Suchergebnisse

It is now looking increasingly plausible that, at some point between the middle of 1997 and the beginning of 1999, a number of EC Member States (perhaps even a majority) will move to the final stage of Economic and Monetary Union. The macro economic consequences of EMU and the costs and benefits ofparticipating are already the subject ofactive and extensive academic analysis. Very little attention has so far been given to the question of how a two-tier EMU, with only some EC countries prticipating in Stage 3, would function and what implications there might be for those remaining in Stage 2.The purpose of this Note is to highlight some of these issues, which will need to be studied and understood in much greater depth before a decision is taken. It looks at the legal and institutional framework set out in the Maastricht Treaty, the relevant experience of nearly-fixed European exchange rates from 1987 to 1992 and the economic and political implications of particular country configurations in a two-tier EMU, concluding that mutually satisfactory management of such a relationhip will require greater political will and co-operative spirit than has been in evidence so far.

At the heart of fiscal rules in the EU is the (in)famous 3%-threshold: countries should avoid deficits exceeding 3% of GDP. If deficits exceed 3% of GDP, countries are to undertake consolidation ef-forts. This rule has been hotly debated since its introduction. Many argue that it is inherently procy-clical, by forcing countries with 'excessive' deficits to consolidate during recessions. Others stress the poor compliance with European fiscal rules. Two chapters investigate the effectiveness of European fiscal rules. On the plus side, if recom-mended to consolidate, member states do impose fiscal measures aimed at reducing excessive budget deficits. At the same time, and less desirable, the 3%-rule seems to elicit strategic behavior. Fiscal forecasts for euro area countries by the European Commission, which are used to judge com-pliance with the fiscal rules, are biased upwards when the budget deficit threatens to exceed the 3%-threshold. The next two chapters look into the economic consequences of consolidation efforts during the crisis. Although significant consolidation measures, implemented by the Dutch government, might have come at the expense of economic growth – at least in the short term – they do seem to have improved investors' perception of the government's solvency. More generally, public investments were severely reduced in many developed economies. However, results show that in general the decline of public capital has not diminished potential growth, suggesting that the current level of public investments does not pose an immediate threat to potential output in most countries.

Maastricht will induce changes to the EC budget the various dimensions of which are explored in this volume. Based on the theory of fiscal federalism the author discusses important aspects of multilayer government finance for existing federations - Australia, Germany, Switzerland and the USA. He sketches the effects of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) onto the Community budget, and concludes with a systematic treatment of revenue instruments for its future financing.

THIS ARTICLE OUTLINES THE THREE MAJOR IDENTIFIABLE APPROACHES WHICH MAY BE TAKEN TOWARDS THE FUTURE REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF BANKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU). A DISCUSSION OF THE REASONS FOR SUCH REGULATION AND PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION IS FOLLOWED BY AN ASSESSMENT OF RECENT RELEVANT EXPERIENCE. THE VERY SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC COSTS OF POORLY DESIGNED REGULATION AND INADEQUATE SUPERVISION ARE ALSO ILLUSTRATED.

With hindsight, the Maastricht Treaty introduced two different forms of flexibility or differentiated integration. The Social Protocol took the form of a permission by all the Member States to a group of Member States to use Community institutions and legislation, which can be seen as the precursor of the general provisions on "closer cooperation" in the Amsterdam Treaty. On the other hand, the provisions on Economic and Monetary Union provide for some Member States to receive opt-outs or derogations from binding Treaty obligations and thus provide the model for the new Title of the EC Treaty on visa, asylum and immigration introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty.

All pillars of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) have unleashed an array of measures to transform the economy towards climate neutrality. With the Green Deal, the strategy review of the European Central Bank (ECB), and the growing body of sustainable finance legislation, climate considerations have entered the traditional mandates governing the conduct of financial, fiscal, and monetary policy. The cross-sectional nature of climate issues reinforces the interdependence and coordination of EMU policies. This article explores changes to EMU architecture and discusses the institutional and legal implications of the novel role of climate in the coordination of EMU policies. It addresses the relationship between Treaty mandate and policy leeway, specifically the way in which the ECB extends its focus on price stability to account for climate considerations and the fiscal legal framework relies on flexibility to incentivize climate investment. It also tracks the emergence of climate stability as an EMU concept, adding to existing concepts of price, fiscal and financial stability.
EMU, ECB, monetary policy, financial policy, fiscal policy, climate change, sustainable finance, greenflation, policy coordination

The aim of the European Union's Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) is to prevent and correct macroeconomic imbalances before they get out of hand. The President's of the EU and Euro area institutions recommend in their report on "Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union" to strengthen this procedure. A euro area system of Competitiveness Authorities is recommended, which should "assess whether wages are evolving in line with productivity and compare with developments in other euro area countries and in the main comparable trading partners". Along these lines it is analysed in this Study how well MIP has worked in the past and how it could make a more effective contribution to preventing and correcting divergences in competitiveness. ; Ziel des Verfahrens bei Makroökonomischen Ungleichgewichten (MIP) ist es, Ungleichgewichte zu verhindern und zu korrigieren, bevor sie gefährliche Dimensionen erreichen. Im Bericht der fünf Präsidenten der EU und Eurorauminstitutionen wird empfohlen, dieses Verfahren zu verstärken. Ein System von "Wettbewerbsräten" für den Euroraum soll etabliert werden. Die Räte sollen beurteilen, ob die Löhne im jeweiligen Mitgliedsland im Schnitt mit der Produktivitätsentwicklung wachsen und wie sie (die Löhne) sich im Vergleich zu den Entwicklungen in anderen Euroraumländern und bei den wichtigsten vergleichbaren Handelspartnern entwickeln. Diese Studie analysiert vor diesem Hintergrund wie effektiv MIP in der Vergangenheit funktioniert hat und empfiehlt, wie MIP einen größeren Beitrag leisten könnte, die Divergenzen der Ungleichgewichte zu korrigieren oder zu verhindern.

The aim of this contribution is to explore Commission leadership in terms of the powers and responsibilities delegated to the Commission under the TEU and the Stability and Growth Pact (Stability Pact, Pact, SGP). Delegation theory is a useful tool to elucidate the scope and limits of the Commission's leadership role in EMU. The Commission's potential for leadership or 'entrepreneurship' is maintained yet constrained by the terms of delegation. These terms provided considerable scope for Commission leadership in Stage II of the EMU project (from 1994) notably in rendering credible the commitment of member states to the start of Stage III on 1 January 1999 and the subsequent launch of the euro. Delegation theory can also demonstrate why the Commission has had difficulty asserting a leadership role since 1999 in the context of macroeconomic – notably fiscal – policy coordination in EMU and more specifically with regard to the application of SGP rules. The Commission's role can be seen principally in terms of the management and watch-dog functions delegated to it in the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP. However, the rule book according to which the Commission must operate in terms of these two functions has been widely criticised – both by member state governments and the Commission itself.