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The logic of nation-state building in the context of modernity is inextricably bound to the founding of politics -- both as conceptual & practical possibility -- on the basis of a binary dissociation of the public from the private, of rights from needs, of reason from passion. Thus, politics in its modern sense becomes tied to a secularized theological-political notion of responsibility. Further, such binary concepts are implicated in those temporal & spatial metaphors that naturalize the spheres of family & civil society, & distinguish them from the sphere of politics. These distinct spheres are essential to the construction of modern rational subjectivities & liberal citizenship. Here, with focus on the case of Iran, the notion of the "civic body" is introduced in an attempt to bring clearly into view the connection between sexed corporeality, cultural nationalism, & gendered citizenship. Through a theoretical examination of the "civic body" as both a site of political citizenship & a field of racial & sexual codification & recodification, such historical & discursive constructions as modernity, Westernization, "Westoxication," Orientalism, universalization, particularlism, masculinity, & femininity will be brought into the nexus of analysis. The intent is both to engage with the literature in the field of Iranian & Middle Eastern studies & to intervene critically with respect to citizenship as an analytical category. 51 References. Adapted from the source document.

El autor ofrece una explicación histórica, política y cultural del liberalismo, una ideología que busco la formación de una sociedad democrática y moderna, y de cómo ha fracasado y se ha desdibujado. El libro cuenta la historia de las ideas liberales y cómo encarnaron en Colombia, quienes las adoptaron, formularon y difundieron y cómo se estrellaron contra una realidad con intereses diferentes. La reflexión del autor es de enorme utilidad porque expone, desde diversos puntos de vista, las razones y hechos que han impedido la modernización de la sociedad colombiana y que han creado un estado débil, posibilitando la aparición de múltiples fuerzas por fuera del establecimiento legal. ; The author offers a historical, political and cultural explanation of liberalism, an ideology that seeks the formation of a modern and democratic society, and how it has failed and has become blurred. The book tells the history of liberal ideas and how they incarnated in Colombia, those who adopted, formulated and disseminated them and how they collided with a reality with different interests. The author's reflection is extremely useful because it exposes, from different points of view, the reasons and facts that have prevented the modernization of Colombian society and that have created a weak state, allowing the emergence of multiple forces outside the legal establishment.

Social historians study social, political, demographic and economic phenomena which take place in geographical space, yet "space" rarely enters historical discourse explicitly as an analytic construct. Given the recent interest among social historians in "localizing" social processes, it is unfortunate that almost all of our efforts have gone toward recognizing the significance of time, to the relative neglect of space. For example, social historians typically assume that events occurring at a given point in time are affected by earlier events. In contrast, it is less widely recognized that events occurring in one location are also affected by similar events in other areas, especially those nearby. In the rare instances in which geographical space has been central, such as in Susan Watkins' treatment of western European fertility decline during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, or in the evidence of the diffusion of democracy in post-war Europe that is emerging from the "Spatial and Temporal Diffusion of Democracy" project at the University of Colorado — Boulder, the payoff has been substantial. Such innovative approaches to historical theorizing give reason to believe that thinking of events in the past as parts of a process moving through time and across space will become more commonplace. If so, then social historians will need an effective and accessible method to account for the spatial distributions of their study phenomena.

Since May 1998, an important issue facing Pakistan
policy-makers has been whether independent power producers (IPPs)
produce expensive electricity. It is contended that IPPs' expensive
power has rendered the state utility, Water and Power Development
Authority (WAPDA), bankrupt. It is also alleged that IPPs indulged in
corruption and colluded with WAPDA officials to get their signatures on
contracts which allowed procurement of expensive power by WAPDA and
which it can ill afford now. This paper shifts through the rhetoric
surrounding IPPs and focuses on the central issue of whether IPPs
produce expensive power. If it can be established that IPPs produce
cheaper power than WAPDA, then the second part of the argument that
WAPDA became financially weak because of IPPs' expensive power is
destroyed. The alleged corruption issues are not discussed as they are
beyond the scope of the paper. Section 1 provides a background to the
establishment of the private power sector in Pakistan. Section 2
discusses various project risks faced by shareholders and lenders.
Section 3 outlines the components of the electricity tariff. Section 4
traces the reasons for increase in electricity tariffs since 1994 when
the Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) were signed. Section 5 shows the
comparative costs of production of IPPs and WAPDA.

The US experienced a considerable increase in inequality between skilled and less-skilled workers during the early 1980s—a period which corresponds with a large temporary appreciation of the dollar. This article investigates the reasons behind this rise in inequality by evaluating the impact of trade with low-wage countries (LWCs) and technological change on the wage bill share of skilled workers (which is designed to capture movements in inequality arising from changes in both the relative wage and employment opportunities of the less-skilled). We find that an increase in US imports from LWCs—encouraged by the large appreciation of the dollar in the early 1980s—seems to explain some of the rise in US inequality in low-skill-intensive sectors, but that technological change (proxied by R&D expenditure) explains the rise in inequality in high-skill-intensive sectors. However, given that the timing of the sudden rise in US R&D expenditure corresponds with the appreciation of the dollar, it may be the case that the deterioration in US trade competitiveness during this period contributed to the rapid increase in the rate of technological change via mechanisms such as 'defensive innovation'. Hence one might also argue that the technology-based explanation for the rise in US inequality could actually be a trade-based explanation.

Recently there has been growing interest among scholars in ethnic return migration. This article examines return migration during the post World War 2 period of descendants of Estonians who emigrated to Russia at the end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century.A case of return migration of West‐Siberian Estonians from the Omsk province is used as an example. Structuration theory is adopted and return migration is treated as a behavioural norm that evolves, spreads and becomes embedded within an ethnic minority living outside its homeland.The research shows that in the case of West‐Siberian Estonians the main carrier of the migration behavioural norm is a generation. The behavioural norm of Estonians born in the 1910s‐1920s has been return migration to Estonia, while the migration behaviour of the 1930s‐1940s and the 1950s‐1960s generations can be characterized by urbanization in West Siberia.Behind these inter‐generation differences in migration behaviour can be found the different socialization of the generations, appearing largely on the level of practical consciousness.The results give reason to assume that ethnic return migration over a long period depends neither directly nor indirectly on momentary environmental changes, but rather on changes in people's values, habits, identity etc., which in the case of an ethnic minority living outside its historical homeland may be followed generation by generation.

The problem of situating economic transitions from communism to postcommunism within more general theories of comparative political economy has received surprisingly little scholarly attention. In this paper the author argues that the reason for the lack of integration between these two literatures is that the dynamics of the formation and decline of the Stalinist socioeconomic system remain basically anomalous for each of the three dominant theoretical frameworks in the field of political economy: the modernization approach, the world-systems approach, and the rational choice approach. Moreover, none of these paradigms by itself appears to account satisfactorily for the diverse economic trends in postcommunist societies. Modernization theory is apparently consistent with economic 'development' in the most successful areas within the Leninist and post-Leninist world; world-systems theory appears to fit the type of 'dependency' emerging in places such as Central Asia and the Caucasus; rational choice analysis elucidates the continuing 'devolution' of Leninist state structures in places where rent-seeking bureaucrats still directly or indirectly control most of the national wealth—but no single approach explains the overall pattern of mixed results. It is concluded that making sense of the puzzling emergence, destruction, and aftermath of the Stalinist economic model requires the integration of ideological modes of coordinating collective action into a more comprehensive political economy paradigm.

Strong research evidence implicates housing design as a powerful factor in crimino‐genesis during the formative years of early childhood. Detailed and large‐scale investigations have revealed 38 design and layout variables that favour existing criminals and breed many new ones by impeding normal child‐rearing practices. The average age of criminals has progressively decreased and crimes have become more sadistic.It is well established that changing the deleterious designs responsible for social breakdown can halt and reverse the decay of local societies. The police report that the relevant type of design improvement allows natural community formation to replace the pre‐existing ethos of anonymity and alienation, so that crime may virtually cease, indeed, in some cases, completely so. Young children are then integrated into the community and do not grow up delinquent. This is criminal prevention, as opposed to crime prevention, which allows delinquency to develop and then tries to control its results.This paper discusses the specific design variables that are influential; the results obtained by changing them in ten estates; the reasons why government (apart from former British Prime Minister Thatcher) turns a blind eye to the design solution to crime; and the evidence for thinking that the escalating urban crisis is close to the sort of sudden change postulated by catastrophe theory.

In 1970, an observer of the investment by the consumer electronics multinationals in Mexico and Taiwan could not have predicted the marked difference in the develop ment of these two nations. The contrast between the Mexican and Taiwanese elec tronics industry could not be more striking—Taiwan's electronics industry was a result of expanding foreign direct investment. Taiwan experienced an expansion of foreign exchange, employment and development of assembler-supplier relations. But, most importantly, it developed local firms capable of supplying these foreign assemblers. Among the Latin American nations, Mexico received the preponderance of investment in consumer electronics. Unlike in Taiwan, investments in Mexico never led to the development of an indigenous industry nor created a synergy between the assemblers and the local suppliers. This paper explores the reasons for the divergence between the two economies, related to the investor's objectives, the investor's position in the international market, and the specific regional location of production chosen for each nationllocality. A complete and historically accurate understanding of the divergence between these two countries can be obtained by examining firm and general industry strategies regarding production and production location between 1965 and 1982. This permits a nuanced understanding of the complexities of local industrial development and the potential role of the foreign investor and, in the process, move beyond simplified arguments about the centrality of the state industrical development.

Following the narrow vote against sovereignty in the 1995 Quebec referendum, the federal government referred three questions on the legality of unilateral secession to the Supreme Court of Canada for its opinion. The Quebec government refused to participate in the proceedings on the grounds that the Quebec people alone will determine their future and anything the Supreme Court has to say on the matter is irrelevant. The Court appointed an amicus curiae, Andre Joli-Coeur, to make the arguments in favour of the Quebec government's position. In this article, the author reviews the amicus' arguments and the Court's reasons for rejecting them. The amicus' submissions revealed one thing: they revealed the weakness of the best available arguments in support of a legal right to unilateral secession. The author argues that the Court was able to bring sovereignists into a conversation framed by the Court's opinion, at the same time as it was pulling the legal rug out from underneath them. The justices should be applauded for crafting an opinion that seeks to minimize the risks of social disorder that would accompany any unilateral declaration of sovereignty and to maximize the chances of a negotiated, peaceful accommodation of the political aspirations of a clear majority of Quebecers clearly expressed in any future referendum.

In August 1969, President Richard M. Nixon approached the American people with a radical proposal to do what the federal government had never done before: guarantee a minimum level of income for every American family unable to provide one for itself. Eight years later, in August 1977, President Jimmy Carter announced a similar proposal for a federal guarantee of income, this time along with an expansion of public works jobs. Like Nixon before him, Carter soon abandoned his bill, and with it the quest for a federal income guarantee. Thus, inconclusively, ended a decade-long struggle to replace the nation's uncoordinated, incomplete collection of welfare programs with a single, comprehensive system of federal relief. This struggle took place against a backdrop of economic stagnation and demographic change that sent social spending soaring and made existing poor-relief arrangements seem increasingly obsolete. It also tapped into growing taxpayer resentment and a rising tide of popular animosity toward welfare. In part for these reasons, the quest for a guaranteed income marked the end of an era of liberal government activism against poverty, and ushered in a new era of poor-law reform. Welfare, not poverty, was the social problem of the 1970s. And the idea of a guaranteed income was the solution embraced by a new, more chastened and conservative, ideological center.

The author discusses the works by Croatian and foreign theologians and historians (Ivo Pilar, Alois Hudal, Janko Simrak, Krunoslav Draganovic, Fran Grivec and Dragutin Nezic) about the Serbian Orthodox Church which appeared in the inter-war period. These authors posed a series of questions which are still open for debate today. Pilar describes the Serbian Orthodox Church as an institution which has an important role in the process of Serbian national integration. Hudal analyzes the reasons for the decline of Catholicism in the Balkans, discussing the negative consequences which befell the Roman Catholic Church in the Yugoslav Monarchy, which supported the expansion of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The works of Simrak, Nezic, and Draganovic deal with the complex process of attempting a union between the Roman Catholic Church and orthodox Christians. The author mentions that these writers and their works are not well known to the Croatian public, and that only during the 1980s was more intensive research undertaken by Croatian academics on the topic of the political and cultural activity of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The author concludes the article by suggesting that these works by Croatian and foreign historians and theologians can serve as the basis for further research on this topic. (SOI : CSP: S. 573f.)

Der Artikel befasst sich mit dem ersten und dem zweiten nationalen Deutschen Kongress der Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte in Berlin im Dezember 1918 und April 1919. Dabei werden Erkenntnisse aus der kollektiven Biografie der Delegierten in Beziehung gesetzt zu den parlamentarisch-politischen Entscheidungen, die von den Kongressen getroffen worden sind. Näher untersucht wird die Einschätzung, dass während der deutschen Revolution 1918/1919 die SPD um Friedrich Ebert versäumt hat, den totalen Wechsel in Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Militärwesen zu vollenden, und dass die Ursache dafür gefunden werden könnte in der Struktur der Partei und in der Disziplin ihrer Mitglieder. Eine Analyse der Biografien der annähernd 700 Delegierten des Nationalkongresses der Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte mit der Methode der 'Kollektiven Biografik' zeigt indes, dass es nicht nur eine Frage der Parteidisziplin war, sondern auch der Sozialisation, der Bildung und der Arbeitslebens-Situation jener Gruppe von Leuten, die die Räte-Bewegung führten und für bestimmte Entwicklungen verantwortlich waren. ; This article deals with the first and second national German congresses of the workers' and soldiers' councils in Berlin in December 1918 and April 1919. It has commonly been stated that during the German revolution 1918/19 the social democratic party around Friedrich Ebert has failed to complete a total change in economy, society and military life and that the reason for this may be found in the party's structure and the discipline of its members. An analysis of the biographies of the approximately 700 delegates to the national congresses of the workers' and soldiers' councils with the method of the 'Kollektive Biographik', however, shows that it was not only a question of party-discipline but also of socialisation, education and working live situation of the group of people, which guided the council movement and was responsible for certain developments.

Immanuel Kant believed that democracy, economic interdependence, and international law and organizations could establish the foundations for "perpetual peace." Our analyses of politically relevant dyads show that each of the three elements of the Kantian peace makes a statistically significant, independent contribution to peaceful interstate relations. These benefits are evident even when the influence of other theoretically interesting factors—such as relative power, alliances, geographic contiguity, and economic growth—is held constant. Increasing the number of shared memberships in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) by one standard deviation reduces the incidence of militarized disputes by about 23 percent from the baseline rate for a typical pair of bordering states. If both members of a dyad are democratic, conflict is 35 percent less likely than the baseline; increasing both the dyadic trade–GDP ratio and the trend in trade by a standard deviation reduces the chance of conflict by 38 percent. Together, all the Kantian variables lower the probability of a dispute by 72 percent. We check for reverse causation and find reason to believe that a feedback system is at work, with IGOs reducing conflict and low-conflict dyads joining IGOs. Democracies and interdependent states are more likely to join IGOs with one another, bringing together the three elements of a system for Kantian peace.