Suchergebnisse

Climate engineering in general and solar radiation management (SRM) in particular raise profound and complex political, legal, social, and ethical questions that go well beyond technical feasibility issues. We consider three such questions. First, can existing EU decision-making processes accommodate sufficient public engagement to ensure legitimate decisions on SRM? Second, does politics influence the choice of legislative procedure for SRM regulation? Third, does the choice of legislative procedure influence the likelihood of SRM implementation? Three main conclusions emerge from our analysis. First, existing EU decision-making processes can – given certain conditions – accommodate considerable public engagement and hence ensure legitimate decisions on SRM. Second, politics matters; indeed, the EU's choice of legislative procedure concerning SRM may well become subject to political negotiations. Finally, the choice of legislative procedure may substantially influence the likelihood of SRM implementation.

This article assesses the political and power dynamics of the Ordinarily Legislative Procedure (OLP) in social Europe and the likely impact of the UK's departure in the field for future integration. It provides a detailed analysis of the OLP in social Europe during two recent periods of integration in the field—the first Barroso Commission (2004–2009) and the Juncker Commission (2014–2019). It finds the dynamics of the OLP have shifted from intergovernmental deadlock during the Barroso Commission to the characteristics of a new intergovernmental core state power during the Juncker Commission, even though the policy area is not a core state power per se. Despite the use of qualified majority voting policy agreements can only be achieved when there is near unanimity support in the Council, the Commission remains a neutral broker, and the Parliament shifts its position to that of the Council. As a result, continued opposition to integration in social Europe by Northern and Eastern Members means the removal of UK political agency will have only a marginal impact on the slow and piecemeal approach to integration in the field.

In the aftermath of the 2019 European elections, the article tries to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the European Parliament within the framework of the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision). After defining and formulating the main indicators, the paper analyses the micro- and macro-performance of the European Parliament within the decision-making process from a quantitative-qualitative and a qualitative-quantitative perspective; highlighting the relativizing factors and the responsiveness of the European decision-making process to the Europeans' needs.

Reviews the reports of the investigating committees in Massachusetts and Nebraska.

The ongoing Pan-European integration process has profoundly influenced the nature of European law and its development, demanding a review of "the ways of how language […] is materialized" (Gibová, 2009, p. 192). EU multilingualism is thus becoming an intricate concept since "EU translation is […] becoming the language of Europe" (Gibová, 2009, p. 192) encompassing a supranational view of the world conveyed in EU-wide legislation. Very much in line with this assumption, and taking into account the teaching experience in Specialised Translation Masters' courses training would-be professional translators, this study examines a corpus of European Parliament Regulations on immigration.In order to understand whether dissimilarities and/or congruencies occur between the EU working language, i.e., English, and the Italian versions, the metadiscourse framework by Hyland (2005), comprising both interactive and interactional features, is used as the point of departure for the analysis of parallel texts. The Regulations produced by EU institutions and conveyed and transmitted both in English as a "procedural language" (Wagner, Bech, &Martίnez, 2012) as well as in Italian have been scrutinized both quantitatively and qualitatively, in order to draw precious pedagogical implications for translation studies and professional practice for future qualified and trained translators.

"Issued August 1, 1917." ; Cover title. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The Lisbon Treaty in order to strengthen the EU's capacity to decide, to act and to ensure the legitimacy of decisions taken at the same time, reformed the decision-making process of the EU, particularly by changing the legislative procedures in force.Among the novelties of the Lisbon Treaty, we must mention the passerelle clauses, which according to the ordinary legislative procedure will be generalized, under certain conditions, in areas which were initially outside its scope.The treaty nominates two types of passerelle clauses: the general passerelle clause which applies to all European policies and the enabling of this clause will be authorized by a decision of the European Council, acting unanimously; the passerelle clauses specific to certain European policies (MFF, Common Security and Defence Policy, judicial cooperation regarding the family rights- this specific clause is the only one explaining which national parliaments keep their right to oppose; cooperation is strengthened in the areas governed by unanimity or by a special legislative procedure, social affairs, environmental ).The flexibility introduced through a significant number of passerelle clauses in the Lisbon Treaty allows adjustment of the EU quickly and efficiently, depending on punctual developments, without neglecting the guarantees on the sovereignty of member states.

This article assesses the political and power dynamics of the Ordinarily Legislative Procedure (OLP) in social Europe and the likely impact of the UK's departure in the field for future integration. It provides a detailed analysis of the OLP in social Europe during two recent periods of integration in the field—the first Barroso Commission (2004–2009) and the Juncker Commission (2014–2019). It finds the dynamics of the OLP have shifted from intergovernmental deadlock during the Barroso Commission to the characteristics of a new intergovernmental core state power during the Juncker Commission, even though the policy area is not a core state power <em>per se</em>. Despite the use of qualified majority voting policy agreements can only be achieved when there is near unanimity support in the Council, the Commission remains a neutral broker, and the Parliament shifts its position to that of the Council. As a result, continued opposition to integration in social Europe by Northern and Eastern Members means the removal of UK political agency will have only a marginal impact on the slow and piecemeal approach to integration in the field.

"Souvenir of the Fourth Legislative Assembly"--Cover. ; Mode of access: Internet.