Suchergebnisse

Does it matter whether banking supervision is undertaken in‐house in the Central Bank or in a separate specialised supervisory institution? After all, bank supervisors and the Central Bank must continue to work closely together wherever the supervisors are located.Nevertheless there has been a recent trend towards hiving off bank supervision to a separate agency, as in the UK. The main driving forces are the rise of the universal bank, increased conglomeration, and concerns with conflicts of interest.Such separation, however, raises questions whether systemic stability might suffer. The ethos and culture of the separate supervisor might come to focus more on conduct of business, consumer protection, issues. Potentially systemic financial crises would have to be handled by a committee.These are qualitative issues, and developed countries, with differing historical, legal and institutional backgrounds, will come to differing conclusions. But in less developed countries, more weight needs to be placed on ensuring the quality of the supervisory staff, i.e. their professional skills, independence from external pressures, and adequate funding. This tells strongly towards retaining banking supervision under the wing of the Central Bank in such emerging countries.(J.E.L.: E5, F3, G2).

The banking sector reforms that the countries of Latin America undertook in the 1990s were an important step forward, but proved insufficient. This article highlights the need to deal with some structural issues, such as the supervision of financial conglomerats, excessive market concentration among a few institutions nationally and region-wide, and the relationship between this and the safety nets which are supposed to contain systemic crises, but which are unable to do so adequately. (CEPAL Rev/DÜI)

This open access book is the first attempt to elaborate the formalization phase of banking supervision in eight developed countries—USA, Japan, Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, France, and UK. This innovative study in the field of banking supervision history identifies why national histories of banking supervision share similarities, but also remain different and are heavily path dependent. This book will be of great interest not only to financial/economic historians but also to general readers interested in banking supervision, i.e., students, bankers, supervisors, and international officials.

P. 1: 100. Congress, 1. Session, October 28 and November 3, 1987. - IV,766 S., zahlr. graph. Darst. und Tab.; P. 2: 100. Congress, 1. Session, November 18; December 2, 3, 9, and 10, 1987. - IV,646 S., 13 graph. Darst., 5 Tab.; P. 3: 100. Congress, 1. Session, January 26 and 27, 1988. - IV,371 S., 11 Tab.; P. 4: 100. Congress, 2. Session, February 2 and 9, 1988. - IV,433 S., 9 Ill., zahlr. graph. Darst. und Tab

Globally, capital adequacy is one of the most central topics for both regulatory authorities and banks. It promotes stability and intends to reduce bank insolvency. It also represents the most important element of banks' profitability (Profits are the first line of defense against losses from credit loss in a bank). After the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1973, many banks incurred large foreign currency losses, with Banks outside Germany having taken heavy losses on their unsettled trades with Herstatt Bank in Cologne, West Germany, when it collapsed in June 1974. This study empirically tests the relationship between changes in the capital adequacy ratio under Basel III and return on equity (ROE) of the Namibian banking sector and whether such relationships exist in the short run or long run. The study used panel quarterly data for a sample of three Namibian commercial banks from the year 1999 to 2019.It employed one panel unit root tests namely: Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat (IPS). To test the existence of a long-run relationship (equilibrium) or effect between the dependent and independent variables, the study employed the Panel Co-integration methods using Pedroni and Kao (Engle-Granger based) tests. The study carried out the Hausman test to determine the best approach for analysis and determined the PMG approach to be the preferable model for analysis. Various diagnostic tests such as multicollinearity through the correlation analysis, autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence tests were carried out to determine if the data set is well-modelled and if the results can be taken seriously. The study's results under the PMG model showed that ROE and CAR have a positive significant relationship in the short run. A dummy variable to capture the connection between ROE and CAR before and after BASEL III shows that the relationship is positive and significant indicating that ROE increases more when there is capital regulation than when there is no capital regulation. The study also concluded ...

One of OJK duties and authorities is to supervise sharia compliance of Islamic banking operations in Indonesia. However, this role is still not optimal to conduct because the existence of DPS is considered sufficient to perform it. This study aimed to examine OJK arrangement on Islamic banking compliance supervision, adjustment on Islamic compliance supervision after switching from BI to OJK, and internalisation of hisbah principles in these regulations. This research used the normative juridical method, compiled positive law related to Islamic Banking supervision and compared it with hisbah principles implemented in the Islamic governance history as a basis for supervision internalised in OJK regulations and legislation. The result showed that (1) OJK regulates Islamic Banking compliance supervision through the rules of DPS establishment in Islamic Banking as the responsible party, received the DPS and SKAI reports periodically, and conducted audits by sampling on the application of sharia aspects; (2) several Islamic Banking supervision regulations still require harmonisation, especially those issued by BI; (3) five hisbah principles exist in the OJK regulations: transparency, accountability, responsibility, professionalism, and fairness.

This paper discusses the incentive conflicts that arise in banking supervision in the EU in a principal-agent framework, where the regulator is the agent and the taxpayers is the principal. The regulatory agent in addition to maintaining financial stability (the objective of the principal) may pursue private interests. Incomplete information, insufficient accountability of the agent and lack of enforceability of compliance result in an incentive problem. A reform of the European supervisory system complemented by strengthening market discipline based on improved disclosure of both the supervisor and the banks may help to solve the European incentive problem.

Mestrado em Economia Monetária e Financeira ; Esta dissertação analisa a supervisão bancária na União Europeia e o possível conflito de interesses entre política monetária e supervisão, que pode acontecer como consequência da integração das funções de supervisão e regulação bancária no Banco Central Europeu. A secção empírica considera o tema pelo lado da supervisão, tendo como referência o cumprimento dos princípios fundamentais de Basileia para uma supervisão bancária eficaz e procurando avaliar se a estrutura de supervisão tem impacto no cumprimento dos mesmos. Foi considerada uma amostra de 22 países e realizada uma cross-sectional anlysis. Os resultados sugerem que a estrutura de supervisão não tem significância no cumprimento dos princípios em questão. Pelo contrário, a liberdade financeira é uma variável com significância. ; This dissertation analyses the banking supervision in the European Union and the possible conflict of interests between monetary policy and supervision due to the integration of banking supervision and regulation duties within the European Central Bank (ECB). The empirical section considers the topic on the supervision side, looking at the compliance with the Basel Core Principles (BCP) for effective supervision as a benchmark, trying to assess whether the banking supervision framework has significant impact on the best supervision practises. A sample of 22 countries and a cross-sectional analysis was considered. The results suggest that the supervisory structure has no significance on the compliance with the BCP. On the contrary, financial freedom is a significant variable. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion