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Many argue that balance of power theory is as applicable to the Third World as it is to other states. Without substantial modification, however, balance of power theory cannot explain Third World alignments, because it ignores key characteristics of Third World states that determine alignment. The author develops a theory, "omnibalancing," that is relevant to the Third World and that repairs these defects. Rather than balance of power's emphasis on states seeking to resist threats from other states, omnibalancing explains Third World alignments as a consequence of leaders seeking to counter internal and external threats to their rule. The superiority of omnibalancing over balance of power in making Third World alignments understandable is related to the Third World in general and to the alignment decisions of two key Third World states in particular. The author concludes by discussing why an understanding of the Third World, including Third World alignment, is central to the study of international relations.

The relationship between militarization and state formation in the West has been the subject of considerable scholarship,1 and there is thus some temptation to simply transfer concepts and arguments from that domain to the study of Third World militarization. Yet state formation dynamics in the two contexts were and are quite different, with important implications for the nature of national security threats. In the West threats tended to be external, rooted in anarchical competition between relatively equal states possessing domestic legitimacy, which meant that militarization could be understood primarily in terms of the political realist focus on security dilemmas and action-reaction dynamics. In contrast, Third World state formation has occurred in a largely dependent context in which relative external security contrasts with domestic insecurity.2 In this case the external environment, rather than being a source of threat, becomes a source of opportunities for elites lacking domestic legitimacy to gain support against internal security threats. In short, national security problems look very different in the First and Third Worlds because of different trajectories and contexts of state formation. Very different mechanisms may therefore account for militarization, suggesting the need for concepts and theories different than those that dominate security studies in the West.

THIS ESSAY PROVIDES AN EXPLORATION OF THE DYNAMICS OF STATE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA. IT IS NOTED THAT MOST OF THE THEORIES THAT ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN STATE FORMATION IN DEVELOPED SOCIETIES DO NOT FULLY HELP WITH THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. THIS DUE TO HISTORICAL, POLITICAL, CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES OF THE SOCIETIES CONCERNED. ANY DISCUSSION OF THE STATE IN THE THIRD WORLD THEREFORE, SHOULD NOT USE THE SAME YARDSTICK OF ASSESSMENT AS ADVANCED SOCIETIES. THE STATES IN THESE SOCIETIES ARE STILL IN GESTATION. THEY ARE INCOMPLETE AND LITTLE DIFFERENTIATED FROM CIVIL SOCIETY, THE FORMATION OF WHICH DEPENDS ON THE ACTION OF THE STATE. THE FORMATION OF STATES IN THE THIRD WORLD IS UNIQUELY COMPLICATED BY THE DISARTICULATING IMPACT OF DOMINATION EXERCISED BY THE CENTRE OF THE WORLD SYSTEM ON ITS PERIPHERY. THE COUNTRIES OF THE THIRD WORLD DO NOT HAVE THE ADVANTAGES CONFERRED BY THE HISTORICAL CIRCUMSTANCES ENJOYED BY WESTERN EUROPE WHEN 'THE MODERN STATE' WAS FIRST FORMED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE WORLD CAPITALIST SYSTEM.

This article reviews some recently published volumes on the subject of Third World security and, in the light of the analyses presented in these books, attempts to discuss a series of major issues in the field of Third World security studies. These include (1) the applicability of the concept of security as traditionally defined in the Western literature on international relations to Third World contexts; (2) the domestic variables affecting the security of Third World states; (3) the impact of international systemic factors on Third World security; (4) the effect of late-twentieth-century weapons technology on the security of Third World states; and (5) the relationship between the security and developmental concerns of Third World states. The author concludes that while international and technological factors have important effects on the security of Third World states, the major variables determining the degree of security enjoyed by such states at both the intrastate and interstate levels are related to the twin processes of state making and nation building that are at work simultaneously within Third World polities.

This book provides a feminist analytical perspective on the specific forms of resistance, organisation and negotiation by women in Third World States.

This study statistically examines the causes of variance in military expenditures as a percentage of Gross National Product for 63 Third World states from 1969-1978 using a pooled time-series analysis. A country's immediate external environment (its security web), its political process, and its degree of incorporation into and dependence on the world economy are analyzed as to their effect on its defense burden. The findings provide strong statistical evidence that a Third World country's immediate external environment has a significant impact on that country's military burden, thereby suggesting that a subsystemic level of analysis is needed in studying state military allocations.

THIS ANALYSIS SUGGESTS THAT REVOLUTIONARIES IN THE CONTEMPORARY THIRD WORLD ARE MOST LIKELY TO SUCCEED WHEN CIVIL SOCIETY AS A WHOLE CAN BE POLITICALLY MOBILIZED TO OPPOSE AN AUTONOMOUS AND NARROWLY BASED DIRECT COLONIAL REGIME OR A SULTANISTIC NEO-PATRIMONIAL REGIME. THIS HAS BEEN A CHARACTERISTIC, IN FACT, OF VIRTUALLY ALL THIRD WORLD STATES THAT HAVE BEEN TOPPLED BY REVOLUTIONS. IN CONTRAST, WHEN RADICALS CONFRONT A STATE WITH SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL CONNECTIONS-EVEN IF THE STATE IS AUTHORITARIAN AND ITS TIES ARE RESTRICTED TO THE MIDDLE AND UPPER CLASSES-THEN REVOLUTIONARY COALITION BUILDING BECOMES VERY DIFFICULT.

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