Suchergebnisse

Die Studie untersucht, in welchem Umfang es den Staaten Westafrikas gelungen ist, ihre Außenpolitik zu harmonisieren. Sie waren auch in der Kolonialzeit nie passive Akteure, nach der Unabhängigkeit war die Idee des Panafrikanismus weit verbreitet. Faktoren wie Einfluß oder Führungskraft wirken auf die außenpolitische Entscheidungsfindung ein und schlagen sich in unterschiedlicher Form nieder (Zahl von Staatsbesuchen, diplomatischen Vertretungen und internationalen Verträgen usw.). Dabei findet ein Austausch überwiegend auf politischer Ebene statt, die meisten bilateralen Abkommen decken wirtschaftliche Themen ab. Der Außenhandel zwischen den einzelnen Ländern ist eher gering, es ist hier und z.B. in der Militärpolitik eine starke Abhängigkeit von den entwickelten Staaten zu beobachten. Im Hinblick auf die Mitgliedschaft in multilateralen Organisationen gibt es Unterschiede zwischen anglophonen und frankophonen Staaten. (DÜI-Wgm)

"This book probes key issues pertaining to Africa's relations with global actors. It provides a comprehensive trajectory of Africa's relations with key bilateral and major multilateral actors, assessing how the Cold War affected the African state systems' political policies, its economies, and its security. Taken together, the essays in this volume provide a collective understanding of Africa's drive to improve the capacity of its state of global affairs, and assess whether it is in fact able to do so."--Back cover

Does democratization increase commitment to multilateral security? In this article, the author argues that democratic transitions increase the incentives of states to cooperate in multilateral security and that this is observable in the rate at which new democracies ratify international treaties of arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, and disarmament. New democrats, she asserts, seek a positive international reputation as an insurance mechanism against future regime reversals. By becoming "good citizens" of the global system, newly elected democratic leaders seek to expose potential conspirators to the possibility of diplomatic and economic sanctions if they were to attempt to reverse the transition. First, using original data on the ratification rates of 201 states for twenty major arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament treaties, the present study shows conclusively that new democracies outpace older democracies and all autocracies in committing to multilateral security. Second, the study empirically tests whether the swift ratification of security treaties works as a consolidation strategy and finds that, indeed, it does. That is, new democracies that commit to nonproliferation and arms control treaties are less likely to experience a regime reversal. (World Politics / SWP)

When will states receive concessions in multilateral negotiations? And on which issues are those concessions likely to be received? I highlight two factors that influence the likelihood a state will receive concessions on an issue in multilateral negotiations: (1) the degree to which the issues linked together in the negotiation are "differently valued" by the negotiating states, and (2) the costliness of states' "best alternative to a negotiated agreement" on each individual issue. The former creates the opportunity for an exchange of concessions; the latter creates the incentive for that exchange to occur. It is the interaction of having more differently valued issues on the table and having a more costly best alternative to a negotiated agreement on an issue that makes a state more likely to receive concessions on that issue. This argument stands in contrast to the standard negotiation literature, which has shown that having a more beneficial best alternative to a negotiated agreement will yield greater concessions. I argue that these contradictory assertions exist because there are two types of best alternatives to a negotiated agreement that must be taken into account – one at the negotiation level and those at the issue-specific level. The current literature has tended to focus on the former while I focus on the latter. I test my argument on an originally constructed dataset of concessions states received in the Uruguay Round trade negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. For each issue in the Round, I coded the costliness of each state's issue-specific best alternative to a negotiated agreement and the level of concessions it received on that issue. The results provide insights into the workings of multilateral negotiations.

Verhandlungen über ein globales Abkommen zur Verringerung des Risikos katastrophaler Klimaänderungen erregen von Zeit zu Zeit mediale Aufmerksamkeit. Das Scheitern des Kyoto-Protokolls und der Verhandlungen zu einem Post-Kyoto-Abkommen in Kopenhagen 2009 sind Beispiele für die Hindernisse auf dem Weg zu effektiven Klimaschutzabkommen. Die ökonomische Theorie zeigt, warum die Implementierung eines großen internationalen Vertragswerkes unwahrscheinlich ist. Abkommen zwischen einer geringen Anzahl von Staaten deren ökonomische Parameter (Faktorausstattung, Einkommensniveau- und Verteilung, internationale Nettoschuldenposition) gewisse Kriterien erfüllen, werden eher zu nachhaltigem Klimaschutz führen. In dieser Arbeit werden Modelle aus der politischen Ökonomik, der Spieltheorie und der Wohlfahrtsökonomik vorgestellt um diese Behauptung zu belegen. Die politische Ökonomik wird hier durch den Median-WählerInnen Ansatz repräsentiert. Danach zeigt sich, dass neben der Ausstattung eines Staates mit emissionsarmen/intensiven Produktionskapazitäten das durchschnittliche Einkommensniveau und die Einkommensverteilung von Relevanz sind. Die Spieltheorie fokussiert auf den öffentlichen Gut Charakter von Klimapolitik. Klimapolitik muss nicht in einem Gefangendilemma mit Nash-Gleichgewicht stecken bleiben. Abkommen zwischen einer begrenzten Anzahl von Staaten können zustande kommen und stabil sein. Der wohlfahrtsökonomische Ansatz fokussiert auf die ökonomische Interdependenz zwischen zwei großen offenen Ökonomien und arbeitet die Einflussfaktoren auf die Wohlfahrtseffekte unilateraler und multilateraler Klimapolitik heraus. Die Wohlfahrtsänderung einer strikteren Klimapolitik (=Reduktion der Emissionszertifikatsmenge) hängt von der internationalen Nettoschuldnerposition eines Landes, der dynamischen Effizienz der Weltwirtschaft und von der Klimaschutzpräferenz der Bevölkerung in den beiden hoch entwickelten Ökonomien ab. ; Negotiations for a global climate protection framework reach the media over and over again. The most famous examples for the failure of efficient contracts for climate protection are the Kyoto-Protocol and the negotiations for its successor in Copenhagen 2009. By reasoning over economic theory, the illustration of the impossibility of multinational conventions is the main objective of this thesis. Regional agreements with a limited number of participants and subject to certain economic conditions of the participants (factor endowment, income level and distribution, international debt position) are more likely to lead to a sustainable protection of world?s climate. Models of political economy, game theory and welfare economics will be used to elaborate on this claim. In case of the political economy the median-voter approach will be chosen. It will be shown, that besides the endowment of a country with emission intensive and clean production capacities, the average level of income and the distribution of income are important. By using game theory the public good character of climate policy and the problem of free-riding will be analysed. Climate policy does not necessarily end up with a Nash-equilibrium, where all states maximize their benefits individually. Stable treaties must have a limited number of signatories. The welfare economic approach focuses on the interdependence of two large, open economies exhibits welfare effects of unilateral and multilateral climate policy. The welfare change of a strict climate policy (=reduction of the amount of emission trading certificates) depends in both highly developed states on the international debt position of the state, the dynamic efficiency of the world economy and the preference of the population for climate protection. ; Tobias Haring ; Abweichender Titel laut Übersetzung der Verfasserin/des Verfassers ; Zsfassung in engl. Sprache ; Graz, Univ., Masterarb., 2010 ; (VLID)213616

Multilaterale internationale Abkommen haben in den letzten Jahrzehnten stark zugenommen. Doch wie genau laufen Verhandlungsprozesse zu solchen Konventionen ab? Was sind entscheidende Erfolgsfaktoren? Wie kann ein einzelner Verhandlungsteilnehmer am besten Einfluss nehmen? Das vorliegende Werk untersucht systematisch, wie multilaterale Verhandlungen am besten gesteuert werden können. Anhand von zwei komplexen internationalen Verhandlungen im Kontext der Vereinten Nationen werden entscheidende Erfolgsfaktoren untersucht und bewertet. Ein Leitfaden am Ende des Buches gibt Hinweise darauf, wie die Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeit von komplexen internationalen Verhandlungen gesteigert werden kann. Das Buch richtet sich insbesondere an Ministerialbeamte, Diplomaten und Vertreter von NGOs und internationalen Organisationen, die an Verhandlungen zu internationalen Vertragswerken beteiligt sind. Der Autor ist Jurist und Politikwissenschaftler und arbeitet als Unternehmensberater zu den Themen Kommunikation und Verhandlungen

MANY NEW SECURITY PROBLEMS HAVE EMERGED IN THE WAKE OF THE END OF THE COLD WAR. THIS PAPER EXAMINES BOTH THE NEW DEMANDS AND THE NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE MULTILATERAL MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. IT FOCUSES ON SEVERAL NEW SECURITY PROBLEMS, INCLUDING THE SPREAD OF DEADLY TECHNOLOGIES, THE BREAK-UP OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND ETHNIC DISPUTES--WHOSE EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT DEMANDS MULTILATERAL CO-OPERATION. IT SUGGESTS WHAT FACTORS WILL TEND TO FAVOR A NEW MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO THESE PROBLEMS, INCLUDING THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES THEREIN. IT CONTENDS THAT PAST CO-OPERATION ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROVIDES A VALUABLE AND ENCOURAGING MODEL OF NEW MULTILATERAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

"Die EU nimmt die Konsequenzen einer Aufhebung des Waffenembargos gegen China zu leicht. Die Ankündigung der EU, das vor 15 Jahren gegen China verhängte Rüstungsembargo aufheben zu wollen, hat weit reichende Konsequenzen für Sicherheit und Stabilität der Region. Eine wirkliche GASP ist bei diesem Thema noch lange nicht in Sicht, doch längst überfällig." (Autorenreferat)

This article examines institutionalized citizen involvement in the public sector labor relations pro cess, including (1) labor relations referenda, (2) sunshine bargaining, (3) trilateral bargaining, and (4) public hearings. It analyzes labor relations referenda and sunshine bargaining in depth, and gives summary evaluations of all four types of involvement.

Asymmetric growth in foreign policy dynamics and power posture between China and India at the regional level is the new contour of current Asian politics. One vital aspect of it is the multilateral power politics or engagement through which rising powers connect and integrate with regional vis-à-vis global conditions in order to contend and compete with each other's strategic interests and primacy. This Asian rendezvous is part and parcel of the rhetoric of liberalist sentiments, which realistically do not work in favor of the developing countries' relationships. The history of the China-India bilateral discourse suggests that. In today's context, the increasing multilateral engagement between the two countries is a potential medium for denying space and holding an edge over each other's priority of acquiring assorted global resources, forming an Asian and a global identity, and notably in securing respective national strategic objectives. Current foreign policy contours of both countries are quite different from the previous order and politics. The boundary will continue to be the fundamental problem in their bilateral discourse, while the Asian discourse of Sino-Indian multilateral politics will be decided by their competition and power rivalry in resources and identity. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

Defence diplomacy has gained attention in the past decades. Hence, Indonesia has also developed its defence diplomacy for achieving its strategic interests. In Indonesia's defence diplomacy, bilateral forms have dominated the practice of joint exercises with its defence partners. However, under the Yudhoyono administration in 2014, Indonesia hosted its first multilateral joint exercise, the Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo (MNEK), which aimed at facilitating multilateral engagement with greater international partners. This exercise was continued by the Widodo administration as a biannual event in the following years. Since this multilateral exercise has rarely been studied, this article attempts to qualitatively examine how this exercise has developed and contributed to Indonesia's multilateral defence diplomacy. To support the analysis, this article relies on a combination of documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews, including with numerous participants of past MNEK exercises in 2014, 2016, and 2018.