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Problems with conventional definitions of political corruption are highlighted to better define such political behavior. Three categories are identified: corruption by public officials; public officials' abuse of their offices; & corruption by business enterprises & other private citizens. Political corruption is not perceived as a seminal characteristic of organized crime syndicates. Various legal, public interest, & public opinion definitions of political corruption are examined, further demonstrating the problem of preserving traditional definitions. Analysis of several public opinion definitions of corruption indicates significant differences in how the public defines political corruption & that these notions have changed over time. In addition, different nations posses disparate legal, public interest, & public opinion understandings of political corruption. The need to acknowledge the legitimacy of multiple definitions of corruption is stressed. 22 References. J. W. Parker

Qualitative studies suggest that the spread of privatization of public utilities is due to a change of the economic paradigm and institutional isomorphism pressures. However, current quantitative studies mostly account for domestic factors. These factors can explain differences in national privatization trajectories but cannot explain the large trend. Based on a quantitative analysis of privatizations in the telecommunications sector in 21 OECD countries, the article argues that emulation pressures can explain the trend toward privatization. The analysis suggests that privatization gained legitimacy as more and more governments emulated privatization policies they observed in countries they perceived as similar. However, the article finds no evidence of cross-sectoral diffusion. Thus, according to the analysis, telecommunications privatization diffused within the same sector between countries, but not within the same country between different sectors. Adapted from the source document.

Work on good governance implies a one-best-way model of effective government. This has isomorphic influences on development, whereby governments are influenced to adopt a one-size-fits-all approach to get things done. This article challenges whether such an approach exists, proposing that models actually do not hold even for the so-called effective governments. Governments look different, even if they are similarly called models of good government. This proposition is examined through a study of public financial management practices in a set of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and non-OECD countries. The study shows that effective governments are not more likely to exhibit better practice characteristics implied in one-best-way models. Good public financial management means different things in different countries. The article concludes by suggesting that good governance models give way to menus and the development community invest more time in examining why different countries select different menu items. Adapted from the source document.

Political tolerance is a key democratic value believed to undergird successful and healthy democracies. In nascent democracies especially, citizens must tolerate the views and participation of opposing groups in order to ensure methodical transfers of power with successive elections. Yet, despite its importance, little research considers tolerance outside established democracies. In this paper, we compare political tolerance across eight Eastern European countries and six Western countries. We demonstrate that mean levels of tolerance are lower in the newly democratized countries of Eastern Europe and then examine whether they are a function of East Europeans' limited experience with democracy. We also test whether established individual-level theories of tolerance replicate across this wide range of new and old democracies. We find some support for theories of democratic learning and also show that models of tolerance operate differently across the range of countries in our sample. Adapted from the source document.

Both the Swiss & the Japanese welfare states are difficult to classify in any one of the most widespread typologies, as each of the two countries combines features that are typical of the liberal model, such as a large private sector role in the delivery of welfare, with aspects that are more reminiscent of the conservative model. These include a social insurance system geared toward status preservation & low employment rates for mothers. In this article, Japan & Switzerland are characterized as liberal conservative welfare states. After pointing out the key features of this hybrid welfare state model, the article puts forward some hypotheses with regard to the reform trajectory that this model is likely to follow. In particular, it is argued that retrenchment in these two countries is likely to be more substantial than in conservative welfare states, because the private schemes that are going to be curtailed are less accountable to public scrutiny & do not automatically expose retrenchment-oriented governments to the risk of electoral punishment. The hypothesis is only partially confirmed by the empirical analysis of reform, as Swiss direct democracy institutions are proving a formidable obstacle to a generalized dismantling of welfare programs. In Japan, uncovered needs resulting from retrenchment & social change are being picked up by families. 1 Table, 21 References. Adapted from the source document.

It is commonly accepted that the years 1899–1939 represent a highpoint in anti-Semitism in western societies. What factors account for the wave of extraordinary anti-Semitism after 1899? Was the rise of anti-Semitism between 1899 and the Holocaust uneven? Did anti-Semitism vary in content and intensity across societies? Did Germans embrace anti-Semitism differently from French, Italian, Romanian, and British citizens? Data drawn from the annual volumes of the American Jewish Year Book are used to examine these questions systematically. Pooled time-series analyses suggest that variation in anti-Semitism over time and across countries was largely a function of economic conditions and Jewish immigration, and to a limited extent of the rise of leftist parties.

The vast, controversial body of literature on Communist parties in Western Europe has for decades been characterized by a longestablished contention: the existence of a clear historical & political contrast between the Parti communiste Francais (PCF) & the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI), the former being depicted as a more orthodox, Leninist & "teleological" force close to Moscow, the latter as a much more moderate, "societal" party. This article aims to revisit this contention by reviewing & assessing a series of domestic & international causes. It claims that, in the last instance, the historical contrast between these parties is largely attributable to international factors such as the formative years of the Komintern & the geopolitics of the former Soviet Union. Adapted from the source document.