Suchergebnisse

Abstract
The global arms control regime that began with the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) appears to be collapsing rapidly, with many agreements now abandoned or barely enforced. This article analyzes some of the challenges to new negotiations on arms control based on developments in negotiation theory over the past 60 years. It focuses on the management of multilateral rather than bilateral negotiations, the need to focus on absolute rather than relative gains, the use of problem-solving techniques rather than traditional bargaining, the management of domestic opposition to arms control, the need for national leaders to become active proponents of new negotiations, and the need to focus on norms of cooperative security rather than engaging in arms races. It concludes that a necessary, if not sufficient, condition to save and rebuild the arms control regime is the adoption of more constructive approaches to negotiation on these vital issues.

DESPITE THE POLITICALLY AND EMOTIONALLY CHARGED ATMOSPHERE SURROUNDING EVENTS IN LITHUANIA, PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH HAS KEPT HIS SIGHTS ON THE MAJOR U.S. SECURITY OBJECTIVES OF IMPROVING U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND REDUCING THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT. UNDERSTANDABLE SYMPATHY FOR THE BALTIC STATES HAS GENERATED CONSIDERABLE DOMESTIC PRESSURE ON THE PRESIDENT TO IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZE AND ENCOURAGE AN INDEPENDENT LITHUANIAN STATE. BUT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD SEE THIS AS DIRECT INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND THIS WOULD HOLD PROGRESS IN U.S.-SOVIET ARMS NEGOTIATIONS HOSTAGE TO UNPREDICTABLE EVENTS IN LITHUANIA.

This article explores the relationship between justice and effectiveness in bilateral and multilateral arms control negotiations. A set of hypotheses, derived from earlier research about the impacts of procedural and distributive justice on negotiation outcomes is evaluated. The sample consists of twenty cases, ten bilateral and ten multilateral. The results of statistical analyses show strong effects of procedural justice on the effectiveness of bilateral, but not multilateral, negotiations. Further analyses indicate that the effects are largely accounted for by half of the bilateral cases. Case-by-case analyses reveal some of the conditions that explain the correlation between pj principles and effective outcomes. Distributive justice correlated with more substantial agreements in the multilateral cases. Reasons for the limited effects of procedural justice on multilateral outcomes are discussed. The article concludes with more general implications and suggestions for further research. Adapted from the source document.