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My starting point is the assumption that there is no general obligation to obey the law, not even a prima facie obligation and not even in a just society. This assumption is perhaps becoming more popular. In recent years it has been defended by several writers. There is more that needs to be said in its support, but I will not attempt to do so here. Instead, I will reflect on a problem posed by accepting it, a problem concerning the relations between an individual citizen and the state. It is common to think that the state has authority over its citizens and that they owe it allegiance. If there is no general obligation to obey the law, does it not follow that the state has no authority over its citizens and that they do not owe it allegiance? After first explaining briefly the assumption and the problem it creates, I shall consider different attempts at solving it which try to show that recognition of an authority does not entail belief in an obligation to obey that authority. These attempts at solving the problem fail. I shall then turn to one traditional argument concerning the foundations of the state's authority: the argument that political authority rests on consent.

What is the meaning of sentences of the form 'X is the lawful government of the country Y,' and what kinds of statements are normally -made by using them? Most answers to these questions can be classified as legalistic, moralistic, or compromise solutions. The gist of the legalistic approach is that the lawful government is that authorized by the positive law of the land. Critics of the legalistic approach point out that disagreement about the lawful government is not always solved when agreement is reached about the positive law of the land. For example, two people may disagree as to whether the Colonels' Government is the lawful government of Greece, while being in complete agreement that the post-coup law is the positive law of Greece. From this fact, which indeed should be admitted and explained by any theory on the subject, the moralists conclude that the lawfulness of a government is a matter of morality and not of law. It is determined by moral rules, by personal commitments, etc. Those who favor a compromise solution claim that in certain contexts sentences about lawful governments are used to make legal statements, while in other contexts they are used to make moral statements or express moral positions or attitudes. In this paper I will first criticize one moralistic solution, that presented by R. M. Hare, and one compromise solution, the one put forward by J. G. Murphy, and then proceed to formulate and defend a variant of a legalistic position.

What are our duties or rights? How should we act? What are we responsible for? How do we determine the answers to these questions? Joseph Raz examines and explains the philosophical issues underlying these everyday quandaries. He explores the nature of normativity – namely, the fact that we believe and feel we should behave in certain ways, the reasoning behind certain beliefs and emotions, and various basic features of making decisions about what to do. He goes on to consider when we are responsible for our actions and omissions, and offers a novel account of responsibility. We can think of responsibility for unjustified actions or attitudes as a precondition of the blameworthiness of a person for an attitude or an action, or perhaps for a whole set of actions, intentions, or beliefs. Responsibility for justified actions or attitudes may be a precondition of praiseworthiness. Either way responsibility may point to further consequences of being justified or unjustified, rational or not. But crucially, responsibility attaches to people in a more holistic way. Some people are responsible for their actions, while others are not. In this way, Raz argues that the end is in the beginning, in understanding how people are subject to normativity, namely how it is that there are reasons addressed to them, and what is the meaning of that for our being in the world. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1272/thumbnail.jpg

Texto original: Joseph Raz, «Intention in Interpretation» en Robert P. George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law. Essays on Legal Positivism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 249-286.

The book is a contribution to the study of values, as they affect both our personal and our public life. It defends the view that values are necessarily universal, on the ground that that is a condition of their intelligibility. It does, however, reject most common conceptions of universality, like those embodied in the writings on human rights. It aims to reconcile the universality of value with (a) the social dependence of value and (b) the centrality to our life of deep attachments to people and countries alike. Building from there, the book explores personal love, the value of life, and the fundamental duty of respect for people

This book explores, within a liberal framework, the nature, significance, and justification of political freedom or liberty. Against recent liberal positions, it is argued that political morality is neither rights-based, nor equality-based. What underlies rights, and the value of freedom, is a concern with autonomy

The paper offers a new account of the rule of law, revising my previous view, and criticising some alternatives. It focuses on the rule of law's aim to avoid arbitrary government, and on its relation to the essential functions of government. The rule of law requires that government action will manifest an intention to protect and advance the interests of the governed. As such it is almost a necessary condition for the law's ability to meet other moral demands, and it facilitate coordination and cooperation internally and internationally.