Suchergebnisse

It is argued that the current negotiations around the International Criminal Court (ICC) are just another attempt to define international criminal law. Previous attempts at defining international law for piracy, war crimes, slavery, genocide, & aggression have been attempted, eg, in the 1949 Geneva Convention, but jurisdictional arrangements were left untouched. Positive submission to international law has not yet been given by those vanquished in war, eg, Iraq & Yugoslavia. The universality of international law & notions of right are not resolved. Thus, inconsistencies between the proposed structure of the ICC & the realities of the international legal, political, & economic order cannot be fixed without massive changes in that order, leaving the state with unacceptable losses in authority. The ICC should not be supported. M. Pflum

In November 2013, the South African-German Centre for Transnational Criminal Justice hosted a conference on "Africa and the International Criminal Court", in Cape Town, South Africa. The theme of the Conference was the strained relationship between African states, represented by the African Union (AU), and the International Criminal Court (ICC). This relationship started promisingly but has been in crisis in recent years. This book sheds light on the present frictions between the AU, the ICC and the UN Security Council. Eminent experts in the field of international criminal justice, including judges and prosecutors of the ICC and other African judicial bodies, as well as international criminal law scholars, analyze and debate the achievements and shortcomings of interventions by the ICC in Africa. They propose ways in which international courts and domestic courts within and outside of Africa can cooperate and address fundamental issues of international criminal law, such as the implementation of the Rome Statute, deferrals of cases before the International Criminal Court and the prosecution of crimes by third states on the basis of universal jurisdiction. Researchers and practitioners in the field of international criminal law and related disciplines will benefit from the high-level experiences and proposals brought together in this volume. For students with a focus on criminal law and its international implications it is a source of information and challenges

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is responsible for prosecuting crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide. Despite the potential for the ICC to deter human rights abuses, scholars and policy makers are divided on the effectiveness of it. This debate, however, is plagued by some important theoretical and empirical limitations. I address the problems in the literature and evaluate whether the ICC can prevent human rights abuses. I argue that the ICC can deter governments from committing human rights violations by imposing a variety of costs on them throughout their investigations that decrease their expected payoffs for engaging in human rights abuses. Across a variety of statistical estimators that account for standard threats to inference and several anecdotes, I find strong support for my theoretical expectations; leaders from states that have ratified the Rome Statute commit lower levels of human rights abuses than nonratifier leaders.

When the treaty on the International Criminal Court (ICC) is ratified by the UN member states, it will have worldwide jurisdiction & the ability to prosecute atrocities immediately. Victims will have a participatory role in the ICC process & be eligible for reparations. The ICC will be able to encourage & strengthen national prosecutions. Key strengths & weaknesses of major aspects of the ICC Statute, e.g., on war crimes, jurisdiction, the Security Council, & national court relationships, are described. The supporting & opposing positions of UN members on this statute are discussed. M. Pflum

AbstractThe International Criminal Court (ICC) came into effect on 1 July 2002. This article gives an account of the historical background to the ICC and an overview of the Court's Statute, remit and powers. It is argued that the ICC is a highly politicized legal institution which will only be effective through inter-state cooperation. Despite its lengthy historical antecedents and legal precedents, prudence suggests that — due to the nature of international politics — the establishment of the ICC should be viewed as the beginning of a cumulative process of reforming the politics of international justice rather than the end of a process of transformation in international law.

AbstractWhether and how violence can be controlled to spare innocent lives is a central issue in international relations. The most ambitious effort to date has been the International Criminal Court (ICC), designed to enhance security and safety by preventing egregious human rights abuses and deterring international crimes. We offer the first systematic assessment of the ICC's deterrent effects for both state and nonstate actors. Although no institution can deter all actors, the ICC can deter some governments and those rebel groups that seek legitimacy. We find support for this conditional impact of the ICC cross-nationally. Our work has implications for the study of international relations and institutions, and supports the violence-reducing role of pursuing justice in international affairs.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is responsible for prosecuting crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide. Despite the potential for the ICC to deter human rights abuses, scholars and policy makers are divided on the effectiveness of it. This debate, however, is plagued by some important theoretical and empirical limitations. I address the problems in the literature and evaluate whether the ICC can prevent human rights abuses. I argue that the ICC can deter governments from committing human rights violations by imposing a variety of costs on them throughout their investigations that decrease their expected payoffs for engaging in human rights abuses. Across a variety of statistical estimators that account for standard threats to inference and several anecdotes, I find strong support for my theoretical expectations; leaders from states that have ratified the Rome Statute commit lower levels of human rights abuses than nonratifier leaders.

This book explores the institution of the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a policy instrument. It argues that after the Cold War the European Union started challenging the unilateral policies of the United States by promoting new norms and institutions, such as the ICC. The development flies in the face of traditional explanations for cooperation, which would theorize institutionalization as the result of hegemonic preponderance, rational calculations or common identities. The book explains the dynamics behind the emergence of the ICC with a novel theoretical concept of normative binding. Normative binding is a strategy that provides middle powers with the means to tie down the unilateral policies of powerful actors that prefer not to cooperate. The idea is to promote new multilateral norms and deposit them in institutions, which have the potential to become binding even on unilateralist actors, if the majority of states adhere to them.

This article argues against the common view that the International Criminal Court (ICC) prevents peace since rebels will not accept accountability. In the presence of an international criminal authority, accountability may be unavoidable. This is true for rebels, but also for state agents. Should the government renege on agreed provisions, it risks ICC attention on its own actors, including into the future. In this way, the ICC functions as a permanent third-party guarantor of the provisions and reduces the commitment problem for the rebels, conditional on certain circumstances. A case study of Colombia finds support for the theoretical proposals.

This article explores why governments commit to human rights enforcement by joining the International Criminal Court (ICC). Compared with other international institutions, the ICC has substantial authority and autonomy. Since governments traditionally guard their sovereignty carefully, it is puzzling that the ICC was not only established, but established so rapidly. Looking beyond traditional explanations for joining international institutions, this study identifies a new causal factor: a country's dependence network, which consists of the set of other states that control resources the country values. This study captures different dimensions of what states value through trade relations, security alliances, and shared memberships in international organizations. Using event history analysis on monthly data from 1998 to 2004, we find that dependence networks strongly affect whether and when a state signs and ratifies the ICC. Some types of ratification costs also influence state commitment, but many conventional explanations of state commitment receive little empirical support. Adapted from the source document.

On April 1, 2021, the Biden administration issued an executive order reversing the Trump administration's sanctions on International Criminal Court (ICC) personnel. The administration rescinded the sanctions placed upon the ICC prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, and the head of the Office of the Prosecutor's Jurisdiction, Complementarity, and Cooperation Division, Phakiso Mochochoko, and removed the officials from the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons. The ICC, European Union (EU), and human rights groups welcomed the reversal.

FOR FOUR YEARS, THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION TOUTED THE CREATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) AS A KEY GOAL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. YET, IN JULY 1998, WHEN THE DRAFT TREATY TO CREATE THE ICC WAS APPROVED, THE UNITED STATES SIDED WITH A NASTY ANTI-COURT MINORITY THAT INCLUDED LIBYA, IRAQ, YEMEN, AND QATAR. THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE WHITE HOUSE HAD DITHERED. ALTHOUGH INTERNATIONAL TALKS BEGAN IN 1994, WASHINGTON FAILED TO FIRM UP ITS POSITION UNTIL A SHORT TIME BEFORE THE FINAL ICC CONFERENCE IN ROME. BY THEN, IT WAS TOO LATE FOR AMERICAN DIPLOMATS TO CONVINCE FRUSTRATED FRIENDS AND ALLIES TO ACCOMMODATE NEW U.S. DEMANDS. DUE TO WHITE HOUSE PROCRASTINATION, A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY WAS LOST TO SHAPE THE ICC IN AMERICA'S IMAGE.

This article will review the jurisdiction of the new International Criminal Court (ICC) under the Rome Statute of 17 July 1998. Jurisdiction will be examinedratione personaeandratione materiae, including in each case its scoperatione temporis, concentrating on two separate aspects of jurisdiction as they appear in the Statute. These are jurisdiction to bring charges against an alleged offender and to bring that person to trial, and as a corollary, jurisdiction to detain or arrest an accused or suspected person. Given that it is early in the history of the Rome Statute, some consideration of other issues raised by the Statute is also necessary.