Suchergebnisse

Territorial disputes historically have been commonplace in the Transcaucasian region. Nagorno-Karabakh is a region legally recognised as a part of Azerbaijan, but has historically been disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan. It was an autonomous region during Soviet times, but fell within the administrative boundaries of the then Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh has operated de facto independently since 1992, when it declared independence. Azerbaijanis from regions bordering Nagorno-Karabakh were displaced from their homes in the 1990s. This created what some refer to a security buffer, but which constitute occupied territory. Azerbaijan seeks the return of all territories. For Karabakh Armenians any dispute settlement that would leave Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan is untenable, given security threats. The conflict is coloured by history, past injustices, and ideologies around identity. Despite decades of mediation attempts by the osce and others, the territory remains fervently disputed. Border skirmishes have been frequent since the 1990s. However, since September 2020 serious escalations in hostilities and violence in region risk a broader regional conflict and drawing in Turkey, Russia and Iran. The paper provides a historical exposition of factors underpinning the dispute, which are critical to understanding its context and ultimate resolution. It examines the claim to self-determination by the people of Nagorno-Karabakh from the perspective of international law. It addresses the interplay between conflicting norms of territorial integrity and self-determination. The paper reflects on questions of statehood, and on the emerging concept of remedial secession in cases of egregious human rights violations and where internal self-determination is denied, and their possible relevance to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.

Territory and foreign policy -- A brief international history of the nation-state -- Diaspora as foreign policy -- Geopolitics as foreign policy

Das Werk bietet eine grundlegende Analyse des Konfliktlösungspotentials des Völkerrechts. Mit Blick auf die gerichtliche Aufarbeitung der Krim-Annexion zeigt die Autorin dem Völkerrecht immanente Durchsetzungsdefizite auf und stellt die Folgefrage nach Lösungsansätzen in der bestehenden Systematik der Völkerrechtsordnung. Ein besonderer Fokus liegt auf der Analyse völkerrechtlicher Sanktionsregime, die als außergerichtlicher Durchsetzungsmechanismus im Spannungsverhältnis von Recht und Politik stehen. Die Autorin beleuchtet nicht nur einen hochaktuellen Konflikt, sondern ergründet die Zukunftsfähigkeit völkerrechtlicher Instrumente als Reaktion auf die Verletzung fundamentaler Grundnormen der internationalen Friedensordnung.

Japan occupied the Paracel and Spratly Islands in 1939 and annexed both islands into the administrative jurisdiction of Taiwan. After World War IJ, the troops of the Republic of China were responsible for receiving both of the islands upon the surrender of the Japanese army. On April 28, 1952, the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty was signed, with both treaties stipulating that Japan renounce the right, title and claim to the Paracel and Spratly Islands. According to the principle of uti possidetis and occupation, the Republic of China has had the priority right of occupation to hold the right of sovereignty to both islands since that critical date. (Issues Stud/GIGA)

The democratic and territorial peace arguments explain interstate peace via distinct mechanisms. Yet they can be integrated. I theoretically derive both the unique domains in which each argument might operate and the ways in which the two arguments might reinforce one another. An analysis of the period 1816–2001 demonstrates support for a more integrative approach. Within contiguous dyads, border settlement significantly reduces conflict, even for non-democratic dyads. Democratic dyads, however, experience no such effect in the absence of border settlement. Nonetheless, the democratic peace functions strongly in non-contiguous dyads, and even the most peaceful, contiguous dyads require both democracy and border settlement. Such findings offer a foundation for further theoretical development that integrates the two arguments.