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AbstractThis paper investigates two questions: how does multilateral trade liberalisation affect inward foreign direct investment, and does this impact (if any) depend on the domestic trade policy? The analysis uses a panel data set comprising 171 countries spanning the period 1995–2012. Results indicate that multilateral trade policy liberalisation is conducive to higher FDI inflows in host countries. Furthermore, our evidence suggests that domestic trade policy almost always positively drives inward FDI in a context of multilateral trade policy liberalisation. Countries which initially have the most restrictive trade policy regimes appear to be the greatest beneficiaries of FDI inflows when they liberalise their trade policy in the context of multilateral trade liberalisation.

Since the end of the first "World War—an event widely considered to mark a turning point in the development of international law—several suggestions have been made to negotiate a multilateral treaty aimed at the protection of private foreign investment.

We currently observe a renaissance of the debate about a multilateral investment agreement (MIA). The last attempts to establish such an agreement failed in 1998 at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and in 2003, as part of the Doha Development Agenda of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The reasons for these failures are both the resistance of emerging countries and developing countries to one-sided policies mainly aimed at protecting international investors, and divergences among industrialised countries, particularly regarding the liberalization of market access regulations. The proponents name several arguments in favour of a resumption of negotiations about an MIA: First, we can now observe a fundamental shift in global investment flows. Companies from emerging countries are increasingly investing abroad and aim at a better protection of their foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing and industrialised countries. The traditional criticism put forward by influential, emerging countries against an MIA appears to be weakening as the result of a growing convergence of interests. Secondly, among industrialised countries themselves there is a growing consensus regarding international investment rules. One sign of this are the Shared Principles for Inter national Investment , adopted in 2012 by the EU and the U.S.A., whose purpose is to smooth the way for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership . With this gradual convergence, in particular regarding the inclusion of market access provisions, a further stumbling block along the way to an MIA appears to have been done away with. Thirdly, the increasing regionalisation of investment rulemaking is advanced as an argument which can facilitate the leap to the next-higher, multilateral level. As a result of socalled Mega-Regionals - like the Transpacific Partnership between the U.S.A. and 10 other countries in the Pacific Region, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and six other countries, including China or the planned Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership - it is possible that a consolidation of investment rules will arise which would simplify the negotiations about an MIA. These current trends can in fact help to smooth the path to a global accord. However, the main question driving the international debate should not be whether it is possible to establish an MIA. What is more important is the question whether the institutional form of an MIA is suitable for effectively solving the most pressing challenges in the current investment regime. This is not very likely, since an MIA is unlikely to lead to significantly more FDI flows or to give stronger consideration to the interests of the developing countries. An MIA will most likely also not lead to greater coherency between the investment rules and other policy areas. It is more promising to tackle these challenges in the context of regional co-operation, since this permits better accommodation of the treaty contents to the specific needs of the countries involved. Negotiations at the regional level should be supplemented by co-ordination efforts on the global level. The G-20 is the appropriate orchestrator for talks about these systemic questions, talks which in turn should be carried on with the inclusion of the OECD, WTO, and the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and other stakeholders.

Abstract
Since their emergence after World War II, multilateral development banks (MDBs, or Banks) have become crucial players in promoting economic development in the developing world. The theory of immunity enables the MDBs to shield themselves from jurisdictions of national courts, and protects them in Bank operations. This paper presents a critique of the immunity claimed by MDBs, and argues that such a claim of immunity should be restrictive, rather than absolute. Meanwhile, it is important to establish adequate dispute settlement systems within the MDBs, counterbalancing their immunities from legal process. The systems offer a fair trial to private parties, and should be independent from Bank management. As for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the young Bank's operations can be on the ground only with its immunities respected by members, while the committed high standards are possible only with adequate internal dispute settlement systems.

RESUMEN: A partir del Tratado de Lisboa, la UE adquirió una nueva competencia sobre la inversión extranjera directa, lo que desencadenó fuertes tensiones internas. En su relación con terceros Estados, la UE dirigió un verdadero cambio de paradigma ya que la nueva política común de inversiones supuso un giro decisivo respecto a la protección de inversiones extranjeras. La reforma promovida por la UE hunde sus raíces en una sustancial crítica a la legitimidad del mecanismo tradicional de solución de controversias en esta materia -el arbitraje internacional entre inversor y Estado (ISDS)- y los problemas de compatibilidad de dicho sistema con el ordenamiento jurídico de la UE. La propuesta de reforma elaborada por la UE implica reemplazar el modelo tradicional de ISDS por una nueva estructura institucional, promoviendo con ello un cambio sistémico mediante la judicialización de la solución de controversias sobre inversiones. Al efecto, la UE ha desarrollado algunas iniciativas innovadoras, como la creación de sistemas de cortes de inversiones en sus acuerdos bilaterales de última generación y la propuesta de creación de un Tribunal Multilateral de Inversiones. En la actualidad, se está debatiendo esta propuesta en el marco multilateral de UNCITRAL. En esta tesis, se aborda de manera sistémica el proceso de institucionalización del sistema de solución de controversias sobre inversiones promovido por la UE, al analizar sus principales características, las tensiones emergentes y los desafíos vinculados con la implementación de esta nueva propuesta. ; ABSTRACT: Following the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union obtained a new competence on foreign direct investment, which triggered some strong internal pressures. In terms of its relations with non-member countries, the EU caused a true paradigm shift, since the new common investment policy led to a turning point on foreign investments protection. The reform supported by the EU is rooted in a substantial criticism to the legitimacy of the dispute settlement ...