The Russian scientific community stills have interest in «Muslim brotherhood» movement. In particular, this interest is connected with the rejection of a number of organizations affiliated with «Muslim brotherhood» in the French Republic to sign the «Charter of Principles». It is known that the foreign press and Russian scientists have repeatedly noted the fact of the connection of some religious organizations in France with «Muslim brotherhood», but scientific literature in Russian pays insufficient attention to how this connection is implemented. In this paper, the author reveals some channels of interaction between the Islamic community of France and «Muslim brotherhood». In addition, the author will show how Muslim Brothers use «Muslims of France» (former «Union of Islamic Organizations of France») as the foremost propagators of their values and ideas. Including in the political space of the Fifth Republic.
The Great Arab Revolt of 2011 has moved swiftly from the peaceful overthrow of autocrats in the nation‐states of Tunisia and Egypt to brutal repression in the tribal societies of Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen.Meanwhile, the wired youth bulge of the Middle East that brought change is dissipating into an impotent diaspora while the organized interests of the old regimes and the once‐suppressed Islamists charge ahead to power. This section examines the revolt, the reaction and the power struggles in its aftermath.
As Syrian president Bashar al-Assad struggles to contend with a massive popular uprising, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) is poised to dominate whatever coalition of forces manages to unseat the Baathist regime. Though in many ways the Brotherhood's official political platform is a model of Islamist moderation and tolerance, it is less a window into the group's thinking than a reflection of its political tactics. Unlike its parent organization, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which often kept its ideological opponents at arm's length, the SMB has repeatedly forged alliances with secular dissident groups even as it secretly tried to negotiate a deal with the Assad regime to allow its return from exile. Since the moderation of its political platform over the past two decades has clearly been intended to facilitate this triangulation, it does not tell us much about the ultimate intentions of the Syrian Brotherhood. Adapted from the source document.
This paper highlights how the Muslim Brotherhood instrumentalized antisemitic conspiracies in its journal al-Daʻwa in its bid to strengthen its socio-political authority under Sadat. After discussing theoretical insights on conspiracy theories and (Muslim and Muslim Brotherhood) antisemitism, the paper zooms in on the return of the Muslim Brotherhood under Sadat, focusing on the movement's internal dynamics and its growing socio-political ambitions, followed by a content analysis of antisemitic conspiracy theories found in al-Daʻwa. The final part of the paper analyses the different dimensions and the functions of these antisemitic conspiracies for the movement. The paper concludes that through the antisemitic conspiracies, the Muslim Brotherhood has positioned itself as a religious, moral and political authority. Although al-Daʻwa promulgated classical (European) antisemitic conspiracies, these were utilized by the movement for purposes other than mere hatred and distrust of the Jews and Jewish–Muslim polemics.
"Since it became clear in March 2011 that free general elections would be held in Egypt, a month after the fall of Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood has been bent on a 'majority strategy'. This included a whole series of measures and developments, such as founding a political party, winning the general elections of November 2011 - January 2012, and the elections for the Majlis al-Shura elections of February 2012 and obtaining a dominant influence in the Constituent Assembly, which was appointed after the elections. But not only did it mean winning the elections in these democratic bodies, it also meant obtaining control over professional organizations that would delegate representatives to the Constituent Assembly, such as trade unions, professional syndicates, and other organizations belonging to civil society. This trend has been accelerated since Muhammad Mursi has become president in June 2012. Using his executive powers he has increased the power of the Muslim Brotherhood by dismissing and appointing high officials. The sacking of General Hussein Tantawi in August 2012, and the downgrading of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) was of course the most spectacular move, but the appointment of governors, newspaper editors, and other media have been means of extending the power of the Muslim Brotherhood. The detractors of the Brotherhood accuse the organization of willfully grabbing power at the expense of the activists who brought the revolution of 25 January about. They argue that during the transition phase, which ended with the referendum on the constitution on 15 December 2012, the institutions of the state should represent 'all currents and groups in Egypt'. Its defendants, on the other hand, argue that the Brotherhood has obtained a majority in parliament and then won the presidential elections and that movement therefore represents the 'will of the people' (iradat al-shab). The supporters of the previous regime are blocking the justified reforms that the Brotherhood is implementing in the name of the revolution. This contribution analyzes the 'majority strategy' of the Brotherhood and its inability to form coalitions (except with some sections of the Salafi movement) and break out of its isolation and appeal to a larger public. Does this stem from its previous history of persecution during the past 80 years and its suspicious nature as a semi-underground movement that has no experience in politics, or does it have its roots in the nature of the revolution which reached an impasse very early on and cannot be resolved without more heavy-handed measures? The contribution will include in its analysis the responses of other political players to the rise of the Brotherhood (Salafis, liberals, activists, split-offs of the Brotherhood, SCAF, judges, etc). It will also include an analysis of the way the Brotherhood looks at politics. Is it true that politics has become a separate field of activity that aims at finding solutions to concrete problems during the past thirty years, or is it simply an instrument to acquire power? The contribution is based on close (if intermittent) reading of Egyptian newspapers and weblogs over the past one and a half years." (author's abstract)
The Muslim Brotherhood is one of the oldest and most controversial Islamist movements to have emerged out of the Middle East. Cloaked in secrecy since its inception in 1928, it has presented a conundrum to many in the Middle East and the West who are highly suspicious of the movement and its goals. Drawing on interviews with key members of the Brotherhood, Alison Pargeter sheds light on the evolution of the movement and assesses the aims and strategies it has employed both in the Middle East and in Europe. The Brotherhood's relationship to violence and to the state, its attitudes towards democ
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The Muslim Brotherhood has achieved a level of influence nearly unimaginable before the Arab Spring. The Brotherhood was the resounding victor in Egypt's 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, and six months later, a leader of the group was elected president. Yet the implications of the Brotherhood's rising power for the future of democratic governance, peace, and stability in the region is open to dispute. Drawing on more than one hundred in-depth interviews as well as Arabic language sources not previously accessed by Western researchers, Carrie Rosefsky Wickham traces the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt from its founding in 1928 to the fall of Mubarak and the watershed elections of 2011-2012. Further, she compares the Brotherhood's trajectory with those of mainstream Islamist groups in Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco, revealing a wider pattern of change. Wickham highlights the internal divisions of such groups and explores the shifting balance of power among them. She shows that they are not proceeding along a linear path toward greater moderation. Rather, their course has been marked by profound tensions and contradictions, yielding hybrid agendas in which newly embraced themes of freedom and democracy coexist uneasily with illiberal concepts of Shari'a carried over from the past. Highlighting elements of movement continuity and change, and demonstrating that shifts in Islamist worldviews, goals, and strategies are not the result of a single strand of cause and effect, Wickham provides a systematic, fine-grained account of Islamist group evolution in Egypt and the wider Arab world
The article examines the reasons that prompted the governments and expert circles of many EU countries to pay increased attention in the past two years to the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood (BM) religious and political association within the EU. According to the author, this is due not only to the terrorist attacks of Islamists in France and Austria in 2020, but also to the manifestations of the growing influence of this category of Muslim organizations and groups on the social and political life of the countries of the Old World. The article focuses on the analysis of the means, methods and mechanisms characteristic of the groupings associated with the structures of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, on their differences from similar organizations in the Middle East. The author turns to the history of the emergence and growth of the influence of the «brothers» in Europe in order to more thoroughly examine the phenomenon of today: while the authority and influence of the BM are noticeably falling in the Arab countries, in the Old World the situation is different for the «brothers» – in many cases they manage to hide their Islamist essence under the cover of left, «progressive» rhetoric, which allows them to fit into the current political and ideological discourse in the host countries. However, with the aggravation of intercivilizational relations in Europe, BM groups are increasingly forced to leave their traditional «hiding places», publicly claiming the status of «defenders of discredited Muslims», but in fact trying to legalize their radical views and positions. The resulting scale of their presence and influence in European societies noticeably frightens the establishment and the population of these countries. The author comes to the conclusion that at the current stage, an aggravation of the confrontation between the political elites in the EU countries and the BM structures is inevitable
In: Sedgwick , M 2022 , Anticolonial Terrorism : Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood to 1954 . in C Dietze & C Verhoeven (eds) , The Oxford Handbook of the History of Terrorism . Oxford University Press , New York , Oxford Handbooks , pp. 419-438 . https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199858569.013.021
This chapter looks at the rise of anticolonial terrorism in Egypt, and especially at the role played by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. It argues that assassination became established among anticolonial nationalists in Egypt before the Brotherhood was founded and was then briefly practiced by the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood, however, generally preferred other varieties of violence, which it understood as jihad. Some of these were more obviously acts of political violence than others. The use of violence was never part of the Brotherhood's main strategy, however, and in the end it proved disastrous for them. They definitively abandoned terrorism in about 1968.
In: Orient: deutsche Zeitschrift für Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur des Orients = German journal for politics, economics and culture of the Middle East, Band 54, Heft 1, S. 21-29