Suchergebnisse

Models of international tax competition typically assume the existence of a benevolent government. This paper presents a model which integrates the view of government as source of inefficiency with an analysis of distorting taxes on capital investment, savings and labor income in a common theoretical framework. The model yields the conclusion that the effects of international tax coordination on the welfare of residents can be ambiguous because the costs of inefficient public good supply are lowered but wateful government consumption is increased. However, the above finding is derived when the residence-based capital tax is not available. In contrast, government use of taxes clearly is inefficient from the viewpoint of residents in the presence of residence-based capital taxation.

This paper develops an endogenous growth model where sustained growth is due to the introduction of a public input. Consumers derive utility from consumption, leisure and a public good. The public input and the public good are the flow of government expenditures. These expenditures are financed by means of income taxes. With these assumptions, it is shown that the dynamic equilibrium may exhibit local indeterminacy when the tax rate on the labour income is large. The tax structure that maximizes growth and the optimal tax structure are characterized and compared.

The consumption tax affects the consumer, but also affects the wealth of the producer because of the tax incidence effect. It affects cash flows from corporate investment, bears influence on capital budgeting choices on investment timing and financing and the respective agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors. In the context of irreversible investment, our model shows that consumption taxation delays investment and precipitates default. Furthermore, we find that the consumption tax has a negative effect on the agency costs of debt, the yield spreads and the optimal leverage ratio. Finally, the model also produces implications for governmental tax policy. ; peer-reviewed

We investigate the effect on municipality spending efficiency of a local property tax reform, which reduced in 2008 the upper limit of the property tax. We compute municipality efficiency scores via data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) from 2005 to 2011, and then we rely in a panel data set to estimate how the tax reform affected the efficiency scores. Results of the analysis show that average input efficiency scores declined from 0.575 before the tax reform to 0.488 after the tax reform. This change was transversal to municipalities that reduced the municipal property tax (IMI) and to the ones that maintained the tax rate. In addition, the IMI reform is linked to higher efficiency scores. In other words, the reduction in efficiency ends up being smaller for the municipalities that decreased the IMI tax rate. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

We investigate the effect on municipality spending efficiency of a local property tax reform, which reduced in 2008 the upper limit of the property tax. We compute municipality efficiency scores via data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) from 2005 to 2011, and then we rely in a panel data set to estimate how the tax reform affected the efficiency scores. Results of the analysis show that average input efficiency scores declined from 0.575 before the tax reform to 0.488 after the tax reform. This change was transversal to municipalities that reduced the municipal property tax (IMI) and to the ones that maintained the tax rate. In addition, the IMI reform is linked to higher efficiency scores. In other words, the reduction in efficiency ends up being smaller for the municipalities that decreased the IMI tax rate.