Suchergebnisse

This paper interrogated the political economy of democratic consolidation in Nigeria. The objectives of this paper among others was to refute and debunk the common assumption that only elections that are credible, free and fair, and reflective of the true will of the people would contribute to democratic consolidation. The paper adopts an explanatory design for analysis and relied on some empirical data generated through observation and official documents and essentially on secondary sources of data which were analyzed, using a descriptive method of analysis. The findings of this paper have shown that issues of poverty, inequality and unemployment if not tamed, can reverse the consolidation of Nigeria's democracy. The paper concluded that after over a decade of uninterrupted civilian administration, there is need to refocus energies on issues of poverty, inequality and unemployment if Nigeria is to consolidate its democracy.

Formal political institutions have been assigned two roles in democratization theorizing: as contingent effects of strategic interaction and as predictable bases for democratic consolidation. These roles might be reconciled if we assume that institutions become persistent once in place. But patterns of behavior surrounding these institutions do not appear to conform to the expectations of path dependency or comparable frameworks: while unchallenged in some cases, these institutions are repeatedly contested and often enough revised in others. This is true even of 'low stakes' institutional designs. Consequently, groups often perceive institutional designs not as 'locked in' and instead as malleable over even a few years. Codified political institutions therefore appear unable to generate the reduced risks - in effect, the credible commitments - which Adam Przeworski's argument about democratic consolidation requires. This conclusion suggests that consolidation may result from reductions in political risks caused by non-institutional factors. It also has implications for diverse arguments which assume stability or predictability in formal institutions.

The study examines Zambia's evolving aid relationship in relation to the country's democratic trajectory. The impact of aid in terms of democratic consolidation is linked to the development of the party system, the efficacy of key democratic institutions, and accountability in relation to tolerance of participation by the media and civil society in the political process. The study suggests that there are many good reasons for so-called traditional donors to phase out aid to Zambia. Zambia has recorded economic growth for the most part of this decade, but poverty levels still stand at near 70 per cent and both equity issues and poor human development indicators provide reasons for concern. The study cautions against an aid exit at a time when economic growth and new foreign partners may strengthen the executive office vis-à-vis civil society, opposition and agencies of restraint. The study argues for an enhanced emphasis on democracy assistance that may strengthen stakeholders and institutions with capacity to hold the executive to account for their policy actions in terms of development.

It has been assumed that African political parties should play a key role in democratic consolidation. This article first assesses their performance in terms of particular democratic functional requirements. Second, it seeks to explain apparent shortcomings in their performance by reference to the imbalance of party systems and "weakness" of parties, especially opposition parties, and also by reference to certain underlying factors. These include the economic context, weakness of civil society, prevalence of ethnicity as a basis for political mobilization, personalism, clientelism and strong presidencies. (Democratization - www.frankcass.com /DÜI)

The year 1997 was critical for Thailand. A severe economic crisis hit in July calling into question years of economic growth and increasing prosperity. A few months later Thailand adopted a new Constitution that aimed at reforming the political system, and at making corruption and vote buying less prevalent. While this article shows that the economic turmoil was a prime catalyst for political change, it was not as simple as saying that public outcry over the economic crisis forced conservative parliamentarians into voting to accept the proposed constitution. While public outcry did matter, what is vitally important is that elite political leaders, the heads of the major parties, ministers, and generals, were renegotiating their alliances and ties both with one another, and with various groups in society that were pushing for change. Elite resignation to political pressure and policy shifts among the top leaders is what ultimately allows for the passage of the constitution and for Prime Minister Chavalit's departure. This article takes a closer look at Thai politics and tries to answer the following questions: Did the economic crisis lead to (meaningful) political reform and why or why not? Since the codification of the 1997 constitution has Thai politics become more democratic? It is my analysis that the consolidation of democracy was in reach in 1997 but today has slipped further from Thai citizens' grasp. The explanations, or the independent variables for both the successful reforms of the political system in 1997 and the backsliding away from democratization, are largely the same. When both internal and external pressures prod democracy along, reforms take place. When pressures are pushing in different directions democratic reforms become threatened. Internal pressures include the military, civil society, and the behavior and power of political and economic elites; and external ones are the IMF, national security concerns, and globalization in general. When conditions or variables change, and when elite priorities or preferences shift, as this article will show, we can see the results in Thai politics.

"Examining autonomy in the Russian Federation, Matthew Crosston ascertains how the regional use of bilateral autonomy treaties has influenced the long-term stability, legitimacy and efficacy of the state. The study challenges some long-accepted conclusions about democratization and the devolution of power, advancing into new international arenas Riker and Dahl's relatively-ignored theoretical concerns that decentralized federations are ineffective and disintegrative while centralized federations are consolidating. Scholars of Russian politics, democratization, ethnic conflict, comparative intergovernmental relations and development will find this book particularly stimulating."--Jacket

This volume compares patterns of coalition politics vis-a-vis the institutionalization of democracy in four Asian developing and multi-ethnic countries. The cases cover India, Sri Lanka Malaysia, and Japan, all of which have experienced a significant period of coalition politics.