Suchergebnisse

International audience ; The political and economic crisis in Europe is often viewed as an indirect consequence of the global financial and economic breakdowns caused by the US "subprime" crisis. European governments themselves tend to underestimate Europe's responsibility for the crisis and seem to prefer to manage the symptoms of the crisis rather than pursue a real recovery from it. This paper argues that the enforced policies are far from achieving an appropriate economic solution for the Eurozone. Moreover, it suggests that, although the European domestic debt situation is very close to the American one, their most recent evolutions and their main causes differ. If the growth of the American debt can partly be explained by macroeconomics imbalances, the causes of the growth of the European domestic debt must be found in a change in the behavior of the financial sector agents. The conclusion advocates for a more radical European policy to solve the debt bubble. ; La crise européenne est souvent perçue comme le produit indirect de la crise financière et de la récession mondiale causée par l'éclatement de la crise des "subprimes" américaine. Les gouvernements européens eux-mêmes tendent à sous-estimer les responsabilités des européens dans la crise et préfèrent en gérer les symptômes plutôt que de travailler à un redressement en profondeur. Dans cet article nous montrons que les politiques mises en œuvre ne peuvent être considérées comme des solutions appropriées à la situation économique. D'autre part, nous suggérons que bien que les niveaux des dettes domestiques européennes et américaines sont proches, leurs causes et leurs évolutions récentes sont différentes. Si l'accroissement de la dette américaine peut s'expliquer par des déséquilibres macroéconomiques, l'augmentation de la dette européenne ne peut s'expliquer que part des changements comportementaux des acteurs du secteur financier. En conclusion nous proposons de mettre en œuvre des solutions plus radicales pour mettre fin à la bulle du crédit.

International audience ; The political and economic crisis in Europe is often viewed as an indirect consequence of the global financial and economic breakdowns caused by the US "subprime" crisis. European governments themselves tend to underestimate Europe's responsibility for the crisis and seem to prefer to manage the symptoms of the crisis rather than pursue a real recovery from it. This paper argues that the enforced policies are far from achieving an appropriate economic solution for the Eurozone. Moreover, it suggests that, although the European domestic debt situation is very close to the American one, their most recent evolutions and their main causes differ. If the growth of the American debt can partly be explained by macroeconomics imbalances, the causes of the growth of the European domestic debt must be found in a change in the behavior of the financial sector agents. The conclusion advocates for a more radical European policy to solve the debt bubble. ; La crise européenne est souvent perçue comme le produit indirect de la crise financière et de la récession mondiale causée par l'éclatement de la crise des "subprimes" américaine. Les gouvernements européens eux-mêmes tendent à sous-estimer les responsabilités des européens dans la crise et préfèrent en gérer les symptômes plutôt que de travailler à un redressement en profondeur. Dans cet article nous montrons que les politiques mises en œuvre ne peuvent être considérées comme des solutions appropriées à la situation économique. D'autre part, nous suggérons que bien que les niveaux des dettes domestiques européennes et américaines sont proches, leurs causes et leurs évolutions récentes sont différentes. Si l'accroissement de la dette américaine peut s'expliquer par des déséquilibres macroéconomiques, l'augmentation de la dette européenne ne peut s'expliquer que part des changements comportementaux des acteurs du secteur financier. En conclusion nous proposons de mettre en œuvre des solutions plus radicales pour mettre fin à la bulle du crédit.

"Examines the relationship between rhetoric and debt, arguing that they are fundamentally entangled in producing and disciplining who is deemed worthy of credit and how debt materializes differentially: as a credit to some and condemnation of others."

This dissertation explores the relationship between sovereign debt ownership, default probabilities, and debt returns, focusing on the increasing domestic debt ownership in devloped countries since the global financial crisis in 2007. It also explains, both theoretically and empircally, how changes in sovereign debt maturity structure would affect the real economy. This dissertation helps advance the study of the linkages between sovereign debt composition, asset prices and the real economy.In the first chapter, I study the relationship bewteen sovereign debt default and debt ownership structure. Major developed countries have experienced a significant run-up in public debt after the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008. However, the impact on sovereign debt ownership varies across countries. Specifically, the share of debt held by domestic banks has increased in GIIPS countries but declined in non-GIIPS countries. I explain the cross-country differences in debt ownership structure using a dynamic equilibrium model with strategic and non-discriminatory defaults, in which sovereign debt can serve as collateral for expanding private investments. The key insight is that the share of debt held domestically is positively correlated with the government's incentive to default. Consequently, the model predicts that the share of domestically-held debt is strictly increasing in total debt only in highly-indebted countries whose debt has low collateral value. My result is consistent with the notion that domestic debt is a committment device for debt repayment. The key policy implication is that changes in debt ownership are important indicators for the optimality of public debt level. Using data from a panel of 11 countries between 2007 and 2014, I find evidence consistent with these predictions.In the second chapter, I study the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies, and how changes in fiscal policies, such as the level of debt and debt maturity composition, would affect inflation, the real economy and asset prices. I developed a three-period equilibrium model, in which monetary policies are modelled as open market operations. In my model, inflation and the term structure of interest rates are jointly determined by monetary and fiscal policies, and therefore Sargent (1981)'s "game of chicken'' problem is avoided. I show from the model that fiscal instruments, such as the primary surplus, and the level and maturity structure of government debt, have important implications on inflations and the term structure of interest rates. I then provide robust empirical evidence on how changes in debt-maturity structure are associated with changes in future inflation using U.S. data. One percent increase in the fraction of short-term debt issued is associated with more than 0.2 percent increase in future inflation of different horizons. Empirical evidecne also shows that changes in the short-end of the maturity structure has the most explanatory power over short- and medium- horizons, whereas changes in the long-end of the maturity structure has the most explanatory power over long- horizons.

Many analysts argue that trade sanctions are ineffective because they generate incentives for evasion. Others object to them as hurting the population of the target country as much as its leaders. We argue that loan sanctions unlike trade sanctions may be self-enforcing, and that they help the population by protecting it from being saddled with "odious debt" run up by dictators to finance looting or repression. In particular, governments could impose sanctions by instituting legal changes that prevent seizure of a country's assets for non-repayment of debt, if the debt was incurred after the sanction was imposed. This would reduce creditors' incentive to extend loans to sanctioned regimes. However, decisions on whether assets can be seized to enforce debt repayment would be subject to bias if they were made ex post and the deciding body asymmetrically valued the welfare of debtor countries and their creditors. Restricting such decisions to cover only future lending would help avoid this time-consistency problem.

The Definition of Debt Management : Fiscal deficits have become much larger and more widespread than they were. The budget deficit dominates economic policy discussion in the mid - 1980's. Today, there is not a country whether developed or developing without a fiscal defict (In east Eurepean Countries also). Debt is a major government revenue source these days and borrwing is an alternative to*taxation in the short run. But the consequences of government borrowing are different at home and abroad. Because the two forms of finance have different characteristics. There is also another difference of finance for developed and developing countries

Abstract. Accumulating debt is usually harmful for states, but a cyclical deficit policy and large-scale borrowing have been beneficial for the United States. While structural changes in the international political economy may cap America's future ability to process debt, an empirical analysis of the economic dimensions of hegemony over the last quarter century shows unambiguously that the hegemon reaps disproportionate gains in the area of trade and investment. This finding provides new insight on whether it is advantageous to be a hegemon.Résumé. Les États pâtissent généralement de l'accumulation des dettes, mais une politique de déficit cyclique et le recours à de larges emprunts ont pourtant été bénéfiques aux États-Unis. La capacité future de la puissance américaine à gérer sa dette sera peut-être entamée par les changements structurels subis par l'économie politique mondiale. Toutefois, l'analyse empirique des dimensions économiques de la situation d'hégémonie durant les vingt-cinq dernières années met à jour, et sans ambiguïté aucune, les gains disproportionnés générés par l'hégémon dans les domaines du commerce et de l'investissement. Cette recherche apporte un éclairage nouveau au débat sur les avantages liés à la position d'hégémon.