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Arising out of the author's lifetime fascination with the links between the formal language of mathematical models and natural language, this short book comprises five essays investigating both the economics of language and the language of economics. Ariel Rubinstein touches the structure imposed on binary relations in daily language, the evolutionary development of the meaning of words, game-theoretical considerations of pragmatics, the language of economic agents and the rhetoric of game theory. These short essays are full of challenging ideas for social scientists that should help to encourage a fundamental rethinking of many of the underlying assumptions in economic theory and game theory. As a postscript two economists, Tilman Borgers (University College London) and Bart Lipman (University of Wisconsin, Madison), and a logician, Johan van Benthem (University of Amsterdam, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation and Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and Information) offer comments

The relevance of the systems approach in the science of language in recent decades has led to the popularity of studying complex units of the word formation system (word-formation pairs, type, paradigm, chain, nest). The article is devoted to the description of the word-formation chain as a syntagmatic derivational structure organized by the stepped formation of each derivative in a certain word-formation way. The phenomenon of through-the-stepped word formation is described, which results in omission of a motivating lexeme and indicating the incompleteness of the derivational chain. The paper lists the criteria for typing and abstraction of word-formation chains within the LSG of emotive verbs. According to the degree of abstraction the hierarchy of derivational chains is presented: specific, typical, categorical word-formation chains. The author of the article draws attention to the need to single out an even more typified association of word-formation chains, based on the equal-thematic nature of word-formation meanings – supercategorical word-formation chains. These structures represent an invariant derivational model typing categorical derivational chains of one LSG. The paper notes the need to highlight such abstracted word-formation models as a means of ordering the derivational system of the language.

In the article are considered some issues about the peculiarity and the content of foreign language teaching of various categories of adults in the process of non-formal education. The general conceptions, global strategies, trends, and forms of foreign language teaching of various categories of adults are highlighted. The program and normative documents of the European Union and Ukraine, which determine the policy of foreign language teaching of adults in the process of non-formal education, are carecterized as well.

Part I. Meaning and Objects -- Beyond Sense -- Meaning and Grammar -- Models and Formal Language -- Montague Grammar -- Meaning and Possibility -- Propositional Attitudes -- Natural Language Metaphysics -- Part II: Meaning and Subjects -- Semantic Externalism -- Meaning and Use -- Meaning and World -- Meaning and Mind -- Meaning and Indexicality -- Meaning and Context -- Meaning and Causality -- Meaning and Acquaintance -- Attitudes de se -- Worlds and Centers -- Meaning and (Epistemic) Subjectivity -- Meaning and Private Objects -- Implicit de se -- Conscious Experience -- Semantic Internalism -- Part III. Meaning, Language and Perception -- Meaning at the Interface -- The Old View of Perception -- The New View of Perception -- Meaning as Perception -- Cognitive Propositions -- Meaning and Conscious Experience -- Meaning and Other Minds -- Meaning and Nature.

An introductory textbook, Logic for Justice covers, in full detail, the language and semantics of both propositional logic and first-order logic. It motivates the study of those logical systems by drawing on social and political issues. Basically, Logic for Justice frames propositional logic and first-order logic as two theories of the distinction between good arguments and bad arguments. And the book explains why, for the purposes of social justice and political reform, we need theories of that distinction. In addition, Logic for Justice is extremely lucid, thorough, and clear. It explains, and motivates, many different features of the formalism of propositional logic and first-order logic, always connecting those features back to real-world issues. Key Features Connects the study of logic to real-world social and political issues, drawing in students who might not otherwise be attracted to the subject. Offers extremely clear and thorough presentations of technical material, allowing students to learn directly from the book without having to rely on instructor explanations. Carefully explains the value of arguing well throughout one's life, with several discussions about how to argue and how arguments - when done with care - can be helpful personally. Includes examples that appear throughout the entire book, allowing students to see how the ideas presented in the bookbuild oneach other. Provides a large and diverse set of problems for each chapter. Teaches logic by connecting formal languages to natural languages with which students are already familiar, making it much easier for students to learn how logic works.

Preparatory Considerations -- § 1. Outset from the significations of the word logos: speaking, thinking, what is thought -- § 2. The ideality of language. Exclusion of the problems pertaining to it -- § 3. Language as an expression of "thinking." Thinking in the broadest sense, as the sense-constituting mental process -- § 4. The problem of ascertaining the essential limits of the "thinking" capable of the significational Function -- § 5. Provisional delimination of logic as apriori theory of science -- § 6. The formal character of logic. The formal Apriori and the contingent Apriori -- § 7. The normative and practical functions of logic -- § 8. The two-sidedness of logic; the subjective and the Objective direction of its thematizing activity -- § 9. The straightforward thematizing activity of the "Objective" or "positive" sciences. The idea of two-sided sciences -- § 10. Historically existing psychology and scientific thematizing activity directed to the subjective -- §11. The thematizing tendencies of traditional logic -- a.Logic directed originally to the Objective theoretical formations produced by thinking -- b.Logic's interest in truth and the resultant reflection on subjective insight -- c. Result: the hybridism of historically existing logic as a theoretical and normative-practical discipline -- I / The structures and the sphere of objective formal logic -- The way from the tradition to the full idea of formal logic -- 1. Formal logic as apophantic analytics -- § 12. Discovery of the idea of the pure judgment-form -- § 13. The theory of the pure forms of judgments as the first discipline of formal logic -- a.The idea of theory of forms -- b.Universality of the judgment-form; the fundamental forms and their variants -- c.Operation as the guiding concept in the investigation of forms -- § 14. Consequence-logic (logic of non-contradiction) as the second level of formal logic -- § 15. Truth-logic and consequence-logic -- § 16. The differences in evidence that substantiate the separating of levels within apophantics. Clear evidence and distinct evidence -- a.Modes of performing the judgment. Distinctness and confusion -- b.Distinctness and clarity -- c.Clarity in the having of something itself and clarity of anticipation -- § 17. The essential genus, "distinct judgment," as the theme of "pure analytics" -- § 18. The fundamental question of pure analytics -- § 19. Pure analytics as fundamental to the formal logic of truth. Non-contradiction as a condition for possible truth -- § 20. The principles of logic and their analogues in pure analytics -- § 21. The evidence in the coinciding of "the same" confused and distinct judgment. The broadest concept of the judgment -- § 22. The concept defining the province belonging to the theory of apophantic forms, as the grammar of pure logic, is the judgment in the broadest sense -- 2. Formal apophantics, formal mathematics -- § 23. The internal unity of traditional logic and the problem of its position relative to formal mathematics -- a.The conceptual self-containedness of traditional logic as apophantic analytics -- b.The emerging of the idea of an enlarged analytics, Leibniz's "mathesis universalis," and the methodico-technical unification of traditional syllogistics and formal mathematics -- § 24. The new problem of a formal ontology. Characterization of traditional formal mathematics as formal ontology -- § 25. Formal apophantics and formal ontology as belonging together materially, notwithstanding the diversity of their respective themes -- § 26. The historical reasons why the problem of the unity of formal apophantics and formal mathematics was masked -- a.Lack of the concept of the pure empty form -- b.Lack of knowledge that apophantic formations are ideal -- c.Further reasons, particularly the lack of genuine scientific inquiries into origins -- d.Comment on Bolzano's position regarding the idea of formal ontology -- § 27. The introduction of the idea of formal ontology in the Logische Untersuchungen -- a.The first constitutional investigations of categorial objectivities, in the Philosophie der Arithmetik -- b.The way of the "Prolegomena" from formal apophantics to formal ontology -- 3. Theory of deductive systems and theory of multiplicities -- § 28. The highest level of formal logic: the theory of deductive systems; correlatively, the theory of multiplicities -- § 29. The theory of multiplicities and the formalizing reduction of the nomological sciences -- § 30. Multiplicity-theory as developed by Riemann and his successors -- §31. The pregnant concept of a multiplicity-correlatively, that of a "deductive" or "nomological" system-clarified by the concept of "definiteness" -- § 32. The highest idea of a theory of multiplicities: a universal nomological science of the forms of multiplicities -- § 33. Actual formal mathematics and mathematics of the rules of the game -- § 34. Complete formal mathematics identical with complete logical analytics -- § 35. Why only deductive theory-forms can become thematic within the domain of mathesis universalis as universal analytics -- a.Only deductive theory has a purely analytic system-form -- b.The problem of when a system of propositions has a system-form characterizable as analytic -- § 36. Retrospect and preliminary indication of our further tasks -- b. Phenomenological clarification of the two-sidedness of formal logic as formal apophantics and formal ontology -- 4. Focusing on objects and focusing on judgments -- § 37. The inquiry concerning the relationship between formal apophantics and formal ontology; insufficiency of our clarifications up to now -- § 38. Judgment-objects as such and syntactical formations -- § 39. The concept of the judgment broadened to cover all formations produced by syntactical actions -- § 40. Formal analytics as a playing with thoughts, and logical analytics. The relation to possible application is part of the logical sense of formal mathesis -- §41. The difference between an apophantic and an ontological focusing and the problem of clarifying that difference -- § 42. Solution of this problem -- a.Judging directed, not to the judgment, but to the thematic objectivity -- b.Identity of the thematic object throughout changes in the syntactical operations -- c.The types of syntactical object-forms as the typical modes of Something -- d.The dual function of syntactical operations -- e.Coherence of the judging by virtue of the unity of the substrate-object that is being determined. Constitution of the "concept" determining the substrate-object -- f. The categorial formations, which accrue in the determining, as habitual and inter subjective possessions -- g. The objectivity given beforehand to thinking contrasted with the categorial objectivity produced by thinking — Nature as an illustration -- § 43. Analytics, as formal theory of science, is formal ontology and, as ontology, is directed to objects 119 -- § 44. The shift from analytics as formal ontology to analytics as formal apophantics -- a.The change of thematizing focus from object- provinces to judgments as logic intends them -- b.Phenomenological clarification of this change of focus -- ?. The attitude of someone who is judging naïvely-straightforwardly -- ?. In the critical attitude of someone who intends to cognize, supposed objectivities as supposed are distinguished from actual objectivities -- ?. The scientist's attitude: the supposed, as supposed, the object of his criticism of cognition -- § 45. The judgment in the sense proper to apophantic logic -- § 46. Truth and falsity as results of criticism. The double sense of truth and evidence -- 5. Apophantics, as theory of sense, and truth-logic -- § 47. The adjustment of traditional logic to the critical attitude of science leads to its focusing on the apophansis -- § 48. Judgments, as mere suppositions, belong to the region of senses. Phenomenological characterization of the focusing on senses -- § 49. The double sense of judgment (positum, proposition) -- § 50. The broadening of the concept of sense to cover the whole positional sphere, and the broadening of formal logic to include a formal axiology and a formal theory of practice -- §51. Pure consequence-logic as a pure theory of senses. The division into consequence-logic and truth- logic is valid also for the theory of multiplicities, as the highest level of logic -- § 52. "Mathesis pura" as properly logical and as extralogical. The "mathematics of mathematicians" -- § 53. Elucidations by the example of the Euclidean multiplicity -- § 54. Concluding ascertainment of the relationship be-tween formal logic and formal ontology -- ?.The problem -- b.The two correlative senses of formal logic -- c. The idea of formal ontology can be separated from the idea of theory of science -- II / From Formal to Transcendental Logic -- 1. Psychologism and the laying of a transcendental foundation for logic -- § 55. Is the development of logic as Objective-formal enough to satisfy even the idea of a merely formal theory of science ? -- § 56. The reproach of psychologism cast at every consideration of logical formations that is directed to the subjective -- §57. Logical psychologism and logical idealism -- a. The motives for this psychologism -- b. The ideality of logical formations as their making their appearance irreally in the logico-psychic sphere -- § 58. The evidence of ideal objects analogous to that of individual objects -- § 59. A universal characterization of evidence as the giving of something itself -- § 60. The fundamental laws of intentionality and the universal function of evidence -- § 61. Evidence in general in the function pertaining to all objects, real and irreal, as synthetic unities -- § 62. The ideality of all species of objectivities over against the constituting consciousness. The po.

Nosso objetivo neste artigo é analisar a constituição do discurso formal no contexto do Tribunal do Júri, a fim de delimitar parâmetros que o caracterizem com base nos discursos de Promotores de Justiça e de Advogados de Defesa. O contexto foi escolhido em razão de nesse ambiente serem realizados diversos ritos processuais e, principalmente por essa razão, ele foi identificado como formal. A pesquisa é fundamentada na Sociolinguística Interacional, com orientações etnográficas, combinadas com a metodologia da Análise da Conversação. O corpus é constituído de filmagem de uma sessão de julgamento no Tribunal de Justiça do Distrito Federal e dos Territórios, compreendendo aproximadamente onze horas de gravação.

This article is concerned with the formal terms of reproach in Russian discourse and the corpus methods of their identification. Theoretically, it builds on the thesis that there are 'true' reproaches that can function autonomously in discourse and be adequately understood outside their context. Practically, the article describes the corpus search for formal terms of reproach. Methodologically, it abandons the synthetic outlook of pragmalinguistics, which dominates Russian linguistics, and treats reproach as a strictly linguistic object that has dis­cursive manifestations. This approach uses methods of corpus linguistics, which 'visualise' abstract models through arrays of real-life language data.

International audience ; We present ACME, a tool implementing algebraic techniques to solve decision problems from automata theory. The core generic algorithm takes as input an automaton and computes its stabilization monoid, which is a generalization of its transition monoid. Using the stabilization monoid, one can solve many problems: determine whether a B-automaton (which is a special kind of automata with counters) is limited, whether two B-automata are equivalent, and whether a probabilistic leaktight automaton has value 1. The dedicated webpage where the tool ACME can be downloaded is The notion of stabilization monoids appears in two distinct contexts. It has first been developed in the theory of regular cost functions, introduced by Colcom-bet [Col09,Col13]. The underlying ideas have then been transferred to the setting of probabilistic automata [FGO12]. 1.1 Stabilization Monoids in the Theory of Regular Cost Functions At the heart of the theory of regular cost functions lies the equivalence between different formalisms: a logical formalism, cost MSO, two automata model, Band S-automata, and an algebraic counterpart, stabilization monoids. Here we briefly describe the model of B-automata, and their transformations to stabilization monoid. This automaton model generalizes the non-deterministic automata by adding a finite set of counters. Instead of accepting or rejecting a word as a non-deterministic automaton does, a B-automaton associates an The research leading to these results has received funding from the French ANR project 2010 BLAN 0202 02 FREC, the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement 259454 (GALE) and 239850 (SOSNA).

International audience ; We present ACME, a tool implementing algebraic techniques to solve decision problems from automata theory. The core generic algorithm takes as input an automaton and computes its stabilization monoid, which is a generalization of its transition monoid. Using the stabilization monoid, one can solve many problems: determine whether a B-automaton (which is a special kind of automata with counters) is limited, whether two B-automata are equivalent, and whether a probabilistic leaktight automaton has value 1. The dedicated webpage where the tool ACME can be downloaded is The notion of stabilization monoids appears in two distinct contexts. It has first been developed in the theory of regular cost functions, introduced by Colcom-bet [Col09,Col13]. The underlying ideas have then been transferred to the setting of probabilistic automata [FGO12]. 1.1 Stabilization Monoids in the Theory of Regular Cost Functions At the heart of the theory of regular cost functions lies the equivalence between different formalisms: a logical formalism, cost MSO, two automata model, Band S-automata, and an algebraic counterpart, stabilization monoids. Here we briefly describe the model of B-automata, and their transformations to stabilization monoid. This automaton model generalizes the non-deterministic automata by adding a finite set of counters. Instead of accepting or rejecting a word as a non-deterministic automaton does, a B-automaton associates an The research leading to these results has received funding from the French ANR project 2010 BLAN 0202 02 FREC, the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement 259454 (GALE) and 239850 (SOSNA).