Suchergebnisse

Defends rational choice models in terms of philosophy of science, the usefulness of the rational actor assumption, and the application of rational choice models to the study of revolutions. (Abstract amended)

The rational-choice approach brings scientific deductive methods to bear on politics. Appropriate methods are derived from physics, when actors interact probabilistically but non-rationally, and from game theory when they interact rationally. Collective action problems occur in the provision of public goods. As policies are themselves public goods, this leads to the game-theoretic analysis of voting, bureaucracy and lobbies. It is inconsistent to believe that economic actors are basically self-interested but that political actors are not. Rather, one should treat people as equally (not necessarily wholly) self-interested in each sphere. The paradoxes of social choice are then shown to have important implications for political science.

▪ Abstract  Skepticism toward sociology has grown over recent years. The attention granted to rational choice theory (RCT) is, to a large extent, a reaction against this situation. Without doubt, RCT is a productive instrument, but it fails signally in explaining positive nontrivial beliefs as well as normative nonconsequential beliefs. RCT's failures are due to its move to use too narrow a definition of rationality. A model can be developed that combines the advantages of the RCT (mainly providing self-sufficient explanations), without falling victim to its shortcomings. This model is implicitly used in classical and modern sociological works that are considered to be illuminating and valid.

Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory, a book written by Donald Green and Ian Shapiro and published in 1994, excited much controversy among political scientists and promoted a dialogue among them that was printed in a double issue of the journal Critical Review in 1995. This new book reproduces thirteen essays from the journal written by senior scholars in the field, along with an introduction by the editor of the journal, Jeffrey Friedman, and a rejoinder to the essays by Green and Shapiro. The scholars-who include John Ferejohn, Morris P. Fiorina, Stanley Kelley, Jr., Robert E. Lane, Peter C. Ordeshook, Norman Schofield, and Kenneth A. Shepsle-criticize, agree with, or build on the issues raised by Green and Shapiros critique. Together the essays provide an interesting and accessible way of focusing on competing approaches to the study of politics and the social sciences

Authoritative rational choice theorists continue to argue that wide variants of rational choice theory should be regarded as the best starting-point to formulate theoretical hypotheses on the micro foundations of complex macro-level social dynamics. Building on recent writings on neo-classical rational choice theory, on behavioral economics and on cognitive psychology, the present article challenges this view and argues that: (1) neo-classical rational choice theory is an astonishingly malleable and powerful analytical device whose descriptive accuracy is nevertheless limited to a very specific class of choice settings; (2) the 'wide' sociological rational choice theory does not add anything original to the neo-classical framework on a conceptual level and it is also methodologically weaker; (3) at least four alternative action-oriented approaches that reject portrayal of actors as computational devices operating over probability distributions can be used to design sociological explanations that are descriptively accurate at the micro level.

Discusses varied opinions and debates about rational choice theory and methodology.

Contribution to a special journal issue entitled "Rational Choice Theory & Politics" (see related abstracts in SA 44:1). Although rational choice theory has enjoyed only modest predictive success, it provides a powerful explanatory mechanism for social processes involving strategic interaction among individuals, & it stimulates interesting empirical inquiries. Rather than present competing theories to compare against rational choice, Donald P. Green & Ian Shapiro (1984) have merely alluded to alternative explanatory variables, eg, culture, institutions, & social norms, without showing either how these factors can be incorporated into a more powerful theory, or how they are inconsistent with rational choice theory. It is likely that any eventual theory of the origin & maintenance of social institutions, norms, & values will have to reserve a central place for rational action. Adapted from the source document.

Drawing and building on the existing literature, this Element explores the interesting and challenging philosophical terrain where issues regarding cooperation, commitment, and control intersect. Section 1 discusses interpersonal and intrapersonal Prisoner's Dilemma situations, and the possibility of a set of unrestrained choices adding up in a way that is problematic relative to the concerns of the choosers involved. Section 2 focuses on the role of precommitment devices in rational choice. Section 3 considers the role of resoluteness in rational choice and action. And Section 4 delves into some related complications concerning the nature of actions and the nature of intentions.

Rational choice theory springs from the utilitarian premises that what is best for society is nothing but the sum of what is best for each individual, & that what is best for the individual is best understood by the individual himself. Modern research, however, has often found both these premises to be invalid: sometimes rational individual action leads to collectively irrational decisions; occasionally, individual preferences emerge out of irrational motives. Other theories of the relation between man & society, eg, the doctrines of paternalism & the general will, are analyzed. It is concluded that the present difficulties of rational choice theory can be attributed to its reluctance to integrate empirical knowledge of decision making. A new theory is needed that treats rulers as more independent of their voters than does rational choice theory, but as more bound than they are in practice. 47 References. HA

As stated elsewhere in this issue, we cannot claim to explain an institution's origin just by the functions it serves. In part, this may be because of the cognitive limitations of those actors who are instrumental in institutional formation & institutional change. But even more clearly, it is the case that rational instrumental choice does not imply functional institutions. Just as rational choice in a prisoner's dilemma may result in inefficient policies, rational choice by actors with conflicting preferences for institutions may result in institutions that are suboptimal. Examples of rational choice explanations of dysfunctional institutions are provided in the area of bureaucracy, regulation, healthcare, & budgeting. I argue that the paradoxes & impossibility results of rational choice theory offer the best insights currently available into the persistent inefficiencies of the world of politics. 34 References. Adapted from the source document.

Political marketing is a relatively new approach to analyzing political activity that draws on management marketing assumptions to describe political behavior. These assumptions are explicitly grounded in neoclassical economic assertions about behavior. In political science, these assumptions are utilized by orthodox rational choice theory. Thus, political marketing can be located within this perspective. Rational choice provides a series of analytic models through which ontological implications can be derived & predictions made. Yet, the political marketing approach seeks to build on orthodox rational choice accounts by introducing a normative element to this perspective, prescribing the internalization of these assumptions in order to achieve the desired objective. Further, this normative aspect claims that the adoption of marketing improves the democratic process. However, rational choice is an analytical "toolkit" that does not seek to make normative claims. Indeed, normative arguments are inconsistent with rational choice, which seeks to provide a scientific, value-free approach to political analysis; consequently, the analytical & normative aspects of political marketing need to be rendered explicit & such normative aspects challenged. 55 References. Adapted from the source document. COPIES ARE AVAILABLE FROM: HAWORTH DOCUMENT DELIVERY CENTER, The Haworth Press, Inc., 10 Alice Street, Binghamton, NY 13904-1580