Suchergebnisse

We use the theory of organizational ecology to study how governmental venture capital (GVC) affects the investment behavior of private venture capital (PVC). Because of its objectives and dominant competencies, GVC is a unique organizational species that occupies a different niche than PVC. GVC is conceived to establish mutualistic relations with PVC. Accordingly, the greater the presence of GVC in a venture capital (VC) ecosystem, the more PVC investors should be attracted toward GVC's niche. We consider several relevant niche dimensions at the company (age and size), industry (biotechnology), and regional (competitiveness) levels. Our analysis of 1,239 PVC investments in Europe confirms most of our predictions.

AbstractManuscript TypeEmpiricalResearch Question/IssueWhere are fintech venture capital investments taking place around the world? What is the role of institutional factors on the international allocation of fintech venture capital?Research Findings/InsightsWe document a notable change in the pattern of fintech venture capital (VC) investments around the world relative to other types of investments after the global financial crisis. We show that fintech venture capital investments are relatively more common in countries with weaker regulatory enforcement and without a major financial center after the financial crisis. Also, we show the fintech boom is more pronounced for smaller private limited partnership venture capitalists that likely have less experience with prior venture capital booms and busts. These fintech VC deals are substantially more likely to be liquidated, especially when located in countries without a major financial center.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsWe build on the institutions and corporate governance literatures by showing the importance of enforcement in driving relative differences in investment patterns and investor participation. For entrepreneurial startups, regulatory arbitrage drives investment into countries with a dearth of enforcement and regulatory costs. We argue that the spike in fintech venture capital in certain countries is attributable to differential enforcement of financial institution rules amongst startups versus large established financial institutions after the financial crisis.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsRegulatory arbitrage in the context of fintech venture capital can spur booms and busts. Less experienced venture capitalists seem more prone to undertake investments that exacerbate boom and bust cycles. National governance is strengthened by the enforcement of regulatory standards, and corporate governance through investor experience and oversight can mitigate these swings, and facilitate better investment outcomes.

This paper proposes a simple partial equilibrium model to investigate the effects of government policy on venture capital backed investments. Giving up an alternative career, entrepreneurs focus their effort on a single, high risk venture each. Venture capitalists acquire an equity stake and offer a base salary as well. In addition to providing incentive compatible equity finance, they support the venture with managerial advice to raise survival chances. We analyze several policy measures addressed at venture capital activity: government spending on entrepreneurial training, subsidies to equipment investment, and output subsidies at the production stage. While these measures stimulate entrepreneurship, only cost-effective government services can improve welfare.

The first comprehensive guide for mastering venture capital. Essentials of Venture Capital is your guide to understanding how venture capital and technology finance works from the inside out. Author Alexander Haislip easily explains the most complex concepts in venture capital and how the business is evolving to meet modern market needs. He illuminates the opaque industry that drives innovation in Silicon Valley and beyond.: Learn how venture capital firms are organized and managed; Develop techniques for fundraising and making high-growth investments; Understand preferred stock provisions and.

The entire venture capital sector of Central and Eastern Europe is characterised by the increased weight of state resources. The strengthening of public activities is mainly due to the new type of equity schemes introduced in the European Union's 2007 to 2013 programming period, which allowed the countries in the region to use part of the Structural Funds to develop their venture capital sector. More than 60 venture capital funds undertook to invest more than EUR one billion by the end of 2015, by raising one third of the funds from private investors. The paper examines how successful the CEE EU Member States, with a relatively less developed venture capital industry, were in using government equity schemes based on market cooperation between the state and market actors. Since, due to the shortness of the time elapsed since launching these schemes, the success of the companies financed by such hybrid venture capital funds cannot be assessed, this paper primarily aims to analyse whether the region was able to utilise the past lessons from government equity schemes in countries with a more developed venture capital industry. Similarly to the equity programs applied in the West, the government venture capital programs in the region are also characterised by the short time frame, the mass of administrative requirements tying the hands of investors, the small fund size, which prevents efficient operation, and the limited participation of institutional investors amongst private investors. Compared to developed countries, the unjustified level of benefits to and non-transparent selection of private fund managers and the immaturity of the investment proposals constitute disadvantages in the region. However, the greatest risk of public equity schemes, i.e. the crowding out effect on private investors, is missing in the CEE region due to the lack of market investors.