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"Recent crises show clearly that Europeans security depends on external developments. The Common Security and Defense Policy failed to provide security, while the European Union military missions were limited in terms of their scope. This inability threatens the interests and security of the member states. Exactly, this research explores the concept of military power of the EU. In order to elaborate anatomy of military power of the EU, the descriptive-analytic method is used. Military performance analysis proves that the EU is able to have the greatest impact in the global arena. The research shows that with the achievement of a political strategy among the stakeholder, on which the replacement of the consensus mechanism with an ordinary majority is predicted, the EU would be able to lead a proactive and efficient security policy." (author's abstract)

This report is about the background of Stabilization Force(SFOR) and peace stabilization duties handed over to a European Union force(EUFOR).

This article provides an overview of the study of the European Union since the doldrums of the 1970s. We focus on three debates that have helped to shape the field. Has European integration centralised state control or is European integration part of a process of dispersion of authority? What is the role of identity in framing preferences over European integration? And, finally, is European integration part of a new political cleavage? We observe that the European Union is a moving target. It has a habit of throwing up new and unexpected facts which wrong-foot extant theories. We have no grounds for believing that this will not continue. Adapted from the source document.

Against the background of a sense of crisis in the European Union and in international politics, European Union Member States have since 2016 increased their cooperation within the Common Security and Defence Policy, for example, establishing the European Defence Fund. Scholars have long pointed out that the European Union lacks the necessary 'hard' military power to influence international politics, subscribing to and constituting an image of the European Union as not masculine enough. We are critical of these accounts and develop a different argument. First, building on insights from feminist security and critical military studies, we argue that the European Union is a military power constituted by multiple masculinities. We consider the European Union to be a masculine military power, not only because it uses and aims to develop military instruments, but also because of how militarism and military masculinities permeate discourses, practices and policies within Common Security and Defence Policy and the European Union more broadly. We argue, second, that the crisis narrative allows the European Union to strengthen Common Security and Defence Policy and exhibit more aggressive military masculinities based on combat, which exist alongside entrepreneurial and protector masculinities. These developments do not indicate a clear militarisation of Common Security and Defence Policy, but, rather, an advancement and normalisation of militarism and the militarised masculinities associated with it.

On May 6, 1955, the Western European Union (WEU) formally came into existence.1 On May 7, the WEU Council held its inaugural meeting in Paris. The Council considered various questions relating to the structure of WEU and, after approving the Interim Commission's report and adopting the draft agreement on the status of WEU and its staff, appointed Louis Goffin (Belgium) Secretary-General of WEU. Admiral Ferreri (Italy) was appointed director of the Agency for the Control of Armaments. The Council also decided, on the basis of studies carried out by a working group established at the nine-power conference in Paris on October 21, 1954, to create a Standing Armaments Committee composed of national representatives and served by a small secretariat. The Standing Committee had the task of "the development of the closest possible co-operation between member countries of Western European Union in the field of armaments, in order to seek the most practical means of using the resources available to these countries for equipping and supplying their forces and of sharing tasks in the best interest of all". In order to promote liaison with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the seat of the Standing Committee was to be Paris; Charles Cristofini (France) was appointed Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the international secretariat of the Standing Committee. The Council further decided that the first meeting of the WEU Assembly should be held in Strasbourg during die same period as the next session of die Consultative Assembly of die Council of Europe and that the WEU Assembly should be composed of die representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Consultative Assembly.

Officials within parliaments have received marginal scholarly attention. This also holds for the European Parliament (EP) which contains a considerable administration. This study, based on an online survey (N = 118), shows that political group staff are primarily committed to the concerns of their respective political groups, but also to the arguments of those external actors which have similar party affiliation. Since most group officials are, in addition, affiliated to a particular committee, they also emphasize sectoral interests, including the concerns of affected interest groups. EP secretariat officials, on the other hand, give priority to sectoral and expert concerns. Both groups of staff rank European concerns above national ones, and pay more attention to the arguments of the European Commission than to the arguments of any other institution. This study thus suggests that officials in the EP contribute to the spanning of ideological and sectoral cleavages across European Union institutions. These observations may be seen as deviating from a basically intergovernmental portrayal of the Union. Adapted from the source document.

Despite the American Federation of Government Employees membership recent rejection of a proposal that its organizing activity extend to military personnel, the unionization debate persists. The European experience is cited in argument by both sides but in this article the assumed analogical link between that experience and the U.S. case is shown to be nonexistent.