Examining consciences, but whose conscience?
In: The political quarterly, Band 93, Heft 3, S. 547-549
ISSN: 1467-923X
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In: The political quarterly, Band 93, Heft 3, S. 547-549
ISSN: 1467-923X
In their statement, Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship, the U.S. Catholic bishops acknowledge that "the responsibility to make choices in political life rests with each individual in the light of a properly formed conscience." This essay argues that, in light of this responsibility, it is important to affirm a commitment to the primacy of conscience as that idea has been understood in the Catholic tradition. If we really expect voters and public officials to make responsible, conscientious decisions about matters of public policy, we should not speak in ways that suggest that the proper formation of conscience is simply a matter of falling in line with church teaching. Such an approach will not contribute to the ability of voters and public official to make conscientious decisions, because church teaching does not generally speak definitively to the concrete questions that voters and public officials face. The essay articulates an understanding of the primacy of conscience that is rooted in a proper understanding what conscience is and of the relationship between conscience and truth. To be a human person is to have a duty to seek the truth in order that one can form for oneself right and true judgments of conscience. As one seeks the truth, one is bound to adhere to the truth as it is known, and one is bound to order one's life in accord with the demands of truth. In all our activities we are bound to follow our conscience. This is what it means to speak of the primacy of conscience. The essay also discusses the demands of proper conscience formation, which exclude a mistaken notion of the autonomy of conscience. We each have to commit ourselves to forming for ourselves right and true judgments of conscience, but we cannot form our consciences by ourselves. Proper formation of conscience must be attentive to the teaching of the church and the insights of human reason. It must also be guided by the balancing virtue of prudence, which is appropriately attentive to the limits of what it might be possible for good law to accomplish under existing social, political, and constitutional conditions. In the midst of often deep moral disagreement in our society, respect for the primacy of conscience calls us to engage in the respectful dialogue that is essential if we are to join together with our fellow citizens in an authentic search for truth, forming hearts and minds committed to making choices that will protect human dignity and promote the common good.
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In: Business ethics: the magazine of corporate responsibility, Band 11, Heft 6, S. 17-17
ISSN: 2155-2398
"To have convictions and yet to live with those who have others, or none, is the last achievement of man, as it is the first mark of civilization. Conscience, if stunted, reverts to barbarism in a pinch, whatever its prevailing veneer of culture. And conscience is always stunted unless it transcends itself. Civilization, consequently, lies somewhere beyond conscience. Where it lies and how, it is our purpose presently to enquire. But first we must reveal man's moral sense to itself, neither pitying its weakness nor condoning its wickedness. It is an ancient doctrine, from which conscience has exempted only itself, that none can wear a crown who has not borne the cross. Conscience must be made to face its cross, for the sake of man and his future. These are bold words. If they can be shown true, they may make man brave against his final enemy, himself. To show them true is here our first concern. To do this we must nerve ourselves to track to their lair the philosophers, not forgetting the theologians, who have assured men that almost their worst is actually their very best. This will be no easy task, but it will not be without excitement. With that said, the current text is comprised of 10 chapters concerning the following topics: the morphology and orientation of conscience; the theological implementation of conscience; the idealistic implementation of conscience; the sociological implementation of conscience; the metaphysical implementation of conscience; the logical implementation of conscience; the aesthetic finality of conscience; solipsims and social order; dialectical behaviorism and social order; and oughtness and order"--Preface. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved).
In: Cultural studies - critical methodologies, Band 14, Heft 6, S. 606-609
ISSN: 1552-356X
In: Routledge Communication Series
Screenwriting With a Conscience: Ethics for Screenwriters is for screenwriters who care deeply about what they write; who are aware that movie images matter and can influence audiences; and who want to create meaningful screenplays that make powerful statements while entertaining and winning over audiences. A user-friendly guide to ethical screenwriting, this book makes the case that social responsibility is endemic to public art while it emphatically champions First Amendment rights and condemns censorship.In this dynamic and practical volume, author Marilyn Beker provides methods for self-as
In: Radovi. Razdio filoloških znanosti, Band 27, Heft 17
Želja je autora ovog napisa da odredi u kojoj je mjeri književno djelo Itala Sveva još uvijek aktualno u današnjem povijesnom trenutku talijanske književnosti i u kojoj se mjeri ono može uklopiti u njezin kronološki slijed kao književni poziv kojim se u neku ruku završava talijanska književna tradicija iz druge polovice 19. stoljeća i najavljuju nove tendencije koje će karakterizirati talijansku književnost prve polovice 20. stoljeća. Poslije uvodnog dijela, u kojem je odredio mjesto (uz Pirandella) u kontekstu kompleksnih odjeka talijanskog Risorgimenta, autor analizira književnu pojavu poznatu kao »Slučaj Svevo« koja je svojevremeno (slično »Slučaju Silone« i »Slučaju Lampedusa«) zaokupljala interes talijanske i evropske književne kritike i utvrđuje da je Svevo morao najprije steći evropsku i svjetsku slavu da bi tek potom bio priznat i kao talijanski književnik. Talijanska je književna kritika, zaista, gotovo šutke prešla preko njegovih književnih djela od pojave njegova prvog romana 1898. pa sve do 1925. godine. U procjepu dvaju evropskih kultura, talijanske i njemačke, Svevo je, naime, izrastao u osebujnu književnu ličnost čija se djela, tematski i jezično (bez obzira ne neke leksičke i sintaktičke nekorektnosti koje su se, po savjetu vodećih talijanskih jezikoslovaca, posebno Devota, mogle lako ispraviti) nisu mogla bezbolno uklopiti u talijansku književnu tradiciju na prijelazu dvaju stoljeća, te su ih književni kritičari, dijelom nenamjerno a dijelom i namjerno, gotovo u cijelosti ignorirali. Kasnije, poslije objavljivanja njegova trećeg romana Zenova savjest, posredovanjem B. Crémieuxa, V, Larbauda i posebno J. Joycea — koji su Svevovu slavu pronijeli Evropom — talijanska se književna kritika nije više mogla oglušiti i Svevo je gotovo preko noći postao za talijanske književne kritičare i historičare bezmalo najzanimljivija tema. Put Svevova konačnog priznanja u Italiji raskrčio je prvi Eugenio Montale 1925. godine.
In: New labor forum: a journal of ideas, analysis and debate, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 75-83
ISSN: 1095-7960
In: Bulletin of peace proposals: to motivate research, to inspire future oriented thinking, to promote activities for peace, Band 15, Heft 4, S. 291-298
ISSN: 0007-5035
World Affairs Online
This book provides a new interpretation of the ethical theory of G.W.F. Hegel. The aim is not only to give a new interpretation for specialists in German Idealism, but also to provide an analysis that makes Hegel's ethics accessible for all scholars working in ethical and political philosophy.
In: European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Band 14, Heft 3, S. 95-114
John Cottingham suggests that "only a traditional theistic framework may be adequate for doing justice to the role of conscience in our lives." Two main reasons for endorsing this claim are assessed: the religious origins of conscience, and the need to explain its normative authority. I argue that Graeco-Roman conceptions of conscience cast doubt on this first historical claim, and that secular moral realisms can account for the obligatoriness of conscience. Nevertheless, the recognition of the need for an objective foundation for conscience which emerges from these debates should be embraced by both secular and religious ethicists alike.
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