THE AUTHOR OF THIS ARTICLE DISCUSSES VARIOUS WAYS OF EVALUATING MEMBERS OF THE SENATE. EACH YEAR, THE AUTHOR POINTS OUT, VARIED INTEREST GROUPS RATE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. THESE RATINGS ARE PREFERENTIAL CHOICE DATA. APPLYING MULTIDIMENSIONAL UNFOLDING TO THE RATING OF U.S. SENATORS FOR 1969-1978 PRODUCES ONE COMMON EVALUATIVE DIMENSION THAT ACCOUNTS FOR 80 PERCENT OF THE VARIANCE.
ON 26 NOVEMBER 1981, THE AUSTRALIAN SENATE ENDORSED THE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PARLIAMENT'S APPROPRIATIONS AND STAFFING AND SPECIFICALLY RESOLVED THAT: (A) THE SENATE SHOULD ESTABLISH A STANDING COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE SENATE'S APPROPRIATIONS AND STAFFING; (B) THE ESTIMATES FOR THE SENATE, AS FINALLY AGREED TO BY SUCH STANDING COMMITTEE, BE SUBMITTED TO THE MINISTER FOR FINANCE FOR INCLUSION IN A SEPARATE PARLIAMENTARY APPROPRIATION BILL.
USING A NET TRANSFER DOMINANCE CRITERION, THE AUTHORS OF THIS ARTICLE INVESTIGATE THE RELATIVE VALUE OF VARIOUS SENATE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIPS OVER THE 80TH-91ST AND 95TH-100TH CONGRESSES. THREE ASPECTS OF THE RANKINGS STAND OUT. FIRST, THERE ARE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES OVER TIME. SECOND, COMMITTEES ARE EASILY DISTINGUISHED IN THE EARLY TIME PERIOD BUT HARD TO RANK IN LATER CONGRESSES. FINALLY, MORE AND MORE MEMBERS NOW GIVE UP COMMITTEE SEATS WITHOUT COMPENSATION. TWO EXPLANATORY THEORIES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED. "WEAK": THE ORTHODOX THEORY OF COMMITTEE POWER HOLDS IN THE SENATE, BUT THE DISTRIBUTION OF COMMITTEE POSITIONS HAS BECOME MORE EQUITABLE, SO THAT MEMBERS ARE LARGELY CONTENT WITH THEIR PORTFOLIOS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIPS. "STRONG": COMMITTEES IN THE SENATE ARE LARGELY IRRELEVANT, AT LEAST COMPARED TO THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN THE HOUSE. AT A MINIMUM, IT APPEARS THAT COMMITTEES IN THE SENATE DO NOT PROVIDE THE KIND OF CONGESTED, EXCLUDABLE BENEFITS TO MEMBERS THAT HOUSE MEMBERS RECEIVE.
SEVERAL EMPIRICAL STUDIES HAVE SUGGESTED THAT LEGISLATORS ENGAGE IN A SURPRISINGLY LARGE DEGREE OF ON-THE-JOB CONSUMPTION, OR IDEOLOGICAL BEHAVIOR. THESE FINDINGS CAST DOUBT ON THE HYPOTHESIS THAT LEGISLATORS CAN BE MODELLED AS THOUGH THEY SEEK TO MAXIMIZE POLITICAL SUPPORT. THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO DETERMINE WHETHER COMMONLY USED PROXIES FOR IDEOLOGY IN FACT REPRESENT BEHAVIOR TO WHICH VOTERS ARE AVERSE. THE RESULTS SHOW THAT LEGISLATORS WHO ENGAGE IN MORE OF THIS BEHAVIOR LOSE GENERAL-ELECTION SUPPORT WITHOUT GENERALLY RECEIVING COMPENSATING INCREASES IN PARTY-PRIMARY SUPPORT. A COROLLARY TO THIS RESULT IS THAT VOTERS PUNISH SHIRKING LEGISLATORS SIGNIFICANTLY.
THE CONCEPT OF FEDERALISM IS IMPORTANT IN POLITICAL SCIENCE; YET IT HAS PROVEN DIFFICULT TO CLARIFY AND TO USE IN EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. THIS ANALYSIS DEMONSTRATES THAT THE CONGRESSIONAL FEDERALISM SCORES REPORTED IN PUBLIUS ARE NOT UNIDIMENSIONAL AND THAT A BETTER MEASURE OF FEDERALISM CAN RESULT IN IMPROVED EXPLANATORY POWER OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD FEDERALISM. A PROCEDURE FOR CONSTRUCTING A BETTER MEASURE OF FEDERALISM IS SUGGESTED.
THE NEW YORK STATE SENATE'S RULES STRENGTHEN THE MAJORITY LEADER BY AUTHORIZING HIM TO DISPENSE POLITICAL BENEFITS AND CONTROL THE COURSE OF LEGISLATION. THERE ARE FOUR REASONS FOR THIS: THE NEW YORK POLITICAL CULTURE, THE COMPOSITION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES, THE LEVERAGE OF OTHER CAPITOL FORCES, AND THE LEEWAY OPENED BY LOOSE LAWS AND INATTENTIVE VOTERS. THE MAJORITY LEADER USES THIS POWER NOT TO DICTATE BUT TO BROKER. HE NEEDS SKILL AND SAVVY BECAUSE HE HAS TO SATISFY AN INTELLIGENT AND DEMANDING CONSTITUENCY. OBSERVERS DISAGREE ABOUT THE POLICY CONSEQUENCES.
LITTLE IS KNOWN ABOUT THE SENATORS WHO CHANGE THEIR VOTING POSITIONS DURING NORMAL POLITICAL TIMES, BUT IT IS GENERALLY ASSUMED THAT INCUMBENTS HAVE VERY STABLE VOTING RECORDS AND THAT VOTE CHANGES COME PRIMARILY FROM THE REPLACEMENT OF PERSONNEL. THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES HOW TURNOVER IS RELATED TO SENATE VOTING SHIFTS ON A VARIETY OF ISSUES. THE MAJORITY OF VOTE CHANGES COME FROM INCUMBENTS RATHER THAN FRESHMEN. FURTHER, THERE IS NO OVERALL DIFFERENCE IN THE PROPORTION OF VOTE CHANGES MADE BY PARTY TURNOVERS AND INTRAPARTY REPLACEMENTS.
THE U.S. SENATE PASSED ITS VERSION OF THE $291 BILLION NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FY1992 ON AUGUST 2, 1991, APPROVING SUBSTANTIALLY MORE MONEY FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FORCES THAN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HAD ALREADY APPROVED. WITH MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM ON THE B-2 BOMBER AND THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE, THE HOUSE AND SENATE HAVE SET THE STAGE FOR A SHOWDOWN.
