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Public pension funds have gained greater prominence in recent years. Many are severely under-funded and collectively, state and local pension funds are several hundred billion dollars in the red. This book examines public pension funds from both the technical and policy perspectives. It provides a comprehensive discussion of fund management, detailing important technical materials needed to help readers understand the subject.

Good governance structures have become an issue of public interest, including public pension systems. This study assesses the pension funds governance in Tanzania, with a special focus on board of trustees' issues. The growing interest referred to, is partly because the quality and performance of the funds trustees determines the income flows to which members are entitled and promised, as well as any shortfalls thereof, that may require interventions. Our findings suggest that board of trustees play an important role for funds governance and hence performance. The pension fund structure and mechanisms in Tanzania uphold high standards. Yet, a major issue is that the board selection seems to be politically motivated and that the government claims most board seats, making conflicts of interest likely to occur repeatedly.

Public pension funds have gained prominence over the years. This book examines public pension funds from both the technical and policy perspectives. It provides a comprehensive discussion of fund management, detailing important technical materials needed to help readers understand the subject

A substantial portion of corporate shareholdings in the United States is held by pension funds that secure retirement benefits for broad segments of the workforce. A number of commentators have argued that the assets secured by these pension funds should be used to promote the creation of a more democratic and egalitarian economy. Specifically, pension assets could be invested in projects that are deemed socially worthwhile, wielded in strategic "corporate campaigns" against companies resisting unionization, or directed toward allowing workers to obtain control over their own companies. This program of employing pension assets in the pursuit of a more democratic economy – referred to by the author as "pension fund socialism " – is hindered by a number of obstacles arising both from within the structure of pension funds and from the larger legal, economic and political landscape. For instance, there are legitimate reasons to limit the risk pension funds carry, thus narrowing the range of investment opportunities open to the funds. Also restricting the potential of pension fund socialism are the conflicting interests among different sectors of the workforce, such as those existing between current employees and retirees. The author's thesis is that the prospects of pension fund socialism are substantial but not as bright as many proponents have suggested.

"This paper presents a dynamic model of a public pension fund's choice of portfolio risk. Optimal portfolio allocations are derived when pension fund management maximize the utility of wealth of a representative taxpayer or when pension fund management maximize their own utility of compensation. The model's implications are examined using annual data on the portfolio allocations and plan characteristics of 125 state pension funds over the 2000 to 2009 period. Consistent with agency behavior by public pension fund management, we find evidence that funds chose greater overall asset - liability portfolio risk following periods of relatively poor investment performance. In addition, pension plans that select a relatively high rate with which to discount their liabilities tend to choose riskier portfolios. Moreover, consistent with a desire to gamble for higher benefits, pension plans take more risk when they have greater representation by plan participants on their Boards of Trustees"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site