Suchergebnisse

The 2015 Paris Agreement established a new logic for international climate governance: the pledge-and-review system. In 2009, the same idea had been proposed in the Copenhagen Accord, but was then forcefully rejected by the negotiation community. Explaining this turnaround, I analyze the role of the United States in the international climate negotiations, using Putnam's two-level game framework and Snidal's k-group theory. U.S. domestic politics imposed significant constraints on the terms of the Paris Agreement, contributing to the emergence of the new treaty architecture. Until 2015, U.S. negotiators were either unable or unwilling to bring the demands of political actors at the domestic and international levels in alignment. President Obama achieved this alignment in 2015 by creating international support for a treaty without legally binding obligations that could circumvent a Congressional ratification barrier. The latter required a surprising move: the proactive engagement of China despite the structural context of hegemonic transition.

Friederike Asche analysiert in "Equity and the Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement" Artikel 14 des Pariser Klimaabkommens aus einer ethischen Perspektive. Es wird gezeigt, warum alle Staaten - auch Entwicklungsländer - moralische Verantwortung in Bezug auf den Klimawandel tragen, warum diese Verantwortung aber in unterschiedlichen Abstufungen auftritt und so zu unterschiedlichen Konsequenzen für die staatlichen Akteure führt. Auf dieser Basis wird ein vereinfachtest, exemplarisches Modell entwickelt, wie Staaten im Rahmen der internationalen Klimaverhandlungen in Gruppen eingeteilt werden können, die auf moralischen Parametern beruhen. Anhand dessen lässt sich zeigen, wie der Prozess des Global Stocktakes so gestaltet werden könnte, dass er Gerechtigkeitsansprüchen genügt. Außerdem werden Lösungsvorschläge erarbeitet, wie mit Umsetzungs- und anderen Problemen dieses Entwurfs umgegangen werden kann.

The Paris Agreement has achieved one of two key necessary conditions for ultimate success – a broad base of participation among the countries of the world. But another key necessary condition has yet to be achieved – adequate collective ambition of the individual nationally determined contributions. How can the climate negotiators provide a structure that will include incentives to increase ambition over time? An important part of the answer can be international linkage of regional, national, and subnational policies, that is, formal recognition of emission reductions undertaken in another jurisdiction for the purpose of meeting a Party's own mitigation objectives. A central challenge is how to facilitate such linkage in the context of the very great heterogeneity that characterizes climate policies along five dimensions – type of policy instrument; level of government jurisdiction; status of that jurisdiction under the Paris Agreement; nature of the policy instrument's target; and the nature along several dimensions of each Party's Nationally Determined Contribution. We consider such heterogeneity among policies, and identify which linkages of various combinations of characteristics are feasible; of these, which are most promising; and what accounting mechanisms would make the operation of respective linkages consistent with the Paris Agreement.

Climate change has been at the center of economic and social discussion for some years. The passage of time has intensified this debate and reflection. A well-known relevant event in this domain was the signature of the Paris Agreement in 2014, and its subsequent enforcement by European Union (EU) member countries. This study examines if the climate change measures adopted by the Agreement had an impact on the electricity sector outside the EU28, seeking to assess whether there is international diversity in these markets or if they work uniformly at global level. The goal of this work is to study the behavior of spot electricity prices before and after the Agreement was signed by EU members, analyze its effect in terms of spot prices, and determine the conditions that lead to stability and non-stability. We examine the behavior of spot electricity prices in two different electricity markets: the US and Brazil. The study applies both qualitative methodologies, namely fsQCA, and quantitative methodology, in order to identify changes in the pattern of electricity price behavior with the advent of the Agreement. Arguably, regulatory theory still incorporates the effects of the emergence of global dynamics in the regulation process. However, what this article suggests is that changes in regulatory frameworks with global impact, even if exogenous to a specific market, can profoundly alter the dynamics of that market. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

The 2015 Paris Agreement was widely greeted with enthusiasm. We assess the short-term and long-term potential effectiveness of Paris. Concerning short-term effectiveness, we contend that while Paris scores high on participation, and reasonably high on the depth of the parties' commitments (ambition), its Achilles' heel will likely be compliance. Concerning long-term effectiveness, we argue that Paris does little to restructure states' incentives so as to avoid free riding. At worst, it might end up as a failure, much like Kyoto did. On the other hand, domestic and international norms could continue to develop in a direction that makes it more and more difficult for individuals, firms, and states alike to ignore the plea to limit and reduce their carbon footprints. Technological progress that gradually reduces abatement costs, combined with leadership by major emitters such as the United States, might further strengthen climate cooperation and enhance other countries' willingness to follow through. However, deep political polarization continues to represent a significant barrier to U.S. leadership on climate change.

In December 2015, 195 countries adopted a new global climate agreement in Paris. It provides an expanded regulatory framework and specifies the goals of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). A significant number of states including the U.S. are expected to ratify the Paris Agreement (PA) within the year. Industrialized nations have a strong obligation to keep up the momentum that was generated in Paris. If the European Union (EU) wants to maintain its leadership role, it should focus on two key tasks in 2016. First, it should speed up legislation to implement the climate and energy targets for 2030 adopted by the European Council, a political prerequisite for Member States' ratification of the PA. Second, it should expand and strengthen cooperation with the developing countries. For the immediate future, an increase in EU climate ambitions for 2030 or 2050 is not likely to become part of the political agenda. (author's abstract)

The UN Paris Agreement puts in place a legally binding mechanism to increase mitigation action over time. Countries put forward pledges called nationally determined contributions (NDC) whose impact is assessed in global stocktaking exercises. Subsequently, actions can then be strengthened in light of the Paris climate objective: Limiting global mean temperature increase to well below 2 °C and pursuing efforts to limit it further to 1.5 °C. However, pledged actions are currently described ambiguously and this complicates the global stocktaking exercise. Here, we systematically explore possible interpretations of NDC assumptions, and show that this results in estimated emissions for 2030 ranging from 47 to 63 GtCO2e yr-1. We show that this uncertainty has critical implications for the feasibility and cost to limit warming well below 2 °C and further to 1.5 °C. Countries are currently working towards clarifying the modalities of future NDCs. We identify salient avenues to reduce the overall uncertainty by about 10 percentage points through simple, technical clarifications regarding energy accounting rules. Remaining uncertainties depend to a large extent on politically valid choices about how NDCs are expressed, and therefore raise the importance of a thorough and robust process that keeps track of where emissions are heading over time.

Le rapport Stern de 2006 reflète l'urgence de la lutte contre le changement climatique. D'après l'Accord de Paris de 2015, 55 pays représentant 55 % des émissions de gaz à effet de serre prendront l'initiative pour traiter le problème du changement climatique. Cet accord est peut-être la meilleure chance d'inverser le changement climatique. L'Accord de Paris de 2015 met en œuvre des mesures différenciées, équitables, durables et légalement contraignantes pour atteindre ces objectifs. On peut espérer que cet accord est bien plus avancé que son prédécesseur, le Protocole de Kyoto. Ce dernier, entré en vigueur à partir de 2005, appelait la communauté internationale à réduire les émissions de gaz à effet de serre de 5,25 % par rapport à 1990. Cependant, un traité significatif devrait viser une réduction des émissions de 60 %. Cela signifie que les États-Unis, qui représentent environ 20 % des émissions globales de gaz à effet de serre, doivent jouer pleinement un rôle de leader pour valider cet accord.

The UN Paris Agreement puts in place a legally binding mechanism to increase mitigation action over time. Countries put forward pledges called nationally determined contributions (NDC) whose impact is assessed in global stocktaking exercises. Subsequently, actions can then be strengthened in light of the Paris climate objective: limiting global mean temperature increase to well below 2 °C and pursuing efforts to limit it further to 1.5 °C. However, pledged actions are currently described ambiguously and this complicates the global stocktaking exercise. Here, we systematically explore possible interpretations of NDC assumptions, and show that this results in estimated emissions for 2030 ranging from 47 to 63 GtCO2e yr−1. We show that this uncertainty has critical implications for the feasibility and cost to limit warming well below 2 °C and further to 1.5 °C. Countries are currently working towards clarifying the modalities of future NDCs. We identify salient avenues to reduce the overall uncertainty by about 10 percentage points through simple, technical clarifications regarding energy accounting rules. Remaining uncertainties depend to a large extent on politically valid choices about how NDCs are expressed, and therefore raise the importance of a thorough and robust process that keeps track of where emissions are heading over time.

The UN Paris Agreement puts in place a legally binding mechanism to increase mitigation action over time. Countries put forward pledges called nationally determined contributions (NDC) whose impact is assessed in global stocktaking exercises. Subsequently, actions can then be strengthened in light of the Paris climate objective: limiting global mean temperature increase to well below 2 °C and pursuing efforts to limit it further to 1.5 °C. However, pledged actions are currently described ambiguously and this complicates the global stocktaking exercise. Here, we systematically explore possible interpretations of NDC assumptions, and show that this results in estimated emissions for 2030 ranging from 47 to 63 GtCO2e yr−1. We show that this uncertainty has critical implications for the feasibility and cost to limit warming well below 2 °C and further to 1.5 °C. Countries are currently working towards clarifying the modalities of future NDCs. We identify salient avenues to reduce the overall uncertainty by about 10 percentage points through simple, technical clarifications regarding energy accounting rules. Remaining uncertainties depend to a large extent on politically valid choices about how NDCs are expressed, and therefore raise the importance of a thorough and robust process that keeps track of where emissions are heading over time.

The UN Paris Agreement puts in place a legally binding mechanism to increase mitigation action over time. Countries put forward pledges called nationally determined contributions (NDC) whose impact is assessed in global stocktaking exercises. Subsequently, actions can then be strengthened in light of the Paris climate objective: limiting global mean temperature increase to well below 2 °C and pursuing efforts to limit it further to 1.5 °C. However, pledged actions are currently described ambiguously and this complicates the global stocktaking exercise. Here, we systematically explore possible interpretations of NDC assumptions, and show that this results in estimated emissions for 2030 ranging from 47 to 63 GtCO2e yr−1. We show that this uncertainty has critical implications for the feasibility and cost to limit warming well below 2 °C and further to 1.5 °C. Countries are currently working towards clarifying the modalities of future NDCs. We identify salient avenues to reduce the overall uncertainty by about 10 percentage points through simple, technical clarifications regarding energy accounting rules. Remaining uncertainties depend to a large extent on politically valid choices about how NDCs are expressed, and therefore raise the importance of a thorough and robust process that keeps track of where emissions are heading over time.

The UN Paris Agreement puts in place a legally binding mechanism to increase mitigation action over time. Countries put forward pledges called nationally determined contributions (NDC) whose impact is assessed in global stocktaking exercises. Subsequently, actions can then be strengthened in light of the Paris climate objective: limiting global mean temperature increase to well below 2 °C and pursuing efforts to limit it further to 1.5 °C. However, pledged actions are currently described ambiguously and this complicates the global stocktaking exercise. Here, we systematically explore possible interpretations of NDC assumptions, and show that this results in estimated emissions for 2030 ranging from 47 to 63 GtCO2e yr−1. We show that this uncertainty has critical implications for the feasibility and cost to limit warming well below 2 °C and further to 1.5 °C. Countries are currently working towards clarifying the modalities of future NDCs. We identify salient avenues to reduce the overall uncertainty by about 10 percentage points through simple, technical clarifications regarding energy accounting rules. Remaining uncertainties depend to a large extent on politically valid choices about how NDCs are expressed, and therefore raise the importance of a thorough and robust process that keeps track of where emissions are heading over time. ; ISSN:2041-1723