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Objective: In this study, we examined how effectively people can monitor new stimuli on a peripheral display while carrying out judgments on an adjacent central display. Background: Improved situation awareness is critical for improved operator performance in aviation and many other domains. Given the limited extent of foveal processing, acquiring additional information from peripheral vision offers high potential gains. Method: Participants carried out a sequence of central perceptual judgments while simultaneously monitoring the periphery for new stimuli. Peripheral detection was measured as a function of central-judgment difficulty, the relative timing of the two tasks, and peripheral event rate. Results: Participants accurately detected and located peripheral targets, even at the highest eccentricity explored here (~30°). Peripheral detection was not reduced by increased central-task difficulty but was reduced when peripheral targets arrived later in the processing of central stimuli and when peripheral events were relatively rare. Conclusion: Under favorable conditions—high-contrast stimuli and high event rate—people can successfully monitor peripheral displays for new events while carrying out an unrelated continuous task on an adjacent display. Application: In many fields, such as aviation, existing displays were designed with low-contrast stimuli that provide little opportunity for peripheral vision. With appropriate redesign, operators might successfully monitor multiple displays over a large visual field. Designers need to be aware of nonvisual factors, such as low event rate and relative event timing, that can lead to failures to detect peripheral stimuli.

We model a hierarchy consisting of a fixed number of heterogeneous agents, each of which reports (possibly distorted) information to its direct superior who can detect and correct the misreport with some probability. Two problems are simultaneously considered: designing the efficient hierarchy structure and configuring the agents who are heterogeneous in their trustworthiness. We develop the Unimprovability Principle, which is an analogy of Bellman Principle. By applying the principle, we show that efficiency requires only the least reliable agent in any rank to have subordinates.