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Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis, there is an increased interest to understand how social inequalities, discrimination, and inclusion are related to the pandemic. Sub-Saharan Africa has been comparatively resilient regarding the number of cases and fatalities per capita. At the same time, the region has high rates of multiple inequalities. Socioeconomic inequalities could adversely affect the fight against COVID-19 by influencing people's access to healthcare and eroding confidence and trust in public health institutions. This work investigates the effects of education, gender, income, and political inequalities on COVID-19 in Sub-Saharan Africa. The study also explores a country case study from Ghana to complement the systematic regional analysis. We find that pre-existing income inequality, along with some other dimensions of inequality, may have contributed to higher infection and mortality rates of COVID-19. We recommend that in the shortterm governments should consider outcomes of inequality in their fight against COVID-19. In the medium and long-term, and for the effectiveness of measures to fight future outbreaks, governments should strive to reduce various forms of inequalities.

Inflationary performance in sub-Saharan Africa since 1996 is examined. Median inflation has tended to be higher than in other regions of the developing world, such as MENA and Latin America. Inflation is highly persistent and is higher in countries that are less politically stable, in those without hard-peg exchange rate regimes, and in those with larger fiscal deficits. Inflation has declined over time, at least at the upper end of the distribution. There is no evidence that commitment devices such as inflation targeting have reduced inflation, but in SSA the sample is confined to two countries. Inflation typically spikes after a devaluation, and is sensitive to supply-side shocks. Movements in the real price of oil and rice (but not maize) have significantly affected the inflation rate. In countries that are poor in oil and minerals and therefore more reliant on agriculture, output growth is negatively correlated with inflation, presumably because, when the harvest is good and agricultural output is high, the extra supply reduces food prices. Fiscal balances also display considerable persistence and are more favourable in resource-rich and politically stable countries and in those with hard-peg exchange rate regimes, and have improved over time.

ABSTRACTSince the early 1990s, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have established semi-autonomous revenue authorities (ARAs), organisationally distinct from ministries of finance, with some real operational autonomy, and with staff paid at rates substantially higher than those in comparable public sector jobs. This has been seen by some observers as a step to dilute the power of the central state executive. We demonstrate that this is a misreading of the story of revenue authorities in Africa. Both African governments and the international development agencies involved in the reforms see ARAs as a means of increasing central government revenues, and thus enlarging the authority of the (central) state. To date, there is little sign that the creation of revenue agencies has actually increased public revenues. It has, however, facilitated a range of reforms in the ways in which taxes are assessed and collected, and deflected pressures that might otherwise have emerged for substantial privatisation of tax collection.

This paper puts sub-Saharan Africa's economic development into perspective. While much did not go as hoped for at independence, much of the region has been on a more promising development trajectory since the mid-1990s, as we illustrate using growth, poverty, and human development indicators. We identify key weaknesses, including lack of structural transformation and the slow rate of employment growth. We refer to global shocks that have played a critical role in sub-Saharan Africa's economic performance alongside domestic events, policies, and governance. Finally, we discuss a set of critical challenges requiring effective management for sub-Saharan Africa to realize its considerable development potential.

Since early 1987, the Overseas Development Institute has been engaged on a major piece of research under the general title "Industrialization in sub-Saharan Africa", involving in-depth case studies of several African countries. The case study work falls into two distinct parts. First an analysis of the industrialisation process from the early 1960s to the mid-1980s, followed by discussion of the options for and possibilities of accelerated industrialisation in the late 1980s and 1990s. This working paper presents the first phase of the research for Cameroon

This paper puts sub-Saharan Africa's economic development into perspective. While much did not go as hoped for at independence, much of the region has been on a more promising development trajectory since the mid-1990s, as we illustrate using growth, poverty, and human development indicators. We identify key weaknesses, including lack of structural transformation and the slow rate of employment growth. We refer to global shocks that have played a critical role in sub-Saharan Africa's economic performance alongside domestic events, policies, and governance. Finally, we discuss a set of critical challenges requiring effective management for sub-Saharan Africa to realize its considerable development potential.

Military coups, leaders abolishing constitutional term limits, and violent conflicts undermining democratic governance have made headlines in sub-Saharan Africa in recent years. However, longitudinal data from key democracy indices and survey data from Afrobarometer reveal that the state of democracy in Africa is better than expected in certain regards. Democracy indices show a strong increase for sub-Saharan Africa since 1990. While only relatively few countries qualify as "democratic" and many more remain in the grey zone between democracy and autocracy, recent "backsliding" trends have not offset past gains. Although frequently dissatisfied with their leaders and with how democracy works, two-thirds of Africans support democracy while even bigger majorities reject authoritarian alternatives. Africans' support for it already makes an independent case for democracy. In addition, democracy also means freedom from oppression as well as the right to choose one's rulers. Democratic systems can manage conflicts peacefully and are arguably better for socio-economic development. Major threats to democracy include adverse socio-economic conditions, intergroup conflicts, a politicised military, and authoritarian-minded civilian leaders. External factors such as support for dictators, the influx of authoritarian ideologies and narratives, as well as increased external rivalries over "zones of influence" pose a special threat.

The extent of political corruption within sub-Saharan neopatrimonial states during the late 20th century is investigated. An overview of the causes, techniques, & effects of neopatrimonial corruption is presented. Although African nations have become economically liberalized & democratized, it is contended that incident rates of political corruption have not decreased. Rather, corrupt actions by public officials have actually increased. Moreover, African politics have become more criminalized since the early 1980s. Regional & international reactions to the increase of politically corrupt acts in sub-Saharan African are discussed. It is concluded that struggles against corruption will not succeed in such criminalized political systems; in addition, it is maintained that political corruption constitutes a repudiation of democratic processes. 101 References. J. W. Parker

This article examines an empirical anomaly. In most developing regions, poor democratic nations enroll more primary school students than their authoritarian counterparts. Regime type, however, cannot account for the wide variance in enrollment in Africa. This study demonstrates that colonial heritage is a good predictor of primary school enrollment for low-income countries in Africa. Additional analysis shows that colonization's impact on education has not diminished since independence. Rather, the initial differences in enrollment between the former French & British colonies have grown over time. The results hold important implications for the study of political institutions & their impact on economic development. Even after they no longer exist, political institutions can have substantial lingering effects on important developmental outcomes. 2 Tables, 3 Figures, 2 Appendixes, 34 References. Adapted from the source document.

Sub-Saharan Africa comprises 48 states at various stages of social, economic and political development. Despite the heterogeneity of these countries, the following general developments relating to statehood and governance in the past 15 years can at least be identified: Such pan-African initiatives as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU) have done away with the political taboo of interference in internal affairs; it is no longer an accepted justification for inaction. Since the early 1990s processes of political transformation have begun in many sub-Saharan African countries; regime change has occurred in many cases. Notwithstanding regression in Zimbabwe and Ethiopia, for example, Africa as a whole has become politically more open; the participation of the people in political processes through elections has increased. Political transformation has tended to have little effect effect on the accountability of regimes; many political systems continue to be characterized by neopatrimonialism. The policies and service delivery undertaken by African countries have been inadequate. This is true both of basic social and economic services and of governance in the security sphere. In many cases, state does not have a secure monopoly of power. Although there have been changes for the better, major governance deficits persist in almost all parts of the continent and require additional efforts by the African countries themselves. The expected economic results of improved governance are a long time coming for many citizens; in the long term this poses a threat to the stability of the continent. The scale of external support in the form of development aid has a major influence on the political structures and policy-making of the countries assisted. In many cases, governance structures are being weakened by external actors.

United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa provides an exploration of United Nations military intervention in Africa, from its beginnings in the Congo in 1960 to the new operations of the twenty-first century. The scene is set by an examination of the theoretical bases both of United Nations peacekeeping and of Africa's post-independence politics and international relations. The peacekeeping project in Africa is then described on a region by region basis - Central Africa, Southern Africa, West Africa, the Horn and Trans-Saharan Africa - with comparisons and contrasts within and between each part of Africa highlighted throughout. A number of key questions are considered: how have developments in the broader international system affected conflicts in Africa? what are the internal and external forces which have caused African states to 'fail' and 'collapse'? how have external powers 'used' UN Peacekeeping in pursuit of their own political agendas? what determines success and failure in African peacekeeping? are there African solutions to African problems which could supplant UN involvement? As well as providing an account of UN involvement, the book is concerned to explore the long historical origins of the African conflicts with which the UN has been engaged. Written in an engaging and accessible manner, United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa provides an invaluable examination of the complex issues surrounding UN interventions in Africa.

Although privatization has been a key feature of economic policy in Africa since the early 1990s its sequencing and intensity have varied from country to country, with donor leverage being an important determinant of the pace of implementation. However, although many privatization schemes were undertaken in response to donor demands for reduced government participation in business, the process soon achieved its own dynamics. The positive view of privatization suggests that it went ahead, in spite of domestic opposition, because politicians and bureaucrats perceived real benefits to themselves and their supporters. They could influence the sales to their own benefit, while, on the other hand, a more focused public sector improved service delivery. – privatization ; positive models ; normative models ; economic policy ; sub-Saharan experience

Purpose
– The purpose of this paper is to examine how the intakes of calories, proteins, and fats vary with income in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).


Design/methodology/approach
– Annual time series data for 43 countries covering 1975-2009 that yields a balanced panel was employed for analysis. Nutrient-income elasticities are estimated based on the aggregate Engel Curve framework, using a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) technique that is robust to autocorrelation.


Findings
– The estimated nutrient-income elasticities are small: a 10 percent increase in income will lead, respectively, to rises of about 0.73, 0.87, and 0.90 percent in calories, proteins, and fats intake; showing that policies that are aimed at eliminating malnutrition through only the growth of per capita income will have positive but limited impacts. The estimated aggregate Engel Curve and the non-parametric plots show that at higher income levels the relationship between income and nutrient intake is non-linear and diminished, suggesting a low likelihood for the manifestation of an obesity epidemic in SSA.


Originality/value
– This is the very study that attempts to look at the nutrition-income elasticities at cross-country level in SSA.