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This paper argues that sound principles of freedom of expression protect an individual's choice of which language to speak. They do so, not to guarantee against mistranslation, but rather to ensure that speakers are able to reach their intended audiences and, more importantly, to allow for the expressive value of speaking a particular language as a symbol of ethnic or political identification. The example of Quebec's Charter of the French Language and the resulting litigation is considered in some detail.

THIS CHAPTER IS COMPRISED OF THE TEXT OF THE JOHANNESBURG PRINCIPLES ON NATIONAL SECURITY, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION. THESE PRINCIPLES WERE ADOPTED ON 1 OCTOBER 1995 BY A GROUP OF EXPERTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENED BY ARTICLE 19, THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER AGAINST CENSORSHIP, IN COLLABORATION WITH THE CENTER FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, IN JOHANNESBURG. THE PRINCIPLES ARE BASED ON INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL LAW AND STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, EVOLVING STATE PRACTICE, AND THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW RECOGNIZED BY THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS.

Text of principles adopted by a group of experts in international law, national security, and human rights convened by ARTICLE 19, the International Centre Against Censorship, in collaboration with the Centre for Applied Legal Studies of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg; adopted Oct. 1, 1995.

In response to the controversy surrounding the publication in a Danish newspaper of cartoons depicting Islam's prophet, Muhammed, we, the Association of the Manifeste des Libertés, insist on a dual commitment. We condemn fundamentalism and those who feed it. And we reassert and nourish hope for a democratic, common future together, with pluralism of cultural backgrounds. This hope is hated by the extreme right parties in Europe and by the radical Islamists. They throw the ball back and forth between each other. We aim to seize it.

Much legal and philosophical work has been devoted to discussing the importance of protecting freedom of expression from legislative curtailment by the state. That state-centric focus has meant that the ways that wider social phenomena can stifle freedom of expression have, with a notable exception, escaped sustained philosophical attention. The paper reflects on the nature of socially coercive restrictions on free expression and offers an account of how it is appropriate to respond to such forms of social coercion. First, it considers a range of social costs pertaining to expression and argues that such costs can constitute meaningful restrictions on the freedom to express. Second, it reflects on the normative implications concerning that threat to free expression and defends two related moral duties citizens have to refrain from being complicit in unjustified social coercion—a duty of expressive toleration and a duty of respect for expressive agency.