Suchergebnisse

"The dilemma of how best to protect human rights is one of the most persistent problems facing the international community today. This unique and wide-ranging history of humanitarian intervention examines responses to oppression, persecution and mass atrocities from the emergence of the international state system and international law in the late sixteenth century, to the end of the twentieth century. Leading scholars show how opposition to tyranny and to religious persecution evolved from notions of the common interests of 'Christendom' to ultimately incorporate all people under the concept of 'human rights'. As well as examining specific episodes of intervention, the authors consider how these have been perceived and justified over time, and offer important new insights into ideas of national sovereignty, international relations and law, as well as political thought and the development of current theories of 'international community'"--

Main description: Humanitarian Interventions - that sounds nice; much nicer than wars, battles and use of military force. Foremost, the phrase makes you think of the delivery of sanitary goods, medication, of soup-kitchens. Here we are not supposed to think of interventions of this kind; we have to have humanitarian interventions in mind which are humanitarian intervention-wars. (I) At exactly what point is the use of military force a humanitarian intervention? What is the humanitarian aspect of those interventions? Their occasion? Their motive? Their alleged as well as their actual consequences? (II) At exactly what point are humanitarian intervention-wars morally justifiable? Are they justifiable even if they are wars of aggression breaching international law? And finally: (III) Was the war which was presented to us as the paradigmatic example of a humanitarian-intervention-war, that is: the war in Kosovo in the spring of 1999 (with over 37,000 bombing missions), really justifiable as a humanitarian intervention? Many of us wanted to believe so at the time. Does our ex ante judgement hold today in an ex post reflection? And which lessons for the future should we learn from the success or failure of this humanitarian war? These are the questions proposed in this book; therefore, it is concerned with problems of semantics (part I), problems of moral assessment (part II) and with the moral, legal and political conclusions we draw from our experiences with the war in Kosovo, our primary example of a humanitarian intervention (part III). International experts in the areas of philosophy, international law, sociology and peace studies debated these questions vigorously for several days. This is the resulting volume.

The following essay describes the idea of humanitarian intervention in relation to civil-military cooperation. In the first part it presents the definition of the concept, its characteristics as well as the brief history of its development. Second part describes the issues of legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Third part concentrates on relations between civil and military actors, co-operation of their tasks based on the example of CIMIC, as well as the challenges remaining to make their coexistence successful. For better presentation of the complexity of the issue, in the last part are presented lessons learned from humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. Article ends with short presentation of future prospect for improvement of civil-military cooperation in humanitarian interventions.

THE ARTICLE PROVIDES GUIDANCE IN FORMULATING AND ANALYZING ETHICAL DECISIONS ABOUT HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, BOTH THEORETICALLY AND EMPIRICALLY. THE MORAL ASSUMPTIONS OF INTERVENING AGENCIES PREDISPOSE THE TYPE OF INTERVENTION UNDERTAKEN AND CONTRIBUTE TO A FULLER UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEMS OF CO-ORDINATION BOTH WITHIN AND BETWEEN AID AGENCIES AND THE MILITARY. A UNIFIED THEORY OF INTERVENTION MUST THEREFORE ACCOMMODATE THESE CLEAVAGES AND, AT SOME LEVEL, INCORPORATE THEM.

This book scrutinises the practice of humanitarian intervention to explore the extent to which racism and heteronormativity, rooted in colonial understandings of time and space, are enacted through the UK's responses, failed responses and non-responses to atrocity crimes. Taking humanitarian intervention as its central focus, the book uses queer international relations scholarship to draw the ongoing coloniality of the Western state into stark relief. In particular, it highlights the ways in which dominant logics in these debates invoke subject-positions of extreme selfhood or otherness. These are identified as The Brutal Dictator', The ISIL Terrorist' and The British Self', framed as existing at various steps on The Universal Path to Democracy'. In studying these extreme cultural figures of selfhood and/or otherness, the book examines the ways in which racism and heteronormativity work together to dehumanise certain populations under coloniality, and the ways in which this can be resisted. By studying the UK's response to mass atrocities in Libya, Syria, Iraq and Myanmar between 2011 and 2018, it uncovers the extent to which these debates continue to operate through a colonial script. The book notably studies failed interventions (Syria) and non-interventions (Myanmar) as significant objects of study which, alongside the comments of UK legislators opposing the case for violence, help to expose the ongoing impact of colonial identities in the formulation of contemporary foreign policy. As well as looking at the British case, the book reflects upon changing norms of humanitarian intervention from the 1990s to the present day, including what might be understood as the rise and fall of R2P. The book also makes a distinct contribution to queer international relations scholarship, broadening what Vernon calls the homonormative turn' with a renewed focus on heteronormativity as a racist and globally-dominant episteme. Offering both a theoretically informed analysis of humanitarian intervention and a practical guide for possible strategies to resist future iterations of liberal violence, this book will appeal to scholars, students, policy-makers and NGOs interested in R2P/humanitarian intervention, queer/decolonial/feminist international relations, and British politics.

The intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Kosovo during the spring of 1999 aroused controversy at the time and still provokes questions about the legality of the action, its precedential effect, and procedures for developing new international law. The participants faced a legal and moral dilemma between international law prohibitions on the use of force and the goal of preventing or stopping widespread grave violations of international human rights. This commentary seeks to chart a course for the future in light of the current legal and moral environment. Many individuals on all sides of the Kosovo crisis maintained the highest standards of law and morality. Regrettably, others, particularly political leaders, fell short of their moral or legal obligations or both. Of the latter, the leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) headed by Slobodan Milosevic stands out. The FRY committed grave international crimes against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. However, both the ethnic Albanians and the Serbs in Kosovo engaged in aggressive and brutal actions against each other and both were at fault, legally and morally. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has also committed terrorist and other brutal acts against the Yugoslav Serbs and the FRY forces. As for the United Nations, though perhaps not morally at fault, it did not address the Kosovo problem in a timely and effective manner, as is its responsibility. Indisputably, the NATO intervention through its bombing campaign violated the U.N. Charter and international law. As a result, the intervention risked destabilizing the international rule of law that prohibits a state or group of states from intervening by the use of force in another state, absent authorization by the U.N. Security Council or a situation of self-defense. The NATO actions, regardless of how well-intentioned, constitute an unfortunate precedent for states to use force to suppress the commission of international crimes in other states--grounds that easily can be and ...

Frontmatter -- Contents -- United Nations military interventions since 1948 -- Abbreviations and acronyms -- Preliminaries -- Chapter 1 Evolution: intervention and humanitarianism from collective security to peacekeeping -- Chapter 2 After the cold war: a new world order? -- Chapter 3 Sovereignty and community: a 'responsibility to protect'? -- Chapter 4 Africa: post-colonial intervention amidst fragile statehood -- Chapter 5 Humanitarian intervention and coercive action: the Balkans -- Chapter 6 A model intervention? The birth of Timor Leste -- Chapter 7 Is it worth it? Success and failure in UN intervention -- Further reading -- Index

In this piece, Henderson looks to the shadow of Rwanda in terms of the concept of humanitarian intervention, and the evolution of the R2P doctrine. Tracing the re-examination of the conceptualisations of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention that evolved after Rwanda, Henderson assesses the legal, normative, and institutional challenges that still attend the attainment of its goals. Henderson concludes on a note of cautious optimism: Although it is in no way a panacea, R2P – at the very least – raises the possibility that a greater range of measures may be taken in response to the commission, or anticipation of, atrocity crimes in the future. The legacy of Rwanda is the hope, reflected in R2P, that silence and idleness will never again be the international community's response to genocide.

Should states use military force for humanitarian purposes? Leading scholars and practitioners provide practical and theoretical answers to this burning question, demonstrating why humanitarian intervention continues to be a controversial issue, not only for the UN, but also for Western states and humanitarian organizations.