Suchergebnisse

Wie der Autor darlegt, verfolgte Frankreich im Vergleich zu Großbritannien eine Mandatspolitik im Nahen Osten, die sich weniger auf die lokale Elite als auf direkte Kontrolle stützte. Dementsprechend waren die französischen Geheimdienste im Nahen Osten gut organisiert. Anhand von erst seit Mitte der 1990er Jahre zugänglichem Archivmaterial geht der Autor den Aktivitäten der französischen Geheimdienste - Service de Renseignements, Section de Centralisation des Renseignements und Sûreté Générale - in der Zeit zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen in Syrien nach. Dabei wird deutlich, dass die Geheimdienste ein integraler Bestandteil der französischen Mandatsmacht waren, die in kritischen Momenten, wie der syrischen Revolte von 1925, arabische Nationalbestrebungen zu kontrollieren wussten. (DÜI-Mjr)

In the debate on intelligence contracting, intelligence officers are grouped into two personnel categories characterized by opposing sets of motivations and interests. Government employees are assumed to be motivated by a higher goal related to national security, while intelligence contractors are said to be motivated primarily by pecuniary interests and loyal first and foremost to their shareholders. Contemporary research on human motivation, however, suggests that the two personnel categories are not all that different in that both appear to be intrinsically motivated and loyal primarily to the mission at hand, namely national security. Moreover, comparative research on public organizations and private corporations suggests that there are more similarities between the two than there are differences. This must lead us to re-examine the recent criticism fielded against the practice of intelligence contracting. Adapted from the source document.

In its report published in 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (known as the '9/11 Commission') analyses the functioning of the Intelligence Community (ICo). It indicates that the ICo is both over-fragmented and guilty of not sharing enough information. The Commission recommends that central control of the ICo needs to be strengthened and that more incentives for information-sharing should be designed. This article takes a critical look at these two recommendations. Sharing information carries major risks and is therefore not something that can take place as a matter of course. Moreover, information has to be subject to a selection process before it can be shared. This selection cannot be measured objectively, so mistakes in the selection are unavoidable. Strengthening central control also poses risks: it engenders more battles over territory, it does not improve understanding of the capillaries of the organization - the capillaries being where the primary processes of information gathering, validation and assessment take place - and it involves the destruction of checks and balances. Fragmentation may even be functional since it leads to redundancy, itself a safeguard against the risk of misselecting relevant information.

Increasing modernization in military technology and methodology occurred during the beginning of the twentieth century. These changes had a direct effect on how U.S. Marines practiced military intelligence during the occupation of Haiti from 1915- 1934. The use of military intelligence had an impact on the outcome on the occupation but was not the only factor that contributed to U.S. military victories. My thesis explains that the improvement of intelligence methods used by Marines in Haiti occurred as a result of outside influence, changing circumstance in Haiti, and individual agency. Major failures had occurred that allowed resistance to grow unchecked in the Haitian countryside. With the introduction of full-time military intelligence officers and improved data documentation, the intelligence collected became more useful to Marine Corps leadership. The staff officers that assumed the roles of intelligence personnel created new forms for recording intelligence reports and made past intelligence more accessible to military command. Individual ingenuity led to the assassination of Charlemagne Peralte, the central leader of the caco revolt. This thesis discusses the intelligence innovation that occurred during the occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1935.

1 Introduction: Imperial Intelligence and a Forgotten Insurgency? -- PART ONE Policing Revolutionary Terrorism in Bengal -- 2 The ''Bomb Cult'' and ''Criminal Tribes'': Revolutionaries and the Origins of Police Intelligence in Colonial Bengal -- 3 Surveillance, Analysis and Violence: The Operations of the Bengal Police Intelligence Branch -- 4 Intelligence Failures, Militarization and Rehabilitation: The Anti-Terrorist Campaign after the Chittagong Armoury Raid -- PART TWO The Wider World -- 5 Transnational Revolutionaries and Imperial Surveillance: Bengal Revolutionary Networks Outside India -- 6 Spies, Sailors and Revolutionaries: Bengal Revolutionaries, Indian Political Intelligence and International Arms Smuggling -- 7 Intelligence Expertise and Imperial Threats: Bengal Intelligence Officers in North America, Europe and Asia -- 8 Epilogue: Bengal Intelligence Officers and the Second World War --

Intro -- Title Page -- Acknowledgments -- Epigraph -- Prelude -- Chapter 1 -- Chapter 2 -- Chapter 3 -- Chapter 4 -- Chapter 5 -- Chapter 6 -- Chapter 7 -- Chapter 8 -- Chapter 9 -- Chapter 10 -- Chapter 11 -- Chapter 12 -- Chapter 13 -- Chapter 14 -- Chapter 15 -- Chapter 16 -- Chapter 17 -- Chapter 18 -- Chapter 19 -- Chapter 20 -- Chapter 21 -- Chapter 22 -- Chapter 23 -- Chapter 24 -- Chapter 25 -- Chapter 26 -- Chapter 27 -- Chapter 28 -- Chapter 29 -- Chapter 30 -- Chapter 31 -- Chapter 32 -- Chapter 33 -- Chapter 34 -- Chapter 35 -- Chapter 36 -- Chapter 37 -- Chapter 38 -- Chapter 39 -- Chapter 40 -- Chapter 41 -- Chapter 42 -- Chapter 43 -- Chapter 44 -- Chapter 45 -- Chapter 46 -- Chapter 47 -- Chapter 48 -- Chapter 49 -- Epilogue -- About the Authors -- Copyright.

CONTENTS -- FOREWORD -- PREFACE -- CHAPTER 1 THE TRANSITION BEGINS -- CHAPTER 2 PREQUEL: THE BIRTH OF A LONER -- CHAPTER 3 DIFFERENT TOWN, SAME STORY -- CHAPTER 4 BOOZE AND DRUGS -- CHAPTER 5 A LIFE-CHANGING DECISION -- CHAPTER 6 INITIAL TRAINING -- CHAPTER 7 BUSTED -- CHAPTER 8 GERMANY -- CHAPTER 9 THE ROAD TO ISTANBUL -- CHAPTER 10 TURKEY AND IRAN -- CHAPTER 11 FIRST KILL: AFGHANISTAN AND THE LOSS OF INNOCENCE -- CHAPTER 12 PAKISTAN AND INDIA -- CHAPTER 13 DISASTER IN IRAN, RECKONING IN ISTANBUL -- CHAPTER 14 RECOVERY AND REFLECTION -- CHAPTER 15 BACK TO WORK: EXTRACTION FROM THE DDR -- CHAPTER 16 THE SEARCH FOR NORMALCY -- CHAPTER 17 THE HELLS ANGELS -- CHAPTER 18 GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC CALLING -- CHAPTER 19 MEININGEN AND THE SPETZNAZ -- CHAPTER 20 WELCOME TO THE BUREAUCRACY -- CHAPTER 21 INTO THE ABYSS -- CHAPTER 22 THE FINAL PLUNGE -- CHAPTER 23 BACK TO LIFE -- GLOSSARY -- ABOUT THE AUTHOR