Suchergebnisse

Federations employ a large variety of mechanisms for conducting relations between central, regional, and local levels of government. These mechanisms span the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government within each level. Concludes that policy makers should exercise care in selecting mechanisms that are appropriate to their task. In particular, regard should be had to the efficiency of each mechanism, and its conformity with federal values and the rule of law. (Original abstract - amended)

AbstractFrom recent debates about the performance of the Canadian federal system, two images of processes of intergovernmental relations can be extracted: a "competitive" and a "collaborative" image. Differing propositions about the effects on processes and outcomes of the framework of rules and institutions of intergovernmental relations are embodied in these contrasting images. Elinor Ostrom's framework for institutional analysis is applied to the investigation of these effects. Using Fritz Scharpf's analysis of the "pathological" effects of a specific set of collaborative arrangements in West Germany as points of departure and contrast, the working rules underlying Canadian intergovernmental relations are elaborated. The author concludes that a competitive dynamic underpins a high degree of flexibility in these arrangements. Proposals to implement a more collaborative set of arrangements through constitutional reform are critically evaluated in this light, and the author makes suggestions about the course constitutional reform might take following the failure to adopt the Meech Lake Accord.

Analyzes present structure as "competitive" rather than "collaborative" and discusses proposals for constitutional reform. Summary in French. Some comparison to West German federalism.

Federations employ a large variety of mechanisms for conducting relations between central, regional, & local levels of government. These mechanisms span the executive, legislative, & judicial branches of government within each level. Executive involvement ranges widely in degree of formality, from the making of formal intergovernmental agreements to informal liaison between governmental officers. Executive mechanisms have also evolved for correcting vertical & horizontal fiscal imbalances in federal systems. Legislatures play an important role in giving the force of law to cooperative policies initiated by the executive. These legislative mechanisms include reciprocal schemes, complementary schemes, mirror legislation, & the reference or delegation of powers from one level of government to another. The judiciary, though often undervalued, is significant for its role in establishing the legal framework within which other branches of government conduct their intergovernmental relations, through articulation of powers & competencies. The article concludes that policymakers should exercise care in selecting mechanisms that are appropriate to their task. In particular, regard should be had to the efficiency of each mechanism, & its conformity with federal values & the rule of law. 26 References. Adapted from the source document.

The article looks, first, at what shapes the structure of intergovernmental relations (IGR), &, second, at the structures themselves. With respect to the factors that shape IGR, the paper identifies six: demographic & geographical; social & cultural; historical; constitutional & institutional; political; & circumstantial. With respect to the structures themselves, the paper notes that the degree of institutionalization, the extent to which IGR is decision making in character, & the degree of transparency all help to define the IGR system. The paper then goes on to categorize IGR into four dimensions: intra-jurisdictional IGR, in which the defining feature is the character of the relations between & among the central & regional governments; IGR & the judiciary, in which the appeal to the courts becomes the extension of IGR into a different arena; & international & other forms of IGR, involving quasi-governmental international bodies, multitiered political structures transcending the parameters of states, & forms of indigenous self-government. The article closes by arguing that democratizing IGR is one of the central challenges confronting governance at the beginning of the new century. Adapted from the source document.

Federations employ a large variety of mechanisms for conducting relations between central, regional, and local levels of government. These mechanisms span the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government within each level. Executive involvement ranges widely in degree of formality, from the making of formal intergovernmental agreements to informal liaison between governmental officers. Executive mechanisms have also evolved for correcting vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances in federal systems. Legislatures play an important role in giving the force of law to cooperative policies initiated by the executive. These legislative mechanisms include reciprocal schemes, complementary schemes, mirror legislation, and the reference or delegation of powers from one level of government to another. The judiciary, though often undervalued, is significant for its role in establishing the legal framework within which other branches of government conduct their intergovernmental relations, through articulation of powers and competencies. The article concludes that policy makers should exercise care in selecting mechanisms that are appropriate to their task. In particular, regard should be had to the efficiency of each mechanism, and its conformity with federal values and the rule of law.

The article looks, first, at what shapes the structure of intergovernmental relations (IGR), and, second, at the structures themselves. With respect to the factors that shape IGR, the paper identifies six: demographic and geographical; social and cultural; historical; constitutional and institutional; political; and circumstantial. With respect to the structures themselves, the paper notes that the degree of institutionalisation, the extent to which IGR is decision‐making in character, and the degree of transparency all help to define the IGR system. The paper then goes on to categorise IGR into four dimensions: intra‐jurisdictional IGR, in which the defining feature is the character of the relations between and among the central and regional governments; IGR and the judiciary, in which the appeal to the courts becomes the extension of IGR into a different arena; and international and other forms of IGR, involving quasi‐governmental international bodies, multitiered political structures transcending the parameters of states, and forms of indigenous self‐government. The article closes by arguing that democratising IGR is one of the central challenges confronting governance at the beginning of the new century.

The period since 1974 has witnessed major changes in intergovernmental relations as Congress has decreased federal financial aid to state and local governments and has exercised partial and total preemption powers in new areas and in innovative ways. President Ronald Reagan persuaded Congress to combine 57 categorical grant-in-aid programs into nine new or restructured block grants, thereby giving state governments a degree of regulatory relief. In addition, several of his administrative initiatives reduced federal regulation of state and local governments. Nevertheless, the president signed several major preemption, crossover-sanction, and tax-sanction bills into law. Current trends suggest that Congress will rely less on grants-in-aid and more on preemption, supplemented by crossover and tax sanctions, to achieve its policy goals. As a result, the federal system will become more complex. Federalism theory must be modified to explain fluctuating national-state relations on a continuing basis and the mutual dependence of each plane upon the other two planes for the performance of functions by incorporating, as central elements, informal and formal federal preemption.