called globalization theory which has failed in all its aspects: as a general social theory, as a historical and sociological argument and as a basis for interpretation of actual events. As opposed to Rosebenrg, the author claims that globalization should be regarded as a 'metapolitical' concept with its semantic and political functions. Using the methodological assumptions of Reinhart Koselleck, the author shows that 'metapolitical' concepts reach their intellectual and political high point by accelerating history and by transcending the actual situation. After their revolutionary peak, they disappear or they change their meaning in order to refer to the 'new reality'. Based on the insights of Hannah Arendt, the author shows that globalization has lost its revolutionary potential, but also that the end of globalization theory would not necessarily follow. Adapted from the source document.

The author discusses some recent changes in the theoretical literature on globalization. He claims that the irreversibility of the globalization process is no longer taken for granted as in the enthusiastic literature on the subject during the 1990's. The globalization is no longer regarded as an untouchable structure, and for over a decade now, we are witnessing an overall questioning of the globalization process itself. Therefore, the author pays special attention to the theoretical works of Justin Rosenberg who claims that the age of globalization is over. For Rosenberg, the globalization was only an ideological construction supported by the so called globalization theory which has failed in all its aspects: as a general social theory, as a historical and sociological argument and as a basis for interpretation of actual events. As opposed to Rosebenrg, the author claims that globalization should be regarded as a 'metapolitical' concept with its semantic and political functions. Using the methodological assumptions of Reinhart Koselleck, the author shows that 'metapolitical' concepts reach their intellectual and political high point by accelerating history and by transcending the actual situation. After their revolutionary peak, they disappear or they change their meaning in order to refer to the 'new reality'. Based on the insights of Hannah Arendt, the author shows that globalization has lost its revolutionary potential, but also that the end of globalization theory would not necessarily follow. Adapted from the source document.

SUMMARY:
The article explores the role of history in constructing contemporary processes in post-socialist Mongolia. The main focus of the article is on the figure of Chinggis Khan, in particular upon its role in the new Mongol nationalism and in the self-identification of Mongols. The author argues that the image of Chinggis Khan supplements other elements of Mongol nationalism, such as the "classic" script, Buddhism and shamanism, and "The Secret History of the Mongols." The traditional seasonal celebration of "naadam" now includes references to Chinggis Khan and the Chingisids. The author also points to differences in the perceptions of Chinggis Khan among various Mongol-speaking peoples, such as Buryats, Kalmyks, and Mongols of China, and to the historical figure's importance in securing a "greater Mongolian sentiment." In the 20 th century, the cult of Chinggis Khan was reflected in contested memorial sites (alleged to be the tomb of the hero) in Mongolia proper and in China, where the cult is commercialized. Exploring historical developments in the self-identification of Mongol-speaking societies, the author discusses the transition from a sense of identity to modern nationalism. According to the author, the emergence of a greater transnational Mongol identity depended on the existing cultural community. Finally, the author explores the conflict between notions of Mongol identity built on exclusively ethic grounds (centered on Khalkha) and the notions of "greater Mongol identity" focused on the figure of Chinggis Khan, pastoral nomadism, and shamanism.

This article argues that a particular notion of rationality, more exactly a specific notion of legitimate inference, is presupposed by much work in the social sciences to their detriment. The author describes the notion of rationality he has in mind, explains why it is misguided, identifies where and how it affects social research, and illustrates why that research is weaker as a result. The notion of legitimate inference the author has in mind is one that believes inferences are guided by principles that are formal, universal and a priori—that is, that make no substantive, domain-specific empirical assumptions about the world. The author briefly provides a variety of reasons to be skeptical about such principles. Those reasons extend from broad philosophical considerations to quasi-empirical evidence. The author then argues that this notion of inference is involved with both the practice and the content of the social sciences in various ways. In terms of practice, this notion of inference lies behind the way statistical testing is generally done in the social sciences. In terms of content, the author argues that this notion of rationality is invoked, for example, in game theory and in rational expectations macroeconomics. In all cases, use of the formal rationality notion leads social scientists to put more faith in their results than is warranted and thus is an obstacle to doing better social science.

At the beginning of the article, the author focuses his attention on general characteristics of the ideal and the real homo energeticus. Next, the author tries to show the relationship between homo energeticus and different homines: 1. homo teleologicus – the man pursuing his goals, 2. homo sociologicus – a man seeking to meet the needs of affiliation, entering into relationships with others, 3. homo politicus – a man as a social being. In the second part of the article, the author presents homo energeticus in the organization. He discusses pro- and anti-effective organizational cultures (positive and negative cultures), then discusses a human capital model and a sieve model of HRM and their impact on the mental costs incurred by workers in their work environment. There is also indicated the cognitive potential inherent in the typologies of national cultures, such as the typology of G. Hofstede, in relation to the concept of homo energeticus. The author concludes his article with the view that there is a need for further study of the issue and draws a real possibility of integrating this concept in education, particularly to philosophical, ethical, praxiological and business ethics educations. According to the author, the inclusion of the concept into education would contribute to greater reflectivity of individuals in their personal lives, would contribute to more creativeness of employees in organizations, and also contribute to building civil society and the realization of sustainable development.

In this essay the author takes issue with postmodernist and/or poststructuralist theory of resistance. In the course of discussing what the author calls "the impasses of the way out", she devides her analysis into two parts: one devoted to an exposition of the collapse of the emancipationist paradigm and to the impasses of the "way out" generally, and one devoted to the conception of the subject attuned to resistance. As a consequence of this discussion, the author argues that the pre-eminence of resistance, advocated by the postmodernists and/or poststructuralists, has serious implications for our understanding of the way out in the present constellation, but also for contemporary thought itself. In the course of tracing the experience of post-emancipationsit thought in its attempt to deal with the impasses of the "way out", the author shows how postmodernist thought, by declaring that "the intractable" has fallen silent in the present social and political struggles, has largely contributed to the depoliticisation that has come increasingly to characterise our daily lives. Second, it has been shown how postmodernist and/or poststructuralist thought, in its desire to yield hole of a "way out", turned out to be one of the most insidious ways of surrendering to the "growing impasses of capitalism". ; In this essay the author takes issue with postmodernist and/or poststructuralist theory of resistance. In the course of discussing what the author calls "the impasses of the way out", she devides her analysis into two parts: one devoted to an exposition of the collapse of the emancipationist paradigm and to the impasses of the "way out" generally, and one devoted to the conception of the subject attuned to resistance. As a consequence of this discussion, the author argues that the pre-eminence of resistance, advocated by the postmodernists and/or poststructuralists, has serious implications for our understanding of the way out in the present constellation, but also for contemporary thought itself. In the course of tracing the experience of post-emancipationsit thought in its attempt to deal with the impasses of the "way out", the author shows how postmodernist thought, by declaring that "the intractable" has fallen silent in the present social and political struggles, has largely contributed to the depoliticisation that has come increasingly to characterise our daily lives. Second, it has been shown how postmodernist and/or poststructuralist thought, in its desire to yield hole of a "way out", turned out to be one of the most insidious ways of surrendering to the "growing impasses of capitalism".

The author critically examines the organising principle of the affirmative action provisions of the Employment Equity Act (or EEA), as well as the implications of the recent judgment by the Constitutional Court in its first case involving the application of affirmative action in the employment context (and in terms of the EEA) – SAPS v Solidarity obo Barnard. While reiterating the need for restitutionary measures such as affirmative action in South Africa, the author concludes – probably quite controversially - that the EEA's treatment of affirmative action has nothing to do with the equality right in the Bill of Rights, and that the Act pursues a different (and omnipresent) social engineering agenda by the state. The author calls for this realisation to prompt future affirmative action cases arising from the application of this Act to be removed from the scheme of (and potential defences available under) the equality jurisprudence, and for the courts to critically interrogate the constitutionality of the EEA's affirmative action scheme within its own context. The author believes that Chapter III of the Act is unconstitutional in this sense, and he calls for the scrapping of its provisions. He also calls for a (more) constitutionallycompliant exposition from the Constitutional Court of the parameters of legitimate affirmative action under the Bill of Rights, and adds his voice to the numerous calls for reconsideration of the "rationality test" expounded in Minister of Finance v van Heerden. More generally, the author considers the apparently all-pervasive application of the government ideology of the pursuit of demographic representivityin "transformation" of employment and other contexts (expressing grave doubts about its constitutionality along the way). This article forms Part 1 of this piece and the author considers the constitutional requirements for a legitimate affirmative action programme or measure. He then examines the affirmative action scheme of the Employment Equity Act, and explains his views on why such scheme is, in fact, unconstitutional. In Part 2 of this piece (which follows in this edition), the author continues to critically evaluate the Constitutional Court judgment in the Barnard case, and he highlights the biggest areas of disappointment of this judgment within the context of South Africa's equality jurisprudence. After a very brief consideration of the recent amendments to the Employment Equity Act, the author concludes by providing reasons why the Act's approach to affirmative action needs to be rejected, and soon.

The author critically examines the organising principle of the affirmative action provisions of the Employment Equity Act (or EEA), as well as the implications of the recent judgment by the Constitutional Court in its first case involving the application of affirmative action in the employment context (and in terms of the EEA) – SAPS v Solidarity obo Barnard. While reiterating the need for restitutionary measures such as affirmative action in South Africa, the author concludes – probably quite controversially - that the EEA's treatment of affirmative action has nothing to do with the equality right in the Bill of Rights, and that the Act pursues a different (and omnipresent) social engineering agenda by the state. The author calls for this realisation to prompt future affirmative action cases arising from the application of this Act to be removed from the scheme of (and potential defences available under) the equality jurisprudence, and for the courts to critically interrogate the constitutionality of the EEA's affirmative action scheme within its own context. The author believes that Chapter III of the Act is unconstitutional in this sense, and he calls for the scrapping of its provisions. He also calls for a (more) constitutionally-compliant exposition from the Constitutional Court of the parameters of legitimate affirmative action under the Bill of Rights, and adds his voice to the numerous calls for reconsideration of the "rationality test" expounded in Minister of Finance v van Heerden. More generally, the author considers the apparently all-pervasive application of the government ideology of the pursuit of demographic representivity in "transformation" of employment and other contexts (expressing grave doubts about its constitutionality along the way). This article forms Part 1 of this piece and the author considers the constitutional requirements for a legitimate affirmative action programme or measure. He then examines the affirmative action scheme of the Employment Equity Act, and explains his views on why such scheme is, in fact, unconstitutional. In Part 2 of this piece (which follows in this edition), the author continues to critically evaluate the Constitutional Court judgment in the Barnard case, and he highlights the biggest areas of disappointment of this judgment within the context of South Africa's equality jurisprudence. After a very brief consideration of the recent amendments to the Employment Equity Act, the author concludes by providing reasons why the Act's approach to affirmative action needs to be rejected, and soon.

The author critically examines the organising principle of the affirmative action provisions of the Employment Equity Act (or EEA), as well as the implications of the recent judgment by the Constitutional Court in its first case involving the application of affirmative action in the employment context (and in terms of the EEA) – SAPS v Solidarity obo Barnard. While reiterating the need for restitutionary measures such as affirmative action in South Africa, the author concludes – probably quite controversially - that the EEA's treatment of affirmative action has nothing to do with the equality right in the Bill of Rights, and that the Act pursues a different (and omnipresent) social engineering agenda by the state. The author calls for this realisation to prompt future affirmative action cases arising from the application of this Act to be removed from the scheme of (and potential defences available under) the equality jurisprudence, and for the courts to critically interrogate the constitutionality of the EEA's affirmative action scheme within its own context. The author believes that Chapter III of the Act is unconstitutional in this sense, and he calls for the scrapping of its provisions. He also calls for a (more) constitutionally-compliant exposition from the Constitutional Court of the parameters of legitimate affirmative action under the Bill of Rights, and adds his voice to the numerous calls for reconsideration of the "rationality test" expounded in Minister of Finance v van Heerden. More generally, the author considers the apparently all-pervasive application of the government ideology of the pursuit of demographic representivity in "transformation" of employment and other contexts (expressing grave doubts about its constitutionality along the way). In Part 1 of this piece (which precedes this article in this edition), the author considers the constitutional requirements for a legitimate affirmative action programme or measure. He then examines the affirmative action scheme of the Employment Equity Act, and explains his views on why such scheme is, in fact, unconstitutional. This article forms Part 2 of this piece and the author continues to critically evaluate the Constitutional Court judgment in the Barnard case, and he highlights the biggest areas of disappointment of this judgment within the context of South Africa's equality jurisprudence. After a very brief consideration of the recent amendments to the Employment Equity Act, the author concludes by providing reasons why the Act's approach to affirmative action needs to be rejected, and soon.