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Sociale en economische veranderingen hebben gezorgd voor een meer dynamische en instabielere vorm van kapitalisme. Organisaties zien zich gedwongen om hun structuren en processen te heroverwegen en zodanig aan te passen dat ze flexibeler en effectiever worden. Dit proefschrift bestudeert dergelijke reorganisaties. Het maakt gebruik van observaties uit een studie onder private ondernemingen en overheidsinstanties in Nederland en Mexico, om recente patronen van organisatieveranderingen in zowel de publieke als private sector te begrijpen. De resultaten laten onder meer zien dat managers niet noodzakelijkerwijs reorganisaties starten omdat ze de controle hebben, zoals doorgaans wordt aangenomen. Het is waarschijnlijker dat ze reorganiseren vanwege een gebrek aan controle. Dit impliceert dat managers die een gebrek aan controle waarnemen een grotere kans hebben om te gaan reorganiseren, terwijl zij die zich wel in controle zien zich waarschijnlijk zullen verzetten tegen veranderingen. De resultaten wijzen er verder op dat de behoefte aan controle belangrijke consequenties kan hebben voor het implementeren van veranderingen in de publieke sector. De studie naar een bestuurlijke hervorming van de Mexicaanse overheid laat zien dat managers soms coördinatie moeten opofferen om naleving van regels (compliance) te verkrijgen. Empirisch bewijs suggereert verder dat het reorganiseren van de overheid niet noodzakelijkerwijs grote hoeveelheden financiële middelen vereist. Tot slot impliceren de resultaten dat publieke en private organisaties sinds de jaren '90 convergeren, althans in Nederland. Dat gezegd hebbende, blijven cruciale verschillen bestaan. We laten bij voorbeeld zien dat meer autonomie voor publieke managers kan zorgen voor "meer verandering", vergeleken met managers in de private sector. Dit suggereert dat de algemeen aanvaarde zienswijze op publieke organisaties als "rigide" deels ongefundeerd is. ; Social and economic changes have brought about a more dynamic and unstable form of capitalism. Organizations have been forced to rethink their structures and processes and adapt them to become more flexible and effective. This dissertation studies these reorganizations. It uses observations drawn from a study of private companies and government agencies in the Netherlands and Mexico to understand some of the recent patterns of organizational change in the public and the private sectors. Results show, among other things, that managers do not necessarily embark on reorganizations, as assumed in many popular management textbooks, because they are "in control", but probably because they are not. This implies that managers who detect lack of control are more likely to reorganize; whereas, those who perceive themselves in control will likely resist change. Further, results also show that the need for control may have important consequences for the implementation of changes in the public sector. The study of a governmental reform in Mexico shows that sometimes managers must sacrifice coordination to achieve compliance. Evidence also suggests that implementing reorganizations in the government does not necessarily imply committing vast financial resources. Finally, results suggest that since the 1990s, public and private organizations, at least in the Netherlands, seem to be converging. Yet, crucial differences persist. For instance, we show that granting more autonomy to public managers fosters "more change" relative to private ones. This suggests that the common view on the "rigidity" of public organizations may be partially unfounded.

There is not a single African country that did not attempt public sector reforms in the 1990s. Governments no longer see themselves as sole suppliers of social services, frequently opting for partnerships with the private sector. Efficiency and choice have entered the language of the planning and implementation units of Africa's line ministries, while privatization is no longer the controversial subject it was a decade ago. There have also been moves towards more open and democratic governments. Reforming Africa's Institutions looks at the extent to which reforms undertaken in Sub-Saharan Africa in recent years have enhanced institutional capacities across the breadth of government. To what extent have reforms been internalized and defended by governments? The authors also look specifically at the impact of public sector reforms on these economies and pose the question whether 'ownership can be attained when countries continue to be heavily dependent on external support. The volume is presented in three parts. The first focuses on the issue of reform ownership; on the issues of governance, the political economy of reform ownership, and the contradictions inherent in using aid as an instrument for enhancing domestic reform ownership. Part two examines the nature of incentives in the African civil service and the reforms undertaken in recent years to raise public sector efficiency in Africa. The third part discusses issues related to institutional capabilities in Africa and how they have been affected by the reforms undertaken in the 1990s, including privatization and movement towards political pluralism.