Suchergebnisse

The temptation to free-ride on others' contributions to public goods makes enhancing cooperation a critical challenge. Solutions to the cooperation problem have centered on installing a sanctioning institution where all can punish all, i.e., peer punishment. But a new, growing literature considers whether and when the designation of a group leader—one group member, given the sole ability to administer punishment—is an effective and efficient alternative. What remains unknown is whether and to what extent these group leaders establish cooperative norms in their groups via their own contributions to the public good, their use of sanctions, or both. Nor has past work examined whether leaders' behaviors have lasting effects on non-leaders' cooperation in subsequent interactions, outside of the leader's purview. Here I show that leaders' contributions to the public good predict non-leaders' subsequent cooperation. Importantly, the effect is not limited to cooperation within the institution: the effect of leaders' contributions continue to predict non-leaders' contributions in a later interaction, where sanctions are removed. This process is mediated by non-leaders' increased contributions in the institution, suggesting that leaders have effects on followers that shape followers' subsequent behaviors. These effects occur above and beyond a baseline tendency to be influenced by non-leader group members; they also occur above and beyond the influence of peers in groups under a peer punishment institution. Results underscore how critical it is that groups install cooperative leaders: followers model their leaders' cooperation choices, even in decisions external to the original institution and outside of the leader's watch.

ABSTRACTNorms that restrict choice sets or impose otherwise harsh requirements would seem to act as barriers to group formation by raising the costs of adherence to potential and continuing members. Contrary to that intuition, one observes a broad range of group norms in the real world that impose large costs on group members. Iannaccone provides a rationale for harsh norms as a mechanism to reduce free‐riding in supplying a club good. This paper proposes a new rationalization for harsh group norms as a mechanism under which harsh norms serve to screen out disloyal members, providing what is essentially a technology for measuring loyalty in environments where group leaders cannot reliably measure group members' loyalty. The model demonstrates that loyalty can be signalled through acts that are seemingly irrelevant to the group's core objectives and identity.

It is widely believed that males are more competent at task-group activity. This article critically examines the bases for asserting a sex difference in task-group ability. The argument focuses on the need to separate the effects of ability from the effects of opportunity to perform. A study is then presented that controls for the hypothesized contaminating effects of status and sex-biased activity. Children ages 3 to 8 were randomly assigned to sex, age, and race homogeneous three-person groups and asked to engage in a complex, sex-neutral task. On 13 task performance dimensions there was only one significant difference. The remaining 12 dimensions showed mixed but insignificant differences. The conclusion is that both males and females can manage complex task-group activity.

Inhaltsverzeichnis: Introduction: Democratic Norms, Group Perceptions, and the 2020 Election (Daniel E. Bergan) -- 1. Democratic Norms, Social Projection, and False Consensus in the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election (Aaron C. Weinschenk, Costas Panagopoulos and Sander van der Linden) -- 2. Out-Party Cues and Factual Beliefs in an Era of Negative Partisanship (Suhwoo Ahn, Daniel E. Bergan, Dustin Carnahan, Rachel Barry and Ezgi Ulusoy) -- 3. Getting out the Black Vote in Washington DC: A Field Experiment (Jamil S. Scott, Melissa R. Michelson and Stephanie L. DeMora) -- 4. Sleepy Joe? Recalling and Considering Donald Trump's Strategic Use of Nicknames (Tyler Johnson) -- 5. Disclosures of Character: Formal Aspects of Presidential Campaign Announcement Speeches (Michael Cornfield) -- Conclusion: Reflections on Democratic and Social Norms after the 2020 Election (Daniel E. Bergan and Bruce I. Newman).

Recent data and experience have shown apparent increased individ ual frustration with involvement in group work in a learning set ting. A major source of frustration was found in apparent ineffec tiveness of work groups to secure individual member compliance and control for deviant behavior. This research defines, develops, and demonstrates application of an explicit norm structuring proce dure designed to increase group influence over individual member and reduce frustration with group work.

The process of establishing norms is an important aspect of group dynamics. Most, if not all, of the major models of group development incorporate norming as an important part of the process. However, little is understood and agreed on regarding how norms develop. With the increased availability and power of technology to connect people at remote sites, the popularity of computer-mediated teamwork has increased dramatically. This new communication context brings with it some dramatic differences from the traditional face-to-face context, along with a need to understand how norms develop in this environment. This study investigates the norming process engaged in by 10 computer-mediated learning teams. The study describes how group norms evolve from a general to an operationalized state. Based on the findings of the research, a model describing the process of norm development in computer-mediated teams is presented. In addition, a model is presented to describe how individual perceptions of norm boundaries are modified as the group norms become more operationalized.

AbstractThe provision of trader feedback is critical to the functioning of many markets. We examine the influence of group identity on the volunteering and informativeness of feedback. In a market experiment conducted simultaneously in Germany and the United States, we manipulate the interaction of traders based on natural social and induced home market identities. Traders are more likely to provide feedback information on a trader with whom they share a common group identity, and the effect is more pronounced for social identity than for home market identity. Both kinds of group identity promote rewarding good performance and punishing bad performance.

It has been suggested that the salience and legitimacy of norms for performance excellence are universal in all sport teams. However, the different task structures within sport influence the nature of interactions, which in turn, may influence the development of team norms. Thus, one purpose of this study was to examine the strength of group norms in individual sport teams. A second purpose was to determine the relationship between those norms and self-reported behaviors reflective of the norms. Participants (N = 97) of university-level individual sport teams completed a questionnaire, which assessed performance norms and behaviors for practice, competition, off-season, and team social functions. The results provided support for the conclusion that normative expectations in individual sport teams exert a weak influence. Also, generally, individual perceptions of the strength of team norms were unrelated to self-reported behaviors. The results were discussed in terms of the dynamics of the group task.

A partir d'une critique des «évidences» qui commandent la conception dominante des actions de développement agricole et les recherches sur ce thème, l'auteur de l'article entreprend une analyse des processus de transformation des normes en milieu agricole.
L'étude de l'activité d'un groupe d'éleveurs, au sein d'un «réseau d' interconnaissance», conduit ainsi fauteur à souligner l'importance de la prise en compte, non seulement des choix techniques matériels mais aussi des façons dont les acteurs eux-mêmes les conçoivent et en débattent.

Variability in ecological risk perceptions was investigated by surveying members of four stakeholder groups commonly involved in environmental policy debates. Fifty‐six individuals from government, industry, environmental, and general‐public groups completed a risk‐perception survey in which they evaluated 34 environmental hazards on 17 attributes and also evaluated the riskiness and acceptability of each hazard. In addition, participants reported their environmental beliefs and norms using Dunlap et al.'s revised New Ecological Paradigm Scale and modified versions of Schwartz's Awareness of Consequences and Personal Norms Scales. Group membership was predictive of participants' scores on the belief and norm scales. Factor analysis of attribute ratings (averaged across participants) revealed the anticipated three oblique factors: ecological impacts, scientific understanding, and aesthetic impacts. Factor patterns were very similar for the four stakeholder groups. Factors from the aggregate analysis were predictive of individuals' riskiness judgments, but these relationships were moderated by participants' group membership, beliefs, and norms. Compared to members of other groups, members of the general public placed less emphasis on ecological impacts and more emphasis on the other two factors when judging the ecological riskiness of hazards. To our knowledge, these results represent the first formal tests of interactions between hazard characteristics and participant characteristics in determining riskiness judgments, and illustrate how traditional psychometric analyses can be successfully coupled with individual‐difference measures to improve the understanding of risk perception.