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Why is the descriptive (or numerical) representation of women in policy-making positions higher in some cities than in others? Despite a strong body of work on the descriptive representation of women in state government, research on the presence of women in municipal government is limited in empirical scope and theoretical development. This study is different. First, the authors employ an original data set of 239 cities with populations of 100,000 or more to update and extend the empirical reach of scholars' knowledge. Second, the authors develop and test hypotheses to explain how the urban political context affects women's descriptive representation. The analysis reveals that the election of women as council members and mayors are interdependent phenomena. The authors also find that political characteristics of local communities are consequential for predicting the presence of women as municipal policy makers—just as consequential as electoral structures and other institutional features.

Why is the descriptive (or numerical) representation of women in policy-making positions higher in some cities than in others? Despite a strong body of work on the descriptive representation of women in state government, research on the presence of women in municipal government is limited in empirical scope and theoretical development. This study is different. First, the authors employ an original data set of 239 cities with populations of 100,000 or more to update and extend the empirical reach of scholars' knowledge. Second, the authors develop and test hypotheses to explain how the urban political context affects women's descriptive representation. The analysis reveals that the election of women as council members and mayors are interdependent phenomena. The authors also find that political characteristics of local communities are consequential for predicting the presence of women as municipal policy makers-just as consequential as electoral structures and other institutional features. Adapted from the source document.

We assembled a large panel of project-level technical and financial data and country-level economic, institutional, political, and governance variables to assess the determinants of private financing of infrastructure in emerging markets and developing economies. Controlling for economic characteristics, we find that overall private participation of infrastructure financing increases with freedom from corruption, rule of law, quality of regulations, and decreases with court disputes. We provide plausible explanations of deviations from this pattern when data is disaggregated at the sectoral level. We also found that legal systems-types of democracy or dictatorship-do not play a role in whether the private sector invests in infrastructure. Our results do not vary when controlling for income inequality and across quartiles of experience, country wealth, and wealth per capita. The study shows that upstream "enabling" institutions, policies, and regulations and sector economics need to be addressed simultaneously to facilitate private infrastructure investment financing.

Efforts to replicate our study of the effects of politics on trade flows between the major powers have revealed that the computer program written to calculate the estimates produced errors in both the coefficients and the standard errors. Furthermore, these errors have some consequences for the results. In this brief corrigendum, we present corrected tables for our research note and a slightly modified interpretation of the results.Our study examined evidence to assess three arguments about how politics may affect trade. The first contends that positive political relations in a dyad result in higher levels of trade. This argument leads to two hypotheses: States in conflict will have a lower level of trade than those not in conflict, and trade will increase with the degree of common interests between a pair of states. The second argument concludes that democratic dyads will have a higher level of trade than other dyads. The third argument focuses on the security concerns of states and leads to the hypotheses that alliances will increase trade in a bipolar system but will have no effect in a multipolar system. We refer readers to the original article for a fuller statement of the logic of these arguments, their respective hypotheses, and a complete statement of our research design and operationalization of the variables (Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 1998).

This paper provides a review of recent developments in the theory and evidence of political determinants of budget deficits. Specifically, we discuss five areas, namely; political system, government fragmentation, ideology, budget procedure and political budget cycles. We also provide evidence of recent studies.