Carbon pricing is an important instrument in addressing climate change. However, a well-functioning carbon pricing instrument needs a robust framework to quantify GHG emissions (including removals) underpinned by high quality data. This data can help policy makers set the level of a carbon tax (CT) and help regulators track how many emissions allowances companies need to surrender under an Emissions Trading System (ETS). A robust framework will facilitate implementation and enforcement of the rules and increase compliance levels. This report builds on the PMR Guide for Designing Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting Programs (PMR MRV Guide), which provides a broader overview of establishing an MRV system. This report focuses on the technical detail of quantification protocols, that is, how in practice emissions data can be monitored and quantified for reporting. This report is intended for policy makers and government officials responsible for setting up and implementing emissions quantification protocols as part of the emissions monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) systems that support carbon taxes and emissions trading systems.
South Africa's National Climate Change Response Policy (NCCRP) sets out a number of key goals. Reaching these goals will enable South Africa to meet its commitments under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). They key elements that will ensure South Africa can effectively track and steer greenhouse has (GHG) emissions and removals are the following: Establishment of a national system for GHG measurement, reporting and verification (MRV). Meeting UNFCCC reporting commitments on steps taken and envisaged to implement the UNFCCC (focusing on understanding and driving down GHG concentration trends). Integration of these MRV activities with established South Africa systems for Air Pollution Management.
Markets abound in media—but a media theory of markets is still emerging. Anthropology offers media archaeologies of markets, and the sociology of markets and finance unravels how contemporary financial markets have witnessed a media technological arms race. Building on such work, this volume brings together key thinkers of economic studies with German media theory, describes the central role of the media specificity of markets in new detail and inflects them in three distinct ways. Nik-Khah and Mirowski show how the denigration of human cognition and the concomitant faith in computation prevalent in contemporary market-design practices rely on neoliberal conceptions of information in markets. Schröter confronts the asymmetries and abstractions that characterize money as a medium and explores the absence of money in media. Beverungen situates these inflections and gathers further elements for a politically and historically attuned media theory of markets concerned with contemporary phenomena such as high-frequency trading and cryptocurrencies. ; Armin Beverungen: Capital's Media Edward Nik-Khah and Philip Mirowski: The Ghosts of Hayek in Orthodox Microeconomics:Markets as Information Processors Jens Schröter: Money Determines Our Situation
A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Historically, utility monopolies have generated electricity and sold it to customers at prices set by state regulators. Today, private companies in 24 states compete to sell electricity at market prices determined by supply and demand. California is part of a broader western market in which electricity is routinely bought and sold across state and national boundaries. GAO found evidence that wholesale electricity suppliers exercised market power by raising prices above competitive levels during the summer of 2000 and at other times after the restructuring. Neither GAO's analysis nor other studies addressed whether market power exercised in California violated federal or other laws. The design of California's electricity market enabled individual wholesale electricity suppliers to exercise market power. Once prices rose, the design was ineffective in returning prices to competitive levels. Prominent experts on market design and industry experts generally agree that two principal market designs flaws increased wholesale suppliers' incentive and ability to raise prices above competitive levels: (1) retail prices were frozen and (2) the California Public Utilities Commission generally prohibited or discouraged long-term contracts between utilities and wholesale suppliers."
Im Zentrum dieser Masterarbeit stehen die politischen Prozesse rund um die Wahldes Ausgabemechanismus von Verschmutzungsrechten im EU ETS. Von besonderemInteresse ist hier die Frage, wie sich die Wahl des Allokationsmechanismus auf asymmetrischeInformationsprobleme im EU CO2 Markt auswirkt.Es finden deskriptive, theoretische und empirische Ansaetze Verwendung, um diepolitischen Prozesse, die zur Wahl des EU Allokationsmechanismus fuehren, offenzulegen:Die relevanten Akteure, die die gesetzlichen Bedingungen des EU ETSgestalten, werden analysiert. Darunter befinden sich die EU Kommission, das EUParlament, der EU Ministerrat und Lobbygruppen. Mithilfe der Agency-Theoriewerden politische Befehlswege im EU ETS ermittelt. Weiters werden Informationsproblemezwischen EU Institutionen und Lobbygruppen sowie zwischen der Kommissionund den Mitgliedsstaaten beschrieben. Ein politisches Lobbying-Modellvon Yu-Bong Lai wird im Detail beschrieben und auf seine Anwendung hin getestet,um die Wechselwirkungen zwischen den Lobbyzuwendungen und der Gesetzgebungaufzueigen. Als Werkzeuge dafuer dienen einerseits das Lai-Modell und andererseitsdie Prozesse der Entscheidungsfindung in der EU Politik.Meine Analyse zeigt, dass Lais Lobbying-Modell den Wechsel hin zu mehr Auktionenin der 3. Phase des EU ETS erklaeren kann, jedoch nur, wenn einige Unstimmigkeitenin Lais Modellannahmen ignoriert werden. Das Modell ist aber nicht inder Lage die Ausnahmen, die einigen Industrien in diesem Handelszeitraum gewaehrtwurden, zu begruenden. Werden hingegen verteilungstechnische und institutionelleAspekte von verschiedenen Ausgabemechanismen beruecksichtigt, so koennen auchdiese Ausnahmen begruendet werden.Die Wahl des Allokationsmechanismus dient hauptsaechlich dazu die Zustimmungvon wichtigen Akteuren im politischen Markt zu Aenderungen am CO2 Markt abzukaufen. Gesichtspunkte der oekonomischen Effizienz sind fuer die Wahl des Ausgabemechanismuseher zweitrangig. ; This masters thesis focuses on political processes around the allocation methodchoice in the EU ETS. The main focus lies on the choice of the allocation methodand its role to decrease asymmetrical information in the EU carbon market.This thesis uses descriptive, theoretical and empirical approaches to highlight thepolitical processes leading to the EU allocation method choice: An analysis of theactors taking part in EU ETS legislation is presented, including the EU Commission,the EU Parliament, the Council of Ministers and interest groups. Agency theoryis used to deduce the delegation chains determining political decisions in the EUETS. Furthermore, informational problems between EU bodies and interest groupsand between the EU Commission and the member states are described. Technicaland distributional aspects of free allocation and auctioning of emission permits aresummarized. A political support function model of Yu-Bong Lai is presented andtested to depict the interplay between lobbying contributions of interest groups andregulators. Moreover, the choice for more auctioning in the 3rd EU ETS phase isrationalized by using the lobbying model and decision making procedures in EUinstitutions.My findings are that, by ignoring some inconsistencies on the model assumptions,Lais lobbying model can explain the shift to more auctioning in the 3rd EU ETSphase. However, the model discussed is not able to describe the exemptions grantedto several industries. But by using distributional and institutional aspects of theallocation method choice also these exemptions can be explained.The choice of grandfathering is generally used to allocate rents to crucial policystakeholders to get the needed majorities for changes in the carbon market. Otherefficiency considerations are rather secondary to the choice of the allocation method. ; Rainer Bromann ; Abweichender Titel laut Übersetzung der Verfasserin/des Verfassers ; Zsfassung in dt. und engl. Sprache ; Graz, Univ., Masterarb., 2015 ; (VLID)444936
Markets abound in media - but a media theory of markets is still emerging. Anthropology offers media archaeologies of markets, and the sociology of markets and finance unravels how contemporary financial markets have witnessed a media technological arms race. Building on such work, this volume brings together key thinkers of economic studies with German media theory, describes the central role of the media specificity of markets in new detail and inflects them in three distinct ways. Nik-Khah and Mirowski show how the denigration of human cognition and the concomitant faith in computation prevalent in contemporary market-design practices rely on neoliberal conceptions of information in markets. Schröter confronts the asymmetries and abstractions that characterize money as a medium and explores the absence of money in media. Beverungen situates these inflections and gathers further elements for a politically and historically attuned media theory of markets concerned with contemporary phenomena such as high-frequency trading and cryptocurrencies.
The role of markets in influencing food security cannot be overemphasized. Therefore it is important to understand how policies aimed at influencing market policy have performed. This paper studies how market liberalization policies have affected market efficiency in Malawian Maize markets. Using monthly time series price data from 12 markets in Malawi for the period from 1991 to 2016, market efficiency is measured using market integration as an indicator. Vector Error Correction models and Threshold auto regression models are used to measure the magnitude, direction and speed of market integration. We find that compared to maize market integration studies, market integration is indeed high, with average percent values of long run price transmission around 97% thereby supporting the law of one price. Speed of adjustment parameters for the Vector error correction model were on average 23% indicating a time frame of 4 months for market to return to equilibrium after a shock. The threshold auto regression model results indicate much faster speeds of adjustment, with an average time range of 2 weeks for half of the disequilibrium to be corrected. Therefore, Market Liberalization policies, even under frequent government intervention has led to increased market efficiency. ; submittedVersion ; M-ECON
