Suchergebnisse

In this paper, the implicit and explicit conceptualizations of international organizations found in the three major theories of international relations are outlined and compared. It turns out that in a neorealist framework, international organizations can be explained; however, they exhibit no autonomy and cannot therefore be conceptualized as a corporate actor. Principally, the same applies to rational choice institutionalism, although limited autonomy is conceivable. Both theories are reductionist in the sense that they do not allow a corporate actor beyond the nation-state. International organizations are at best instruments of state interests. Solely social constructivist theories allow a conceptualization of international organizations as partly autonomous corporate actors. The reason for this conceptual openness lies in its ontology that includes ideational factors such as knowledge and ideas. The concept of emergence gives the core explanation for international organization autonomy: identities and interests of states and international organizations constitute each other mutually. This is specified by referring to the generation of new knowledge within international organizations as the key feature which accounts for feedbacks to the member-states of international organizations. This power of international organizations to alter perceptions and identities of their own 'founding fathers' makes them more than state instruments. International organizations thereby gain autonomy, which justifies conceiving of them as high-order corporate actors in international relations.

Financial globalization is an inherent feature of today's economies. But the positive impact of financial globalization has been limited and some puzzling evidence has been found recently. To explain these puzzles, Stulz argued that finance is critically affected by Twin Agency Problems: firstly, the controlling shareholders can use their power for their own benefit but at the expense of outside investors. Secondly, the state rulers can use their power to improve their own welfare at the expense of all shareholders. When these agency problems worsen, diffuse ownership is inefficient and ownership concentration is the best choice. Ownership concentration inversely limits a country's ability to benefit from financial globalization. On the basis of Stulz's theory and remaining the central role of the Twin Agency Problems in fostering ownership concentration, this study relaxes some simplified assumptions in Stulz's model and develops a more practical one. According to this developed model, the following solutions from the theoretical research are suggested for the government to solve the agency problems: improving the legal sense through education; increasing the expected profitability with active economic policies; strengthening the constraint on the expropriators through laws and regulations; implementing the above three strategies together; lastly, improving the investor protection during the development of financial market. This paper also makes an empirical investigation in China. On the basis of the data from 1481 Chinese companies listed in Shanghai, Shenzhen or New York, it is found that more than 70 % of the companies are ownership concentrated. More than halve of them are controlled by the state and nearly 20% are controlled by families. The average degree of ownership concentration in China is more than 30%, which is higher than most other Asian countries. It was argued that listing abroad can decrease the ownership concentration, but the evidence in China shows that the companies listed abroad are more concentrated than those listed only inland. The investigation of the profitability reveals that the companies listed abroad are not more profitable than those listed inland, but the difference of the profitability between these companies is much less, which means the companies listed abroad are more reliable as a whole, because bad companies are strictly forbidden to step into the market. The investigation of the relationship between capital scale and ownership concentration shows that the companies with greater capital scale are more concentrated and most of the giant companies are controlled by the government. Because in a country without advanced financial market the capital can be collected from the public is limited and the huge companies could only be financed by the state. The smaller companies are easier to become ownership dispersed. The research of the relationship between ownership concentration and profitability reveals that family held companies are more profitable than state held ones; the widely held companies have the lowest profitability. Although most of the dispersed companies have a poor performance, some of them are really good. The research of the ownership structures finds out that the companies with indirect dispersed structure or foundation held structure are more profitable and the deviation of profitability of these companies is much less than the pyramid structure. Another discovery is that most of the companies with indirect dispersed structure are held by hundreds of or even more than thousand of the employees of the listed company. The reasons why these companies are more profitable are the lower separation of voting rights from cash flow right and the more ownership encouragement. In the employee held companies, the ownership is dispersed to all the managers and almost all employees, and all of them are encouraged to do well and to act as monitors for each other. So, it is difficult for the top managers to steal from the company. Through all these empirical research the following suggestions to resolve the twin agency problems are obtained: not relying on foreign financial market but concentrating on the advancement of legal sense, laws and regulations inland; strictly examining the companies which apply to be listed on the exchange and prevent the bad companies from going into the market; beginning the decentralization of ownership with relative smaller companies; transforming the state holding company into employee holding dispersed company; eliminating or decreasing the separation of voting rights from cash flow rights; encouraging and supervising the managers by given more managers stocks or shares of the company. ; Finanzielle Globalisierung ist ein Kennzeichen der heutigen Wirtschaft. Ihre positive Einwirkung ist beschränkt und widersprüchliche Beobachtungen können gemacht werden. Um diese Beobachtungen zu erklären, argumentierte Stulz, dass die Finanzierung von den "twin agency problems" beeinflusst wird. Erstens: Die kontrollierenden Anteilseigner setzen ihre Macht für ihre eigenen Interessen ein, das schadet den Interessen anderer Investoren. Zweitens: die Staatsbeamten nutzen ihre Macht, um ihre eigene Wohlfahrt zu maximieren, das schadet den Interessen aller Investoren. Wenn sich dieses Problem verschärft, ist das diffuse Eigentumsrecht uneffizent und die Konzentration der Eigentumsrechte die beste Lösung. Diese Konzentration schwächt jedoch die Vorteile der Globalisierung. Auf Basis der Theorie von Stulz lockert diese Arbeit manche vereinfachte Annahme und erweitert das Modell zu einem praktischerem. Gemäß dem entwickelten Modell werden der Regierung die folgenden Lösungen aus der theoretischen Forschung empfohlen, um diese Probleme zu lösen: Verbesserung des Gesetzbewußtseins durch Ausbildung; Vergrößerung der zukünftige Gewinnfähigkeit durch aktive wirtschaftliche Politik; Verstärkung des Zwangs auf die Veruntreuer durch Gesetze und Regulierung; gleichzeitige Durchführung der oben genannten drei Strategien; Verbesserung des Schutzes der Investoren während der Entwicklung des Finanzmarktes. Diese Arbeit ist auch der empirischen Untersuchung in China gewidmet. Basierend auf den Daten von 1481 chinesischer Unternehmen, die in China und/oder an der New Yorker Börse notiert sind, wurde ermittelt, dass bei über 70% der Unternehmen die Eigentumsrechte konzentriert sind. Über 50% der Unternehmen werden vom Staat kontrolliert, rund 20% von Familien. Der durchschnittliche Grad der Eigentumsrechtskonzentration in China liegt bei über 30%. Das ist höher als in den meisten anderen asiatischen Länden. Es wird argumentiert, dass eine ausländische Notierung die Eigentumsrechtskonzentration vermindern kann, jedoch konnte erarbeitet werden, dass in China die im Ausland notierten Unternehmen konzentrierter sind als die inländisch notierten. Die Untersuchung der Gewinnfähigkeit zeigt, die auslandnotierten Unternehmen sind nicht profitabler als die inlandnotierten. Dabei ist der Unterschied der Gewinnfähigkeit zwischen den auslandnotierten Unternehmen viel geringer. Das bedeutet, die auslandnotierten Unternehmen als Ganzes zuverlässiger sind, da der Zutritt der schlechten Unternehmen zum ausländischen Finanzmarkt streng verboten ist. Die Untersuchung der Beziehung zwischen Kapitalumfang und Eigentumsrechtskonzentration zeigt, dass die Eigentumsrechte der Unternehmen mit größerem Kapitalumfang sind konzentrierter. Die meisten Großunternehmen werden vom Staat kontrolliert, denn in einem Land ohne entwickelten Finanzmarkt ist das Kapital, das öffentlich gesammelt werden kann, beschränkt und die Großunternehmen können nur vom Staat finanziert werden. Die Eigentumsrechte der kleineren Unternehmen werden leicht diffus sein. Die Untersuchung der Beziehung zwischen Eigentumsrechtskonzentration und Gewinnfähigkeit zeigt, die Familie haltenden Unternehmen sind profitabler als die Staat haltenden; die diffus gehaltenen Unternehmen haben die niedrigste Gewinnfähigkeit. Die Untersuchung der Eigentumsstruktur zeigt, dass die Unternehmen mit indirekt diffuser oder Stiftung haltender Struktur profitabler sind und die Abweichung der Gewinnfähigkeit dieser Unternehmen viel geringer ist als bei denen mit Pyramidenstruktur. Ein weiteres Ergebnis der Untersuchung ist, dass die meisten Unternehmen mit indirekt diffuser Struktur von einem Großteil der Mitarbeiter der notierten Unternehmen selbst besessen werden. Die Ursache für die höhere Gewinnfähigkeit dieser Unternehmen ist einerseits die geringere Trennung von Stimmrechten und Cashflowsrechten und andererseits die stärkere Eigentumsförderung. In den Mitarbeiter haltenden Unternehmen sind die Eigentumsrechte an alle Manager und fast alle Mitarbeiter verteilt. Alle Manager und Mitarbeiter sind angehalten bestmögliche Leistungen zu bringen; sie wirken als Monitoren untereinander. Deshalb ist es für das obere Management schwerer, dem Unternehmen wirtschaftlichen Schaden zuzufügen. Gemäß der vorliegenden Untersuchungsergebnisse gibt es folgende Vorschläge zur Lösung des "Twin Agency Problems": Keine Engagement auf ausländischen Finanzmärkten, aber Konzentration auf die inländische Entwicklung des Gesetzbewußtseins, der Gesetze und der Regulierung; strenge Prüfung der Unternehmen, die die Notierung an der Börse beantragen und Verhinderung des Eintritts schlechter Unternehmen in den Finanzmarkt; Umwandlung der Staat haltenden Unternehmen in Mitarbeiter haltende diffuse Unternehmen; Beseitigung oder Verminderung der Trennung von Stimm- und Cashflow-Rechten; Förderung und Überwachung der Manager durch Erhöhung der Anzahl der Manager, die durch Aktienbesitz an Unternehmen beteiligt sind.

Using principal–agent theories, this study examined differences in the perceptions of nonprofit chief executive officers (CEOs) and board chairs on key governance aspects, including board performance, leadership, satisfaction with diversity, and board meetings. Using data from the CEOs and board chairs of 474 nonprofit organizations, we found statistically significant differences in the governance perceptions of these leaders of nonprofit organizations. The findings provide support for an agency theory explanation about the differing interests of principals (board chairs) and agents (CEOs). The findings suggest that these two sets of nonprofit actors frequently operate from different perspectives, potentially affecting the governance of their organizations.

The predominant ontological position on agency in policy learning literature has been relatively learner-oriented, thus focusing on policy actors puzzling about policy problems. In other words, it focuses on how actors acquire, translate, and disseminate knowledge and information to address policy problems or 'puzzles'. However, despite its influence on learning and its outcomes, policy actors' powering, or agency in shaping learning processes has been scarcely explored or theorised. Drawing on policy learning literature, this article explores and demarcates the concept of 'policy learning governance' as a supplementary perspective to the learner-oriented view of agency in policy learning research. Here, learning governance can be understood as the deliberate processes by which policy actors strategise, design, and govern policy learning processes towards achieving technical or political objectives. This article explains how integrating a learning governance perspective into existing conceptual approaches to policy learning can provide a better basis for understanding the interactions between different constitutive elements of policy learning processes and outcomes, such as policy or belief change. In this way, it offers a more robust baseline for explaining learning processes, an advancement that has significant implications for both policy learning theory and practice.

Bureaucracies, politics, and culture -- Cops -- Soldiers -- Diplomats -- Conclusion

The article addresses expanding of global economic systems by studying Sámi strategies addressing Norwegian High Northern Policies (NHNP) launched by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2005. NHNP attracted global economy, labour and knowledge to the Arctic region. The Sámi responding are analysed by using agency theories in economic geography, and contributes to expand the content of agencies e.g. by understanding its embedding in specific historical shaped structures as well as in debates on new opportunity spaces in the wake of globalism. The study demonstrates three strategies debated and launched by the Sámi Parliament: (i) In grounding its resistance the Sámi Parliament argued that the entry of international industries into areas with Sámi population threaten the fundamental conditions for Sámi livelihood. (ii) By entering global governance the parliament emphasized the importance of Sámi negotiation with multinational companies in global governance frameworks. (iii) And by changing the historical understanding of Sámi territories in order to include research and higher education milieus outside remote rural districts.