Suchergebnisse

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Outlines key concepts and practices of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in its efforts to maintain peace in the region; implications for the evolution of ARF institutions.

Discusses the sovereignty dispute over the Spratly Islands, and other maritime jurisdiction issues, and how they are viewed by experts and commentators; includes impact of an informal initiative to promote maritime cooperation. Suggests that focus on these disputes has prevented proper consideration of common interests in marine ecological protection, resource development, and other uses of the sea.

The continuing changing nature of conflict and violence in the past two decades ; coupled with a decrease in financial resources ; catapulted preventive diplomacy to the international community's security agenda. If originally the preventive diplomacy doctrine aimed at the short-term goal of preventing violence or conflict escalation ; today it has come to encompass tasks aimed at resolving the underlying issues that cause and fuel conflict. In parallel – promptly deployable and cost-effective – mediation has become a more and more sophisticated and increasingly deployed instrument of preventive diplomacy. However ; there is no consensus in the literature on how high-level mediation serves preventive diplomacy goals. The question of whether preventing conflict means to prevent the onset of (armed) violence in conflict ; or whether it makes sense to talk about violence prevention at later stages of the conflict's cycle ; permeates the evolution of the preventive diplomacy doctrine and literature and divides opinion in mediation literature. The following literature review aims to offer an understanding on how mediation works as a preventive diplomacy instrument by synthesizing the literature and bridging it with a contemporary understanding of the concept. It does so through a parallel review of the evolution of the concept of preventive diplomacy and its agenda and conflict mediation literary debates on mediation timing ; strategy and outcomes in conflict prevention. It concludes ; first ; that high-level mediation is better equipped and understood as an instrument of preventive ; rather than pre-emptive mediation ; and denotes that while the preventive diplomacy agenda has expanded ; mediation literature has tended to have a narrow view of the extent to which mediation can contribute to preventive diplomacy goals.

Ugglas, M. af: Conditions for successful presentive diplomacy. S. 11-32. Stoel, M. van der: The role of the CSCE High Commissioner on national minorities in CSCE preventive diplomacy. S.33-54. Höynck, W.: CSCE missions in the field as an instrument of preventive diplomacy. S. 55-72. Törnudd, K.: The role of the CSCE missions in preventive diplomacy: the case of Estonia. S. 73-86. Lahelma, T.: The role of the CSCE missions in preventive diplomacy: the case of Estonia (August 93-June94). S. 87-99. Rotfeld, A. D.: In search of a political settlement: the case of the conflict in Moldova. S.100-138. Napolitano, A.: Sanctions as a possible tool of preventive diplomacy. S. 139-157

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The track record of "preventive diplomacy" in the first years of the post-Cold War era is not particularly encouraging. Croatia, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, Tajikistan, "Kurdistan"—the list goes on to include over 90 armed conflicts since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the vast majority of which have been ethnic conflicts. Indeed, in the view of U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry, it is ethnic conflict that is driving "much of the need for military forces in the world today" (Defense Department 1994). Some have questioned whether the whole concept of preventive diplomacy is yet another false and misleading "alchemy for a new world order" (Stedman 1995). That it has been "oversold," its difficulties underestimated and its risks undervalued is a fair criticism. But to simply write it off would be to commit the mirror-image mistake of those too eager and uncritical in their embrace. Instead, in my view we need to proceed from three basic postulates: a) Preventive diplomacy is possible. b) Preventive diplomacy is difficult. c) Preventive diplomacy is necessary. The purpose of this paper is to develop and support these postulates as a step towards refining the concept of preventive diplomacy, de-reifying any remaining promises of panacea and otherwise moving from appealing idea to usable foreign policy strategies. After first developing a working definition for the term preventive diplomacy, I address each of the postulates, drawing both on theoretical-conceptual arguments and empirical evidence from recent major cases.