Measuring the formal independence of regulatory agencies
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 19, Heft 2, S. 198-216
ISSN: 1350-1763
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In: Journal of European public policy, Band 19, Heft 2, S. 198-216
ISSN: 1350-1763
World Affairs Online
In: Public management review, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 313-331
ISSN: 1471-9045
In: European political science: EPS ; serving the political science community ; a journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 7, Heft 4, S. 453-459
ISSN: 1680-4333
Working from data of transnational depth and breadth, the author concludes that policy makers delegate in order to tighten the credibility of policy commitments and to tie the hands of future ministers who may have different preferences
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 46, Heft 2, S. 401
ISSN: 0022-3816
In: Public administration: an international quarterly, Band 87, Heft 2, S. 425-426
ISSN: 0033-3298
In: Swiss political science review, Band 20, Heft 3, S. 388-412
In: Journal of politics in Latin America, Band 2, Heft 1, S. 3-30
ISSN: 1868-4890
During the 1990s, a large number of regulatory agencies were created or reformed in different sectors in Latin American countries. Almost all included political delegation mechanisms, intended as formal rules to enhance credible commitments to time-consistent policies. In this paper, using an original data set of agencies' head tenure in the telecommunications and finance regulatory agencies, we discuss if these mechanisms worked as planned, and find a divergence between actual mandates and the formally established fixed terms, effected by means of systematic early resignations. Our findings reveal, however, some consistent patterns of behavior. Stronger legislative presidential power reduced effective delegation to some extent, and agencies' organizational strengths protected them from patronage. We also confirmed the existence of some significant differences be-tween the two sectors examined. Having slightly weaker delegation rules, delegation practices were also less effective in telecommunications than in financial services, contrary to expectations about credible commitments. (GIGA)
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In: Journal of politics in Latin America: JPLA, Band 2, Heft 1, S. 3-30
ISSN: 1866-802X
During the 1990s, a large number of regulatory agencies were created or reformed in different sectors in Latin American countries. Almost all included political delegation mechanisms, intended as formal rules to enhance credible commitments to time-consistent policies. In this paper, using an original data set of agencies' head tenure in the telecommunications & finance regulatory agencies, we discuss if these mechanisms worked as planned, & find a divergence between actual mandates & the formally established fixed terms, effected by means of systematic early resignations. Our findings reveal, however, some consistent patterns of behavior. Stronger legislative presidential power reduced effective delegation to some extent, & agencies' organizational strengths protected them from patron-age. We also confirmed the existence of some significant differences between the two sectors examined. Having slightly weaker delegation rules, delegation practices were also less effective in telecommunications than in financial services, contrary to expectations about credible commitments. Adapted from the source document.
In: Political studies review, Band 16, Heft 3, S. 172-183
ISSN: 1478-9302
The goal of this contribution is to discuss the application of the principal–agent framework to the study of interactions between elected politicians – the principal – and independent regulatory agencies – the agent. Through a review of recent research we suggest that the principal–agent framework, despite its parsimony and analytical leverage, requires considerable refinement to make sense of these relations. Indeed, evidence on the functioning of independent regulatory agencies shows that some of their key practices tend to deviate from expectations based on the principal–agent framework. First, principals do not necessarily seek to exert control over agencies. Second, relations which structure the principal–agent mechanics other than those with elected principals are decisive in shaping the behaviour of regulators. Third, agencies can acquire political power over time and eventually subvert the logic of delegation. It is time to recognise that these deviations should not be conceived as anomalies but rather as systemic features that characterise post-delegation relations between elected politicians and independent regulators.
A poster presentation regarding a comparison of approved indications between regulatory agencies. Introduction: Medicinal products are allowed on the market following approval by autonomous regulatory agencies which are tasked with their evaluation. Differences in evaluation practices during the registration of medicinal products are found in Europe and the United States of America which may lead to discrepancies in clinical guidelines, pricing policies, and drug use. Aims: To compare the differences in the indications of medicinal products authorised by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the US Food & Drug Administration using new molecular entity cardiology-related medicinal products as examples. ; N/A
BASE
In: Public administration and development: the international journal of management research and practice, Band 27, Heft 4, S. 319-332
ISSN: 1099-162X
AbstractThis article examines the autonomy of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in Turkey. It explores, first, the different factors that have led to the creation of IRAs and second, the legislative basis of their formal or de jure autonomy. Thereafter, the article assesses the extent to which this formal autonomy is really put in practice and how it is perceived by board members. The enquiry was conducted through a survey comprising interviews and a questionnaire applied to the same. It concludes that although formal autonomy is satisfactorily provided for by law, government tends to limit this autonomy through secondary legislation. Consequently, there are some constraints on the actual use of autonomy. Concerning de facto autonomy, survey findings show that boards are exposed to external and internal pressures and interference in their deliberations. Thus, the assumption that 'the greater the autonomy the more efficient the management' is questioned. The main sources of pressure on board members are from the regulated sectors themselves. These findings have an important bearing on democracy and the political–administrative interface, as it is confronted by market forces. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Between 1996 and 2002, the Brazilian government established independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) for electricity, telecommunications, oil, gas, and other infrastructure sectors as part of a very ambitious privatization program. Following the formulas advocated internationally, Brazilian IRAs have institutional guarantees of independence, such as fixed and staggered terms of office for commissioners, congressional approval of presidential nominations, and alternative sources of funds to ensure their financial autonomy. This Article analyzes the design of IRAs in Brazil and asks whether their institutional guarantees of independence were effective in insulating them from the political sphere. The Author's general conclusion is that these guarantees--typical of developed countries, especially the United States--failed to insulate Brazilian agencies. The Article indicates a number of episodes of political influence over agencies, and it applies detailed institutional analysis to explain what went wrong. The Brazilian experience illuminates the difficulties that many developing countries face in trying to realize the ideal of regulatory independence and the benefits that would supposedly flow from this. Thus, it might serve as a cautionary tale for policymakers and for developing countries contemplating similar reforms.
BASE
In: Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, Band 22, Heft 3, S. 449-472
ISSN: 1809-4538
ABSTRACT In this paper we model the process of regulatory agency design, focusing on the role of credibility. The government is constrained in the sense that it must create regulatory institutions that allow it to commit to not administratively expropriate investors. The model explains both the preference of the agency head chosen by the government as well as the optimal level of statutory control. We argue that in Brazil this trade-off between credibility and control of the agencies is key to understanding the specific regulatory institutions that have been chosen. Comparative static results are derived to examine how changes in some key variables affect the design of the agencies, providing us with a set of hypotheses for comparing the design of five different agencies created to regulate industries with very different characteristics. Although these agencies were initially created under very similar designs, they are expected to evolve in ways that accord with our theory.
In: Brazilian journal of political economy: Revista de economia política, Band 22, Heft 87, S. 65-88
ISSN: 0101-3157
This paper models the process of regulatory agency design, focusing on the role of credibility. The government is constrained in the sense that it must create regulatory institutions that allow it to commit to not administratively expropriate investors. The model explains both the preference of the agency head chosen by the government as well as the optimal level of statutory control. The authors argue that in Brazil this trade-off between credibility and control of the agencies is key to understanding the specific regulatory institutions that have been chosen. Comparative static results are derived to examine how changes in some key variables affect the design of the agencies, providing us with a set of hypotheses for comparing the design of five different agencies created to regulate industries with very different characteristics. Although these agencies were initially created under very similar designs, they are expected to evolve in ways that accord with the theory of the authors. (Rev Econ Polit/DÜI)
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