Search results

Targeting policy is treated as a marginal capping of seigniorage and government expenditures, respectively. Appropriate policies of stabilization might be performed by the government rather independently due to existence of a distorted and asymmetric financial market in a transition economy. Feasible strategies are represented as solutions to the Bellman equation in the optimal stopping problem for stochastic processes of budget expenditures and government borrowing on the open market. Respective options to stop spending and borrowing prescribe the optimal policy for budget expenditures as well as for seigniorage targeting. Implementation of such a policy is, in essence, an imposition of the call provisions on the government debt, the optimal value of which is equal to the value of the opportunity to borrow at the optimal point.

Abstract.  We present an analysis of how political factors may come into play in the equilibrium determination of inflation. We employ a standard overlapping generations model with heterogenous young‐age endowments, and a government that funds an exogenous spending via a combination of non‐distortionary income taxes and the inflation tax. Agents have access to two stores of value: fiat money and an inflation‐shielded, yet costly, asset. The model predicts that the relationship between elected reliance on the inflation tax (for revenue) and income inequality may be non‐monotonic. We find robust empirical backing for this hypothesis from a cross‐section of countries. JEL classification: E5, P16

This book analyzes the revenues from the creation of currency by a central government. Adopting an institutional perspective, it develops a general theory of seigniorage by identifying three monetary regimes in economic history and the history of economic thought: a commodity currency, a fiat currency and a credit currency regime. As such it provides a modern analytical framework to analyze the nature of revenues from the creation of currency and their optimal height, whether currency is issued by means of minting coins, by printing and spending paper notes, by crediting private entities, or combinations thereof. The results of this analysis stretch beyond the immediate topic. The book establishes a relationship between the theory of seigniorage and government debt, the theory of the interest rate, the optimal rate of inflation, or the effectiveness and inflationary limits of outright monetary transactions. Jens Reich studied economics and social sciences at Frankfurt University and at the New School for Social Research in New York. He received his PhD from Frankfurt University and has thaught at several Universities. He was, among others, Visiting Assistant Professor at Université Lumiere Lyon 2 (Minerve Program) and holds a lectureship at Frankfurt University. He published in several Journals and edited volumes, among others with Claudia M. Buch, Vice-President of the Deutsche Bundesbank. In 2014, he left the division for Financial Market and Financial Economics at the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) and joined the German Central Bank (Bundesbank) where he is currently Senior Economist in the Division for General Policy on Macroprudential Policy Issues in the Department for Financial Stability. He is founder and organizer of the sole PhD and Post-Doc colloquium for the history of economic thought in the German speaking area, which from 2017 onward is officially part of the Verein für Socialpolitik. His research focusses on monetary theory.

Governments usually do not admit they are causing inflation deliberately. They try to take advantage of this situation, promoting populist actions. They issue money to fund increasing spending on subsidies and transfers, causing strong increases in prices with the consequent welfare loss. Funding fiscal deficits by issuing money (seigniorage) allow us asking ourselves why governments use seigniorage when they know that this action leads to a higher inflation. In trying to find the answer, we should distinguish the role of economic institutions by comparing the Central Bank behavior. The main hypothesis in this paper is that in countries as Argentina, with an inflationary long story, the rate of inflation needed to sustain a given long run fiscal deficit is higher than in developed economies. We analyze the monetary policy in Argentina and stress possible differences with the policy applied in other emerging economies of the European Union, particularly Turkey. ; https://aaep.org.ar/anales/works/works2015/Descalzi_AAEP2015.pdf ; Fil: Descalzi, Ricardo Luis. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas; Argentina. ; Fil: Neder, Ángel Enrique. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas; Argentina. ; Economía, Econometría