Suchergebnisse

Welchen Wert hat ein Vertrag, wenn im Ausnahmefall eine Suspendierung vertraglicher Pflichten möglich bleibt? Dieser Frage nähert sich die Arbeit zunächst mit einer rechtsvergleichenden Analyse von Art. 4 IPbpR, Art. 15 EMRK und Art. XIX GATT. Sie nimmt dazu deren Entstehungsgeschichte, Inanspruchnahme- und Spruchpraxis in den Blick. Dabei entsteht die Ausgangsthese, dass Schutzklauseln den Vertragsbestand begünstigen und sogar eine Vertragsvertiefung bewirken. Dieser These geht die Arbeit sodann auf theoretischer Basis nach, indem sie fragt, inwiefern gerade die rechtliche Einbettung des Ausnahmefalls Vertragsbestand und Vertragsvertiefung begünstigt. Es entsteht die Hauptthese der Arbeit: Recht kann eine Integrationsfunktion zugeschrieben werden. So ergänzt die Arbeit das Forschungsfeld "Integration durch Recht" durch eine rechtswissenschaftliche Perspektive.

In the past, many WTO member states have liberalized their trade policies unilaterally. However, they were decreasingly prepared to guarantee these measures multilaterally, that is to bind them. This paper analyzes the background of this development by resorting to three political economy arguments pro multilateral binding: the terms of trade externality argument, the tying hand argument, that is to protect a government which is prone to liberalize against domestic lobby groups, and finally the argument that trade policies are instruments for general political targets. For all three arguments, it is shown why an important driving force of mercantilistically motivated trade negotiations has become weaker, the reciprocity requirement. The paper recommends narrower negotiation issues and mandates to prevent a further rising heterogeneity of issues and negotiation partners.

In this article the authors try to show that the women's policies of three international trade secretariats (ITSs) have become, to a certain degree, institutionalized. In addition, the women's policies of these ITSs have been characterized by a transfer of values and resources from trade unions of industrialized countries to those of underdeveloped countries. They represent, therefore, a sort of international solidarity, which is pragmatic and mainly oriented towards members. Nevertheless, there are still many problems and shortcomings. Women are still underrepresented in the leading bodies and at congresses. Furthermore, the ITSs are not able to influence other institutions effectively or to enforce upon their members policies adopted at the international level.

AbstractHow can trusting relationships be identified in international politics? The recent wave of scholarship on trust in International Relations answers this question by looking for one or the combination of three indicators – the incidence of cooperation; discourses expressing trust; or the calculated acceptance of vulnerability. These methods are inadequate both theoretically and empirically. Distinguishing between the concepts of trust and confidence, we instead propose an approach that focuses on the actors' hedging strategies. We argue that actors either declining to adopt or removing hedging strategies is a better indicator of a trusting relationship than the alternatives. We demonstrate the strength of our approach by showing how the existing approaches would suggest the US-Soviet relationship to be trusting when it was not so. In contrast, the US-Japanese alliance relationship allows us to show how we can identify a developing trusting relationship.